on Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection - Energie EDF

Key dates
POST-FUKUSHIMA: THE NUCLEAR OPERATORS ARE MOBILISED
• March 2011: decision by the State Council to put
the approval and licencing of new reactors on
hold but continuation of power generating in the
existing nuclear facilities and the construction of
the 25 nuclear units already under way
• October 2012: announcement that the
construction of nuclear power facilities will be
resumed, with a small number of Generation
III projects over the next five years, probably at
coastal sites
In conclusion, I think that rapid adoption of the stress
test route in Western Europe has enabled operators and
regulatory authorities to begin reassessing the design
bases in terms of natural hazards and to conduct the
corresponding nuclear safety studies more promptly there
than in the USA. Nonetheless, after 9/11, the USA has
probably progressed further and faster as concerns the
availability of mobile response equipment for emergency
situations.
MY ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
For France
I observe that the programme of physical and organisational
modifications is particularly ambitious. EDF is clearly one
of the operators to have taken action most promptly in
the areas of physical and organisational arrangements
to resist external hazards. I emphasise the importance of
dealing with cases of non-conformity as top priority.
The creation of the Nuclear Rapid Response Force
(French acronym FARN) has increased the sustainability
of response by being available to support the plant
emergency teams and the ability to deal with an accident
situation affecting a number of reactors at the same site.
Its staffing and specialisation began at Civaux Nuclear
Power Plant to prepare for deployment in early 2013 of
an national reconnaissance team and a flying column
ready to be sent to any nuclear power plant. I emphasise
the need for training, maintaining skills and motivating
the Nuclear Rapid Response Force staff.
The project also calls for promptly creating a number
of connection points for equipment in the plants
in a coordinated manner. This is accompanied by
modifications to the installations affecting systems that
are important to nuclear safety. I would like to draw the
THE INSPECTOR GENERAL’S REPORT
ON NUCLEAR SAFETY AND RADIATION PROTECTION
Without knowing the details of the American regulatory
arrangements, I remain convinced that the periodic
reassessment of nuclear safety is definitely positive. This
exists in France and the UK, with ten-yearly reassessment
of the risks in the light of new data and knowledge.
I note that “hard core” requirements (robust physical
and organisational arrangements intended to guarantee
nuclear safety beyond the design basis, an ultimate line of
defence against highly-improbable situations) are as yet
limited to France.
I would like to call to mind the letter sent in July 2012
by the Chairman of EDF to Li Ganjie, the president of
the extraordinary meeting on the IAEA Convention on
Nuclear Safety in August 2012. This letter forcefully
states the standpoint of the EDF Group which is that “no
severe accident will entail a consequence long-term
contamination of large territories”. It also emphasises
the importance of periodically reviewing the nuclear
safety options. It seems highly desirable for all the reactors
in the world to meet these two requirements.
Finally, I hail the active manner in which the EDF Group
managers in France, the UK and the USA have drawn
lessons from the Fukushima accident and influenced
world governance of the nuclear industry.
attention of the ASN and EDF to the very short time
available for settling all these matters. The electrical
resupply points can raise design questions that can be
difficult, particularly in the field of instrumentation and
control, as it is needed to guarantee that the existing
situation is not negatively impacted. This is an important
nuclear safety issue.
As in 2011, I insist that the Nuclear Rapid Response Force
which is part of the EDF accident response organisational
structure, is the subject of due consideration with the
government authorities: the Nuclear Risk Support Team
(MARN), the defence zone prefectures and the National
Committee of Public Safety and Defence. I note that
an experiment is planned with the public authorities of
South-East France.
In view of these major changes that come in addition
to the General Refurbishment work, I will be carefully
watching how these modifications are made without
overloading the skills in the plants and the engineering
centres. I would like to once again hail the way all the
players mobilised to deal with a task this great while
respecting the time limits and quality requirements.
I recall the need to establish a strategic plan with
the ASN as soon as possible, including the ten-yearly
nuclear safety upgrades that are now enshrined in
French law.
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