PhD Document - Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria

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CHAPTER 2. THE CASE OF SOCIAL ROBOTICS robustly every day. Prosopagnosia is another rare neurological disorder characterized by a specific inability to recognize faces [De Renzi, 1997]. As is the case in blindsight, patients with prosopagnosia show an ability to perceive and process the visual input of which they claim not to be aware. They see faces, though they can not recognize them. These patients are further evidence for the existence of unconscious processing. In linguistics something similar has also been observed. There is evidence that speak- ers unconsciously assign a structure in constituents to sequences of words. Besides, the rules that constitute knowledge of the language, i.e. the rules that enable us to produce gram- matically correct sentences, are unconscious [Chomsky, 1980]. On the other hand, studying knowledge representation, Bartlett was led to propose the concept of schemata: much of human knowledge consists of unconscious mental structures that capture the generic aspects of the world [Wilson and Keil, 1999]. Many other examples of conscious/unconscious dissociation have been encountered. Researchers have demonstrated that this dissociation is present in perception, artificial gram- mar learning, sequence learning, etc., see [Cleeremans, 2001] for descriptions of experiments. These findings suggest that the presence of unconscious influences on behaviour is pervasive. Some authors argue that newborns, unlike adults, perceive the world with every detail, and only with their growing do concepts appear [Snyder et al., 2004]. Infants have eidetic imagery, which tend to disappear as they grow. Experiments show that infants at 6 months can discriminate between monkey faces as well as between human faces, but not after 9 months. They also possess "absolute pitch" (the ability to identify or produce any given musical tone without the aid of any reference tone). Absolute pitch is very rare in adults, although all musical savants and many individuals with autism possess it. The same authors argue that metaconcepts are also developed. Details (or the concepts that constitute the metaconcepts) tend to fade into our unconscious. In the context of learning, the "conscious competence model" explains the process and stages of learning a new skill (or behaviour, ability, etc.) (see [Kirkpatrick, 1971]). We move through conscious/unconscious levels of learning: 1. Unconscious incompetence: we are incompetent and ignorant of it. 2. Conscious incompetence: we are incompetent but we can recognize our incompetence. 3. Conscious competence: learnings that develop more and more skill and understanding. 4. Unconscious competence: the skill becomes so practised that it enters the unconscious 16
CHAPTER 2. THE CASE OF SOCIAL ROBOTICS Property Conscious Unconscious Engaged by Novelty, emergencies, danger Repetition, expected events, safety Used in New circumstances Routine situations Capacity Tiny Huge Controls Volition Habits Persists for Tenths of seconds Decades (lifelong) Table 2.1: Properties of the cognitive conscious and the cognitive unconscious (taken from [Raskin, 2000]). parts of the brain. Common examples are driving, sports activities, typing, manual dexterity tasks, listening and communicating. It becomes possible for certain skills to be performed while doing something else, for example, knitting while reading a book. The person might now be able to teach others in the skill concerned, although after some time of being unconsciously competent the person might actually have difficulty in explaining exactly how they do it (the skill has become largely instinctual). Why are some mental processes unconscious? Unconscious mental processes are fast, allowing us to do things like riding a bicycle without having to think about how to control each of our movements (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2). Some authors contend that it is practice and habituation what makes details go unconscious [Baars, 1988, Mandler, 1984]. Only novel, informative inputs trigger conscious processing (or "mental attention", which is a scarce resource). When events are easily predictable, they are no longer conscious [Berlyne, 1960, Sokolov, 1963]. This actually constitutes an attractive theory of learning: we learn when we habituate to certain details or stimuli that appear repeatedly. As we habituate we have less and less conscious consideration for the stimuli (i.e. we put less mental attention to those redundancies). Being consciousness a scarce -limited- resource, this process would perfectly account for the progress of the individual that learning implies. This mechanism is very similar to the "chunking" technique used in the SOAR candidate unified theory of cognition, see [Newell, 1990]. Chunking allows an agent to identify and store the mental processes that consistently lead to a goal. Later, the agent does not engage in mental processing for that task, but it retrieves the stored pattern automatically. Chunking is meant to produce the "power of law of practice" that characterizes the improvements in human performance during practice. If practice and habituation is what makes details go unconscious, then social abilities should be relatively more unconscious, as they appear first in life and are always present in the acquisition of other abilities (recall that in Chapter 1 we saw that the Social Situ- 17
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CHAPTER 5. PERCEPTION Classify cues
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CHAPTER 5. PERCEPTION Figure 5.10:
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CHAPTER 5. PERCEPTION 5.3 Audio-Vis
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CHAPTER 5. PERCEPTION modules, inst
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CHAPTER 5. PERCEPTION each angle we
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CHAPTER 5. PERCEPTION hypothesis is
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CHAPTER 5. PERCEPTION M4.- Pattern
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CHAPTER 5. PERCEPTION nods and shak
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CHAPTER 5. PERCEPTION effect of thi
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CHAPTER 5. PERCEPTION effects of am
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CHAPTER 5. PERCEPTION image decreas
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CHAPTER 5. PERCEPTION with an incre
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CHAPTER 5. PERCEPTION However, we a
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CHAPTER 5. PERCEPTION where y0 is t
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CHAPTER 5. PERCEPTION be distinguis
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CHAPTER 5. PERCEPTION in the sense
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CHAPTER 5. PERCEPTION a) b) c) d) F
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CHAPTER 5. PERCEPTION the habituati
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Chapter 6 Action "CHRISTOF: We’ve
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CHAPTER 6. ACTION Expression: "Surp
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CHAPTER 6. ACTION 6.1.3 Implementat
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CHAPTER 6. ACTION Figure 6.3: Facia
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CHAPTER 6. ACTION c α error 0 o 0.
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CHAPTER 6. ACTION fear anger sorrow
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CHAPTER 6. ACTION However, we belie
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Chapter 7 Behaviour "A good name, l
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CHAPTER 7. BEHAVIOUR used defines t
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CHAPTER 7. BEHAVIOUR step environme
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CHAPTER 7. BEHAVIOUR Predicate Desc
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CHAPTER 7. BEHAVIOUR Action Descrip
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CHAPTER 7. BEHAVIOUR Name Action to
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CHAPTER 7. BEHAVIOUR ➔ Basic emot
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CHAPTER 7. BEHAVIOUR [Reilly, 1996]
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Chapter 8 Evaluation and Discussion
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CHAPTER 8. EVALUATION AND DISCUSSIO
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Chapter 9 Conclusions and Future Wo
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CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE W
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Appendix A CASIMIRO’s Phrase File
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APPENDIX A. CASIMIRO’S PHRASE FIL
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Bibliography [Adams et al., 2000] B
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BIBLIOGRAPHY [Bruce et al., 2001] A
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BIBLIOGRAPHY [Driscoll et al., 1998
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BIBLIOGRAPHY [Hernández et al., 20
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BIBLIOGRAPHY [Kjeldsen, 2001] R. Kj
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BIBLIOGRAPHY [Martin et al., 2000]
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BIBLIOGRAPHY [Oviatt, 2000] S. Ovia
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BIBLIOGRAPHY [Schulte et al., 1999]
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BIBLIOGRAPHY [Tyrrell, 1993] T. Tyr
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Index absolute pitch, 16 action sel
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INDEX proprioception, 39 prosopagno
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