Ben-Elia, E. and Ettema, D. (2011) Changing commuters' behav- ior ...
Ben-Elia, E. and Ettema, D. (2011) Changing commuters' behav- ior ...
Ben-Elia, E. and Ettema, D. (2011) Changing commuters' behav- ior ...
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<strong>Ben</strong>-<strong>Elia</strong>, E. <strong>and</strong> <strong>Ettema</strong>, D. (<strong>2011</strong>) <strong>Changing</strong> commuters’ <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong><br />
using rewards: A study of rush-hour avoidance. Transportation<br />
Research Part F Traffic Psychology <strong>and</strong> Behaviour, 14 (5). pp. 354-<br />
368. ISSN 1369-8478<br />
We recommend you cite the published version.<br />
The publisher’s URL is http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.trf.<strong>2011</strong>.04.003<br />
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<strong>Changing</strong> commuters’ <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> using rewards: A study of<br />
rush-hour avoidance<br />
* (corresponding author)<br />
Eran <strong>Ben</strong>-<strong>Elia</strong> * ,<br />
Centre for Transport <strong>and</strong> Society<br />
Faculty of Environment <strong>and</strong> Technology<br />
University of the West of Engl<strong>and</strong><br />
Frenchay Campus, Bristol, BS16 1QY, United Kingdom<br />
eran.ben-elia@uwe.ac.uk<br />
Dick <strong>Ettema</strong><br />
Urban <strong>and</strong> Regional research centre Utrecht<br />
Faculty of Geosciences<br />
Utrecht University<br />
P.O. Box 80115<br />
3508 TC, Utrecht, The Netherl<strong>and</strong>s<br />
d.ettema@geo.uu.nl<br />
Key Words<br />
Attitudes, <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>-change, congestion, habitual <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>, information, motivation, reward.<br />
Abstract<br />
In a 13-week field study conducted in The Netherl<strong>and</strong>s, participants were provided with daily<br />
rewards – monetary <strong>and</strong> non-monetary, in order to encourage them to avoid driving during<br />
the morning rush-hour. Participants could earn a reward (money or credits to keep a<br />
Smartphone h<strong>and</strong>set), by driving to work earlier or later, by switching to another mode or by<br />
teleworking. The collected data, complemented with pre <strong>and</strong> post measurement surveys,<br />
were analyzed using longitudinal techniques <strong>and</strong> mixed logistic regression. The results<br />
assert that the reward is the main extrinsic motivation for discouraging rush-hour driving. The<br />
monetary reward exhibits diminishing sensitivity, whereas the Smartphone has endowment<br />
qualities. Although the reward influences the motivation to avoid the rush-hour, the choice<br />
how to change <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> is influenced by additional factors including gender <strong>and</strong> education,<br />
scheduling considerations, habitual <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>, <strong>and</strong> cognitive factors regarding attitudes <strong>and</strong><br />
perceptions, as well as travel information availability factors.<br />
1
1. Introduction<br />
Congestion on urban roads throughout the European Union is increasing <strong>and</strong> is expected to<br />
worsen as the dem<strong>and</strong> for trip making increases <strong>and</strong> supply of road infrastructure remains<br />
limited (European Commission, 2006a, 2006b). Loading of excess dem<strong>and</strong> on the<br />
transportation system has considerable external costs such as pollution, noise <strong>and</strong> road user<br />
safety (Mayeres et al., 1996). Road overloading disrupts vehicle flow, increases the<br />
frequency of incidents <strong>and</strong> magnifies the uncertainty of travel schedules (Lomax & Schrank,<br />
2003). Congestion is a collective, synchronic phenomenon: massive commuting at a more or<br />
less common time-frame (e.g. the morning rush-hour). Thus, shifting of commuters’<br />
departure times to less congested times, before or after the rush-hour, change of transport<br />
mode (from car to public transport) or change of work mode (working from home), should, in<br />
theory, lead to considerable time savings, greater travel certainty <strong>and</strong> lower external costs of<br />
congestion.<br />
Transportation dem<strong>and</strong>-based solutions (e.g. road pricing, promoting modal alternatives,<br />
parking policy <strong>and</strong> l<strong>and</strong> use planning policy) have been suggested to reduce congestion<br />
(Shiftan & Golani, 2005). In this respect, transport economists have been arguing for the<br />
implementation of road pricing as a first-best solution to efficiently alleviate congestion<br />
externalities (Nijkamp & Shefer, 1998; Rouwendal & Verhoef, 2006; Small & Verhoef, 2007).<br />
However, road pricing is controversial <strong>and</strong> its <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>al implications are not well<br />
understood. As suggested initially by Vickrey (1969), optimal pricing requires the design of<br />
variable tolls, making them quite complex for drivers’ comprehension (Bonsall et al., 2007;<br />
Verhoef, 2008). In addition, road pricing raises questions regarding social equity (Giuliano,<br />
1994), fairness <strong>and</strong> public acceptability (Eriksson et al., 2006) as well as economic efficiency<br />
(Banister, 1994; Viegas, 2001).<br />
Second-best schemes have been suggested to circumvent the difficulties in implementing<br />
first-best pricing solutions (Small & Verhoef, 2007). In The Netherl<strong>and</strong>s the notion of using<br />
rewards to achieve desired outcomes in travelers’ <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> has been recently implemented<br />
in the context of the Spitsmijden 1 program (<strong>Ettema</strong> et al., 2010; Knockaert et al., 2007), thus<br />
far, the largest systematic effort to analyze the potential of rewards in the field as a policy<br />
mean for changing commuter <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>. A pilot study (see section 3 for further details),<br />
involving 340 participants <strong>and</strong> lasting over 13 weeks, was organized in the second half of<br />
2006. Its objective was to investigate, in an empirical field study, the potential impacts of<br />
rewards on commuters’ <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> during the morning rush-hour. Participants could earn a<br />
reward (money or credits to keep a Smartphone h<strong>and</strong>set which also provided real-time traffic<br />
information), by driving to work earlier or later, by switching to another travel mode or by<br />
teleworking. Initial results provided evidence of substantial <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> change in response to<br />
the rewards, with commuters shifting to earlier <strong>and</strong> later departure times <strong>and</strong> more use of<br />
public transport <strong>and</strong> alternative modes or working from home (<strong>Ettema</strong> et al., 2010).<br />
The effectiveness of rewards to reinforce a desirable <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> (e.g. identification <strong>and</strong> loyalty,<br />
work effort) is supported by a large volume of empirical evidence (Kreps, 1997; Berridge,<br />
2001). However, in the context of travel <strong>and</strong> traffic <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>, rewards are poorly represented.<br />
Punishments <strong>and</strong> enforcement (such as policing, felony detectors, fines etc.), have been<br />
more widely documented than rewards (e.g. Rothengatter, 1992; Perry et al., 2002;<br />
Schuitema, 2003). The relative salience of negative motivational means reflects, to a large<br />
extent, a disciplinary bias. Given that travel <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> has been to the most part subjected<br />
<strong>and</strong> influenced by microeconomic theories (McFadden, 2007), it is not surprising that the<br />
<strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>al rationale of many dem<strong>and</strong> based strategies to manage traffic congestion is based<br />
on negative incentives that associate, through learning, the act of driving with punishments<br />
(such as tolls or increased parking costs).<br />
1 translated literally as peak avoidance<br />
2
The few examples where rewards have been applied in a travel context are short term<br />
studies involving the use of a temporary free bus ticket as an incentive to reduce car driving.<br />
To most parts, the results of these studies are inconclusive. For example, (Fujii et al., 2001;<br />
Fujii & Kitamura, 2003) found that an incentive did encourage a change towards reducing<br />
car driving; however the level of car driving returned to previous levels once the incentive<br />
was stopped. In contrast, (Bamberg et al., 2002; Bamberg et al., 2003), found that habitual<br />
<strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> prevented substantial reductions in car use. It is not the scope of this paper to<br />
debate which policy (pricing or rewards) is more effective. However there is substantial<br />
evidence that people respond more favorably <strong>and</strong> are more motivated when rewarded rather<br />
than punished (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Geller, 1989). Thus, the potential of rewards as<br />
a base for traffic management policy is well worth considering if based on robust <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>al<br />
foundations.<br />
The main aim of this paper is to comprehensively analyze <strong>and</strong> explore the changes in<br />
<strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> during the course of the aforementioned pilot study <strong>and</strong> identify key factors that<br />
influenced the response to the rewards. The rest of the paper is organized as follows:<br />
Section 2 sets a number of theoretically driven research questions <strong>and</strong> hypotheses. Section<br />
3 describes the experimental setup <strong>and</strong> methods. Results, based on a mixed logistic<br />
regression analysis are presented in section 4. A discussion is presented in section 5,<br />
followed by summary <strong>and</strong> conclusions in section 6.<br />
2. Research questions & hypotheses<br />
Several key questions are postulated: First, how effective are rewards as a means for<br />
motivating travel <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> change? The literature does not provide a clear indication. One<br />
view suggests that satisfying rewards contribute to higher rates of motivation (Cameron et<br />
al., 2001; 1994). The other view propounds that rewards interfere <strong>and</strong> undermine intrinsic<br />
motivation, deflecting motivation from internal to external causes <strong>and</strong> reducing the amount of<br />
effort devoted to participate in activities (Deci, 1971; 1975; Lepper & Green, 1978). Theory of<br />
Cognitive Evaluation (TCE) further asserts that the effect of reward will depend on how it<br />
affects perceived self-determination <strong>and</strong> competence (Deci & Ryan, 1985).<br />
Second, does the nature of the reward (monetary, in-kind) affect the willingness to change<br />
travel <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> <strong>and</strong> its tenacity? People seem more receptive to large monetary rewards<br />
compared to small ones (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000; Gneezy, 2003). Moreover, a monetary<br />
reward might be framed as a prospective gain. According to Prospect Theory (Kahneman &<br />
Tversky, 1979), diminishing sensitivity to money can affect the perseverance of change.<br />
Participants’ apparently have greater satisfaction <strong>and</strong> motivation is higher with gifts<br />
compared to monetary rewards; however when asked, most people prefer receiving money<br />
(Shaffer & Arkes, in press). In-kind rewards may therefore encourage <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> change<br />
through a different cognitive path: the endowment effect. A Smartphone h<strong>and</strong>set granted to<br />
some participants may be regarded as an uncertain endowment. An endowment is not easily<br />
relinquished, once given (Kahneman et al., 1991). The endowment effect may well motivate<br />
to change <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> just in order to avoid the loss associated with the possibility to give up a<br />
valued object. In this respect, the in-kind reward, unlike the monetary one may have affective<br />
as well as motivational properties.<br />
Third, to what extent do personal <strong>and</strong> social characteristics (e.g. gender, education level,<br />
personal income, or household composition) sustain or diminish the potential impact of<br />
rewards? The connection between socio-economic characteristics <strong>and</strong> travel choices is well<br />
documented (e.g. Harris & Tanner, 1974; <strong>Ben</strong>-Akiva & Lerman, 1985; Axhausen & Gärling,<br />
1992) In this respect income may well affect motivation in the case of the monetary reward.<br />
Diminishing sensitivity could suggest that participants with higher incomes might be less<br />
motivated to change <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> for a rather marginal monetary gain.<br />
3
Fourth, do participants’ beliefs attitudes <strong>and</strong> norms influence their responsiveness to change<br />
<strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>? Several studies (e.g. Gärling et al., 1998; Gärling et al., 2001) suggest attitudes<br />
towards travel alternatives, affect the choice of travel modes. The Theory of Planned<br />
Behav<strong>ior</strong> (TPB) (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen, 1991) suggests a positive attitude towards a<br />
certain <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> will influence a person’s intention to consciously engage in it. Rewards<br />
which create a positive attitude with a certain <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>, will contribute to this <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> being<br />
repeated. Another issue is that of personal norms that are self expectations or specific<br />
actions in specific situations (Schwartz, 1977). They refer to feelings of moral obligations to<br />
<strong>behav</strong>e in a certain way (e.g. environmental friendly <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>). If a reward scheme is<br />
regarded as congruent with the personal norms <strong>and</strong> expectations, it is more likely to<br />
encourage <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>-change.<br />
Fifth, are there situational factors (home <strong>and</strong> work-related) that affect the relative salience of<br />
rewards as means for travel <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> change (here, rush-hour avoidance)? TBP stresses<br />
the role of others’ attitudes, <strong>and</strong> the perceived situational control on influencing intentional<br />
<strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>-change. If a person perceives <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> changes as difficult, the probability of<br />
repeating this action is relatively low. Scheduling constraints such as household obligations<br />
(e.g. child care, children chauffeuring) <strong>and</strong> work organization have been found to influence<br />
individuals’ responses to pricing schemes <strong>and</strong> limit their perceived effectiveness (Gärling &<br />
Fujii, 2006). Participants with child care or children chauffeuring responsibilities on one h<strong>and</strong>,<br />
or participants with inflexible working times, on the other h<strong>and</strong>, might have a limited ability to<br />
change <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> even when motivated by the reward. Conversely, the support a person gets<br />
from the household, workplace <strong>and</strong> from colleagues or friends that are also participating in a<br />
reward based scheme may well contribute to one’s own participation.<br />
Sixth, to what extent options chosen to avoid the peak are determined by habits? In the long<br />
run habitual travel <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>, as asserted by Gärling et al. (2001) <strong>and</strong> Gärling & Axhausen<br />
(2003), is quite relevant for promoting or discouraging a <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> change different from the<br />
usual travel <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>. Theory of Interpersonal Behav<strong>ior</strong> (TIB) (Tri<strong>and</strong>is, 1977, 1980) stresses<br />
the role of habit in <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>. With habitual <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>, decisions are made with a lesser degree<br />
of consciousness which decreases the likelihood <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> will change in response to a<br />
change in context. Habitual <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> is less intentional more automated <strong>and</strong> script based<br />
(Ronis et al., 1989; Gärling & Garvill, 1993). Travel decisions (e.g. the drive to work) are an<br />
example of habitual <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> as repeated decisions which loose intention <strong>and</strong> become<br />
gradually routinized (Verplanken et al., 1997; Gärling et al., 1998).<br />
Last, what is the role travel information plays in changing commuters’ <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>? Several<br />
studies point out that availability of information has significant effects on travelers’ <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong><br />
in the lab (Avineri & Prashker, 2006; <strong>Ben</strong>-<strong>Elia</strong> et al., 2008). For example in the case of routechoice,<br />
<strong>Ben</strong>-<strong>Elia</strong> & Shiftan, (2010) found real-time travel information expedites learning in<br />
unfamiliar environments <strong>and</strong> reduces initial exploration. At the same time, exposure to<br />
information is also associated with more heterogeneity in choice <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> <strong>and</strong> in risk<br />
attitudes. In this respect the Smartphone reward could well have instrumental value as it also<br />
provides access to real-time traffic information. Information might motivate change of<br />
<strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> by facilitating the travel decision process <strong>and</strong> by reducing subjective effort <strong>and</strong><br />
difficulty increasing the perceived situational control.<br />
3. Method<br />
3.1 Participants<br />
Using license plate recognition cameras, 2,300 cars, both privately owned <strong>and</strong> leased<br />
company vehicles <strong>and</strong> traveling at least three times a week during the morning rush hour on<br />
the busy stretch of the A12 motorway (about 15 km connecting Zoetermeer to The Hague).<br />
The Dutch Department of Road Transport provided the names <strong>and</strong> addresses of the car<br />
owners <strong>and</strong> they were approached by mail with an invitation to participate in the experiment.<br />
4
A total of 341 commuters - 221 men <strong>and</strong> 120 women – chose to participate in the<br />
experiment. Upon registration, the participants self selected one out of two types of reward.<br />
The first type of reward was an amount of money (3-7 Euros <strong>and</strong> see next subsection) for<br />
each day that the participant avoided driving during the morning rush-hour. In this case,<br />
participants were provided with a realistic estimate of how much they could earn in the<br />
course of the study. The second type comprised credits towards ultimately keeping a<br />
Smartphone (called Yeti) at the end of the experiment. 232 participants (60% men),<br />
selected a monetary reward (‘money’) <strong>and</strong> 109 (74% men) the Yeti reward. The Yeti’s<br />
market value was around € 500 at the time. All the participants were inhabitants of the town<br />
of Zoetermeer <strong>and</strong> the vast majority was working at the time in The Hague or its vicinities.<br />
They are characterized by relatively high percentage of higher education, moderate to high<br />
incomes <strong>and</strong> mostly families with children. Table 1 presents the descriptives of the<br />
participants by group.<br />
3.2 Procedure<br />
***Table 1 about here***<br />
The task <strong>and</strong> rules were communicated to the participants through the project's back office:<br />
Participation had to be voluntary. The participants were to commute at least three times a<br />
week from home to work. They had to have access to e-mail <strong>and</strong> the Internet. They were<br />
requested to complete surveys completely <strong>and</strong> timely. They were made aware that their<br />
movements by car would be recorded <strong>and</strong> had to agree to the installation of an on-board<br />
transponder in their car. In addition it was explained that only the car in which a transponder<br />
had been previously installed could be eligible for the reward. A travel log (i.e. logbook) was<br />
to be filled in daily on a personal webpage on the projects’ internet site. Participants that<br />
opted for the Yeti reward were also instructed to switch on the Smartphone during every car<br />
trip, in order to get full <strong>and</strong> easy access to real-time travel information. All communication<br />
was to be conducted via the project’s back-office which dealt with complaints or operational<br />
problems. A weekly newsletter was also sent to participants’ homes providing further<br />
information <strong>and</strong> clarifications. Participants’ earnings were shown on their personal webpage.<br />
The earnings were updated once a week according to the relevant treatment schemes. The<br />
monetary rewards were directly paid to participants’ bank accounts at the end of the working<br />
week by bank transfer.<br />
3.3 Design<br />
Participants were instructed that they could avoid commuting during the morning rush-hour<br />
(defined between 7:30-9:30 AM) either by shifting their departure times to earlier or later<br />
times of travel, or by choosing other modes of travel (cycling, carpool, public transport), or by<br />
working from home (teleworking). The experiment ran for a period of 13 weeks. The first two<br />
weeks were without reward (pre-test). The data collected during the pre-test was used to<br />
determine participants’ reference travel <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> <strong>and</strong> subsequent assignment to reward<br />
classes. The final week (post-test) was also without rewards.<br />
Those participants who opted for money were the subject of three consecutive reward<br />
treatments lasting 10 weeks in total: a reward of 3€ (lasting three weeks), a reward of 7€<br />
(lasting four weeks) <strong>and</strong> a mixed reward (lasting three weeks) of up to 7€ - of which 3€ for<br />
avoiding the high peak (8:00-9:00) <strong>and</strong> an additional 4€ for avoiding also the lower peak<br />
shoulders (7:30-8:00, 9:00-9:30). A counterbalanced (blocked r<strong>and</strong>omization) design was<br />
used to allocate participants r<strong>and</strong>omly to 6 (that is 3! blocks) possible treatment orders<br />
(referred to as scheme). A few exceptions were applied to couples using the same vehicle.<br />
The scheme of treatments was communicated to the participants through their personal web<br />
5
pages. Participants in possession of the Yeti could acquire credit during a period of five<br />
consecutive weeks. If they earned enough credit relative to a known threshold they could<br />
keep the Smartphone. This threshold was determined by their reward class (see below). The<br />
other five weeks were without credits but participants could still have access to traffic<br />
information. Participants were r<strong>and</strong>omly divided between two schemes in relation to which of<br />
the first or second set of 5 weeks credits could be awarded. They were also made aware of<br />
their respective schemes.<br />
Participants in possession of a Yeti also had 24 hour access to travel information via the<br />
h<strong>and</strong>set during 11 weeks: the credit treatment, the no-credit treatment as well as the posttest.<br />
This information consisted of real-time travel times on the A12 motorway on the<br />
Zoetermeer – The Hague corridor <strong>and</strong> an online map showing congestion levels on other<br />
roads in the area. Information availability was not dependent on the reward itself. In contrast,<br />
participants in the money group had access to information available to all other drivers: pretrip<br />
through internet <strong>and</strong> media <strong>and</strong> en-route from variable message signs along the<br />
motorway.<br />
In addition to the treatments, each participant was also assigned to a reward class which<br />
determined his/her maximum eligible reward. In essence, a participant could only earn the<br />
reward as often as he/she was observed to drive in the morning peak during the pre-test.<br />
Thus, a participant who would drive in the peak three times per week in the pre-test, could<br />
only receive a reward for the third, fourth <strong>and</strong> fifth day in a week he/she avoided the peak,<br />
whereas one who drove in the peak five times per week was eligible for any working day<br />
he/she avoided the peak. This reward could be either the daily monetary reward or the<br />
threshold number of credits needed to keep the Yeti. It should be noted that retrospectively<br />
very few participants failed to meet their threshold. In order to avoid regret, it was also<br />
decided at the end of the study to allow all the participants to keep their Yeti’s. Accordingly,<br />
each participant was allocated into one of four possible reward classes. Once determined<br />
these classes were fixed throughout the rest of the experiment. The majority of participants<br />
belonged to classes A <strong>and</strong> B <strong>and</strong> the minority to classes C <strong>and</strong> D. Table 2 presents the<br />
number of participants (by gender) in each class. In both groups women are more prevalent<br />
in the classes with lower traveling frequencies. For a more detailed description of the<br />
experiment’s design see the report (in English) of Knockaert et al., (2007) also available from<br />
the authors by request.<br />
Self selection of reward types by participants suggests by definition a quasi-experimental<br />
design. Like r<strong>and</strong>om experiments, quasi-experiments share the same basic principles of<br />
manipulation (cause precedes effect) <strong>and</strong> measurable associations (covariation). In contrast,<br />
causation requires more effort as compared to r<strong>and</strong>om assignment there are more threats to<br />
internal validity. In this we will follow the recommendations of Shadish et al., (2002) noting<br />
possible threats. An analysis of threats to internal validity is described in section 4. Lack of a<br />
control group also can contribute to validity problems. Several features in the design allow<br />
improved control <strong>and</strong> reduce possible threats. First, the pre-test / post-test design is fostered<br />
by additional measurements of stated <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> through the two surveys. Specifically threats<br />
resulting from history <strong>and</strong> novelty can be assessed by comparing between the preliminary<br />
survey <strong>and</strong> the pre-test. In addition, the measured factors from the surveys such as usual<br />
<strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>, constraints <strong>and</strong> support measures, can provide relevant mediators to the observed<br />
<strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> <strong>and</strong> verify if selection is a problematic issue. This is dealt in detail in Section 4.<br />
Second, norm comparisons with traffic counts on the main A12 trajectory suggest other<br />
drivers did not change <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> during this period. The sample is small enough not to have<br />
any real impact on traffic flow. Since no significant change in traffic occurred during the 13<br />
week observed period we can assert that any difference between observed <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>s with<br />
treatments <strong>and</strong> without is likely to be related to the intervention. In retrospect, it is<br />
acknowledged that r<strong>and</strong>om assignment <strong>and</strong> group control would have been the preferred<br />
solution.<br />
6
3.4 Measurements<br />
***Table 2 – about here***<br />
Data was collected during the study in several stages. In the first stage, after volunteering<br />
(April-August, 2006), participants completed a web-based preliminary survey. This survey<br />
gathered data regarding several important pre-test factors including home to work daily<br />
travel routines, individual <strong>and</strong> household characteristics (gender, age, education level,<br />
income, family composition); work schedules (i.e. flexibility in departure from home <strong>and</strong> in<br />
starting work early/late, or ability to telework), family obligations (e.g. childcare or child<br />
chauffeuring duties), availability <strong>and</strong> use of alternative means of transport, attitudes towards<br />
alternative travel modes <strong>and</strong> regular use of travel information. The survey results can be<br />
requested from the authors.<br />
The second stage was the actual experiment, lasting 13 weeks (of which weeks 3-12 were<br />
with rewards). It consisted of tracking participant’s observed <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>. Detection equipment<br />
using in-vehicle installed transponders <strong>and</strong> electronic vehicle identification (EVI) as well as<br />
backup road-side cameras was installed at the exits from Zoetermeer to the A12 motorway<br />
<strong>and</strong> on other routes leaving the city. This equipment allowed detecting each <strong>and</strong> every car<br />
passage during the course of the day, minimizing the ability of participants to cheat by trying<br />
to access alternative routes. In addition, participants were instructed to fill in their daily webbased<br />
logbook. They recorded whether or not they had commuted to work (<strong>and</strong> if not, why<br />
not), which means of transport they used <strong>and</strong> at what slot time they made their trip. This<br />
information was used to gain insight into situations in which the participant was not detected<br />
by the EVI.<br />
In this paper we decided to focus on the logbook data. The main reasons were the<br />
completeness of the data which included not only car travel but also non-car travel. In<br />
addition, the logs provide a unique description of each days travel choice whereas<br />
detections could appear several times a day. Furthermore, the logbooks <strong>and</strong> detections were<br />
checked by the project’s back-office for consistency to avoid complaints <strong>and</strong> disagreements<br />
with participants regarding their eligibility for a reward. The logbook contained several<br />
entries: normal entries on working days about the choice of travel <strong>and</strong> abnormal entries<br />
(including situations like use of another car, holiday, illness, problems with the equipment<br />
etc). Only normal entries relating to working days were included in the analysis. Detection<br />
data is left for future research on dynamics of departure time choice.<br />
The third stage of the study was a poster<strong>ior</strong> evaluation survey. In this survey questions were<br />
asked about the participant’s subjective experience during the course of the experiment.<br />
This dealt with their retrospective assessment of <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> adjustment (was it easy / difficult<br />
to adjust travel <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> <strong>and</strong> how much effort was involved in changing one's <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>).<br />
Other questions focused on support measures such as discussions with one's employer,<br />
colleagues <strong>and</strong> household members about flexible working times <strong>and</strong> household routines,<br />
practicing with <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>-change during the pre-test <strong>and</strong> purchasing of certain items.<br />
Questions were also asked regarding the use of travel information enabling a pre/post-test<br />
comparison that indicated a significant increase in usage of both traffic <strong>and</strong> public transport<br />
information.. Retrospective motivations to participate in the program were also inquired. One<br />
fact to be noted is that during the experiment disruptions occurred with the regional rail<br />
service <strong>and</strong> bus service replacements were not always adequately provided. In retrospect<br />
this was mentioned as causing participants some difficulty for using the public transport.<br />
At the same time that data was collected about the participants, a survey of non-participants<br />
was also carried out. It was based on a representative sample of Zoetermeer residents,<br />
regularly commuting to The Hague during the morning rush-hour, who did not participate in<br />
the experiment. The purpose was to determine whether the participants in the trial were<br />
7
epresentative of the total population of rush-hour drivers. Similar questions were put to<br />
these respondents. This analysis (see <strong>Ben</strong>-<strong>Elia</strong> & <strong>Ettema</strong>, 2009) demonstrated that although<br />
the reward is the main motivation in potentially choosing to participate in a similar rewardbased<br />
scheme, lack of flexibility in daily schedules was the main reason to reject the<br />
scheme.<br />
4. Results<br />
Responses appearing in the logbook were sorted into four distinctive <strong>and</strong> exclusive<br />
categories: rush-hour driving (RD), driving earlier (DE) or driving later (DL) than the rushhour,<br />
<strong>and</strong> non-driving (ND) which included all non-auto modes of travel (public transport,<br />
cycling, car pool) as well as teleworking. Since the rewards were provided on a weekly<br />
basis, the number of rush-hour avoidances within the week, could well be correlated. Daily<br />
responses were therefore assembled to weekly average shares (i.e. proportions). Weekly<br />
averages were further aggregated to treatment averages for statistical testing purposes in<br />
the following way: in the money group five repeated measurements (pre-test, three<br />
treatment levels, post-test); <strong>and</strong> in the Yeti group four repeated measurements (pre-test,<br />
credit, non-credit, post-test). The data analysis itself consisted of two stages. In the first<br />
stage (available from the authors by request), each of the four response categories was<br />
analyzed separately using GLM-repeated measures. In the second stage a mixed logistic<br />
regression (MLR) model was estimated based on the significant factors found in the first<br />
stage.<br />
The rationale behind using MLR was that the four response categories (RD, DE, DL, ND)<br />
attributed to each participant are in a sense a closed set of discrete choice alternatives <strong>and</strong><br />
therefore correlated. The probability of choosing a discrete response (i.e. an alternative) is<br />
specified as the dependent variable <strong>and</strong> the independent factors explain this probability.<br />
Usually, the relationship between alternatives <strong>and</strong> explanatory factors is specified with an<br />
outcome function referred to as 'utility'. The greater the utility of an alternative is, the higher<br />
is the probability of a participant choosing it (Train, 2002). Simple logistic regression is<br />
unsuitable for analysis of repeated measurements (McFadden & Train, 2000). However the<br />
MLR model can accommodate this by specifying a panel data model (Revelt & Train 1998;<br />
Bhat, 1999;). We estimated the MLR model using the estimation program of NLOGIT 4.0<br />
(Econometric Software Inc.,) <strong>and</strong> using share-based data with 1,000 r<strong>and</strong>om draws (see<br />
Train, 2000), for further details regarding drawing methods.<br />
Formally, the utility of person n of alternative i in response t <strong>and</strong> the probability (P) of person<br />
n choosing alternative i in response t are (eq. 1, 2):<br />
where P is the conditional probability that person n chooses alternative i out of a set of J<br />
alternatives, Y, is an indicator that i is chosen at response t, X is a vector of explanatory<br />
factors, , is a vector of fixed coefficients (including a constant), is a vector of r<strong>and</strong>om<br />
parameters with a distribution f (0 mean <strong>and</strong> a variance parameter ) <strong>and</strong> is a vector of<br />
independently, identically distributed (iid) Gumbel (or extreme-value type 1) error terms.<br />
The MLR model's main purpose is to estimate the composite effects on all four (correlated)<br />
response categories accounting for the sequential structure of the data. Each category has<br />
8<br />
(1)<br />
(2)
its own utility specification which is linear. Factors were entered into the utilities in a<br />
sequential manner whereby, non significant factors are dropped out <strong>and</strong> significant ones<br />
remain. R<strong>and</strong>om effects (i.e ‘s) are specified (for statistical restrictions only for three out of<br />
four categories) as normally distributed error terms (with zero mean <strong>and</strong> unknown variance<br />
) to better capture differences between respondents (i.e. heterogeneity) across the<br />
observations. In addition we allowed covariation between the r<strong>and</strong>om effects to account for<br />
inherent correlations between the unobserved factors in the model. This is also due to the<br />
nature of the similarity between the three driving alternatives (RD, DE, DL) relative to not<br />
driving (ND).<br />
Table 3 presents the treatments’ average measurements (also illustrated in Figure 1) <strong>and</strong><br />
between group pre/post-test differences. Table 4, presents the coefficient estimates for the<br />
MLR model. As noted in Table 3, pre-measurement levels of RD were substantially higher<br />
than the pre-test <strong>and</strong> this difference is significant for both groups. Thus any significant<br />
change between the pre-test <strong>and</strong> other treatments is also expected to be significant relative<br />
to the pre-measurement level. Since around one third of the participants stated in the<br />
poster<strong>ior</strong> survey that practicing with rush-hour avoidance during the pre-test assisted them to<br />
change their <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>, exploration with alternatives to rush-hour driving could be one way to<br />
explain the difference between stated <strong>and</strong> observed pre-test <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>s. However, since the<br />
pre-measurement is based on stated rather than observed <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>, to remain conservative<br />
we did not include it in the MLR analysis. In addition although the between-group analysis of<br />
RD, suggests that post-test differences are significant this is not confirmed in the more<br />
robust MLR. Consequently only the reward treatments were specified in the model whereby<br />
the coefficients reflect their effects relative to the pre-test.<br />
In terms of goodness of fit the model has a final log likelihood of -1,648.12 <strong>and</strong> the rhosquare<br />
is 0.22. A simple multinomial logistic regression model (without r<strong>and</strong>om effects) had<br />
a log likelihood of -1,678.24. The log likelihood ratio test shows this difference is significant<br />
( 2 = 60.2, df=6, p
Mediators (between-subjects factors) included the design related factors (reward class <strong>and</strong><br />
treatment scheme), <strong>and</strong> factors relating to the participants’ stated <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> derived from the<br />
two surveys. First, as neither the treatment scheme nor any of its interactions are significant<br />
we can conclude that the order of treatments had no effect on <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>. Therefore the order<br />
effect is discarded from the final model in Table 4. Second, among socio-demographic<br />
characteristics gender has a marginally significant effect on RD (p≈0.1) suggesting men tend<br />
to change <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> more than women. In the case of money, higher education has a<br />
significant <strong>and</strong> negative effect on DE. A possible explanation is that education as a proxy for<br />
income could well be masking an income effect. However testing of moderation by income is<br />
not possible due to the small groups involved <strong>and</strong> consequent loss of statistical power.<br />
Third, we find that factors relating to habitual <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> have significant results. The reward<br />
class, which relates to pre-test levels of driving at the rush-hour, has a negative association<br />
with <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> change. It was found that moderating the class effect by group proved<br />
significant. Participants, in both groups, associated with classes A, B (2.5 - 5 rush-hour trips<br />
at pre-test) were more likely to continue driving during the rush-hour compared to classes C<br />
<strong>and</strong> D (0-2.5 trips). In addition, the class coefficient for money is slightly larger than that of<br />
Yeti. The usual departure time has a negative association with DE: i.e. the earlier is the<br />
usual departure time - the more probable is a change of <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> by driving earlier. One may<br />
argue that similar factors that affect driving early in the non rewarded situation (such as<br />
household obligations) will still be at play during the rewarded period. The preferred start of<br />
work time, a likely proxy for the preferred arrival time, has a similar negative effect on DE but<br />
also a positive effect on DL. That means that participants driving later are those that are<br />
more accustomed to depart later in usual circumstances. Finally, the use of other modes for<br />
commuting has a positive effect on not driving. Fourth, concerning scheduling flexibility <strong>and</strong><br />
constraints, a number of factors have been found to affect change of <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>. Child<br />
chauffeuring is positively associated with RD. Other constraints on early departure, such as<br />
childcare responsibilities, were not found significant. Conversely, participants who stated<br />
they had support from their employers with arranging flexible working times are less likely to<br />
drive during the rush-hour. These results demonstrate the relevancy of constraints <strong>and</strong><br />
support measures as important factors that determine the probability to change <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>.<br />
The number of days (per week) that starting work late is possible has a positive effect on DL,<br />
a finding that suggests that participants with more flexible working schedules are more likely<br />
to drive later. Similarly but with a marginally significant positive effect (p
for public transport alternatives to support their <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> are more likely to change <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong><br />
by not driving ( the coefficients for both these factors are positive).<br />
*** Table 3 – about here ***<br />
***Table 4 – about here ***<br />
As noted in section 3, this study is compromised of a quasi-experimental design. Based on<br />
the recommendation of Shadish et al. (2002), we describe here the plausible threats to the<br />
validity of the results. Threats to statistical inferences are not discussed here as we contend<br />
that these are likely to be low given the conservative nature of the analysis method applied<br />
which guarantees proper statistical identification of the measurable effects.<br />
The two most plausible threats in our study are selection <strong>and</strong> history. Attrition is not an issue<br />
since no dropouts occurred. Maturation is also not relevant given the short period of time<br />
that the experiment was running. The issue of selection relates to a pr<strong>ior</strong>i differences in the<br />
money <strong>and</strong> Yeti groups which could compromise the results. In Table 5 we present a<br />
statistical comparison of the differences between the self-selected groups by the factors that<br />
are associated with the response in the MLR model. Most factors have no significant<br />
difference, but gender, chauffeuring children <strong>and</strong> arrangements with employers regarding<br />
flexible working times do. The latter which has the most significant difference was measured<br />
in the poster<strong>ior</strong> survey whereas the first two factors relate to pre-measurement. To contend<br />
with the threats we estimated the effects moderated by group, specifying the MLR model<br />
with group-specific coefficients for these three factors.<br />
Regarding gender, it was barely significant in the model (p≈0.1). We tested moderating<br />
effects for money <strong>and</strong> Yeti but this was found not to be significant. We can therefore<br />
conclude that gender (woman) has a weak negative association with avoidance <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>.<br />
Chauffeuring children is significantly <strong>and</strong> negatively associated with avoidance <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong><br />
(p=0.02). We investigated if this might be moderated by gender but given the small group<br />
involved of both men <strong>and</strong> women who have this constraint we could not identify with<br />
confidence any significant moderating effect. Moderating by group also does not reveal<br />
significant group differences in the MLR model. Therefore we can suggest that the negative<br />
effect identified for chauffeuring on peak avoidance is probable.<br />
The threat attributed to pre-arrangements regarding flexible work times requires more<br />
attention (p
treatment (pre/post test) remains relatively valid. Practicing also has a weak negative effect<br />
on rush-hour driving (p=0.07) which was only found relevant for the money group.<br />
5. Discussion<br />
Effectiveness of rewarding<br />
***Table 5 – about here ***<br />
The results demonstrate, that rewarding, at least in the short run, is effective as within a<br />
short period of time of several weeks, the share of rush-hour avoidance substantially<br />
increased. Thus in concordance with motivation theories (e.g. Cameron et al., 2001) rewards<br />
do influence the motivation to avoid the rush-hour. Moreover, we also found that the decision<br />
how to exercise this change of <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>, whether by driving at other times or by changing<br />
transport or work modes seem to be determined by other factors unrelated to the type or<br />
level of reward.<br />
Nonetheless, it is difficult to conclude from a relatively short longitudinal study about the<br />
impacts of rewards in the long run. Motivation theories suggest that if intrinsic motivation<br />
kicks in, the change of <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> is more likely to be sustained. However, we observed in the<br />
post-test, once rewards ceased, avoidance shares had dropped <strong>and</strong> participants had<br />
returned more or less to their usual <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> of rush-hour driving (as observed in the pretest).<br />
In this respect the results are similar to those obtained by Fujii & Kitamura (2003)<br />
regarding free bus tickets. Therefore at first glance it seems the change was not sustained<br />
for most of the participants. Notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing, in the poster<strong>ior</strong> survey less than 15% of<br />
participants stated they had returned to their previous <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>. Unfortunately, we do not<br />
have observations to corroborate this subjective evaluation. Further research is being carried<br />
out in this respect (see section 7). We also do not posses sufficient (post-test) data to<br />
conclude about the affective qualities of the rewards apart for the fact that the vast majority<br />
of participants (in both groups) answered affirmatively to the question 'did you like the<br />
reward' in the poster<strong>ior</strong> survey.<br />
Reward type <strong>and</strong> levels<br />
We found that both types of reward (monetary <strong>and</strong> in-kind) have a significant <strong>and</strong> negative<br />
effect on rush-hour driving. In the case of a monetary reward, diminishing sensitivity was<br />
clearly noted. The 7€ treatment has the largest overall effect on RD; however the largest<br />
marginal effect (the derivative) is associated with the 3€ treatment. Therefore, for practical<br />
purposes, a moderate monetary reward seems to be sufficient to encourage a relatively<br />
substantial change of <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>. In the case of the Yeti reward, the main effect is the credits<br />
which had an effect similar to the 7€ reward. In this sense an in-kind reward, likely perceived<br />
as an endowment, can be just as useful as the monetary reward. However, for practical<br />
reasons, there may be difficulty in implementing an in-kind reward over a long period of time.<br />
Though not statistically significant in comparison to pre-test levels, avoidance <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> was<br />
also apparent without valid credits. This treatment had no extrinsic reward but travel<br />
information was still accessible to Yeti users. Furthermore, it was evident that Yeti users<br />
were more likely to drive later compared to participants in the money group. Two possible<br />
explanations are possible for this different <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>. On one h<strong>and</strong>, Yeti users had higher<br />
shares regarding support provided from employers. Thus, it is possible that pre-adjustments<br />
were involved in choosing to depart later (especially during the pre-test). On the other h<strong>and</strong>,<br />
the main advantage Yeti users had over the other group was 24 hour access to travel<br />
information. This leads us to suggest that the decision how to change <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> is also<br />
influenced by travel information availability (discussed later on).<br />
12
Socio-demographic characteristics<br />
As noted, this is hardly a novel assumption in travel <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> studies. Gender (marginally)<br />
<strong>and</strong> education, were found to have an impact on the response to the rewards. It seems that<br />
men (mainly in the money group) are more likely to avoid the rush-hour compared to women.<br />
The lower motivation of women to avoid the rush-hour can be associated with many issues.<br />
One idea that has been suggested in social mobility studies (Palma et al., 2009) is that<br />
women are more constrained in time compared to men for various reasons, mainly<br />
household tasks <strong>and</strong> child raising obligations. Dutch women quite often leave work early in<br />
the afternoon to pick up children from nurseries (Schwanen, 2007). This limits their ability to<br />
change their schedule - e.g. to start work later even when extrinsically motivated by a<br />
reward. However, a larger sample is needed to clearly mark the causation between gender<br />
<strong>and</strong> time-use <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>.<br />
Education had a negative effect on <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> change (driving later). Participants (in the<br />
money group) with higher education were less likely to drive later. Education is a known<br />
proxy for latent income effects. Income is regarded as a key issue determining willingness to<br />
pay for travel purposes as well as the value of travel time savings (<strong>Ben</strong>-Akiva & Lerman,<br />
1985; Axhausen & Gärling, 1992). In the context of the money group, the significance of<br />
higher education strengthens the notion of diminishing sensitivity in relation to the monetary<br />
reward: participants with higher real income are likely to be less sensitive to a marginal<br />
monetary gain compared to participants with lower incomes. As a result motivation to avoid<br />
the rush-hour would be negatively associated with real income. Education did not appear to<br />
be a relevant factor on the <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> of Yeti users, possibly because it is cognitively <strong>and</strong><br />
affectively appreciated as an endowment, rather than in monetary (how much it’s worth)<br />
value.<br />
Scheduling<br />
This is a new territory of travel <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> research, lately identified by Gärling <strong>and</strong> Fujii<br />
(2006). The results suggest that <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> change <strong>and</strong> more so the choice of <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong><br />
change is associated with the ability or disability to change daily schedules. Both home<br />
related <strong>and</strong> work related flexibilities are relevant. Family obligations, such as children<br />
chauffeuring - a constraint associate positively with rush-hour driving - make it more difficult<br />
for parents to change travel <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>. The ability to accommodate a flexible schedule <strong>and</strong><br />
the support provided by others are also significant factors. Participants that could start<br />
working later or could telework were more likely to drive later. Participants reporting to have<br />
received support from their employer with arranging flexible working times were also less<br />
likely to drive in the rush-hour. We see these results as supporting evidence that flexibility,<br />
especially at the work place is a key issue in promoting changes in travel <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>. Contrary<br />
to our expectations, home-related support measures such as household arrangements did<br />
not have a significant effect on <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>-change. A possible explanation to the effects of<br />
scheduling is the extent of control over one’s actions <strong>and</strong> their outcomes. The Theory of<br />
Planned Behav<strong>ior</strong> (Ajzen, 1991) suggests perceived situational control is a key factor in<br />
encouraging a conscience <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>-change. Thus flexibility in time-use promotes a sense of<br />
self confidence <strong>and</strong> ability to contend with the schedule’s change.<br />
Habitual <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>, experience <strong>and</strong> attitudes<br />
As suggested by Theory of Interpersonal Behav<strong>ior</strong> (Tri<strong>and</strong>is, 1977, 1980) we found that<br />
factors relating to habitual <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> play an important role in the choice how to change<br />
<strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>. This corroborates findings from other studies (e.g. Gärling et al., 2001; Gärling &<br />
Axhausen, 2003). The effect of habitual <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> is well manifested in the significance of the<br />
reward class, usual departure time, the preferred start of work time (in the case of shifting<br />
driving times) as well as the use of other modes for commuting purposes (in the case of<br />
switching mode). Participants with higher rush-hour commute frequencies during the pre-test<br />
(reward class A, B) were relatively less likely to avoid the rush-hour compared to participants<br />
13
with lower rush-hour frequencies (class C, D). Two potential explanations are put forward.<br />
First, in terms of effort, one could argue that a similar relative response dem<strong>and</strong>s more rushhour<br />
avoidances from frequent rush-hour drivers than from less frequent rush-hour drivers.<br />
Hence, the effort involved is higher for high frequency drivers. This is in line with Garling et<br />
al., (2004) <strong>and</strong> Cao <strong>and</strong> Mokhtarian (2005), who found that travelers prefer low effort<br />
responses over high effort responses. A second explanation is that the added value of<br />
additional rewards depends on the amount already gained, in the sense that the marginal<br />
utility of reward decreases (i.e. diminishing sensitivity). Thus, the extra rewards gained by<br />
high frequency drivers will have a lower impact on <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>. This is in line with the idea of<br />
satisficing <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> described by Simon (1987). In the case of Yeti users, the effect of<br />
reward class is weaker. This might be related to the affective qualities of the Smartphone<br />
endowment i.e. avoiding the displeasure of having to give back the h<strong>and</strong>y Smartphone<br />
encouraged avoidance. In addition, real-time travel information may have been useful in<br />
reducing perceived effort <strong>and</strong> promoting self confidence in the ability to manage with rushhour<br />
avoidance.<br />
It is also evident that a relation exists between the usual schedules (usual departure <strong>and</strong><br />
arrival times) <strong>and</strong> choice of <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>-change. The usual departure time was a decisive factor<br />
affecting the choice to depart earlier whereas the preferred start of work time, a likely proxy<br />
for the preferred arrival time, had a significant influence on both driving earlier <strong>and</strong> later.<br />
Furthermore, previous experience using other transport modes was an important contributor<br />
to the choice not to drive. That is, familiarity with an alternative seems to increase intrinsic<br />
motivation. It appears that the choice of <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>-change is closely related to the perceived<br />
gap between the usual <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> <strong>and</strong> the required change – the smaller the gap the more<br />
likely is that the change will be exercised. One may argue that alternatives that are more<br />
similar to the current <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>, will better meet the travelers’ preferences with respect to<br />
characteristics of the travel mode <strong>and</strong> timing.<br />
Contrary to the usual <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>, a <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>-change requires gaining of knowledge through<br />
exploration <strong>and</strong> reinforced learning about the new situation. It is suggested that exploration<br />
had an important role during the pre-test. Practicing avoidance <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> during the pre-test<br />
was reported by almost a third of the participants( in both groups) <strong>and</strong> it is one explanation<br />
for the dramatic drop in the pre-test shares of rush-hour driving compared to the usual<br />
(stated) <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> recorded in the preliminary survey. This factor was also found (albeit<br />
weakly) to increase the likelihood of decreasing rush-hour driving for the money group.<br />
Recent findings in the context of route-choice <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> suggest information expedites<br />
learning in the short-run whereas lack of information requires greater effort devoted to<br />
exploration <strong>and</strong> learning (<strong>Ben</strong>-<strong>Elia</strong> et al., 2008; <strong>Ben</strong>-<strong>Elia</strong> & Shiftan, 2010). It is plausible that<br />
the pre-test was devoted by participants for information acquisition.<br />
Attitudes have been recently gaining attention in travel <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> studies (Gärling &<br />
Axhausen, 2003). Moreover, perceptions <strong>and</strong> attitudes have been the focus of invigorating<br />
attempts to improve choice modeling (Walker, 2001; Cherchi, 2009). As suggested by TPB,<br />
attitudes <strong>and</strong> personal norms are significant factors in encouraging or discouraging a<br />
conscious decision to change <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>. Our results support this assertion in that participants’<br />
attitudes regarding alternative modes were a key factor in determining the choice of<br />
avoidance <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>. Positive attitudes (defined as regarding a travel mode as a realistic<br />
alternative), regarding public transport <strong>and</strong> cycling, discouraged driving (including at off-peak<br />
periods) <strong>and</strong> encouraged mode switch away from the car. Conversely, perceptions regarding<br />
the (high) effort involved in changing <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> decreased the likelihood of changing <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong><br />
<strong>and</strong> were positively associated with rush-hour driving. We could not find real support for the<br />
relevance of personal norms in the decision to avoid the rush-hour.<br />
Information availability<br />
Several studies confirm the key role that availability of travel information has on promoting<br />
sensible travel choices (Mahmassani & Liu, 1999; Srinivasan & Mahamassani, 2003). Our<br />
14
esults sustain this association in three ways. First, there appear to be significant betweengroup<br />
differences in the <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> change. Yeti users had relatively higher shares of driving<br />
later compared to higher shares of driving earlier in the money group. Yeti users’ main<br />
advantage was the real-time access to travel information whereas the participants in the<br />
money group had to search for the same information i.e. it involved more effort. However, as<br />
noted this result could also be confounded by pr<strong>ior</strong> arrangements with employers over<br />
flexible working times which were more dominant with the Yeti group. Hence, we cannot be<br />
certain if the different response is attributed to the Yeti treatment or related to<br />
prearrangements which facilitated driving later. However, the information explanation is<br />
strengthened by the fact that moderating this effect by group was not significant.<br />
Second, access of travel information, mainly traffic but also public transport information,<br />
intensified during the course of the experiment (pre/post-test comparison). Thus, decisionmaking<br />
in a changed environment apparently increased the need for information about the<br />
outcomes of alternatives. Third, information availability is positively associated with not<br />
driving or driving later. Participants who frequently accessed public transport information <strong>and</strong><br />
who were actively perusing information over public transport connections were more likely to<br />
avoid driving altogether. In addition, participants with higher frequency of accessing traffic<br />
information where more likely to choose driving later. It seems therefore that information<br />
acquisition <strong>and</strong> choice of avoidance <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> are clearly related. However causality here is<br />
uncertain as participants could also increase information acquisition for the alternative they<br />
found is best.<br />
6. Summary <strong>and</strong> conclusions<br />
The main conclusion regarding the use of rewards in encouraging commuters to change<br />
<strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> is that it actually works. Rewards are effective extrinsic motivators for travel<br />
<strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> change - here rush-hour avoidance. The monetary reward was likely perceived as<br />
a gain with diminishing sensitivity, whereas the Yeti should be regarded as an in-kind reward<br />
which had added endowment <strong>and</strong> instrumental qualities. The rewards were able to sustain<br />
the <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>al change throughout the experiment. Nonetheless, it is still an open question<br />
whether the change would be sustained in the long run <strong>and</strong> without rewards. We do not have<br />
enough post-test observations to provide an answer apart from subjective assessments by<br />
the participants. A second conclusion that can be drawn from this research is that the reward<br />
influences the magnitude of change – an increase or decrease in rush-hour avoidance.<br />
However the choice how to avoid – driving at other times, switching to another mode of<br />
transport or working from home, is determined by external factors relating to participants’<br />
personal <strong>and</strong> social characteristics, scheduling flexibility, history <strong>and</strong> information availability,<br />
Although already of some interest to the travel <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong> research community these issues<br />
deserve further attention in future research.<br />
As a closing remark, following the success of the current study, application of reward-based<br />
schemes is now taking place across The Netherl<strong>and</strong>s. Although some concern, based on<br />
traffic simulation models, indicated that too many people might start changing their<br />
schedules to gain a reward (Bliemer & van Amelsfort, 2008), the evidence in the field does<br />
not support this claim. Their effectiveness in mitigating congestion, especially in situations<br />
involving temporary road maintenance or lane closures has been verified (Bliemer et al.,<br />
2009). A recent survey of firms also has shown positive attitude amongst employers towards<br />
the reward scheme (Vonk Noordegraaf & Annema, 2009). So far, the majority of the Dutch<br />
public (apart for the public transport users who are ineligible <strong>and</strong> consequently grumbling)<br />
<strong>and</strong> the government are quite content with the results. However as recently published in the<br />
media the (last) government also wanted to advance a punishment policy through universal<br />
kilometer road charging – a decision that stresses the importance of well-informed,<br />
evidence-based, as well as <strong>behav</strong><strong>ior</strong>ally-sound public policy.<br />
15
Acknowledgments<br />
This study was undertaken as part of the Spitsmijden project, which was funded by<br />
Transumo, the Ministry of Transport in the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s, Bereik, RDW, NS, Rabobank, ARS<br />
T&TT, OC Mobility Coaching, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, TU Delft, Universiteit Utrecht.<br />
The modeling framework was discussed in the 5 th Discrete Choice Modeling Workshop<br />
organized at EPFL (Lausanne, Swizterl<strong>and</strong>) in August, 2009. The comprehensive comments<br />
<strong>and</strong> suggestions of two anonymous reviewers are very highly appreciated.<br />
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19
Table 1: Participants’ characteristics<br />
Gender<br />
Education level<br />
Income €<br />
(net person/month)<br />
Household<br />
composition<br />
Cars / Household<br />
Age (years)<br />
20<br />
Money Yeti<br />
N % N %<br />
man 140 60.3 81 74.3<br />
woman 92 39.7 28 25.7<br />
Secondary 24 10.4 9 8.3<br />
Low vocational 9 3.9 5 4.6<br />
Middle vocational 64 27.7 36 33.3<br />
Higher education 134 58.0 58 53.7<br />
4500 11 4.8 3 2.8<br />
didn't answer 53 22.9 21 19.4<br />
single 35 15.2 10 9.3<br />
partner no kids 61 26.4 20 18.5<br />
partner + kids 118 51.1 73 67.6<br />
single parent 13 5.6 3 2.8<br />
other 4 1.7 2 1.9<br />
1 120 51.9 45 41.7<br />
2 103 44.6 59 54.6<br />
3+ 8 3.5 4 3.7<br />
Mean 41.3 44.8<br />
Median 42.5 45<br />
Per.25 34 37<br />
Per.75 49 51<br />
Table 2: Reward classes* by gender <strong>and</strong> reward type (group)<br />
Money Yeti<br />
A B C D A B C D<br />
Thresholds** 5 4 2 1 15 20 23 25<br />
N<br />
Men 83 33 13 11 34 27 13 7 221<br />
62% 54% 57% 79% 72% 87% 59% 78% 65%<br />
Women 51 28 10 3 13 4 9 2 120<br />
38% 46% 44% 21% 28% 13% 41% 22% 35%<br />
Total 134 61 23 14 47 31 22 9 341<br />
* A: 3.5-5, B:2/5-3.5, C: 1-2.5, D: 0-1 trips/week.<br />
** Money: maximum number of eligible rewards per week; Yeti: number of credits at the end of 5 weeks required to keep<br />
the phone.
Table 3: Mean values of response <strong>and</strong> between-group differences<br />
Money Yeti between-group<br />
difference<br />
Resp. Measurement N Mean s.d N Mean s.d t-stat Mann-<br />
Whitney<br />
U<br />
Rush Preliminary Survey - S 232 89.9 15.44 108 89.8 13.25 0.03 12,153<br />
Hour Pre test - R1 219 48.7 38.17 107 44.0 36.69 1.06 10,395<br />
3€ - R2 229 22.4 28.66<br />
7€ - R3 231 17.7 26.70<br />
3-7€ - R4 230 17.8 26.88<br />
No Credit - R5 109 31.0 31.26<br />
Credit - R6 107 15.4 21.95<br />
Post test - R7 225 47.3 38.91 101 37.6 37.64 2.22 9,808<br />
Driving Preliminary Survey - S<br />
Early Pre test - R1 219 22.7 33.03 107 22.0 33.06 0.20 11,489<br />
3€ - R2 229 37.7 37.87<br />
7€ - R3 231 41.8 38.05<br />
3-7€ - R4 230 42.4 38.49<br />
No Credit - R5 109 24.8 33.24<br />
Credit - R6 107 33.8 37.12<br />
Post test - R7 225 24.3 35.47 101 27.7 37.57 -0.78 10,768<br />
Driving Preliminary Survey - S<br />
Late Pre test - R1 219 10.1 22.29 107 20.3 31.32 -3.37 9,740<br />
3€ - R2 229 17.7 27.64<br />
7€ - R3 231 15.9 26.20<br />
3-7€ - R4 230 15.9 27.15<br />
No Credit - R5 109 24.1 32.19<br />
Credit - R6 107 25.6 31.76<br />
Post test - R7 230 15.9 27.15 101 19.1 31.87 -1.87 10,327<br />
Not Preliminary Survey - S<br />
Driving Pre test - R1 219 18.5 30.25 107 13.8 26.00 1.39 10,816<br />
3€ - R2 229 22.2 30.70<br />
7€ - R3 231 24.6 30.72<br />
3-7€ - R4 230 23.9 32.73<br />
No Credit - R5 109 20.1 28.50<br />
Credit - R6 107 25.1 31.79<br />
Post test - R7 225 15.6 29.02 101 15.6 30.28 0.02 11,086<br />
21
Table 4: Results of mixed logistic regression model<br />
Alt.* Parameter Est. S.E t-test p<br />
RD Constant rush-hour driving 0.750 0.31 2.44 0.010<br />
3€ reward -1.440 0.46 -3.12
Table 5: Between-group differences on Response-associated factors<br />
Factor<br />
23<br />
Money<br />
(N=231)<br />
Yeti<br />
(N=108)<br />
Socio-demographics Gender (woman) 40% 26%<br />
Alternative modes<br />
Schedules<br />
Difficulties<br />
Support measures<br />
travel information<br />
High education 58% 53%<br />
Other modes used for commuting 21% 19%<br />
Public transport is realistic alternative 35% 32%<br />
Cycling is realistic alternative 20% 14%<br />
Usual departure time (hour.min) 7.52 7.57<br />
Preferred start of work time (hour.min) 8.24 8.35<br />
Start work later (days) 3.5 3.64<br />
Telework (days) 0.46 0.58<br />
Chauffeuring children duties 16% 27%<br />
High effort perceived with changing <strong>behav</strong>iour 6% 9%<br />
Problems with regional rain 33% 29%<br />
p*<br />
0.01<br />
0.43<br />
0.58<br />
0.63<br />
0.21<br />
0.27<br />
0.20<br />
0.52<br />
0.37<br />
0.02<br />
0.29<br />
0.72<br />
Arrangements with employer 34% 55%
Figure 1: Average response shares by group by treatment<br />
24