LUXEMBOURG - Council of Europe

COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON TERRORISM (CODEXTER) 

CYBERTERRORISM – THE USE OF THE INTERNET FOR 

TERRORIST PURPOSES 

LUXEMBOURG 

For further information please see the Country 

profiles on counter-terrorism capacity at 

www.coe.int/gmt. 

Pour plus de renseignements, veuillez consulter 

les Profils nationaux sur la capacité de lutte 

contre le terrorisme: www.coe.int/gmt. 

Kapitel 1 

October 2007 www.coe.int/gmt 

www.coe.int/gmt 

A. National policy 

1. Is there a national policy regarding the analysis, detection, prosecution and prevention 

of cybercrime in general and the misuse of cyberspace for terrorist purposes in 

particular? If yes, please briefly describe it. 

Under a scheme of deployment of existing human and material resources to match the scale of the 

problem as observed in Luxembourg, a unit of the Grand-Ducal Criminal Investigation Department 

(Police Judiciaire), the "new technologies section", was specially assigned the task of cybercrime 

prevention. This unit’s principal activity consists in fighting this type of crime and supporting other 

police units less specialised in this respect. Some degree of prevention can also be achieved in so 

far as – once the police become acquainted with a new modus operandi – a public information 

campaign is carried out. However, as this unit’s activities are focused essentially on prosecution, it 

would not be correct to speak of an actual national policy on prevention. 

The misuse of cyberspace for terrorist purposes is not subject to specific control but is part of the 

general measures against terrorism in Luxembourg. The Criminal Investigation Department’s antiterrorist 

unit – in charge of the whole Grand Ducal police force’s action against terrorism – is also 

vested with authority for surveillance of the use of cyberspace, without it being possible to speak of 

proactive investigations in this field, as this concept is unknown in Luxembourg’s criminal 

procedure. 

B. Legal framework 

2. Does your national legislation criminalise the misuse of cyberspace for terrorist 

purposes, and 

a. are these offences specifically defined with regard to the terrorist nature or technical 

means of committing the crime, or 

b. is the misuse covered by other, non-specific criminal offences? 

How are these offences defined and which sanctions (criminal, administrative, civil) are 

attached? 

Acts of terrorism and membership of a terrorist group constitute criminal offences under the terms 

of the law of 12 August 2003 punishing terrorism and the financing thereof, as this statute 

incorporated Articles 135-1 to 135-8 into the Luxembourg Penal Code. These offences are defined 

in general terms in so far as the technical or material resources used for committing them are 

immaterial. These provisions define an act of terrorism as an offence which, owing to its nature or 

context, can be seriously damaging to a country or an international organisation or body, and has 

been deliberately committed in order to: 

- gravely intimidate a population, 

- improperly compel the public authorities or an international organisation or body to perform or 

refrain from any act, or

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- severely destabilise or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social 

structures a country or an international organisation or body. 

A further requirement is that this "basic offence" should be punishable by a prison sentence or 

heavier custodial penalty of at least three years’ maximum duration. 

In addition, Luxembourg’s criminal law contemplates certain other offences in the data processing 

field (Articles 509-1 to 509-7 of the Penal Code). Some of these offences – such as tampering with 

a computer system – are liable to penalties that fulfil the criteria of the basic offence under the 

antiterrorist provisions, and may thus be regarded as acts of terrorism. 

The provisions criminalising terrorist acts are formulated as follows: 

Chapter III-1.- On terrorism. 

(L. 12 August 2003) 

Article 135-1. (L. 12 August 2003) 

Any crime or offence punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of three years or more, 

or by a heavier penalty, shall constitute an act of terrorism where its nature or context is such 

that it may do serious harm to a country or an international organisation or body and has been 

deliberately committed in order to: 

- gravely intimidate a population, 

- improperly compel the public authorities or an international organisation or body to 

perform or refrain from any act, or 

- severely destabilise or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social 

structures a country or an international organisation or body. 


Perpetrators of an act of terrorism as provided above shall be punished by fifteen to twenty 

years’ imprisonment. 

They shall be imprisoned for life where the act has caused one or more fatalities. 


A terrorist group is constituted by an organised association of more than two persons lastingly 

established in order to commit, in a concerted manner, one or more of the acts of terrorism 

referred to in Articles 135-1 and 135-2. 


(1) Anyone who intentionally and wittingly is an active member of a terrorist group shall be 

punished by one to eight years’ imprisonment and a fine of 2 500 to 12 500 euros, or by one of 

these penalties alone, even if not intending to commit an offence within that group or to 

associate with it as principal or accomplice. 

(2) Anyone who participates in preparing or carrying out any lawful activity of the aforesaid 

terrorist group in the knowledge that his or her participation furthers its aims as defined above 

shall be punished by one to eight years’ imprisonment and/or a fine of 2 500 to 12 500 euros. 

(3) Anyone who participates in any decision-making in connection with the activities of a 

terrorist group in the knowledge that his or her participation furthers its aims as defined above 

shall be punished by five to ten years’ imprisonment and/or a fine of 12 500 to 25 000 euros. 

(4) Any leader of a terrorist group shall be punished by ten to fifteen years’ imprisonment 

and/or a fine of 25 000 to 50 000 euros.

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(5) Where acts referred to in paragraphs 1 to 4 above occur within the national territory, the 

culprits shall be prosecuted in accordance with the law of Luxembourg irrespective of where 

the terrorist group is based or engages in its activities. 


It constitutes an act of financing terrorism to provide or to raise by any means whatsoever, 

whether directly or indirectly, illegally and intentionally, funds, assets or wealth of any kind with 

the intention or in the knowledge that they will be wholly or partially used to commit one or 

more of the offences provided for in Articles 135-1 to 135-4 and 442-1, even if they have not 

actually been used to commit one of these offences. 


Persons who have committed an act of financing terrorism as provided above shall incur the 

same penalties as are prescribed by Articles 135-1 to 135-4 and 442-1, and according to the 

distinctions drawn therein. 


Exemption from punishment shall apply to persons who, before any attempt to commit 

offences defined in Articles 135-1, 135-2, 135-5 and 135-6 and before any proceedings have 

been instituted, disclose to the authorities that acts are afoot to prepare for the commission of 

offences defined under the aforementioned provisions, or the identities of the perpetrators of 

such acts. 

In the same cases, the severe prison sentences applicable shall be reduced in the proportions 

determined by Article 52 and according to the scale prescribed therein for persons who, after 

proceedings are instituted, disclose to the authorities the identities of hitherto unidentified 

culprits. 


Exemption from punishment shall apply to persons guilty of participating in a terrorist group 

who, before any attempt to commit acts of terrorism for which the group exists and before any 

proceedings have been instituted, disclose to the authorities the existence of that group and 

the names of its principal or subordinate leaders. 

Common provision in respect of this title. 

Article 136. 

Exemption from the penalties for offences of conspiracy punishable under the terms of this title 

and for the offences prescribed in Article 111 shall apply to culprits who, before any attack and 

before any proceedings are instituted, inform the authorities of such conspiracies or offences, 

and of the perpetrators thereof or accomplices therein. 

In addition, the definitions of offences relating to computer crimes under the Penal Code provide as 

follows:

Section VII.4 – On offences in the field of data processing. 

(L. 15 July 1993) 


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Anyone who has fraudulently gained or maintained access to all or part of an automated data 

processing or transmission system shall be punished by two months to two years of 

imprisonment and/or a fine of 500 to 25 000 euros. 

When this access results in the deletion or alteration of data contained in the system, or in 

impairment of its operation, the term of imprisonment shall be four months to two years and 

the fine 1 250 to 25 000 euros. 

Article 509-2. (L. 15 July 1993) 

Anyone who deliberately or in contempt of the rights of others has impeded or tampered with 

the operation of an automated data processing or transmission system shall be punished by 

three months to three years of imprisonment and/or a fine of 1 250 to 12 500 euros. 


Anyone who deliberately or in contempt of the rights of others has directly or indirectly fed data 

into an automated processing or transmission system or deleted or altered the data which it 

contains or the methods of processing or transmitting such data shall be punished by three 

months to three years of imprisonment and/or a fine of 1 250 to 12 500 euros. 

Article 509-4. (L. 10 November 2006) 

Where, in the cases contemplated in Articles 509-1 to 509-3, money or monetary value has 

been transferred so as to cause a third party a loss of possession with the aim of securing an 

economic advantage to the person committing the offence or to any other person, the penalty 

incurred shall be four months to five years of imprisonment and a fine of 1 250 to 30 000 

euros. 

The same penalties shall apply to persons who have produced, received, procured, held, sold 

or transferred to a third party software intended to make an offence referred to in the foregoing 

sub-paragraph materially possible. 

Article 509-5. Repealed (L. 14 August 2000). 

Article 509-6. (L. 15 July 1993) 

An attempt to commit the offences provided for in Articles 509-1 to 509-5 shall be punishable 

by the same penalties as an actual offence. 

Article 509-7. (L. 15 July 1993) 

Anyone who has participated in an association or conspiracy formed for the preparation, 

effected by one or more material acts, of one or more offences prescribed by Articles 509-1 to 

509-5 shall incur the penalties prescribed for the actual offence or for the most severely 

punished of the potential offences. 

3. Do you plan to introduce new legislation to counter terrorist misuse of cyberspace? 

What are the basic concepts of these legislative initiatives? 

At the present stage it is not planned to adopt new statutory provisions, particularly because the 

cases met with in practice have not revealed any legislative deficiencies.

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4. What are the existing national practices in the field of detecting, monitoring and closing 

down websites used for illicit, in particular, terrorist purposes and what kind of national 

procedures allow the blocking of access to web sites or pages considered illicit? 

As regards the detection and monitoring aspect, reference is made to the reply to question 1. 

It is possible to close down websites based in Luxembourg if the publications posted on them 

constitute criminal offences. Closure is the measure designed to put an end to the offence. Closure 

is thus possible during the phase of court investigation on the investigating judge’s order. 

If the site is located abroad, a request for judicial assistance must be made by Luxembourg, and 

the outcome depends on the decisions taken by the competent authorities of the requested 

country. 

Where Luxembourg is the requested country, it suffices that the offence charged also constitutes 

an offence under the law of Luxembourg. 

5. What are the existing national practices in the field of interception of, or infiltration to, 

the electronic correspondence (e.g. e-mail, forum, instantaneous message service, 

voice over IP -skype, etc). 

National practices are determined by law (Code of Criminal Investigation), the relevant excerpt 

from which is reproduced below, at the end of this reply. From a statutory standpoint, Luxembourg 

has an instrument suited to present-day technical possibilities. It is self-evident that in practice, the 

police – and the State intelligence service as the case may be – are faced with the same technical 

problems as the corresponding departments of other states, in particular the rapid development of 

technology, efficient encoding tools, etc. 

Section VIII. - Special surveillance measures. 


The investigating judge may, as an exceptional measure and by a decision expressly 

substantiated according to the facts of the case and with reference to the conditions stated 

below, order the use of technical devices for surveillance and monitoring of all forms of 

communication, if: 

a) the criminal proceedings concern an act of particular gravity carrying a maximum criminal 

sentence of two years or more of imprisonment, and if 

b) established facts bring the person subject to surveillance under suspicion either of having 

committed or participated in the offence, or of receiving or sending information intended 

for or originating from the person charged with or suspected of the offence; and if 

c) the ordinary methods of investigation prove ineffective owing to the nature of the facts and 

the special circumstances of the case. 

The measures ordered shall be lifted once they are no longer necessary. They shall cease 

automatically one month after the date of the order. They are nevertheless subject to 

extensions of one month each, although the total duration may not exceed one year, by 

reasoned order of the investigating judge, approved by the presiding judge of the chamber of 

the court of appeal who is to rule within two days after receiving the order, the state counsel 

general’s submissions having been heard. 

These measures cannot be ordered in respect of a person charged after his or her first 

interview with the investigating judge, and any such measures ordered earlier shall 

automatically cease to operate at that date. 

These measures cannot be ordered in respect of a person who is bound by professional 

secrecy within the meaning of Article 458 of the Penal Code, unless personally suspected of 

having committed or abetted the offence.

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The state counsel general may in all cases object to the orders of the investigating judge. The 

objection shall be made within two days after the date of the order. It shall be brought before 

the presiding judge of the chamber of the court of appeal who is to rule within two days after 

receiving the order, the state counsel general’s submissions having been heard. 

Article 88-2. (L. 30 May 2005) 

Decisions by which the investigating judge or the presiding judge of the chamber of the court 

of appeal have ordered surveillance and monitoring of telecommunications and postal 

correspondence shall be notified to the operators of the post and telecommunications services 

who shall carry them out forthwith. 

(L. 30 May 2005) These decisions and the action taken on them shall be recorded in a special 

register kept by each operator of post and telecommunications services. 

(L. 30 May 2005) Recorded telecommunications and correspondence, together with data or 

information obtained by the use of other technical surveillance and monitoring devices under 

Article 88-1, shall be handed over, with seals affixed and in return for a receipt, to the 

investigating judge who shall draw up a record of their delivery. The judge shall have copies 

made of all correspondence which may serve as prosecution or defence evidence, and file the 

copies, the recordings and all other data and information received. The judge shall send back 

any written correspondence whose seizure is not deemed expedient to the postal service 

providers, who shall deliver them promptly to the addressees. 

(L. 7 July 1989) Where the measures of surveillance and monitoring of communications 

ordered under Article 88-1 have had no result, the copies, recordings and all other data and 

information on file shall be destroyed by the investigating judge not later than twelve months 

after the order to discontinue the surveillance measures. Where the investigating judge 

considers that these copies or recordings, or the data or information received, may be of use 

for further investigation, he/she shall direct that they be kept on file by an order reasoned 

according to the facts of the case. The state counsel general and the person whose 

correspondence or telecommunications have been placed under surveillance, notified in 

accordance with sub-paragraph 6 below, may challenge the relevant order subject to the 

conditions stated in the last indent of Article 88-1. When the measures for surveillance and 

monitoring of communications ordered under Article 88-1 have led to a decision which has 

acquired res judicata force to discharge, acquit or convict the person charged, the copies and 

recordings together with all other data and information shall be destroyed by the state counsel 

general or the state prosecutor within one month after the date on which the court decision 

acquires res judicata force. 

(L. 30 May 2005) Communications with persons bound by professional secrecy within the 

meaning of Article 458 of the Penal Code, not suspected of having personally committed or 

abetted the offence, cannot be used. Recordings and transcriptions of them shall be destroyed 

forthwith by the investigating judge. 

(L. 7 July 1989) A person whose correspondence or telecommunications have been placed 

under surveillance shall be informed of the measure ordered not later than twelve months after 

the termination of the aforesaid measure. 

(L. 26 November 1982) After the first interview with the investigating judge, the person 

charged and the defence counsel may receive disclosure of the telecommunications recorded, 

the correspondence and all other data and information placed in the file. 

(L. 26 November 1982) The person charged and the defence counsel are entitled to have the 

recordings reproduced in the presence of a judicial police officer (Police Judiciaire).


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The President of the Government may, with the assent of a commission consisting of the 

presiding judges of the Supreme Court of Justice, the Administrative Court and the 

Luxembourg District Court, order the surveillance and monitoring, using appropriate technical 

devices, of all forms of communication for the purpose of detecting breaches of the State’s 

external security which one or more culprits are attempting to commit or have committed or 

attempted to commit, if the ordinary methods of investigation prove ineffective owing to the 

nature of the facts and the special circumstances of the case. 

(L. 7 November 1996; L. 8 June 1999; L. 15 June 2004) In urgent cases, the President of the 

Government may on his/her own authority order the surveillance and monitoring referred to in 

the foregoing sub-paragraph, but shall diligently consult the commission provided for therein, 

which shall decide whether or not the surveillance and monitoring should be maintained. 

Surveillance and monitoring shall cease immediately the required information has been 

obtained, and not later than three months after the date on which the measures were ordered. 

Surveillance and monitoring may, with the assent of the commission, be ordered by the 

President of the Government for a further period of three months. The decision of the 

President of the Government shall be renewable at intervals of three months on the same 

terms. 

Should any member of the commission be unavailable, the presiding judge of the Supreme of 

Court of Justice shall be replaced by a member of the Court of Cassation and the presiding 

judges of the Administrative Court and of the Luxembourg District Court by a member of the 

Council of State’s litigation board. 

Article 88-4. (L. 30 May 2005) 

Decisions whereby the President of the Government has ordered surveillance and monitoring 

of telecommunications and correspondence shall be notified to the post and 

telecommunications service operators, who shall carry them out forthwith. 

(L. 26 November 1982) Surveillance and monitoring of telecommunications shall be performed 

by the intelligence service instituted by the law of 30 July 1960 concerning the guarding of 

secrets affecting the external security of the State. 

(L. 26 November 1982) Communications with persons bound by professional secrecy within 

the meaning of Article 458 of the Penal Code and not personally suspected of attempting to 

commit or of having committed or attempted to commit the offence as principal or accomplice 

may not be used. Recordings and transcriptions of such communications shall be immediately 

destroyed by the head of the intelligence service. 

(L. 30 May 2005) Correspondence shall be handed over with seals affixed and in return for a 

receipt to the intelligence service. The head of the intelligence service shall have photocopies 

made of correspondence which may serve as prosecution or defence evidence and shall send 

back any written correspondence whose retention is not deemed expedient to the post and 

telecommunications service operators, who shall have it delivered to the addressee. 

(L. 26 November 1982) Where the measures of surveillance and monitoring of 

communications implemented under Article 88-3 have had no result, the copies, recordings 

and all other data and information obtained shall be destroyed by the head of the intelligence 

service. 

Where these copies, recordings, data or information may be of use for further investigation, 

destruction shall take place by the time prosecution becomes subject to limitation.

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6. Does your national legislation provide criteria for establishing jurisdiction over the 

misuse of cyberspace for terrorist purposes? What are those criteria? 

Jurisdiction is apportioned by Luxembourg’s judicial organisation in two judicial districts, 

Luxembourg and Diekirch. However, where terrorism and money laundering are concerned, the 

legislator (Article 26 (2) of the Code of Criminal Investigation) has consolidated judicial authority 

around the judicial district of Luxembourg. The criterion for establishing jurisdiction is thus the 

nature of the offence irrespective of the seriousness of the acts or the territorial aspects. 

7. Does your national legal system establish additional offences related to attempts at, or 

complicity in, the commission of the misuse of cyberspace for terrorist purposes 

(ancillary offences)? 

The definition of an act of terrorism is such that there is no need for the "basic" offences to have 

actually had their effects, since Article 135-1 of the Penal Code provides that: "Any crime or 

offence punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of three years or more, or by a heavier 

penalty, shall constitute an act of terrorism where its nature or context is such that it may do 

serious harm to a country or an international organisation or body (…)". Suffice it that they could 

have done serious harm. 

Moreover, as regards the basic offences proper, the general rules of attempting to commit are 

applicable. In Luxembourg, an attempt to commit a crime is still punishable, as is an attempt to 

commit a lesser offence where the legislation so provides. 

The rules on complicity are prescribed by Articles 66 to 68 of the Penal Code which provide as 

follows: 

Article 66. 

The following are punishable as perpetrators of a crime or lesser offence: 

Those who carried it out or directly co-operated in carrying it out; 

Those who, by any act whatsoever, have rendered such assistance in carrying out the act that 

without it the crime or offence could not have been committed; 

Those who by means of gifts, promises, threats, abuse of authority or power, culpable 

machinations or deceit, have offered direct incitement to that crime or offence; 

(L. 8 June 2004) Those who, whether through statements made in meetings or in public 

places, or through placards or posters, or through writings whether or not printed and sold or 

distributed, have offered direct incitement to commit the crime or offence, subject to the last 

two provisions of Article 22 of the law of 8 June 2004 on freedom of expression in the media. 

Article 67. 

The following are punishable as accomplices in a crime or lesser offence: 

Those who issued instructions to commit it; 

Those who obtained weapons, instruments or any other means employed for the crime or 

offence, knowing that they were to be so employed; 

Those who, except in the case prescribed by paragraph 3 of Article 66, have wittingly aided or 

abetted the culprit or culprits of the crime or offence in the acts by which it was prepared or 

facilitated, or the acts by which it was committed. 

Article 68. 

Persons who, being acquainted with the criminal behaviour of the malefactors engaging in 

extortion or violence detrimental to the security of the State, in breach of the peace or against 

persons or property, have habitually afforded them a place of abode, refuge or assembly, shall 

be punished as their accomplices.

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8. What kind of national procedures do you have for submitting an application on the 

activities of Internet-providers and/or hosting companies or other entities, to deprive a 

user from a domain name or to cancel his/her/its registration or licence? 

In Luxembourg, management of the geographic first level domain LU is handled as a public service 

by the Réseau Téléinformatique de l’Education Nationale et de la Recherche (RESTENA) (remote 

processing network for national education and research). 

This service commenced at the time when Luxembourg’s first physical connection to the Internet 

was made and authority for first level domain was assigned to RESTENA by the Internet Assigned 

Numbers Authority (IANA) in March 1992. 1 

Access to the WHOIS service of RESTENA DNS-LU is allowed for any person wishing to obtain 

information on a domain name stored in the LU database. RESTENA DNS-LU supplies the data 

therein solely for purposes of consultation, and RESTENA DNS-LU does not guarantee their 

accuracy. This information cannot be used in full or even in part for compilation, distribution or any 

other purpose without the prior written permission of RESTENA DNS-LU. 2 

Apart from this service intended for every individual, the standard procedures for gathering 

information in police or judicial investigations may be applied. 

Deprivation of the use of a domain name and cancellation of registration are matters governed by 

civil law in most instances. A judicial ruling will be implemented by RESTENA which has no 

independent power to rule in disputes between two individuals claiming the same right of 

ownership for a domain name. 

Use of a domain name may, however, also be a criminal law matter, particularly as regards 

infringement of the legislation on intellectual property and protected trademarks or where the use 

of a domain name would be immoral. In this case, cancellation of a domain name would also 

depend on a judicial ruling. In some circumstances, cancellation during the judicial investigation 

would be conceivable to put an end to the offence. Here, the decision would rest with the 

investigating authorities. 

9. What non-legislative measures do you have in your country to prevent and counter 

terrorist misuse of cyberspace, including self-regulatory measures? 

The state authorities only hold powers vested in them by law. In that sense, all measures are 

legislative measures in one way or another. In the absence of further particulars as to the exact 

purport of this question, it is not possible to give a more detailed reply. 

C. International co-operation 

10. Please describe your country's general framework for international co-operation 

regarding the misuse of cyberspace for terrorist purposes. 

The general provisions on international co-operation are applicable to cyberterrorism, in particular 

the Council of Europe Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters of 20 April 1959, the 

Council of Europe Convention on Extradition of 13 December 1957 and the relevant European 

Union instruments. In relation to other countries, monitoring is usually implemented on the basis of 

a search warrant issued by an investigating magistrate. That said, on the basis of a reasoned 

order, special means of surveillance may be designated by an investigating judge, allowing an 

Internet screening operation which targets a given login to be set up. This procedure is also 

applicable for combating terrorist movements that misuse cyberspace for their own ends. 

1 Le système des noms de domaine d'Internet, Antoine Barthel, Théo Duhautpas, Marc Hensel RESTENA, 

http://www.dns.lu/Pdfs/News_paper1999.pdf. 

2 http://www.dns.lu/en/EN-LUChercher.html.

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11. What are the existing practices and experiences with regard to international cooperation, 

in particular in relation to the procedures described in question 4? 

The law enforcement authorities do not perform any proactive monitoring of the Internet. Only on 

finding an offence covered by the specific provisions of the Penal Code on terrorism can the 

investigating judge to whom the case is referred issue an order requiring the access provider or the 

host of the incriminated site to take blocking and/or closure measures. As regards experiences of 

collaboration with foreign police departments in this field, the cases dealt with in this way principally 

concerned national investigations focused on the storage or dissemination of child pornography, 

whereas it has not yet been possible to acquire experience in measures to block sites preaching 

terrorism. 

D. Institutional framework 

12. Please list the institutions that are competent for countering terrorist misuse of 

cyberspace. 

The competent institutions are the judicial authorities (prosecution department and investigating 

judges) and the Grand-Ducal Police Force. Within the police they are, more specifically, the judicial 

police department (Police Judiciaire) and in particular the Anti-Terrorist Unit of the General Crime 

Section in collaboration with the New Technologies Section for the technical side. 

13. In order to counter terrorist misuse of cyberspace are there any partnerships between 

the public and private sectors or legal obligations for operators of electronic 

communication (Internet-service providers, hosting companies, etc.) as well as persons 

providing the public with access to systems which allow on-line communication via 

access to the network (cyber cafe, WiFi hotspot)? 

At present there is no specific legal obligation as regards the use of cyberspace. Among the 

"ordinary" obligations in force in this respect, mention should be made of the law of 30 May 2005 

requiring providers in the communications sector to retain a certain number of pieces of information 

(see excerpt below). 

There is no formal partnership between the public and the private sectors, although the relevant 

police departments keep up excellent relations with the service providers and their co-operation is 

good on the whole. 

Law of 30 May 2005 

– on the specific arrangements to protect the individual as regards the processing of 

personal data in the electronic communications sector, and 

– amending Articles 88-2 and 88-4 of the Code of Criminal Investigation 

Article 5. Data on traffic 

(1) (a) To meet the needs of detecting, determining and prosecuting criminal offences, and for 

the sole purpose of allowing information to be made available as required to the judicial 

authorities, all service providers or operators processing data which relate to traffic are obliged 

to retain such data for a period of 12 months. A Grand-Ducal regulation shall determine the 

categories of traffic data which may be of use in detecting, determining and prosecuting 

criminal offences. 

(b) After the period of retention prescribed in sub-paragraph (a) above, the service provider or 

operator shall delete or render anonymous the traffic data concerning the subscribers and 

users. 

(…)

Article 9. Location data other than traffic data 

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(1) (a) To meet the needs of detecting, determining and prosecuting criminal offences, and 

for the sole purpose of allowing information to be made available as required to the judicial 

authorities, all service providers or operators processing location data other than traffic data 

are obliged to retain such data for a period of 12 months. For the purposes of this paragraph, 

a single indication of location shall be required for each communication or call. A Grand-Ducal 

regulation shall determine the categories of location data other than traffic data which may be 

of use in detecting, determining and prosecuting criminal offences. 

14. Are there any hotlines regulated by the public or private sectors permitting 

denouncement of those web sites which could be of a terrorist character / nature? 

No. 

E. Statistical information 

15. Please provide relevant statistics on offences relating to the misuse of cyberspace for 

terrorist purposes (including possibly: cases recorded, investigated, brought to court, 

convictions, victims etc.). 

No offence relating to misuse of cyberspace for terrorist purposes has been detected in 

Luxembourg to date. 

16. Where possible, please describe briefly the profile of offenders typically involved in the 

misuse of cyberspace for terrorist purposes (professional background, gender, age, 

nationality), and possible typical organisational characteristics, including trans-national 

links and links to other forms of organised crime. 

As Luxembourg has not as yet been confronted with this type of offence, it is impossible to 

establish a criminal profile as envisaged by this question.

LUXEMBOURG - Council of Europe

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