The Briefs on the Merits - Bna

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722 Supreme Court Practice, 9th Edition Ch. 13.11(h) Enters., 489 U.S. 235(1989). In Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984), then-Justice Rehnquist stated for the Court: When we find the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete, except in “rare and exceptional circumstances.” Even when the language employed in a statute is not conclusive, the language always remains the foremost guide to legislative intention. 30 <strong>The</strong> reason, as the Court emphasized in S&E Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 406 U.S. 1, 14 n.9 (1972), is found in the caveat of Justice Holmes: “We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means.” 31 <strong>The</strong> Court will, in appropriate circumstances, apply traditional canons of construction in interpreting statutory language. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) (applying doctrine of constitutional avoidance to Partial- Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 so as not to pose an undue burden on a woman’s right to abortion); Lopez v. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. 625, 631 (2006) ((“where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion”) (alteration in original; internal quotation marks omitted); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682, 690 (2001) (applying the doctrine of constitutional doubt in construing a statute to allow detention of aliens only for a reasonable time); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 21 (1999) (when a statute includes terms that have “accumulated settled meaning under * * * the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of these terms”); Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 500–01 (2000) (when Congress uses a word or phrase with a settled meaning at common law, it is presumed to know and adopt that meaning unless the statute indicates otherwise); Bank America Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122, 130 (1983) (giving “great weight to the contemporaneous interpretation of a challenged statute by an agency charged with enforcement”); South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 348 (1998) (specific language “governs the general”); Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 418 (1998) (“where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts rationally and purposely in the disparate inclusion and exclusion”). But see Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 167 (2004) (when statutory meaning is clear, no need to inquire into purposes because “it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed”) (internal citations omitted); Director, Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122, 135 (1995) (describing “the proposition that [a] statute * * * should be liberally construed to achieve its purposes” as the “last redoubt of losing causes”); Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 30 United States v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 n.18 (1940); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 390–95 (1951); United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648 (1961); United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 551 (1979). 31 O. W. Holmes, <strong>The</strong> <strong>The</strong>ory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419 (1899).
Ch. 13.11(h) <strong>The</strong> <strong>Briefs</strong> on the Merits 723 U.S. 361, 373–74 n.6 (1986) (rejecting “application of ‘broad’ purposes of legislation at the expense of specific provisions”); Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980) (the Supreme Court will “respect” the “compromise embodied in the words chosen by Congress,” rather than distorting unambiguous language by resort to interpretative maxims). In interpreting a statute, the Court will consider its place in a broader statutory scheme, rather than viewing statutory language in isolation. Zuni Public School District No. 89 v. Department of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534, 1541 (2007); Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 56 (1995). <strong>The</strong> Court has summarized this principle as follows: <strong>The</strong> words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme. A court must therefore interpret the statute as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme and fit, if possible, all parts into an harmonious whole. Similarly, the meaning of one statute may be affected by other Acts, particularly where Congress has spoken subsequently and more specifically to the topic at hand. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (internal citations and quotations omitted). <strong>The</strong> Court also strives to avoid statutory interpretations that are “absurd or glaringly unjust.” Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 519 U.S. 248, 261 (1997); see also United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 69–70 (1994) (“We do not assume that Congress, in passing laws, intended” absurd results). <strong>The</strong> Court has stated that in matters of statutory construction, it “must be guided to a degree by common sense.” FDA, 529 U.S. at 133. Counsel should take care in making use of legislative history and other external sources in statutory interpretation. Some members of the current Court, most prominently Justice Scalia, have been vocal in their opposition to reliance on legislative history. 32 It is unclear to what extent this resistance has actually affected the Court’s decision making, 33 as there remain many cases in which the Court looks to legislative history for guidance. See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2211 & n.11 (2007); Holly Farms Corp. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 517 U.S. 392, 399 n.6 (1996); 32 “[T]he law is what the law says, and we should content ourselves with reading it rather than psychoanalyzing those who enacted it.” Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 279 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). See also JUSTICE SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 29–37 (1997). Other Justices have expressed similar misgivings. See, e.g., Public Citizen v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 473 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“it does not foster a democratic exegesis for this Court to rummage through unauthoritative materials to consult the spirit of the legislation in order to discover an alternative interpretation of the statute with which the Court is more comfortable”). But see Kozinski, Should Reading Legislative History Be An Impeachable Offense?, 31 SUFFOLK L. REV. 807 (1998); Breyer, On <strong>The</strong> Uses Of Legislative History In Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992); Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Department of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534, 1550 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring) (”any competent counsel challenging the validity of a presumptively valid regulation would examine the legislative history of its authorizing statute before filing suit”). 33See J. Schacter, <strong>The</strong> Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1998); R. Kelso, Statutory Interpretation Doctrine on the Modern Supreme Court and Four Doctrinal Approaches to Judicial Decision-Making, 25 PEPP. L. REV. 37 (1997).
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