on Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection - Energie EDF

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THE INSPECTOR GENERAL’S REPORT ON NUCLEAR SAFETY AND RADIATION PROTECTION policy and administrative procedures of the plant were violated, • Rescheduling outage work (generator protection system test was started earlier than the original schedule, maintenance of station auxiliary transformer A was started although station auxiliary transformer B was not returned to operation). The approval and risk assessment for this unusual lineup was inadequate in that the potential consequences were not considered, • Kori 1 NPP internal oversight failed to reveal the station blackout event.” The expert mission gave their recommendations to address these contributory factors. Proactive policy decisions In the light of these serious shortcomings, I note that the South Korean authorities have announced that they have initiated far-reaching reforms and taken vigorous action to reinforce the powers and independence of the NSSC, the nuclear safety authority. I have also noted numerous changes in the operator’s management team, which need to be accompanied by changes in their practices, as the IAEA highlighted. In conclusion, barely one year after the Fukushima accident, I see from these events that the need for proper safety culture and transparency is not yet universally acknowledged. Nuclear safety in operations, which alone can win confidence in the nuclear industry, will always depend on two things: a responsible nuclear operator and a strong nuclear safety authority. 78 NOTEWORTHY OPERATING EVENTS I consider that a nuclear safety event of this nature challenges the nuclear community, as concerns both the collective responsibility of each operating organisation with regard to its peers and the effectiveness of the international watchdogs. Incident sequence (1) 7:30pm on Feb 9 : Tesng of generator protecon relay started 8:34pm : During the relay test, due to the failure of reseng the test-nished relay, 345kV main power circuit breakers tripped open due to 2/3 logic signal resu in LOOP 8:34pm : EDG “B” failed to start on demand due to starng solenoid valve failure resu in SBO, and subsequent loss of shutdown cooling and SFP cooling (RHR) Incident sequence (2) Kori 1: electrical power supply system diagram 1 8:46pm : 154kV Standby offsite power “A” recovered by closing and re -racking SAT “A” circuit breaker exiting SBO condition in 12 minutes 4 8:53pm : Recovered shutdown cooling via RHR “B” by establishing a crosstie from Bus “A” to Bus “B” because RHR “A” was under maintenance in 19 minutes 5 Kori 1: electrical power supply system diagram 2
14/ APPENDICES APPENDICES THE INSPECTOR GENERAL’S REPORT ON NUCLEAR SAFETY AND RADIATION PROTECTION 79
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The Inspector General’s report on
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CONTENTS CONTENTS THE INSPECTOR GEN
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THE INSPECTOR GENERAL’S REPORT ON
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Page 30 and 31: THE INSPECTOR GENERAL’S REPORT ON
Page 41 and 42: MAINTENANCE, A STRATEGIC DOMAIN THE
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Page 45 and 46: I met the staff of the AMELIE spare
Page 47 and 48: NUCLEAR TECHNICAL INFORMATION SYSTE
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Page 61 and 62: PLANT LIFE EXTENSION IS CONDITIONED
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Page 65: MY RECOMMENDATIONS PLANT LIFE EXTEN
Page 96: E.D.F. Présidence IGSN 21, avenue
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