Security Council - World Model United Nations

Security Council 

World Model United Nations 2013 

Study Guide

Contact Us 

World Model united Nations 2013 

info@worldmun.org 

www.worldmun.org 

Letters 

Letter from the Secretary General 04 

Letter from the Under-Secretary General 05 

Letter from the Chair 06 

CONteNtS 

Introduction 

The United Nations Security Council 07 

07 

The Situation in Syria 

Historical Background 

09 Timeline of the Conflict 

14 Discussion of the Problem 

16 Key Foreign Actors 

17 Past UN Actions 

18 Proposed Solutions 

19 Bloc Positions 

21 Questions a Resolution Must Answer 

22 Suggestions for Further Research 

22 

The Situation in Mali 


26 Timeline of the 2012 Conflict 

29 Discussion of the Problem 

30 Past UN Actions 

30 Proposed Solutions 

31 Bloc Positions 

33 Questions a Resolution Must Answer 

33 Suggestions for Further Research 

33 

Conclusion 

Position Papers 

33 Closing Remarks 

34 Endnotes 

40 Bibliographic Essay 

Melbourne Host Directorate PTY LTD | Office of Media and Design

Letters 


Letter from the Secretary-General 

dear delegates, 

it is my pleasure and honor to welcome you to the 22nd session of World Model united 

Nations! My name is Charlene Wong, and i am the Secretary-General of WorldMuN 2013. 

Within this document you will find the study guide for your committee. The conference 

staff for WorldMUN 2013 has been working tirelessly over the past months to provide 

you with an unparalleled conference experience, beginning with this guide. Each Head 

Chair has researched extensively to provide you with a foundation for each committee’s 

topic areas. 

We encourage you to use this study guide as the starting point for your exploration of 

your committee’s topics, and your country or character’s policies. The WorldMUN Spirit 

invites you to step into the shoes of your country or character, and to immerse yourself in 

the committee by researching and developing a full understanding of the issues, perspectives, 

and possible solutions on the table. We offer several additional resources online, 

including our WorldMuN 101 Guide and Rules of Procedure, updated for this year. Both 

are available at www.worldmun.org. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to 

contact your Head Chair or Under-Secretary-General. 

Please enjoy reading this study guide, and I look forward to meeting you in Melbourne 

in March! 

Sincerely, 

Charlene S. Wong 

Secretary-General 


secretarygeneral@worldmun.org 

Melbourne Host Directorate PTY LTD | Office of Media and Design 

4

Letter from the Under-Secretary-General 


it is with the utmost honor and pleasure that i welcome you to the Specialized Agencies. 

the SA holds a special place in the heart of Model united Nations; it is here that 

crises are born and delegates rise to the challenge to address quickly evolving issues in 

real-time. With an average size of 20 delegates per committee, the SA promises to deliver 

an intimate and tight-knit environment where every delegate’s voice can be heard and 

appreciated. 

The SA has always made a firm commitment to substantive excellence and lifelike simulations. 

The first measure of that promise starts here with this study guide. Your chair has 

worked tirelessly over these past few months pouring over books in deep Harvard dungeons 

to breathe life into these topics. I am so proud of their work and hope you make 

the most of this initial resource to inspire and guide your preparation for WorldMuN. 

Come March, your chair and the junior staff will be working to deliver a MUN simulation 

that raises the bar of your delegate experience. 

All that being said, the SA would be nothing without you, her committed delegates, who 

challenge and dedicate themselves to addressing head-on the world’s greatest problems, 

both past, present, and future. With ample preparation, devotion, and creativity, 

you will find success in this SA home. 

As a former MUN delegate and SA staffer, I know what it means to live and breathe a 

thrilling and informative MUN experience. Along with our chairs and junior staff, I hope 

to deliver that same experience to you all. Take care, and I cannot wait to meet you in 

person in Melbourne! 

Sincerely, 

Michael Chilazi 

under-Secretary-General of the Specialized 

Agencies 


sa@worldmun.org 


5

Letter from the Chair 


A warm welcome to the twenty-second session of World Model united Nations! this is 

my third (and sadly, final) WorldMUN, and I can’t think of a better way to spend my last 

college spring break than running a committee that means so much to me and that is so 

critical to shaping the face of international diplomacy today. But most of all, i am incredibly 

excited to embrace the amazing city of Melbourne with you all, as WorldMUN heads 

to Australia for the first time! 

A bit more about me – I’m a senior at Harvard College, pursuing a major in Social Studies, 

which is an interesting blend of government, economics, philosophy, and history. When 

I’m not busy with (pretending to do) schoolwork, I enjoy listening to most types of music 

(no country, please) and following professional sports. Because I grew up in Canada, 

went to high school in New York, and attend college near Boston, my allegiances are 

quite scattered: you can catch me rooting for the Maple Leafs in the NHL, the Giants in 

the NFL, and the Celtics in the NBA. 

WorldMUN is truly a conference and social experience like no other. It has given me several 

lifelong friendships over the years, and I hope that you will seize opportunities at 

nightly events and in committee sessions to establish your own. 

If you have any questions regarding our two pressing topics, the situations in Syria and 

Mali, or just want to chat about sports, music, or politics—please do not hesitate to reach 

out to me at sc@worldmun.org. 

Looking forward to meeting everyone next March! 

Warmest regards, 

Aparajita tripathi 

Chair, uN Security Council 


sc@worldmun.org 


6

The United Nations Security 

Council 

the Security Council is comprised of 15 united 

Nations member States, of which China, the United 

States, the united Kingdom of Great Britain and 

Northern ireland, Russia, and France hold permanent 

seats. The Council first convened in January 1946 in 

London. Though most sessions today take place at the 

UN headquarters in New York, the Security Council 

has met in locations outside of the Headquarters. 

Aside from the five aforementioned permanent 

members, the United Nations General Assembly 

selects the additional ten non-permanent members 

for two-year terms. 

According to Article 24 of the United Nations 

Charter, all Security Council member nations “confer 

on the […] Council primary responsibility for the 

maintenance of international peace and security, 

and agree that in carrying out its duties under this 

responsibility the Security Council acts on their 

behalf.” 1 each Security Council delegation has one 

vote, and nine out of 15 votes are necessary to pass 

all procedural motions. Notably, the five permanent 

seats (so-called “P5” nations) have veto power, 

meaning that a negative vote on a Council action 

from one of these powers automatically supersedes 

and negates all affirmative votes by other members. 

the Security Council has the power to mediate 

negotiations among conflicting parties, appoint 

special representatives, issue cease-fires, deploy 

United Nations peacekeeping forces via directives, 

impose economic sanctions, or resolve to pursue 

multilateral military action. 2 

Topic A: The Situation in Syria 

The ongoing Syrian conflict has without a doubt 

become the central fixture of the international 

political stage since its inception in January 2011. A 

manifestation of a broader revolutionary movement 

in the Middle East and North Africa known as the 

‘Arab Spring,’ the Syrian uprisings have occurred as 

a popular response to perceived corrupt government 

rule. Similar to revolutionary sentiment that has 

recently swept Egypt, Yemen, and Libya, the ideas 

informing civil resistance in Syria have included greater 

government accountability, stricter observance of 

human rights, and media openness—all with the 

purpose of bolstering a legitimacy of rule that, as 

many continue to argue, remains noticeably absent 

from President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. August 2012 

was the deadliest month of the conflict to date, with 

an estimated 5,000-6,000 casualties in that month 

alone. 

Against the backdrop of the Syrian uprisings lies a 

history of sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shia 

Muslims. While sectarianism was not an explicit cause 

of the Syrian uprising, it has shaped which states 

are siding with Syrian government leaders, who are 

mostly Alawite Shias, and the opposition, who are 

predominantly Sunni. This Security Council will have 

to evaluate and address both proximate and indirect 

causes of tension in this ongoing conflict. 


“The injustice of foreigners is burned deep into the 

Syrian soul. [Hafez al-] Assad said to me that Syria had 

been betrayed before World War I by Turkey, after it 

by Britain and France, and more recently by the United 

States, which had created the State of Israel. When a 

people is convinced that all of its troubles come from 

abroad, morbid suspicion becomes a national style.” 

-Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, “First Visit 

to Damascus” (1982) 

Syrian Independence and Ba’ath Party Rule 

The Ba’ath Party was founded in 1941 as a 

socialist and Arab nationalist party seeking to exert 

its influence throughout the Arab world. Between 

1946—the year Syria gained independence from 

France—and 1970, some 21 changes in government 

occurred in Syria, leading to ingrained perceptions of 

weak government legitimacy. The quest to establish a 

Syrian identity was confronted with overcoming what 

Daniel Pipes calls “artificiality,” for Lesser Syria—the 

remnant of the ‘Greater Syria’ dating back to the 

peak of the Arab Muslim civilization in the Middle 

Ages—was a “fragmented piece of territory [that] 

came into existence not for geographic or cultural 

reasons, but as a result of European maneuvering.” 3 


7

In addition to weak government legitimacy and high 

government turnover, post-independence Syria also 

fell victim to weak national identity, xenophobia, 

communal tensions, incubation of radical ideologies, 

and revisionist ambitions among some government 

leaders. 4 Within this turbulent context, the Ba’ath 

Party advocated that Syria join a single, powerful Arab 

nation. Alawites, on the other hand, sought to retain 

their independence or associate with Lebanon. 5 

After Syria gained independence in 1946, its 

incipient government experienced a series of military 

coups that would eventually give rise to growing 

leftist sentiment in the country. 6 it was at this time 

that the Syrian Ba’ath and Communist parties 

emerged as rivals—competition that the Ba’ath tried 

to dissolve by leading Syria into a union with Egypt in 

1958. This union disintegrated just three years later, 

and the Ba’ath Party wrested permanent control of 

Syria by 1963. 7 

By this time, the guiding ethos of the Ba’ath Party 

had fundamentally transformed, as pan-Arabism no 

longer motivated the Party. In place of the former 

ardently Arab nationalist party “‘arose Ba’ath 

organizations which focused primarily on their own 

region, which advocated, and created where possible, 

authoritarian centralized governments, which rested 

heavily on military power and which were very close to 

other socialist movements and were less distinctively 

Ba’athist’” 8 in the original sense. this tumultuous 

period was marked by the radicalization of politics 

and the ascendancy of both the armed forces and the 

Alawites in Syria. 9 

Hafez al-Assad, father of current president Bashar 

al-Assad, became commander of the Syrian air 

forces after the Ba’ath Party seized power in 1963. 10 

Following the Syrian coup d’etat of 1966, which saw 

the military faction of the Ba’ath Party overthrow the 

Party’s civilian leadership, Hafez became Syria’s new 

minister of defense and would later oust his rival and 

political mentor, Salah al-Jadid—then-chief of staff of 

the armed forces—to first assume the prime minister 

position and then the elected presidency from 1971 to 

2000. 11 

Hafez al-Assad’s internationally divisive presidential 

tenure was marked both by notoriety and progressive 

reforms. Hafez, an Alawite Shia, promoted a policy 

of secularism, wherein Christians held a protected 

status in Syrian society and the Sunni-majority 

business community maintained close and stable 

relations with the government. 12 On the other hand, 

he also exemplified a rigid attitude toward dissent 

that often culminated in violent suppression, setting 

a precedent strategy of brute force and minimal 

hesitation for his son’s reign. 

Bashar Al-Assad’s Ascent to Power 

Hafez al-Assad died on 10 June 2000, 13 bringing an 

end to his nearly three-decades-long authoritarian 

rule in Syria. Hafez’s oldest son, Basil, had initially been 

the president’s anticipated successor, but Basil died 

in a car accident in 1994, leaving his younger brother, 

Bashar, to carry on their father’s legacy 14 —and to 

maintain the Alawites’ tight grip over political power 

President Hafez al-Assad, father of Bashar al-Assad, was a Ba’ath 

Party leader who served as Syria’s prime minister from 1970 to 1971 

and its president from 1971 to 2000. 

in Syria. Just hours after Hafez al-Assad’s death, the 

Syrian People’s Council convened an emergency 

session to amend the Constitution to lower the 

required age for a Syrian head of state from forty to 

thirty-four—which just so happened to be Bashar’s 

age at the time of his father’s passing. 15 

Hafez al-Assad’s death also prompted demands 

for liberal reforms from Damascus’ intelligentsia, a 

period known as the Damascus Spring. The primary 

figures associated with the Damascus Spring were 

prominent intellectuals Michel Kilo and Riad Seif, 

who spearheaded the founding of informal political 

forums where open political discourse could occur 


8

and civil society could take root. 16 emergent political 

forums included muntadayat (“salons”), in addition 

to the mobilization of the Committees for the Revival 

of Civil Society in Syria. 17 These efforts resulted in 

notable petitions in favor of “political and intellectual 

pluralism,” repeal of the State of Emergency that 

had been declared by Hafez al-Assad in 1963, and 

multiparty democracy. 18 Initially, it seemed at first 

that Bashar al-Assad’s inauguration would give rise 

to lasting liberal reforms: Assad released several 

political prisoners, ostensibly promoted free speech, 

and spoke out against corruption. 19 early hopes were 

soon disheartened, as the government 

thereafter adopted measures to quash 

growing civil opposition, conveying that the 

damascus Spring would not last. 

The year 2000 also marked the arrival of 

the internet and mobile phones to Syria. 20 

Mass availability of these media sources 

got off to a slow start in Syria, as dissenters 

simultaneously faced issues of low speed 

and heavy government regulation, but 

they would, over the course of the next 

decade, become increasingly central to 

public protest in Syria. Historians Nouehied 

and Warren dubbed these prefiguring 

developments a “media revolution”: 

The Arab Spring may have taken the world 

by surprise in 2011, but another upheaval had 

long been underway in the region. It was a 

media revolution that, through satellite television and 

the internet, had connected people from the Atlantic 

to the Gulf like never before, had smashed political 

taboos, had eroded the cults of personality nurtured 

by authoritarian rulers from Damascus to Tripoli, and 

had helped to empower civil society movements that 

were the bedrock of democracy. 21 

Timeline of the Conflict (March 2011 – 

Present) 

A nation that had once found itself at the epicenter 

of a far-flung Islamic empire—its city of Damascus 

served as the capital of the prolific Umayyad dynasty— 

Syria now finds itself plagued by the deadliest civil 

conflict in the country’s modern history. Since its 

inception, the Syrian uprising has claimed a total of 

27,300 lives—19,500 of which were civilian. 22 

Beginning at Daraa 

The now almost 18-month-long conflict began 

in March 2011 in the Sunni-dominated city of 

Daraa, located on Syria’s southern border, when 

demonstrators took to the streets to protest what 

they believed to be wrongful incarceration of several 

outspoken youth. President Bashaar al-Assad’s 

regime authorized the use of deadly force against the 

unarmed protestors, killing fifteen over the course 

of a two-day crackdown near the Omari Mosque. 

The confrontation further emboldened dissidents, 

Bashar al-Assad, a former eye doctor, became president in 2000 upon the death of 

his father, Hafez al-Assad. Despite early indications of liberal reforms, he has since 

led Syria with a strong fist and has been accused of committing numerous human 

rights crimes against dissidents. 

as demonstrators across the country congregated 

around mosques following Friday prayer on March 

25 to speak out against Assad’s rule. Violent unrest 

spread to numerous other provincial capitals in Syria 

in subsequent months, which witnessed government 

security forces quell protest movements. In a historic 

move in April, Assad lifted a 48-year-old state of 

emergency, dismissed the government, and released 

several political prisoners as part of a conciliatory 

gesture to ameliorate the conflict. 23 However, just 

days after revoking the state of emergency, Assad 

deployed troops to subdue civil protest in the coastal 

city of Baniyas in a series of harsh crackdowns that 

quickly dissolved hope that an end to civil strife was 

near. One witness recounted that soldiers in the 


9

village of Bayda were restricting ambulance access 

to the town, denying medical care for the dozens 

of wounded people there. 24 Such humanitarian 

concerns prompted significant international outcry, 

as the united States and european union tightened 

economic sanctions against Syria. 25 

From Daraa to Homs 

Although Assad’s regime was able to moderately 

subdue rebellions in Daraa, it experienced far less 

success applying state force in the city of Homs, 

located in Western Syria’s fertile plain. Situated on the 

Orontes River, Homs serves as a vital link between the 

Mediterranean coastline and interior cities and, most 

importantly, between Syria’s two most populous 

cities—Damascus and Aleppo. Its strategic location 

within Syria’s communication network could explain 

why it would later become a breeding ground for the 

worst instances of brutality in the conflict, both on 

the part of armed rebels and Assad’s security forces. 

Furthermore, Homs has born witness to violence not 

only from the broader anti-regime insurgency but 

also that stemming from sectarian tensions between 

its largely Sunni-majority and Alawite-minority 

populations (more on sectarianism and the Syrian 

Civil War in “Discussion of the Problem” section). 

On 19 April 2011, Assad’s regime unleashed state 

security forces on protestors holding a sit-in at 

the Clock Tower in Homs following several days of 

demonstrations there. 26 The forceful government 

response arrived just one day after Assad lifted the 

widely unpopular emergency rule that had been in 

place in Syria for 48 years. Seemingly antithetical to 

concessionary and pacifying rhetoric from the regime 

immediately prior to the Clock Tower crackdown, 

President Assad’s administration subsequently 

appeared even more determined to quash protests, 

“under any banner whatsoever,” as Syria’s Interior 

Ministry threatened. 27 Indeed, on April 22—what 

opposition leaders dubbed “The Great Friday”— 

state security forces killed upwards of 100 protestors 

across Syria, 28 resulting in the bloodiest day of the 

conflict since its inception. 

However, Homs also illustrated limitations of the 

Assad regime’s ‘clearance strategy,’ which involves 

“thoroughly clearing [a] city, detaining suspected 

opposition members, holding key terrain, and firing 

on anything who resisted.” 29 While the deployment 

of troops to Daraa at the onset of the conflict had 

succeeded at establishing relative stability—a case 

study for Assad’s ‘offensive’ security strategy—and 

allowed forces to then withdraw from the city, the 

sequence of events that unfolded in Homs presented 

a striking counterexample: instead of becoming 

subdued as the state troops’ clearance strategy 

pressed on more aggressively, the opposition became 

increasingly buoyed to react using armed resistance. 30 

the regime ultimately failed to consolidate the 

progress of its Homs clearance operation, as an 

insurgency force retaliated by killing three soldiers in 

late May in the Sunni-majority Rastan district. 31 the 

regime would temporarily direct its attention away 

from Homs to focus on coastal security operations in 

Western Syria for the next few months. 

Intensification of Armed Resistance 

On 6 June 2011, Assad’s regime reported through 

Syrian state television that “armed gangs” had killed 

120 government security forces in the northwestern 

town of Jisrash Shugur in Idlib province, marking 

the first national news of major civil counterstrikes 

against government operatives. 32 Sunni militiamen, 

in concert with individuals who were likely army 

defectors, were responsible for the killings. 33 Assad 

claimed that the armed groups also had backing 

from islamists and terrorists. More importantly, the 

June Jisrash Shugur incident marked a key escalation 

point in what has since become a bloody civil war: 

the insurgency forces began to strengthen and gain 

a significant number of defectors from state secret 

forces, who were allegedly killing soldiers who were 

hesitating or refusing to fire against civilians.” 34 

Moreover, opposition forces and the Assad regime 

maintained differing viewpoints regarding what 

factors had caused this rebellion to intensify. The 

opposition forces emphasized defectors’ discontent 

with their experiences as members of Assad’s troops 

and willingness to join the rebels’ cause, whereas the 

state regime highlighted the involvement of terroristlinked 

armed groups that had supposedly entered 

the fray. 35 In addition, this was not the first episode 

of violent clashes between Assad’s Ba’ath Party 

10 


and protestors in Jisr al-Shughour: a similar rebel 

movement transpired in 1980, when Jisr al-Shughour 

residents attacked the Ba’ath Party headquarters in 

1980, rendering the region historically volatile ground 

with respect to government relations. 36 

Conflict Spreads to Hama 

By July 2011, the city of Hama, also located on the 

Orontes River, also established itself as one of the 

primary arenas for anti-government protest. Though 

demonstrations in Hama had originated in March, 

when the initial massacre at daraa ignited outcry 

across Syria, Hama truly became a focal point of 

civil strife following a relatively peaceful anti-Assad 

demonstration attended by nearly a half million 

people on 1 July, calling for the fall of the regime. 37 in 

response, groups known as the shabiha—local-based 

pro-Assad paramilitaries 38 —and regime security 

forces opened fire, killing at least 14 people. 39 By the 

next day, Assad had removed the governor of Hama, 

Ahmad Khaled Abdel Aziz, paving the way for his 

security forces to commence a campaign of arrests 

and search and seizure operations. 40 Sarah Leah 

Wilson, Middle East director of the Human Rights 

Watch (HRW) observed in July, “security forces 

have responded to protests with the brutality that’s 

become familiar over the past several months.” 41 On 31 

July 2011, the Syrian army once again stormed Hama, 

this time to suppress dissent on the eve of the holy 

month of Ramadan. The incident resulted in 95 to 100 

deaths, according to various estimates from human 

A child looks on against the backdrop of wreckage. 

rights organizations within Syria. 42 in a noteworthy 

historical parallel, current President Bashar al-Assad’s 

father, Hafez al-Assad, ordered the Syrian army to 

crush dissent voiced by the Muslim Brotherhood in 

Hama in February 1982, 43 killing an estimated 20,000 

civilians. 44 

Formation and Mobilization of the Free Syrian Army 

(FSA) 

At the end of July 2011, defectors from the Syrian 

Armed Forces corralled and launched the primary 

opposition group of the conflict, the Free Syrian Army. 

As a necessary point of clarification, the Free Syrian 

Army (FSA) should not be confused with the Syrian 

Army, which is commanded by Assad and is part of 

Syria’s formal state security apparatus. The Free 

Officers Movement first began to take shape when 

Syrian Army member—Lt. Col. Hussein Harmoush— 

defected from the armed state forces, bringing 150 of 

his army colleagues with him to bordering Turkey. 45 

In a video, Harmoush emphasized that their priority 

was “the protection of the protestors who are asking 

for freedom and democracy.” 46 But a different tone 

would eventually emerge among some defected 

officers—those who were responsible for starting 

the FSA. On 29 July, Colonel Riad Asaad, along with 

six former Syrian Army officers, announced from a 

Turkish province that they had formed the Free Syrian 

Army, and they further made it clear that they would 

“consider any member of the Assad security forces 

that kill [their] people a target to [their] rifles.” 47 

11 


International Pressure Mounts 

About two weeks after the Hama massacre of July 

2011, U.S. President Barack Obama expressed in a 

written statement that the “future of Syria must be 

determined by its people, but President Bashar al- 

Assad is standing in their way […] For the sake of the 

Syrian people, the time has come for President Assad 

to step down.” 48 David Cameron, Angela Merkel, and 

Nicolas Sarkozy—the leaders of the United Kingdom, 

Germany, and France, respectively—issued a joint 

statement similarly calling on Assad to relinquish 

power. 49 

August 2011 also saw tightened sanctions against 

Syria in response to the regime’s ongoing violent 

reactions to public dissent. On 19 August, the 

European Union agreed to level stricter political and 

economic sanctions—the latter involving plans to ban 

the import of crude oil from Syria into the eu. 50 this 

development was significant as it supplemented a 

new round of American sanctions already announced 

by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, banning 

American imports or other cross-border transactions 

involving Syrian petroleum and petroleum products; 51 

US sanctions alone would not have had a pronounced 

effect, given that Syria has not been a major source 

of oil for the United States. However, while sanctions 

effective as of September 2011 from the U.S. and 

european were costing Syria an estimated uSd 

$400M a month by December, 52 they accomplished 

little in the way of compelling Assad’s regime to scale 

back its violent streak of suppressing public dissent. 

Security Forces Retake Homs, Capital of the Revolution 

On 27 September, regime security forces 

commenced a resource-heavy campaign to once 

again seize control of the Rastan district of Homs, 

the strategic area that connects Homs to Hama 

on the other side of the Orontes River. 53 the siege 

occurred in response to a dangerously maturing 

armed resistance movement that had carried out 

deadly ambushes in the city and captured an army 

colonel earlier that month. 54 Throughout October and 

November, the Free Syrian Army repeatedly clashed 

with soldiers in Homs, indicating that widespread civil 

war was imminent. escalating armed resistance in 

Homs during these months was also notable for the 

role of a local anti-Assad militia known as the Khalid 

bin Walid Brigade, which operated alongside the 

larger Free Syrian Army (FSA). 55 the Brigade entered 

periodic and bloody skirmishes with regime forces 

until it eventually withdrew from Homs in March 

2012, 56 but not without leaving behind an ever more 

complex civil war landscape, in which both the regime 

and the opposition tapped support from local militia 

groups and in which anti-government forces could 

not reach consensus about how to engage President 

Bashar al-Assad—if at all. 57 

United Nations Response 

On 4 October 2011, the Russian Federation and 

China vetoed the first of what would become several 

attempts by the United Nations Security Council 

to formally condemn Syria and the government of 

President Bashar al-Assad. 58 The two P5 members of 

the Council were opposed to the idea of imposing 

sanctions on damascus. exactly four months later, 

Russia and China again vetoed a draft resolution 

that would have demanded that Assad’s forces and 

the opposition camps alike cease all violence and 

retaliation in hopes of finally concluding the then- 

10-month-long uprising. 59 the Russian delegate, 

Vitaly Churkin, cited concern about conveying an 

“unbalanced” message to Syria, while the Chinese 

delegate, Li Baodong, emphasized the importance of 

allowing the Syrian people to pursue a reform agenda 

best suited to their national needs and interests. 60 

The Syrian government’s amplified bombardment of 

Homs served as a backdrop for the Security Council’s 

discussions, magnifying the sense of urgency for 

international action. 61 

In light of the regime’s renewed offensive, UN 

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Arab League 

Secretary-General Nabil Elaraby appointed former UN 

Secretary-General Kofi Annan on 23 February as the 

Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and League 

of Arab States on the Syrian Crisis. 62 the stated 

goal of the appointment was to promote a Syrianled 

political solution to the uprising that would be 

receptive to the democratic goals of Syria, involving 

joint discussion between both Assad’s regime and 

the opposition forces. 63 As of March, however, there 

was still no formal resolution passed by the Security 

12 


Council strictly condemning Syria or calling for tough 

action against the country from the international 

community. 

In May 2012, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon called 

on the Syrian government to bring an end to violence and consistent 

arrests of protestors. 

Massacre at Houla and “Real War” 

On 25 May 2012, the Syrian government employed 

use of heavy weaponry along with shabiha (militia) 

support during a crackdown on two oppositioncontrolled 

villages in the town of Houla. The 

confrontation unfolded into a massacre that left 

108 people dead, including dozens of women and 

children. 64 The Houla massacre was a significant 

flashpoint in the conflict for several reasons: first, 

it was considered by many to be the single worst 

attack against civilians in the uprising until that 

point; 65 second, it elicited the first sharply-worded 

Security Council condemnation, of the “strongest 

possible terms,” in a non-binding statement; 66 third, 

it underscored the deep shortcomings of a sixweek-old 

UN ceasefire plan implemented to bring 

an end to the bloodshed in Syria; 67 and fourth, a uN 

statement issued on behalf of Secretary-General 

Ban Ki-moon and the Joint Special Envoy Kofi Annan 

declared that the massacre was “a flagrant violation 

of international law and of the commitments of 

the Syrian government to cease the use of heavy 

weapons in population centers and violence in all its 

forms.” 68 In response to events in Houla, France, the 

united Kingdom, italy, Spain, Canada, and Australia 

all expelled their senior Syrian diplomats. 69 

the following month, President Bashar al-Assad 

once again asserted that foreign-backed militants 

and conspirators were responsible for leading the 

nationwide uprisings. On 23 June, Assad reshuffled 

his government and insisted he was still pursuing 

reforms. 70 He retained his interior, defense, and 

foreign ministries but reportedly filled most remaining 

government positions with Ba’ath Party loyalists. 71 He 

informed his cabinet that Syria was “facing a real war 

from outside, and dealing with a war differs from how 

we would deal with internal sides in Syria.” 72 On the 

tragedy in Houla, Assad dismissed his government’s 

involvement, reflecting, “In reality, even monsters 

would not carry out what we have seen, especially 

what we saw in the Houla massacre …We wish that 

it does not remain in the memory of our children and 

grandchildren.” 73 Assad’s statement illustrates that 

numerous and often conflicting readings of the Syrian 

conflict exist, each with their own conviction about 

who is to be blamed for the ongoing violence and 

mounting death toll. Among other action items, this 

Council must decide how it can clearly and confidently 

identify perpetrators of the bloodshed. 

Assad’s Regime Suffers Setbacks 

In July 2012, members of the Free Syrian Army 

(FSA) laid siege to Aleppo, located roughly 200 

miles north of the capital at damascus. Aleppo, 

Syria’s industrial capital, quickly became the newest 

battlefield in the uprising, as the city suffered heavy 

bombardment and started to resemble “a full-scale 

street war,” according to one UK-based human rights 

group focusing on Syria. 74 At the end of the month, 

United States Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, 

declared that Assad’s assault on Aleppo would 

be “a nail in his coffin.” 75 in early August, the Free 

Syrian army launched a successful counter-assault 

in Salah al-Din, reasserting control over the strategic 

neighborhood—a crucial supply route of government 

troops—from regime forces. 76 

At the start of August, Amnesty international 

issued a report accusing the Syrian government of 

committing crimes against humanity in Aleppo and 

strongly advised that the situation in Syria be referred 

to the international Criminal Court immediately. 77 

According to Article 13 of the founding Rome Statute 

of the ICC, the “Court may exercise its jurisdiction 

with respect to a crime” if it is referred to the ICC 

prosecutor by a State party to the Statute or by the 

13 


Syrian rebels clash with government forces in Idlib, located in northwestern Syria, in March 2012 

Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN 

Charter. 78 Because Syria is not party to the Rome 

statute, any crimes against humanity committed on 

its territory would have to be referred to the ICC 

by the Security Council, which has seen significant 

intransigence in the past year from China and the 

Russian Federation—both permanent seat-holders— 

on the issue of punitive action against Assad’s 

government. When the UN General Assembly, 

which lacks the enforcement power of the Security 

Council, passed a non-binding resolution on 3 August 

demanding that President Assad resign and that 

Syria “immediately and visibly” commit to halting 

violence in the country, 79 the Russian Federation 

and China similarly blasted the effort, arguing that 

the resolution risked further polarizing the conflict 

by only condemning one party to the fighting—the 

Syrian government—and seemingly offering support 

for the other—the militant rebels. 80 

On 6 August, the Syrian government announced 

the formal dismissal of Prime Minister Riyad Farid 

Hijab; the next day, ex-PM Hijab relayed through a 

spokesperson that he had defected to the opposition 

forces, “from the killing and terrorist regime [of 

President Assad].” 81 in the statement, Muhammad 

el-Etri, Hijab’s spokesperson, also denied that the 

Syrian government had fired Hijab, instead stating 

that the administration’s dismissal arrived after 

Syrian intelligence learned that Hijab had fled the 

country. 82 The ex-PM’s allegations about the internal 

agenda of the Syrian government and his account of 

widespread defections from the regime contributed 

to perceptions, both domestic and foreign, that the 

regime is now on the verge of losing power. Etri 

further warned Al Jazeera, “the regime speaks only 

one language: the language of blood.” 83 Although 

Assad’s forces face more global scrutiny and backlash 

than ever, the prospects of peaceful political dialogue 

and transition have started to appear increasingly 

bleak. 

Resignation of Special Joint Envoy Kofi Annan 

Hopes of a concerted diplomatic solution to the 

Syrian uprising were also delivered a blow earlier 

that month, when, on 2 August, Special Envoy of 

the UN and the League of Arab States on the Syrian 

conflict Kofi Annan submitted his resignation from 

the position. Former uN Secretary-General Annan 

painted a terrifying image of Syria for the world: he 

blamed the Syrian government’s unyieldingness, 

unrelenting rebel militancy, and absence of unity in the 

Security Council for his failed mission and his personal 

decision. 84 In the face of both a divided Syrian rebel 

movement and a divided Security Council, Annan 

emphasized that the centerpiece of future diplomatic 

missions would have to be unity of purpose. 

Discussion of the Problem 

Human Rights Violations 

A United Nations report published on 15 August 

2012 confirmed that both Assad’s forces and Syrian 

rebels associated with either the Free Syrian Army 

or local protest groups have committed war crimes. 

According to the report, defectors revealed that 

army commanders provided orders to shoot civilians 

and even to torture detainees, as a part of “state- 

14 


directed policy.” 85 Moreover, for those international 

groups and representatives who have called for 

more even-handed scrutiny of both Assad’s formal 

security apparatus and the rebel militants, the report 

concluded that crimes committed by rebel groups 

“did not reach the gravity, frequency, and scale” of 

those executed by the government’s 

security forces. 86 Perhaps the report’s 

most alarming account concerned 

harm inflicted on Syria’s children, which 

has included shootings, beatings, 

whippings, and electrical shocks—all 

of which culminated in 125 child deaths 

over the course of the commission’s 

reporting period (15 February 2012 – 20 

July 2012). 87 The summary finding of this 

independent international commission 

of inquiry was that the human rights 

situation in Syria had worsened since 

the end period of the preceding Human 

Rights Council report, mid-February. 

On 10 September, the United Nations 

High Commissioner for Human Rights 

Navi Pillay addressed the UN Human 

Rights Council, emphasizing that 

the “use of heavy weapons by the 

[Syrian] government and the shelling 

of populated areas have resulted in 

high numbers of civilian casualties, 

mass displacement of civilians inside and outside 

the country and a devastating human crisis.” 88 Pillay 

also expressed a sentiment common among many 

UN figures that Syria should be referred to the 

international Criminal Court for ongoing human rights 

infringements occurring on its territory, in an effort to 

revoke perpetrators’ sense of impunity. 

Sectarianism 

though sectarianism was not an explicit cause of 

the Syrian uprising, it does shed light on important 

undercurrents of the conflict useful to understanding 

its evolution. Sunni Arabs make up 60 percent of the 

Syrian population, while Shia Muslims, Christians, 

and Kurds constitute its largest minorities. the Assad 

family comes from a Shia sect known as the Alawites, 

a group that constitutes roughly twelve percent 

of Syria’s population and has resided along Syria’s 

coastal Jibal al ‘Alawiyin range since the reign of 

the Ottoman empire. 89 through the presidencies of 

Hafez al-Assad and his son Bashar al-Assad—and their 

predominantly Alawite government appointees— 

the Alawites have in effect ruled Syria for over forty 

Syria’s minority Alawite population is mostly concentrated in the country’s north/ 

northwestern region. 

years. The 1963 coup that ushered the Ba’ath Party 

to power in Syria had also relied on rural Shia support 

networks. 90 

Additionally, close to 70 percent of the Syrian army’s 

non-conscripted “career soldiers” and an estimated 

80 percent of Syria’s officer corps are Alawites. 91 While 

the theme of protestors’ messages over the course 

of the uprising has not been religious, it is important 

to note that most of the demonstrators are Sunni. 

In September 2011, Al Jazeera special respondent 

Nir Rosen, who visited several of the conflict’s focal 

cities, observed, “the opposition is loath to admit it 

but they are all effectively Sunni.” 92 Syrian Christians, 

meanwhile, have been said to largely support Assad’s 

regime namely because they are apprehensive about 

the unknown landscape of a post-Assad Syria. 93 the 

15 


Alawite regime has enjoyed support from other 

minorities in Syria as well, who fear the establishment 

of a Sunni Islamist government in the aftermath of 

Assad’s potential demise. 94 

In October 2011, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary 

Clinton informed the Associated Press that “[it] is 

not yet accepted…by many groups in Syria that their 

life will be better without Assad than with Assad 

[…] There are a lot of minority groups that are very 

concerned.” 95 Although Assad verbally committed to 

a “national dialogue” on reform after the government 

crackdown on protests in Jisr al-Shughour, 96 any 

major reforms have yet to be instated. Moreover, the 

regime realizes that reforms involving representative 

government could likely spell a prompt exit of the 

Assad-led Alawites from rule, which in large part 

explains the regime’s continued intransigence 

towards facilitating a peaceful and inclusive political 

solution to popular unrest. indeed, some historians 

posit that the Syrian government might view this 

crisis as an existential battle for Alawites’ survival and 

retention of power in modern Syria, grounded in fear 

about the return of “historical Sunni hegemony over 

the region.” 97 A geographic analysis of the crisis could 

lend itself to such an interpretation. 

A Geographic Look at the Conflict 

The civil war has thus far largely played out in or 

near Syria’s Western coastal region, within many 

Alawite-majority areas. Today, the two provinces 

of Latakia and Tartus are home to approximately 

75 percent of Syria’s Alawite population: over four 

decades of Ba’ath Party rule, they experienced an 

influx of Alawites from the traditional Alawite base in 

the mountains. 98 

The conflict-ridden cities of Homs and Hama 

also have a significant Alawite population—a 

consequence of policies dating to the administration 

of Bashar al-Assad’s father, Hafez, which encouraged 

Alawites to move from coastal areas towards the 

central plain. 99 One possible theory explaining the 

conflict’s exacerbation might point to Assad’s use 

of the clearance strategy to tighten the Alawite 

government’s hold over Alawite-dominated areas— 

again, perhaps, to act on deep-seated concerns about 

existential threats to the preservation of the Alawite- 

led power structure in Syria. 

Key Foreign Actors 

Iran 

In early August, Saeed Jalil—top national security 

advisor of Shiite-dominated Iran—publicly pledged 

Iran’s support for al-Assad’s Alawite government in 

the ongoing crisis. 100 Iran’s diplomatic input arrived 

on the heels of Kofi Annan’s resignation as the Joint 

Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League 

of Arab States on the Syrian armed conflict. While 

on a trip to Lebanon, Jalil stated, “[we] believe that 

Syria’s friends must help to totally stop the violence, 

organize national dialogue and general elections 

Bashar al-Assad with Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinjad, who 

has consistently voiced support for the Syrian president despite 

growing international outcry against human rights violations that 

have been perpetrated by his administration. 

in this country, and organize humanitarian aid for 

the Syrian population.” 101 Despite Iran’s ostensible 

commitment to ending violence in Syria, Western 

powers and Israel insist that Iran has been serving 

as the Syrian government’s primary ally in providing 

Assad with advice and resources on how to suppress 

widespread public protests, given Iran’s own past 

experience with mass demonstrations following 

its 2009 presidential elections. Furthermore, on 

22 August 2012, the uN declared that it had in fact 

amassed sufficient intelligence that Iran has been 

providing funds, weapons, and intelligence to Assad 

in his regime’s violent campaign to subdue opposition 

groups in his country. 102 

Iraq 

Reports have suggested that Iraq is allowing Iran 

to use its airspace to transport weapons to President 

16 


Assad’s besieged security forces. In early September 

2012, United States Senators John McCain of Arizona, 

Joe Liebermann of Connecticut, and Lindsey Graham 

of South Carolina traveled to Baghdad to meet with 

Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to strongly warn 

Iraq against such complicit action, whereupon Iraq 

firmly denied that it has been providing any such 

deliberate support. 103 

Turkey 

Although neighboring Turkey had once been a 

close ally to Assad’s government, it has since adopted 

a hardline stance against Syria as the crisis has 

unfolded. Mostly notably, Turkey witnessed an influx 

Protestors demonstrate in front of the Syrian consulate in 

neighboring Istanbul in late May 2012. 

of Sunni refugees into its territory following Syrian 

security forces’ clearance operations in northern Idlib 

province. Additionally, the Free Syrian Army (FSA), 

established at the end of July in 2011, maintains its 

headquarters in Turkey—leading Assad to speculate 

that militants from Syrian opposition groups have 

been transporting weapons through and finding 

training resources within that country. In 2011 Turkey 

also adopted tangible measures to denounce the 

actions of the Syrian government, enacting both an 

arms embargo and other comprehensive sanctions 

against Syria. 104 

Russia 

Russia’s role in the Syrian civil war has attracted 

perhaps the most international attention, primarily 

due to uncertainty surrounding Russia’s specific 

motivations in supporting Assad’s government and 

stalling decisive international action against the 

regime’s brutality. Since it achieved formal statehood 

in 1946, Syria has received substantial military and 

economic support from the former Soviet Union and 

Russian Federation. Most relevant to the current 

crisis, Russia and Syria have shared a strong historical 

relationship with regard to arms sales. Russia is the 

second-largest arms exporter in the world, behind 

the United States, and often creates markets for its 

weapons in countries that are “unwilling or unable” 

to purchase arms from the u.S. 105 Given that the 

european union and the united States imposed 

comprehensive sanctions and embargoes against 

Syria in 2011, Russia is a key remaining vendor for 

Assad’s regime as it seeks to keep restless and 

increasingly violent opposition groups at bay. The 

Russian Federation is keen on preventing the Syrian 

uprising from turning into ‘another Libya’—when the 

United Nations imposed an arms embargo on Libya in 

February 2011106 and Russia reportedly lost $4 billion in 

arms contracts107--and will use whichever means at its 

disposal to protect its economic interests, especially 

its powerful veto in this Security Council. Moreover, 

Western powers likely harbor general fears about 

Russia exerting too much political influence in the 

Middle east. 

Past uN Actions 

United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) 

On 25 March 2012, Kofi Annan, the Joint Special 

Envoy of the United Nations and League of Arab 

States to Syria, proposed a six-point plan that was 

accepted by Syria and endorsed by this Security 

Council. The six points were as follows: 

“1) commit to work with the Envoy in an inclusive 

Syrian-led political process to address the legitimate 

aspirations and concerns of the Syrian people, and, 

to this end, commit to appoint an empowered 

interlocutor when invited to do so by the Envoy; 

2) commit to stop the fighting and achieve urgently 

an effective United Nations supervised cessation of 

armed violence in all its forms by all parties to protect 

civilians and stabilize the country. 

To this end, the Syrian Government should 

immediately cease troop movements towards, and 

end the use of heavy weapons in, population centres, 

and begin pullback of military concentrations in and 

17 


around population centres. 

As these actions are being taken on the ground, the 

Syrian Government should work with the Envoy to 

bring about a sustained cessation of armed violence 

in all its forms by all parties with an effective United 

Nations supervision mechanism. 

Similar commitments would be sought by the 

Envoy from the opposition and all relevant elements 

to stop the fighting and work with him to bring about 

a sustained cessation of armed violence in all its 

forms by all parties with an effective United Nations 

supervision mechanism; 

3) ensure timely provision of humanitarian 

assistance to all areas affected by the fighting, 

and to this end, as immediate steps, to accept and 

implement a daily two-hour humanitarian pause and 

to coordinate exact time and modalities of the daily 

pause through an efficient mechanism, including at 

local level. 

4) intensify the pace and scale of release of 

arbitrarily detained persons, including especially 

vulnerable categories of persons, and persons 

involved in peaceful political activities, provide 

without delay through appropriate channels a list of 

all places in which such persons are being detained, 

immediately begin organizing access to such locations 

and through appropriate channels respond promptly 

to all written requests for information, access or 

release regarding such persons; 

5) ensure freedom of movement throughout the 

country for journalists and a non-discriminatory visa 

policy for them; 

6) respect freedom of association and the right to 

demonstrate peacefully as legally guaranteed.” 108 

Some groups within the heterogeneous Syrian 

opposition rejected the plan for not being aggressive 

enough, while others expressed willingness to abide 

by Annan’s blueprint so long as Assad’s regime 

fulfilled its promises as well. 109 the 300-person united 

Nations observer mission ultimately proved to be too 

small to tackle a civil war that was far too advanced 

in its progression. Further, many Syrians embroiled in 

the violence criticized the plan for not being stringent 

enough and thus for allowing Syrian security forces 

more time to carry out its campaign of executions. 110 

Annan’s resignation on 2 August 2012 as envoy above 

all illustrated that a UN-led effort will require good 

faith commitment from Assad’s regime and consensus 

among key member states of the United Nations. On 

19 August 2012, the UNSMIS mandate finally came to 

an end. It is now up to this executive body to decide 

whether the Syrian civil war is beyond diplomatic 

redress and warrants direct military intervention or 

whether Security Council consensus regarding the 

conflict can still be achieved—and expeditiously so. 

Proposed Solutions 

Armed Intervention 

Humanitarian concerns regarding the Syrian civil 

war are on the verge of reaching a tipping point—one 

that could compel external military intervention to 

decelerate Syria’s mounting death toll. However, this 

particular debate has stimulated numerous salient 

comparisons with the 2011 military intervention in 

Libya. First, Syria is one-tenth the size of Libya but 

houses a population three times as large, which also 

explains why the conflict has largely been confined to 

the Western part of the country, where the majority 

of Syrians live. 111 Secondly, the opposition in Syria is 

deeply fragmented and disorganized. On 7 March 

2012, United States Secretary of Defense Leon E. 

Panetta stated, testifying in front of the Senate 

Armed Services Committee, “[it] is not clear what 

constitutes the Syrian armed opposition – there has 

been no single unifying military alternative that can 

be recognized, appointed, or contacted.” 112 UNHCR chief Antonio Gutteres (2005 – present) address the United 

Nations Security Council on the crisis in Syria 

thus, a 

hypothetical multi-state coalition effort in Syria could 

not rely on allying with a unified and coordinated 

18 


Syrian opposition force to dislodge Assad from 

power. Thirdly, armed intervention as a strategy does 

not enjoy unanimous regional support around Syria 

as it did around Libya in 2011. 113 Most notably, Iran 

and Russia have expressed positions sympathetic to 

President Assad’s agenda. 

UN Embargo 

Because there is still no united Nations-authorized 

embargo against Syria, member states—the Russian 

Federation in particular—can continue to arm Assad’s 

regime under the premise that these transactions 

are wholly ‘non-political’ in nature. Continued arms 

shipments to Syria could, as u.S. Secretary of State 

Hillary Clinton has repeatedly argued, cause the 

conflict to escalate further rather than move closer 

towards resolution. The Russian Federation will likely 

be the most vociferous dissenter to this approach, 

given its economic interest in retaining historically 

lucrative sales contracts with Syria. If passed, such an 

embargo would immediately freeze all funds, assets, 

and economic resources belonging to Assad and his 

regime on UN member states’ territories and halt 

member states’ direct or indirect supply or transfer 

of arms to Syria. 

Referral of President Bashar al-Assad to the 

International Criminal Court (ICC) 

As of early August 2012, at least ten members of 

the European Union were in favor 

of referring President Assad and the 

situation in Syria to the international 

Criminal Court, 114 an independent 

international body responsible for 

adjudication on global disputes 

involving genocides, crimes against 

humanity, and other war crimes. 

However, some European diplomats 

have also raised concerns that pursuing 

justice through the iCC might thwart 

efforts at a political resolution to the 

conflict. However, according to the 

Human Rights Watch, “[if] a convincing 

case is made by the EU (including the 

United Kingdom) that the ICC–as an 

independent and impartial judicial 

institution—will examine actions by 

community 

all sides to the Syrian conflict, this can go a long way 

toward countering Russian and Chinese objections 

that Security Council measures on Syria would be 

biased.” 115 Nevertheless, the Security Council would 

still have to prevent a possible Russian or Chinese 

veto to refer the situation in Syria to the ICC in the 

first place. 

Bloc Positions 

North America, Western Europe, and Others 

In August 2012, President Obama warned, along 

similar statements made by Secretary of State 

Clinton, that if Bashar al-Assad’s regime applied 

chemical or biological weapons in the civil conflict, 

such actions would provoke a military response from 

the United States. One of the United States’ primary 

concerns as the war has waged on has been fear of 

such weapons falling into the wrong hands—those of 

rogue or armed terrorist groups. The US’s message 

has thus been pointedly barred at both Assad’s 

administration and other players involved in the 

deadly ground fighting. Michael Eisenstadt, a director 

at the Washington institute for Near eastern Policy, 

argues that Syria has the most advanced chemical 

warfare system in the world, 116 suggesting that its 

deployment would be catastrophic. 

despite the fact that British Prime Minister ruled 

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned in August 2012 that the introduction of 

chemical weapons to the Syrian conflict would be a grave “red line” for the international 

19 


out military action earlier in 2012, he discussed, as of 

November 2012, the possibility of a military response, 

which may involve no-fly zones over Syria (an idea 

originated by U.S. Secretary Clinton) and arming 

rebels with anti-aircraft guns. 117 British Foreign 

Secretary William Hague stated on 13 November 

2012, “We are not excluding any option in the future 

because…the Syrian crisis is getting worse and worse 

all the time.” 118 

At the end of August 2012, French president Francois 

Hollande urged Syria to come up with an “inclusive 

and representative” provisional government, which 

he said France would recognize upon its formation. 119 

France, in line with its Western allies the united 

States and Great Britain, has also stated it will view 

the use of chemical weapons as legitimate grounds 

for military intervention in Syria. 

Australia, in the meantime, was one of the 

first countries to advocate recommending Syrian 

president Bashar al-Assad to the international 

Criminal Court in June 2011. 120 Critiquing inaction on 

the part of the uN Security Council, Foreign Minister 

Kevin Rudd pledged Australia’s support for the Arab 

League’s efforts to bring peace to Syria. Addressing 

the Australian Parliament on 15 February 2012, Rudd 

emphasized, “The full membership of the UNSC 

must accept its responsibility to the people of Syria 

by listening to the unified voice of the world’s Arab 

leaders” and added that “Russia and Chine need to 

reconsider their commitment to the Syrian people.” 121 

Current Foreign Minister Bob Carr, who succeeded 

Minister Rudd in March 2012, worked to mobilize 

humanitarian assistance to Syria and supported Kofi 

Annan’s ultimately failed Peace Plan. 122 

East Asia 

While China has traditionally remained neutral on 

matters relating to the Middle East, it has been vocal 

about the Syrian conflict. Foreign policy analysts 

speculate that China, like Russia, does not want any 

U.S. influence in the region to obstruct China’s access 

to the Middle East’s plentiful energy resources. 

In addition, given its own history with Western 

intervention, China may be reluctant to stand by as 

another Western-led armed intervention occurs. Most 

notably, China has exercised its veto as a permanent 

member to prevent Security Council authorization of 

direct military involvement in Syria. 

Regarding the Republic of Korea’s stance, UN 

Permanent Representative Kim Sook stated when 

the country beat Cambodia for a non-permanent spot 

on the UNSC, “My country’s position is not very much 

far from what has been discussed in the Security 

Council” but did not offer a more detailed stance. 

Korea may thus find itself pressed to vocalize a clear 

position on the Syria question. 

South Asia 

Pakistan’s position on the Syrian conflict has 

coincided with that of Russia and China insofar as 

Pakistan opposes military intervention. Pakistani’s 

acting UN Ambassador Raza Bashir Tarar has stated, 

“It is only through inclusive dialogue and a political 

process that Syria can chart out a course towards a 

stable, secure, and prosperous future.” 123 He further 

argued, “The primary responsibility for ensuring the 

safety and security of [the] Syrian people rests with 

the Syrian government.” 124 tarar also expressed 

that the Syrian crisis should not deflect the global 

community’s attention from a lingering and 

unresolved Palestinian issue, which he said “remains 

at the heart of tension conflict in the Middle Eastern 

region.” 125 

Eastern Europe 

As has been mentioned earlier in this guide, Russia 

has assumed an intransigent position on the situation 

in Syria, one grounded in, as a top Kremlin negotiator 

put it, “a matter of principle.” 126 the Russian Federation 

would have the international community believe that 

its stance against military intervention in Syria stems 

from mindfulness about exacerbating instability in 

the region rather than support for Bashar al-Assad’s 

authoritarian regime. Most recently, Western powers 

have started to exert increasing pressure against 

Russia to present viable alternatives to bringing peace 

to Syria if it so vehemently opposes direct military 

intervention. As a New York Times article pointed out 

in June 2012, Russia faces significant risks—at the very 

least, reputational ones—in the Middle because of its 

unbending position: the Arab world could perceive 

Moscow as a supporter of dictatorships, especially if 

Assad manages to stay in power. 127 

20 


Azerbaijan tends to pursue a foreign policy of 

non-alignment but has spoken out against Assad’s 

regime for taking up arms against its own people, 

and Azerbaijan has maintained it cannot maintain 

cooperative relations with Syria for that reason. 

Latin America and the Caribbean 

Argentina expressed regret over China and 

Russia’s veto of multiple Security Council resolutions 

on the crisis in Syria and has called for an end to the 

violence and stricter adherence to human rights in 

the country. Argentina was a supporter of uN Special 

Envoy Kofi Annan’s Six Point Plan. 128 

Guatemala likewise viewed Chinese and Russian 

vetoes as a disappointment to the Council’s potential 

for constructive action amidst a rapidly deteriorating 

human rights situation in Syria and, further, 

considered them a threat to the UNSC’s legitimacy. 129 

Africa 

Morocco has repeatedly expressed that it would 

like to see the Syrian conflict resolved peacefully. 

In January 2012, Morocco led and distributed an 

Arab-European draft resolution that expressed 

concern about the deteriorating state of conflict 

in Syria and further called on Syrian authorities to 

“fully cooperate” with the Arab League Mission to 

Syria. 130 To Morocco’s deep disappointment, the draft 

resolution was vetoed by both China and the Russian 

Federation in early February. 

As a newly voted member of the current Security 

Council, Rwanda brings a unique perspective on 

war, peace, and genocide, having witnessed the 

1994 genocide in which roughly a million Tutsis died. 

Syria and Rwanda are often brought up in tandem 

regarding the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine 

of international law, which was unanimously adopted 

at the 2005 uN World Summit. R2P stipulates that 

the international community has the responsibility 

to apply appropriate humanitarian, diplomatic, and 

other means to protect populations from genocide, 

war crimes, and crimes against humanity, if the State 

fails to fulfill these functions. 131 

togo has urged more expedient action from the 

Security Council, in light of several vetoed resolutions 

on Syria in 2012, emphasizing that the UNSC bears 

a responsibility to bring peace and security to the 

Syrian people. 

Questions a Resolution Must Answer 

(QARMA) 

1. is a political solution to the Syrian crisis still 

possible, and does it present the optimal course 

of action from this Security Council? if so, what 

will form the basis of a new political process in 

Syria? What recommendations will the Council 

make regarding transitional governing bodies 

and elections? 

2. How can the Security Council clearly and 

confidently delineate the central perpetrators 

in the ongoing violence? 

Russia has proven to be a reliable ally of the Syrian government and has refused to turn against Assad as quickly as its Western counterparts, 

here seen voting against a Security Council resolution on Syria. 

21 


3. Should Bashar al-Assad be recommended to 

the international Criminal Court? 

4. Is armed intervention a feasible and effective 

approach? 

5. How does the Security Council plan to 

coordinate with other united Nations agencies 

to address this issue, and what other resources 

does it intend to employ? 

6. How will the Security Council continue to 

engage foreign ministries of Syria’s neighboring 

countries, which have become embroiled in 

the violence? 

Suggestions for Further Research 

Please note that this background guide is intended 

to serve as a comprehensive overview of the crisis in 

Syria, and by no means are its contents exhaustive. I 

have outlined major sources of tension in the conflict, 

which you should use as a springboard for further 

research that directly engages your delegation’s stake 

in Syria’s political development and peace process. 

Moreover, as this topic is highly current, I would 

recommend reading reliable news media (BBC News, 

Al Jazeera, CNN, United Nations Press Releases from 

both the Security Council and Human Rights Council) 

to stay updated on evolving dimensions of the 

conflict. However, as you approach these valuable 

resources, please be especially attentive to issues of 

objectivity. Al-Jazeera, for instance, is a Qatari-owned 

television network, and the Gulf states have been 

especially vocal in their opposition to Assad and his 

regime. thus, in your research, you should always 

be asking yourself who the source is and whether it 

presents a uniquely motivated stance that needs to 

be taken into account during debate. 

For additional reading, i would suggest the 

following recently published texts: 

• Revolt in Syria: eye-witness to the uprising by 

Stephen Starr (2012) for firsthand testimony 

from a cross-section of Syrian society affected 

by the violent conflict and citizens’ varied 

political beliefs 

• The Syrian Rebellion by Fouad Ajami (2012) for 

a historical perspective on the rebellion and a 

comparison between the reigns of Bashar al- 

Assad and his father Hafez al-Assad 

• The Battle for the Arab Spring: revolution, 

counter-revolution, and the making of a new 

era by Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren (2012) for 

discussion of the challenges many Arab nations 

confront as they attempt to build sustainable 

democratic institutions, tackle political Islam, 

and compete economically on the international 

stage 

Topic B: The Situation in Mali 

Northern Mali has served as the site of a violent 

separatist insurgency since January 2012. Following 

a coup d’état that ousted President Amadou 

Tomani and bred considerable political instability 

in its immediate aftermath, the once-nomadic 

Tuareg rebels claimed control of Northern Mali 

with the help of their organization, the National 

Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). 

The MNLA subsequently declared Azawad’s formal 

independence from Mali. Notably, the United Nations 

Security Council condemned the coup, along with many 

other international diplomatic bodies. The Economic 

Community of West African States (ECOWAS), for 

instance, suspended Mali’s membership and imposed 

sanctions against the country. eCOWAS also presided 

over negotiations that stipulated that both Tomani 

and the leader of the interim government would 

resign, sanctions would be removed, rebels would be 

granted amnesty, and power would be transferred 

to the National Assembly of Mali, led by its Speaker 

dioncounda traore. 

However, renewed offensives have seen armed 

groups loot massive amounts of food from the World 

Food Programme’s warehouses in several parts 

of Northern Mali, which caused the WFP to cease 

its operations there at the start of April. thus the 

violent insurgency has not only crafted a landscape 

rife with political uncertainty but also highlighted a 

critical humanitarian dimension of the conflict for the 

Council’s immediate attention. 


the tuaregs (or so-called Blue Men of desert 

because of the indigo dye coloring their traditional 

clothes) are a pastoral nomadic people who occupy a 

large portion of the land in the Sahara and the Sahel— 

22 


anging from Libya to the northern part of Niger to 

southern Algeria to northern Mali and to Burkina 

Faso. Mali is home to roughly one million of this 

region’s Tuareg population, which totals anywhere 

between two to three million. 132 The Tuareg can be 

further divided into regional groups such as the Kel 

Adrar (Kidal in Mali), Iwellemeden (West Niger), and 

Kel Owey (Air in north central Niger). 133 

Geographic distribution of Tuareg peoples in the Sahara and Sahel 

regions of northern Africa. 

throughout post-colonial history, the Malian 

Tuaregs have experienced marginalization by state 

policies of modernization and sedentarization. 

Following the appropriation of dune rangelands 

for cultivation by sedentary farmers, the pastoral 

Tuaregs were displaced to lands of poorer biological 

productivity. 134 Historical tensions between the 

Tuaregs and the Malian government have catalyzed 

three major rebellions in the country’s recent history, 

outside of the present ongoing conflict—in 1962- 

1964, 1990-1995, and 2007-2009. 135 

Decolonization and Birth of the Malian Republic 

French West Africa (L’Afrique-Occidentale 

Françaises, AOF) experienced decolonization largely 

due to the outcomes of World War ii. Charles de Gaulle 

thereafter pledged to give France’s colonial subjects 

a stronger voice in the broader French political 

arena. 136 By October 26, French Sudan—which would 

eventually become the Republic of Mali—had elected 

a Constitutional Assembly that went on to draft a new 

Constitution allowing political parties. 137 the creation 

of the Republique Soudainaise in 1958 dissolved 

the AOF. By February 1959, French Sudan and 

Senegal had together formed the francophone Mali 

Federation. 138 However, disagreements regarding the 

political future of this Federation led the Republique 

Soudainaise to declare its independence from the 

Mali Federation, under the new (and current) name 

of the Republic of Mali on 22 September 1960. 139 

Despite the Malian Republic’s proclamation of 

its independence in September of 1960, “both the 

state and the Malian nation had yet to be created.” 140 

The new country faced a weak infrastructure and 

lacked a professionally trained population devoted to 

industry. Moreover, at this time, the Malian political 

elite constructed the Malian national identity around 

Mali’s largest ethnic groups, the Mande and Bambara, 

to the notable exclusion of the Tamasheq-speaking 

Tuaregs. To compound this tension, the Kel Tamasheq 

and other minority groups such as the Moors also did 

not see themselves as Malian. 141 this early identity 

distinction would lay the historical groundwork for 

future sentiments of marginalization among the 

Tuaregs. Furthermore, because the idea of a Malian 

nation was not yet significantly entrenched in the 

minds of the country’s citizens, the government’s 

early treatment of the tuaregs would shape the 

Tuareg minority’s conception of and allegiance to the 

Malian nation-state. 

The First Tuareg Rebellion, 1962-1964 

The First Tuareg Rebellion, also known as 

the Alfellaga, occurred shortly after Mali gained 

independence. Already disenchanted with their 

position in the new Malian state, the Tuaregs began 

to imagine their own state, made up of the tuaregpopulated 

territories of northern Mali, northern 

Niger, and southern Algeria, called Azawad. 142 

tuaregs at this time felt that they were acutely and 

disproportionately plagued by early post-colonial 

Mali’s economic struggles and the oversight of a 

government administration that was not sympathetic 

towards Tuaregs’ pastoral culture compared to that 

of other sedentary farming groups in Mali. 143 For some 

especially dissatisfied Tuareg leaders, the state’s 

efforts at modernization became synonymous with 

land dispossession. Furthermore, the disappointing 

economic realities of the early 1960s in Mali appeared 

in direct contrast to the optimistic rhetoric routinely 

23 


propagated by the government. 

In 1962, the first governor of the Gao region of Mali, 

Bakary Diallo, discussed the place of the nomadic 

Tuaregs in post-colonial Mali: 

…the existence of an ethnic minority of Tamasheq 

and Arabs (white and black) we call the Nomads, 

coexisting with black sedentary populations […] 

Nomad society, as it is left to us by the colonial 

regime, undoubtedly poses us problems in light of 

the objectives of our socio-political programme. […] 

Our objective is to know the problems which we, 

in reference to the colonial regime, call the Nomad 

problem. 144 

The regime of the first president of Mali, Mobido 

Kieta, sought to focus the country’s economic 

growth on its industrial sectors—specifically on 

cattle exports, an area where Mali enjoyed a regional 

comparative advantage. 145 This effort initiated partial 

and forced sedentarization of nomads. Further to 

the resentment of the Tuaregs, Kieta’s regime made 

women work on Service Civique sites as well as part 

of a “para-military force of agricultural labourers, 

recruited parallel to the army, despite the fact that 

in Tamasheq tradition, women of free descent do not 

work. 146 

The Tuareg rebellion began in 1962 as small scale 

attacks on government targets but escalated by 

1963 in northern areas of Mali. 147 ultimately, the 

Malian’s government’s army, possessing greater 

and more advanced resources than the rebels, 

A gathering of Tuareg men, donning there iconic blue garb. 

decisively quashed this first rebellion. 148 under these 

circumstances, many tuaregs migrated to richer 

neighboring countries such as Libya, where better 

wage labor in the oil industry and in Muammar 

Gaddafi’s regular military forces offered enticing 

opportunities. 149 Gaddafi additionally welcomed 

some Tuaregs into the Libyan-backed Islamic Legion 

from which he deployed Islamic militants to Lebanon, 

Palestine, and Afghanistan. 150 

The Second Rebellion, 1990-1995 

Periodic droughts in Western Africa in 1968- 

1974 and 1980-1985 further unraveled the pastoral 

lifestyle of the Sahelian nomads, both destroying 

livestock and displacing Tuareg populations to areas 

in the south where pastoralism offered minimal 

economic survival value. 151 the land reform policies 

of Mobido Kieto had already rendered the Tuaregs 

more vulnerable than other groups to droughts. In 

addition to persistent Tuareg discontent, the 1990- 

1995 rebellion also occurred against the backdrop 

of a pro-democracy opposition movement against 

President Moussa Traore’s corrupt regime. The 

accumulation of democratic pressures in the capital 

city of Bamako combined with Tuareg rebels’ assault 

of the army brought about negotiations between 

the two sides. This opening likely presented itself 

because President Traore could not simultaneously 

afford to deploy state resources in the north to quell 

the Tuareg insurgency and to the south to bring the 

pro-democracy movement under control. 152 

24 


On 6 January 1991, the rebels and the Malian 

government signed the Tamanrasset agreement 

pledging to continue negotiations aimed at bringing a 

final peace to the conflict. The agreement included a 

ceasefire, the mutual transfer of war prisoners, army 

withdrawal from northern Mali, rebel withdrawal to 

their base camps, opportunities for former rebels to 

join the Malian army, and a monitoring commission to 

ensure that the stipulations of the agreement would 

be implemented. 153 While this agreement was never 

fulfilled to the degree of its original intent, it did 

provide a basis for future peace negotiations. More 

importantly, perhaps, the signing of the tamanrasset 

agreement marked the beginning of the rebellion’s 

second phase, in which the rebels’ disunity became 

more clear: the FPLA (Front Populaire de Liberation 

de L’Azawad) supported Tuareg independence 

achieved through military action, whereas the MPA 

(Mouvement Populaire de l’Azawad) sought political 

negotiation of its aim and potential to transform itself 

into a viable political party in the future. 154 

The pro-democracy movement, meanwhile, 

had become even stronger. In the aftermath of a 

government crackdown on protestors that led to 

hundreds of deaths, 155 a military coup ousted traore 

from power, ushering in Amadou toumani toure 

(who would himself be elected as president of Mali 

in 2002) as interim leader. 156 After being elected 

president in the 1992 elections, Alpha Konare granted 

greater autonomy to the heavily Tuareg-populated 

Kidal region of northern Mali, temporarily abating the 

conflict. 157 

A soldier mutiny in 1994 exacerbated tensions 

between the government and Tuaregs once again: 

recently integrated tuareg militants in the Malian army 

(per one of the stipulations of the earlier tamanrasset 

agreement) murdered their fellow soldiers, as mutual 

suspicion ran deep between Tuareg and non-Tuareg 

members of the army. 158 Additionally, several Songhoispeaking 

militia units that had mobilized to protect 

themselves against unprovoked Tuareg aggression 

combined in 1994 to form the Malian Patriotic 

Movement Ganda Koi. 159 this action stemmed from 

perceptions among some groups in Mali that the 

government was now providing disproportionately 

positive relief efforts and resources to Tuaregs 

and thus was being too accommodating towards 

an allegedly violent minority. By 1995, the Malian 

government had nevertheless managed to secure a 

precarious peace, suppressing militant aggression 

on the part of the Ganda Koi and pursuing greater 

measures to reintegrate tuaregs into Malian society. 

It is important to note that at this age the conflict 

had assumed an unmistakably economic character— 

competition over scarce environmental and state 

resources—rather than a primordial ethnic one. 160 

The Third Tuareg Rebellion, 2007-2009 

In late August of 2007, a “splinter” Tuareg group 

under the leadership of Ibrahim ag Bahanga claimed 

it had entered into an alliance with Tuareg rebels in 

bordering Niger, who had commenced a military 

initiative against the Niger government that year. 161 

The group launched attacks against government 

supply convoys, soldiers, and mining roads in the 

regional capital city of Kidal. 162 This development 

unfolded despite the fact that the main tuareg 

movement in Mali maintained it was adhering to a 

2006 peace agreement brokered with the Malian 

government that had brought an end to the second 

Tuareg insurgency. By September of that year, land 

mine explosions had killed dozens of individuals, 

some 35 soldiers were being held captive, and the 

rebel alliance began to assault army outposts at the 

border of Mali and Algeria. 163 the pattern of low 

intensity warfare at this time can be summarized as 

follows: 

Tuareg fighters would lay siege to isolated 

government outposts, lay mines and ambush 

military convoys, launch periodic armed raids, and 

seize hostages before returning to their mountain 

hideouts. Government forces would respond to these 

incidents by attempting to hunt down the marauding 

bands and seize rebel supply cashes. 164 

Whereas the beginning of 2008 witnessed a 

deepening of the conflict, Mali’s government later 

made inroads engaging moderate elements of the 

Tuareg militancy, as a Libyan-mediated ceasefire 

was achieved by April. 165 But as with earlier peace 

agreements forged between the Malian government 

and Tuareg rebels, accusations abounded on both 

25 


sides of poor commitment to the terms of the 

agreement. By the end of 2008, violent rebel activity 

had relatively subsided but no conclusive peace was 

established. 166 

Having thus far employed a tactical strategy 

alternating use of military force with accommodation 

of Tuaregs’ political and economic requests, the 

Malian government now shifted to executing a fullscale 

offensive operation against one particularly 

intransigent faction of the Alliance touareg Nord 

Mali pour le Changement (ATNMC), that was led by 

Ibrahim ag Bahanga. 167 With ag Bahanga’s forces 

beleaguered by the Malian army more than ever, 

hundreds of Tuareg fighters shed the lingering 

defiance of their leader and began to surrender their 

arms. 168 A significant portion of ag Bahanda’s forces 

fled to Algeria and then Libya, where many would 

fight in dictator Muammar al-Gaddafi’s army. This 

peace would effectively last fewer than three years 

before the current iteration of the historical Tuareg 

insurgency. 

Timeline of the 2012 Conflict (January – 

present) 

Self-determination in the Sahara 

The proximate cause of the 2012 Tuareg rebellion 

was the return of an estimated average of two to 

three thousand well-trained Tuareg fighters from 

Gaddafi’s Libya. 169 these returning tuaregs joined 

forces with the ATNMC formerly led by Ibrahim ag 

Bahanga, who had died in August 2011, to form the 

Mouvement National de Liberation de l’Azawad 

(MNLA) on 16 October 2011. 170 The MNLA sought 

“to protect and progressively reoccupy the Azawad 

territory” in response to the government’s failure 

to engage in productive dialogue with the Tuaregs 

and its deployment of troops to the Azawad region, 

comprised of Timbuktu, Kidal, and Gao. 171 these three 

capitals quickly became the primary focal points of 

the fourth and current Tuareg rebellion. 

In January 2012, the MNLA launched a full-scale 

attack on Menaka in the Gao region of northern 

Mali, accusing the government of dishonoring its 

commitments to the tuaregs and for undue military 

provocation. 172 Not only did the Malian government 

of President Amadou toumani toure reportedly lose 

ground during the first month of renewed combat, 

but the human rights NGO Amnesty International also 

criticized the government’s use of military helicopters 

on civilian targets, 173 describing the situation as the 

“worst human rights crisis in northern Mali for 20 

years.” 174 On 18 February 2012, the United Nations 

reported that upwards of 44,000 Malian refugees had 

fled to neighboring Niger, Mauritania, and Burkina 

Faso to escape the conflict. 175 the international 

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) also declared in 

February that the fighting in northern Mali had caused 

internal displacement of 60,000 Malians, separate 

from UNHCR’s estimates regarding conflict-induced 

forced migration from the country. 176 Lastly, the month 

of February was significant because a commission 

within Toure’s government announced that al-Qaeda 

in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) had collaborated with 

the MNLA to kill government soldiers in Aguel’hoc, a 

rural village in the Kidal region. 177 The findings arrived 

despite the MNLA’s persistent denial of involvement 

with islamic extremist groups. 

A youth protests the government’s response to Tuareg attacks in 

northern Mali in early February 2012 

A Competing Vision for Rebellion: The Ansar Dine 

Movement 

On 13 March 2012, iyag Ag Ghali, a former tuareg 

leader, published a video suggesting that the Ansar 

Dine (“Defenders of the Faith”), a movement which 

had thus far fought alongside the MNLA, seeks to 

impose sharia law across northern Mali rather than 

to establish a separate and sovereign Azawad, the 

latter being the MNLA’s principal goal. 178 Ag Ghali has 

become the renegade leader of Ansar Dine within 

26 


the broader anti-government rebellion and allegedly 

maintains relations with AQIM via his cousin, who 

serves as one of AQIM’s local commanders. 179 Ag 

Ghali had not always played an antagonistic role in 

Mali; indeed, he had long secured a reputation for 

Members of the Islamist rebel group Ansar Dine in Timbuktu in April 2012 

functioning as one of the principal power brokers in 

northern Mali before he formed the Salafi Islamist 

Ansar Dine and effectively commandeered the 

insurgency with the help of AQiM and competed with 

MNLA-affiliated Tuaregs for control over the Sahel. 180 

The Ansar Dine’s own ambitions for all of Mali would 

later exacerbate the conflict to unseen levels of 

humanitarian and human rights distress. 

March Coup: Traore Displaced from Power 

Despite President Amadou Toumani Traore’s stated 

willingness to once again open dialogue with rebels 

on 15 March, a group of soldiers calling themselves 

the National Committee for the Restoration of 

Democracy and Rule of Law (CNRDR) and emphasizing 

grievances with the way Traore’s government had 

thus far handled the insurgency, initiated a coup led 

by Captain Amadou Sanogo against Mali’s elected 

government and proceeded to suspend the Malian 

Constitution. 181 Comprised of mainly lower-ranking 

officers, the CNDRE additionally claimed it had not 

been equipped with the proper resources to combat 

the Tuareg rebels, who were meanwhile emboldened 

by the influx of weapons from Colonel Gaddafi’s 

Libya. 182 

the coup elicited international outcry from the 

united States, the African union, and this united 

Nations Security Council, who 

expressed concern about Mali’s 

rapidly deteriorating humanitarian 

situation, referring to growing 

food insecurity in the Sahel given 

that the CNRDR had closed off the 

country’s land and air borders. 183 

Political analysts, on the other 

hand, cited the coup as an 

“unexpected political [mutation]” 

and destabilizing consequence 

of Gaddafi’s overthrow in 

Libya, ushering in even greater 

uncertainty to Western Africa. 184 in 

a troubling sign of this uncertainty, 

the economic Community of 

West African States (ECOWAS) 

declared on 29 March 2012 that it 

was cancelling its mission to Mali 

due to security concerns over its members’ safety. 185 

ECOWAS provided the CNRDR a timeframe of 72 hours 

to relinquish power or be subject to comprehensive 

economic sanctions. 186 in response to noncompliance 

by the CNRDR, ECOWAS adopted measures to close 

Mali’s borders off to trade and freeze its access to 

bank accounts, with observers highlighting that 

landlocked Mali could not survive economically in the 

face of a widespread blockade. 187 Captain Amadou 

Sanogo, the coup’s leader, shared tentative plans 

to instate a transition body possessing the intent to 

organizing free and unfettered elections in which the 

CNRDR would not assert a stake. 188 

By the end of March, witnesses to coup-related 

violence observed that both the MNLA and Ansar Dine 

were fighting on the same side against government 

forces. 189 But this dynamic, as mentioned previously, 

shifted decisively after the coup d’etat. Although the 

MNLA had captured Gao by 31 March, reports arriving 

on 1 April indicated that the Ansar dine had in the 

meantime seized Timbuktu from the MNLA, signaling 

27 


divergence in their aims. 190 In Timbuktu, the Ansar 

Dine “had [now] begun ordering women to cover 

themselves with veils,” declaring that they wanted 

imposition of Islamic sharia law rather than seeking 

an independent Azawad. 191 Ansar Dine’s leader, Ag 

Ghali, appeared publicly in Timbuktu with Algerian 

AQIM leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar the following 

day, on the heels of Belmokhtar’s alleged “shopping 

trip” to Libya for weapons, further confirming a link 

between the terrorist group Al Qaeda and the Ansar 

dine. 192 

Map of lands claimed by Tuareg rebels (as of 5 April 2012) 

On 6 April, MNLA rebels seized control of Gao, 

declaring it the capital city of a new independent 

state called Azawad. 193 the African union, european 

union, and former West African colonial power 

France refused to recognize this declaration of 

independence. 194 Nevertheless, ECOWAS and the 

CNRdR managed to reach a deal in which the 

junta surrendered power to parliament speaker 

dioncounda traore, who was sworn in as the new 

interim president of Mali on 12 April. 195 

Current Situation in Mali: From Tuareg Self- 

Determination to Radical Islamic Terror 

Although the standoff between the MNLA and 

Malian government had been tentatively stabilized, 

the northern Mali conflict had already expanded 

to involve several insurgent groups. From April 

onwards, the MNLA found itself fighting the Ansar 

Dine, other newly mobilized Arab militia groups, and 

protestors—setting up a more complex insurgency 

landscape than ever before. The National Liberation 

Front of Azawad (FNLA), a local ethnic Arab militia 

that had been allied with the Malian government 

prior to the coup but defected sides after the ousting 

of traore from power in March, 196 entered the fray 

on 8 April when it announced its decision to oppose 

Tuareg rule. The FLNA’s Secretary-General Mohamed 

Lamine Sidad stated that his group sought to neither 

gain independence nor impose sharia law, but rather 

to secure the Arab trading community’s economic 

interests in Timbuktu, which had been overrun by 

MNLA rebels. 197 to further complicate allegiances 

after the coup, those Malians who did not support 

partitioning of the country vis-à-vis the MNLA’s 

separatist push for an independent Azawad often 

cast their support to islamist groups who challenged 

the largely-Tuareg MNLA. 

Following the Battle of Gao, the Ansar dine and 

the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa 

(MOJWA), an al-Qaeda offshoot that has allied with 

the Ansar Dine, claimed complete control over 

Mali’s desert north. The shootout in Gao on 26 June 

between Tuareg separatists and al-Qaeda-linked 

islamists culminated in 20 deaths. 198 

Ansar Dine’s role in the northern Mali conflict has 

progressed beyond wresting control of the void left 

by Malian government forces after the March coup. 

To the Tuaregs’ acute discontent, the ascendency 

of Ansar dine threatens the fate of Azawad, with 

northern Mali firmly under Islamist control. Moreover, 

the focus of the Islamist insurgency is more ambitious 

in scope—the imposition of sharia law throughout all 

of Mali—and has therefore proven to be more violent 

than perhaps the Tuareg rebellion that preceded it. 

On September 1, the Ansar Dine gained a strategic 

victory when MOJWA fighters seized control of the 

central Malian town of Douentza after a brief skirmish 

with Douentza’s local militia, causing the broader 

conflict to spread beyond northern Mali. 199 

earlier in August, united Nations Secretary-General 

Ban Ki-moon addressed the “deeply troubling 

situation” in Mali and called on the UN Security 

28 


Council to take a more active role in the conflict, 

specifically the use of targeted financial and travel 

sanctions against those individuals and groups in Mali 

involved in “terrorist, religious extremist, or criminal 

activities.” 200 

Discussion of the Problem 

Human Rights Violations and War Crimes 

Following a 10-day mission in April 2012 to Mali’s 

capital, Bamako, the Human Rights Watch (HRW) 

concluded that separatist Tuareg rebels, Islamist 

armed groups, and Arab militias alike have committed 

war crimes. 201 These crimes have included summary 

executions, amputations, rape of women and young 

girls, use of child soldiers, and raids of medical facilities 

and humanitarian aid agencies. 202 in a report to the 

UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, UN 

High Commissioner for Human Rights 

Navi Pillay stated, “the various armed 

groups currently occupying northern 

Mali have been committing serious 

human rights violations and possibly 

war crimes.” 203 Pillay similarly pointed 

to the recruitment of child soldiers 

and also stoning of victims, violations 

of freedom of expression, freedom 

of religion, and encroachment upon 

cultural rights. 204 She further warned, “I 

am afraid the humanitarian and human 

rights situation in the whole of the Sahel 

region will dangerously deteriorate if 

the crisis in northern Mali is not urgently 

addressed.” 205 

In early October, Assistant Secretary- 

General for Human Rights Ivan Simonovic 

issued a press release declaring, “[w] 

omen are the primary victims of the 

current crisis and have been disproportionately 

affected by situation in the north [of Mali].” 206 

Women in Mali have especially been protesting the 

forced imposition of sharia law by Islamist groups 

that have assumed control since the March coup that 

ousted Amadou toumani traore from the presidency. 

On 6 October, a report surfaced that 200 women had 

marched in protest against islamist groups who are 

requiring women to wear veils. 207 Cisse toure, one 

of the protestors, shared, “Life has become more 

difficult with these people. […] We are tired. They 

impose veils on us and now they are hunting us like 

bandits for not wearing them.” 208 in areas where 

sharia law is being most strictly enforced, women 

have also even been barred from attending work. 209 

Future of Food Insecurity in Mali 

Mali is confronting an impending food crisis 

plaguing an estimated 75 percent of the African 

continent. 210 Armed conflict in the Sahel, however, 

has exacerbated food security issues stemming from 

sparse rainfall in 2011 and stands poised to cause 

further deterioration of the overall humanitarian 

situation in the country. in particular, humanitarian 

agencies have faced difficulty delivering food aid to 

rebel strongholds throughout the north, where the 

Mali’s children are suffering from the compounded crises of food and water shortage 

and armed rebellion, UNICEF has warned. 

UN estimates 1.6 million people are at risk for food 

insecurity. 211 These efforts are taking place against the 

looming specter of possible military intervention by 

the Malian government to bring stability to the region. 

Relief organizations fear that such intervention, 

depending on how it is executed, could pose a serious 

setback to humanitarian initiatives. 212 

in addition, the Malian Red Cross has reported that 

it has been facing resistance from the Ansar Dine and 

29 


MOJWA in gaining access to affected communities. 

The head of the Malian Red Cross, Abdourahmane 

Cisse, stated, “We have never had this problem in 

Mali in the past, but the Islamists do not like the cross 

[hinting at the Red Cross’s insignia], seeing it as a 

Christian thing.” 213 Armed assailants’ looting of reliefrelated 

equipment and appropriation of vehicles has 

also severely hampered aid efforts. 214 

Islamic Radicalism 

until the most recent iterations of the tuareg 

rebellions, West Africa—and Mali in particular—had 

remained a buffer area of more moderate political 

rule, compared to, for example, that of neighboring 

Mauritania, whose governments have been more 

repressive215 and religiously intolerant. Prior to the 

March 2012 military coup, Mali had experienced 

almost two decades of stable democratic government 

and hailed as one of the model African democracies 

during that time. it had further rejected the idea of 

instating a de jure Islamic republic, but still was still 

home to tolerant strain of Sufi Islam that largely 

dismissed the notion of imposing shari’a law, 216 a task 

that Ansar Dine has now violently assumed. Thus, the 

conflict in Mali, if left unresolved any further, risks 

the opening up of ungoverned spaces where more 

radical Islamist rebel groups can launch large-scale 

recruitment and insurgency efforts. These Islamic 

extremists believe that US influence in the West 

Africa has led to a suppression of Islam and seek 

to revive it by any means they see fit. At stake in a 

regionally cooperative resolution of the conflict is 

northern Mali, then, is the effective neutralization of 

any proliferating radicalism in West Africa. 

Recent uN Actions 

Following a request from Dioncounda Traore’s 

interim government for military resources to assist 

Mali’s state armed forces in retaking control of the 

country’s north, the UN Security passed a resolution 

that could lead to international military intervention 

in the near future. the Council urged uN Secretary- 

General Ban Ki-moon to contribute military and 

security planners to the economic Community of 

West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union 

(AU), and their partners to help these organizations 

to put together a recovery force. 217 It must be made 

clear that while this resolution authorized the 

planning of a possible military intervention—whose 

detailed recommendations will be presented to the 

Council 45 days after the resolution’s passage—it did 

not authorize the deployment of the use of force. 

two days after the France-drafted resolution 

was passed, Al-Qaeda-linked armed groups in Mali 

threatened to “open the doors of hell” for French 

citizens if France continued its efforts to push for 

armed intervention to recapture Mali’s north. 218 

A spokesman for MOJWA reportedly warned, “if 

[French President Francois Hollande] continues to 

throw oil on the fire, we will send him pictures of 

dead French hostages in the coming days.” 219 

In the meantime, the European Union began 

preparations for a possible military mission in Mali. A 

statement issued by 27 EU ministers pledged that the 

Union “is determined to back Mali in re-establishing 

the rule of law and a democratic and fully sovereign 

government across its entire territory.” 220 

Ambassador Mark Lyall Grant of the United Kingdom expressed 

concern in March 2012 about the mobilization of terrorist and other 

armed groups that have worsened northern Mali’s humanitarian 

crisis. 

Proposed Solutions 

Speaking at a special session on the situation in Mali 

at the UN General Assembly in late September, U.S. 

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton emphasized, “[the 

conflict in northern Mali] is not only a humanitarian 

crisis. It is a powder keg that the international 

community cannot afford to ignore. […] This effort 

must include coordinating the delivery of emergency 

30 


aid, helping address long-standing political grievances 

of ethnic groups in the North, and preparing for 

credible elections.” 221 

A Negotiated Solution 

While many analysts of the conflict claim that 

a negotiated solution in Mali is unrealistic at this 

stage, it must nevertheless still be considered 

thoroughly prior to any 

authorization of military 

intervention, especially 

given that Islamist groups 

have threatened violent 

retribution against foreign 

citizens if intervention 

is carried out. Mali’s 

northern neighbor Algeria 

has also continued to 

advocate a negotiated 

solution to the crisis out 

of concern that an Africanled 

military intervention 

could destabilize its own 

borders. Moreover, an 

intervention that is too 

hastily formulated or 

inefficiently executed could 

likely end up worsening 

and protracting the 

conflict—particularly its 

humanitarian dimension— 

rather than ameliorating it. 

Military Intervention 

Recent actions taken by 

eCOWAS, the Au, and the 

Security Council suggest 

that intervention, though 

it has not received official 

authorization from the 

Council, is a likely outcome. 

Any form of military 

intervention will have to 

“take into account the broader regional dynamics 

at play and firmly engage partners such as Algeria, 

Tunisia, and Senegal in helping to quell the growth of 

criminal and terrorist networks in the region.” 222 power. 

it will 

Dioncounda Traore has been serving as Mali’s interim president 

since his appointment on 12 April 2012, following the March coup 

which saw military junta captain Amadou Sanogo transfer over 

have to provide specific provisions for the role of the 

transitional government and the intervening forces’ 

relationship with that government. Furthermore, 

the purpose of deploying military force would 

ultimately be to work towards setting up an election 

process that confers greater legitimacy on the new 

government. [Ed Note: This guide was completed 

before 2013. Updates on 

French intervention will 

be provided in the update 

paper.] 

Bloc Positions 

North America, Western 

Europe, and Others 

the united States has 

recognized the merits 

of a political solution 

to the armed conflict in 

Mali—namely the value of 

reaching out to moderate 

Tuaregs—but has also 

emphasized readiness 

for a probable military 

campaign in the region. 

In September, Secretary 

Clinton also pointed out 

new emerging dimensions 

of the conflict in northern 

Mali, saying, “it’s not only 

the violent extremists. We 

now have drug traffickers 

and arms smugglers finding 

safe havens and porous 

borders, providing them 

a launching pad to extend 

their reach throughout 

not only the region, but 

beyond […] This is not 

only a humanitarian crisis; 

it is a powder keg that the 

international community 

cannot afford to ignore.” 223 the united States is 

acutely concerned about possible expansion of al 

Qaeda’s influence in the region through its potential 

penetration of ungoverned lands and through its 

31 


alleged connection with Ansar dine. 

Like the United States, the United Kingdom is 

keen to prevent regional instability. And further like 

the U.S., it perceives neighboring Algeria as a key 

partner in this cause. Visiting Minister for the Middle 

East and North Africa Alistair Burt visited Algiers in 

June 2012, where he stated that the UK views military 

intervention in Mali as a “last resort” and stands in 

support of Algeria’s call for the crisis in Mali to be 

ameliorated through dialogue and negotiation. 224 

France has the most intimate historical ties with 

Mali, which was its former colonial subject. France 

seeks to prioritize an African solution to the Mali 

crisis and does not intend to intervene directly in 

the country. 225 It is, however, committed to offering 

logistical support to eCOWAS as it executes any 

possible ground operations. 

East Asia 

China first entered into diplomatic relations with 

Mali in 1960, and Sino-Malian relations have since 

been strengthened over time. China’s trade with 

Mali was valued at USD $280 in 2008, according to 

the Chinese embassy in Mali. 226 While China generally 

pursues a foreign policy of non-interference in 

countries’ internal matters, it does assign weight 

to the influence of regional bodies (its veto of the 

Morocco-backed Arab-European draft resolution on 

Syria was the most recent notable exception to this 

trend). China has, to that end, pledged its support to 

ECOWAS to protect Mali’s civilians and bring peace to 

the Sahel. China has also not challenged debate about 

possible African military stabilization force in Mali. 

South Asia 

Pakistan has been implicated in the northern Mali 

conflict via allegations that it is providing jihadists to 

train and arm Malian Islamist rebels. Most notable, 

Niger’s president Mahamadou Issofou claimed in 

July 2012, “We have information of the presence of 

Afghans, Pakistanis in northern Mali operating as 

trainers. […] They are training those that have been 

recruited [to rebel against the government] in West 

Africa.” 227 Pakistan can be expected to vehemently 

deny these allegations when it takes the floor in the 

Council’s next session. 

Eastern Europe 

the Russian Federation has its own history of 

contending with radical Islam in the republic of 

Tatarstan, located east of Moscow, and can thus offer 

valuable perspective on the threat posed by Ansar 

Dine in the Islamic Maghreb. Russia condemned 

the March 2012 coup and “demanded that the junta 

leaders should restore the constitutional order and 

ensure the return of the democratically elected 

president to power.” 228 Like China, Russia has not 

contested the possibility of deploying an African 

military stabilization force to northern Mali. 

Latin America and the Caribbean 

Latin American countries’ stake in the Mali crisis 

largely has to do with trade and investment, as the 

LAC (Latin America and the Caribbean) region and 

Africa have both largely defied the global trend of 

economic downturn. Argentina, for example, has 

signed an agreement with 22 other African countries, 

including Mali, that covers “interchange and 

cooperation in agriculture, science and technology, 

trade, culture and education, and technological 

development, energy, fishery, health, credit lines.” 229 

If instability persists in the Sahel, these interests and 

lucrative bilateral relationships will likely be severely 

disturbed. 

Africa 

Rwanda and togo are the current African union 

members on the UN Security Council and will be 

responsible for delivering the views of the AU. They 

will be especially vocal regarding what resources they 

deem necessary to halting the violence in northern 

Mali. Togo is additionally a member of the Economic 

Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and 

thus possesses the dual responsibility of expressing 

that body’s views as well. Whereas members of 

the Morrocan press have allegedly stated that 

the Moroccan people sympathize with some of 

the Tuaregs’ grievances and wanted to see their 

country serve as a regional mediator in the conflict, 

the Moroccan Foreign Ministry rejected the tuareg 

rebels’ declaration of an independent Azawad. 230 

Morocco can be expected to push for a more inclusive 

resolution to security threats to the Sahel that take 

into account other economic and social concerns. 

32 


Questions a Resolution Must Answer 

(QARMA) 

1. Should the Security Council definitively 

2. 

authorize and pursue actual deployment of 

international military force in brining stability 

to Mali’s rebel-held north? 

If military intervention is to be authorized, 

what type of a timeline should be suggested? 

3. How should the forced imposition of sharia law 

by Islamist groups in Mali be tackled? 

4. How can Mali’s government work towards 

holding credible elections that will ensure the 

most stable political transition? 

5. How will punitive action be taken against 

various actors in the insurgency (the MNLA, 

Ansar Dine, and MOJWA) that have committed 

human rights violations and war crimes? 

6. How will Mali’s borders be protected to both 

prevent the illegal entry of arms that could 

embolden militant groups and ensure the safe 

transport of Malian refugees? 

7. What measures will be taken to provide relief 

to Mali’s over 170,000 internally displaced 

persons in the northern cities of Gao, Kidal, and 

Timbuktu? 

Suggestions for Further Research 

As with Topic A, the background information 

contained herein is intended to serve as a starting 

point for your own independent research. this means 

that in order to perform well in this committee, you 

are not only encouraged but also expected to consult 

other academic and media resources in crafting and 

proposing your delegation’s solution for the crisis in 

Mali. For a comprehensive overview of the first three 

Tuareg rebellions, I would recommend the following 

texts: 

• Tuareg Rebellion (2007-2009) edited by Jesse 

Russell and Ronald Cohn (2012) for an account 

of more recent series of insurgencies by the 

tuareg peoples 

• “Desert Insurgency: lessons from the 

third Tuareg rebellion” in Small Wars and 

Insurgencies by Stephen A. Emerson (2011) for 

reasons behind the third Tuareg rebellion and 

a comparative analysis of counter-insurgency 

strategies employed by Mali and Niger 

• Disputed Desert: Decolonisation, Competing 

Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in Northern 

Mali by Jean Sebastian Lecocq (2010) for 

important historical background on Tuareg 

history and politics 

• Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: 

The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali by Kalifa Kieta 

(2008) for perspective on the conflict from 

a lieutenant colonel who formerly served in 

Mali’s army 

To keep track of the current radical Islamist phase 

of the crisis in Mali, i would again suggest Al Jazeera 

and BBC News’s coverage of the ongoing conflict. 

Once again, please remain attentive to the level of 

objectivity of any sources you consult over the course 

of your own research. 

Position Paper Guidelines 

Position papers should be no longer than two 

pages double-spaced in Times New Roman font with 

one-inch margins. They will be due at a time and date 

to be posted on the WorldMUN Melbourne website. 

Devote one page to each of the two topics on our 

Security Council’s agenda. In these two subsections, 

please first discuss how either the Syrian or Malian 

civil conflicts have affected the country you will be 

representing politically or economically and then 

proceed to suggest some solutions that accord 

with your country’s authentic position in current 

international affairs. Finally, briefly discuss a weakness 

of your proposed solution for each topic and how the 

Council can work together to improve it. 

Closing Remarks 

delegates, 

Our Security Council session has the distinct 

responsibility of addressing two topics that have 

dominated global humanitarian and/or political news 

for most of 2012. I am confident in your ability to make 

the most of our committee sessions to draw on your 

research, persuasive oratory, and, above all, your 

willingness to cooperate with your fellow delegates 

to reach meaningful resolutions. 

I am incredibly excited to see what you will 

33 


accomplish in March! Again, if you have any questions 

at all about WorldMUN or the research process, 

please feel free to contact me at sc@worldmun.org. 

Until Melbourne! 

Best wishes, 

Aparajita tripathi 

Chair, uN Security Council 

Endnotes 

1 “Charter, United Nations, Chapter V: The Security 

Council.” UN News Center. UN, n.d. Web. 

2 “Security Council, SC, UNSC, Security, Peace, Sanctions, 

Veto, Resolution, President, United Nations, UN, 

Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding, Conflict Resolution, 

Prevention.” UN News Center. UN, n.d. Web. 

3 Pipes, 151 

4 Ibid. 

5 Ibid. 

6 Walt, 54 

7 Ibid. 

8 Pipes, 158 

9 Ibid. 

10 “Hafiz Al-Assad (president of Syria).” Encyclopedia 

Britannica Online. Encyclopedia Britannica, n.d. Web. 

11 Ibid. 

12 Holliday, Joseph. “The Struggle for Syria in 2011: An 

Operational and Regional Analysis.” Institute for the Study 

of War, n.d. Web., pg. 9 

13 “Hafiz Al-Assad (president of Syria).” Encyclopedia 

Britannica Online. Encyclopedia Britannica, n.d. Web. 

14 Zahler, 8 

15 Zahler, 6 

16 “The Damascus Spring -Carnegie Middle East Center - 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.” Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace. N.p., n.d. Web. 

17 Ibid. 

18 Ibid. 

19 Noueheid and Warren, 44 



22 Miles, Tom, and Stephanie Nebehay. “UN Human Rights 

Chief Faults Both Sides in Syria.” Reuters. Thomson 

Reuters, 10 Sept. 2012. Web. 

23 “Syria Profile.” BBC News. BBC, 12 Dec. 2012. Web. 

24 “Syria: ‘Dozens Injured’ in Baniyas as Arrests Continue.” BBC 

News. BBC, 04 Dec. 2011. Web. 





27 Ibid. 

28 Ibid. 

29 Ibid. 




31 Ibid. 

32 “Syrian State TV Reports 120 Security Forces ‘killed in 

Massacre’” - The National. N.p., n.d. Web. 




34 Ibid. 

35 Ibid. 

36 Ibid. 

37 “Syria: ‘Hundreds of Thousands’ Join Anti-Assad 

Protests.” BBC News. BBC, 07 Jan. 2011. Web. 




39 “Syria: ‘Hundreds of Thousands’ Join Anti-Assad 

Protests.” BBC News. BBC, 07 Jan. 2011. Web. 

40 “Syria: Shootings, Arrests Follow Hama Protest | Human 

Rights Watch.” Syria: Shootings, Arrests Follow Hama 

Protest | Human Rights Watch. N.p., n.d. Web. 

41 Ibid. 

42 “AFP: Syrian Army Kills 100 in Hama Crackdown: 

Activists.” Google News. N.p., n.d. Web. 


44 “AFP: Syrian Army Kills 100 in Hama Crackdown: 

Activists.” Google News. N.p., n.d. Web. 

45 Holliday, Joseph. “Syria’s Armed Opposition.” Institute for 

34 


46 Ibid. 

the Study of War, n.d. Web., pg. 14 



48 “Obama Calls on Syria’s Assad to Step aside - Middle East - 

Al Jazeera English.” Al Jazeera English. N.p., n.d. Web. 

49 Ibid. 

50 “EU Extends Sanctions against Syrian Regime.” European 

Voice. N.p., n.d. Web. 

51 “Obama Calls on Syria’s Assad to Step aside - Middle East - 

Al Jazeera English.” Al Jazeera English. N.p., n.d. Web. 

52 Ibid. 




54 Ibid. 



56 Ibid. 

57 “Syria Enters in Civil War with Combat between Syrian 

Army Soldiers Defectors Al Jazeera Video.” YouTube. 

YouTube, 11 Nov. 2011. Web. 

58 Macfarquhar, Neil. “UN Resolution on Syria Blocked by 

Russia and China.” The New York Times. The New York 

Times, 05 Oct. 2011. Web. 

59 “Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Syria 

as Russian Federation, China Veto Text Supporting Arab 

League’s Proposed Peace Plan.” UN News Center. UN, 02 

Apr. 2012. Web. 

60 Ibid. 


62 “Kofi Annan Appointed Joint Special Envoy of United 

Nations, League Of Arab States on Syrian Crisis.” UN News 

Center. UN, 23 Feb. 2012. Web. 

63 Ibid. 

64 Oweis, Khaled Yacoub, and Louis Charbonneau. “UN 

Security Council Condemns Syria over Massacre.” Reuters. 

Thomson Reuters, 27 May 2012. Web. 

65 “Houla Massacre: UN Blames Syria Troops and Militia.” BBC 

News. BBC, 15 Aug. 2012. Web. 

66 Ibid. 

67 Oweis, Khaled Yacoub, and Louis Charbonneau. “UN 

Security Council Condemns Syria over Massacre.” Reuters. 

68 Ibid. 

Thomson Reuters, 27 May 2012. Web. 


70 “Assad Announces New Syrian Cabinet.” Al Akhbar English. 

N.p., n.d. Web. 

71 Ibid. 

72 “Assad Says Syria Faces War ‘waged from Outside’” UNHCR. 


73 Ibid. 

74 Pannell, Ian. “Syria: Aleppo Is Nail in Assad’s Coffin, Says 

Panetta.” BBC News. BBC, 30 July 2012. Web. 

75 Ibid. 

76 Muir, Jim. “Syria Conflict: Key Aleppo District Sees Fierce 

Clashes.” BBC News. BBC, 08 Aug. 2012. Web. 

77 “News.” Syria: From All-out Repression to Armed Conflict 

in Aleppo. N.p., n.d. Web. 

78 “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.” Rome 

Statute of the International Criminal Court. N.p., n.d. Web. 

79 “General Assembly, in Resolution, Demands All in Syria 

‘Immediately And Visibly’ Commit to Ending Violence That 

Secretary-General Says Is Ripping Country Apart.” UN 

News Center. UN, 03 Aug. 2012. Web. 

80 “Russia, China Blast UN Resolution on Syria - Middle East 

- Al Jazeera English.” Russia, China Blast UN Resolution on 

Syria - Middle East - Al Jazeera English. N.p., n.d. Web. 

81 “Syrian PM Defects from Assad Government - Middle 

East - Al Jazeera English.” Syrian PM Defects from Assad 

Government - Middle East - Al Jazeera English. N.p., n.d. 

Web. 

82 Ibid. 

83 Ibid. 

84 Beirut, Lebanon., Rick Gladstone; Christine Hauser 

Contributed Reporting From New York, And Hwaida Saad 

From. “Annan Steps Down as Peace Envoy and Cites 

Barriers in Syria and United Nations.” The New York Times. 

The New York Times, 03 Aug. 2012. Web. 

85 “UN Report Slams Assad Forces for War Crimes - Middle 

East - Al Jazeera English.” UN Report Slams Assad Forces 

for War Crimes - Middle East - Al Jazeera English. N.p., n.d. 

Web. 

86 Ibid. 

87 Ibid. 

88 Miles, Tom, and Stephanie Nebehay. “UN Human Rights 

Chief Faults Both Sides in Syria.” Reuters. Thomson 

35 


Reuters, 10 Sept. 2012. Web. 










92 “Syria: The Revolution Will Be Weaponised - Features - Al 

Jazeera English.” Al Jazeera English. N.p., n.d. Web. 

93 Ibid. 


the Study of War, n.d. Web. 

95 “Yemen Fox - Clinton Says Some Arab Changes May Come 

Slowly.” Yemen Fox - Clinton Says Some Arab Changes May 

Come Slowly. N.p., n.d. Web. 

96 Ibid. 










100 Black, Ian, and Saeed Kamali Dehghan. “Iran Backs Assad in 

Syria Crisis and Blames ‘warmongering’ US.” The Guardian. 

Guardian News and Media, 07 Aug. 2012. Web. 

101 Ibid. 

102 Barghi, Shirin. “Syria Conflict: Iran Supplies Arms To Assad 

Regime, UN Says.” The Huffington Post. TheHuffingtonPost. 

com, 22 Aug. 2012. Web. 

103 “Syria Today: Iraq Denies Role in the Conflict.” CNN. N.p., 

06 Sept. 2012. Web. 




105 Grove, Thomas. “Russia to Sell Arms to Syria, Sales Overall 

to Rise.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 17 Aug. 2011. Web. 

106 “Security Council Imposes Sanctions on Libyan Authorities 

in Bid to Stem Violent Repression.” UN News Center. UN, 

26 Feb. 2011. Web. 

107 Grove, Thomas. “Russia to Sell Arms to Syria, Sales Overall 

to Rise.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 17 Aug. 2011. Web. 

108 “In Presidential Statement, Security Council Gives Full 

Support To Efforts of Joint Special Envoy of United Nations, 

Arab League to End Violence in Syria.” UN News Center. 

UN, 21 Mar. 2012. Web. 

109 “Kofi Annan’s Six-point Plan for Syria - Middle East - Al 

Jazeera English.” Kofi Annan’s Six-point Plan for Syria - 

Middle East - Al Jazeera English. N.p., n.d. Web. 

110 “Kofi Annan Washes Hands of Syria.” The Independent. 

Independent Digital News and Media, n.d. Web. 

111 Zakaria, Fareed. “The Case Against Intervention in 

Syria.” Time. Time, n.d. Web. 



113 Zakaria, Fareed. “The Case Against Intervention in 

Syria.” Time. Time, n.d. Web. 

114 “Syria, A Path to Justice | Human Rights Watch.” Syria, A 

Path to Justice | Human Rights Watch. N.p., n.d. Web. 

115 Ibid. 

116 Staff, CNN Wire. “Obama Warns Syria Not to Cross ‘red 

Line’” CNN. Cable News Network, n.d. Web. 

117 “How Britain’s Position on Intervening in Syria Has 

Shifted.” The Telegraph. N.p., n.d. Web. 

118 Ibid. 

119 Qaboun, Syria., Steven Erlanger; Reporting Was 

Contributed By Kareem Fahim And Hwaida Saad From 

Beirut, Lebanon; Sebnem Arsu From Istanbul; Rick 

Gladstone From New York; And An Employee Of The New 

York Times From. “France Urges Creation of Interim Syrian 

Government, Pledging Recognition.” The New York Times. 

The New York Times, 28 Aug. 2012. Web. 

120 “International Responses to the Syrian Uprising: March 

2011.” June 2012. Parliament of Australia. N.p., n.d. Web. 

121 Votes and Proceedings of the Australian House of 

Representatives, No. 2, 2012, Forty Third Parliament; First 

Session, Fifth Period 

122 “International Responses to the Syrian Uprising: March 

2011.” June 2012. Parliament of Australia. N.p., n.d. Web. 

123 “Pakistan Sticks to Its Principled Stand on Syrian 

Crisis.” The Nation. N.p., n.d. Web. 

124 Ibid. 

125 Ibid. 

126 Barry, Ellen. “NEWS ANALYSIS; In Its Unyielding Stance on 

Syria, Russia Takes Substantial Risks in Middle East.” The 

New York Times. The New York Times, 09 June 2012. Web. 

36 


127 Ibid. 

128 “General Assembly, in Resolution, Demands All in Syria 

‘Immediately And Visibly’ Commit to Ending Violence That 

Secretary-General Says Is Ripping Country Apart.” UN 

News Center. UN, 03 Aug. 2012. Web. 

129 Ibid. 

130 “UN Arab-European Draft Resolution on Syria to Stress 

Need to Solve Crisis Peacefully.” UN Arab-European 

Draft Resolution on Syria to Stress Need to Solve Crisis 

Peacefully. N.p., n.d. Web. 

131 “Office of The Special Adviser on The Prevention of 

Genocide.” UN News Center. UN, n.d. Web. 

132 “Mali’s Tuareg Rebellion: What Next? - Opinion - Al Jazeera 

English.” Al Jazeera English. N.p., n.d. Web. 

133 Krings, 57 

134 Krings, 58 

135 Ibid. 

136 Lecocq, 33-34 

137 Lecocq, 34 


139 Ibid. 


141 Ibid. 

142 Kieta, 9 

143 Ibid. 




147 Kieta, 10 

148 “Timeline: Mali since Independence - Africa - Al Jazeera 

English.” Timeline: Mali since Independence - Africa - Al 

Jazeera English. N.p., n.d. Web. 

149 Kieta, 13 

150 Ibid. 

151 Kieta, 12 

152 Lecocq, 239 

153 Lecocq, 240 

154 Lecocq, 243 

155 Lecocq, 248 




157 Ibid. 

158 Kieta, 18 

159 Kieta, 20 

160 Ibid. 

161 “Tuareg Conflict Spreads to Mali.” BBC News. BBC, 28 Aug. 

2007. Web. 

162 Emerson, 674-675 

163 Emerson, 675 

164 Ibid. 


166 Ibid. 


168 Ibid. 

169 “Mali’s Tuareg Rebellion: What Next? - Opinion - Al Jazeera 

English.” Mali’s Tuareg Rebellion: What Next? - Opinion - Al 


170 Ibid. 

171 “Explainer: Tuareg-led Rebellion in North Mali - Africa - Al 

Jazeera English.” Explainer: Tuareg-led Rebellion in North 

Mali - Africa - Al Jazeera English. N.p., n.d. Web. 

172 “MALI: A Timeline of Northern Conflict.” IRINnews. N.p., 

n.d. Web. 

173 Ibid. 

174 “Mali: UN Warning over Refugees Fleeing Tuareg 

Rebellion.” BBC News. BBC, 18 Feb. 2012. Web. 

175 Ibid. 

176 Ibid. 


n.d. Web. 

178 Ibid. 

179 “FACTBOX-Ansar Dine - Black Flag over Northern 

Mali.” Reuters. N.p., 03 July 2012. Web. 

180 Ibid. 

181 Washington., Adam Nossiter; Alan Cowell Contributed 

37 


182 Ibid. 

Reporting From London, And Eric Schmitt From. “Soldiers 

Overthrow Mali Government in Setback for Democracy in 

Africa.” The New York Times. The New York Times, 23 Mar. 

2012. Web. 

183 “UN REPORT.” : Security Council Condemns Coup in Mali. 


184 Washington., Adam Nossiter; Alan Cowell Contributed 

Reporting From London, And Eric Schmitt From. “Soldiers 

Overthrow Mali Government in Setback for Democracy in 

Africa.” The New York Times. The New York Times, 23 Mar. 

2012. Web. 


n.d. Web. 

186 Ibid. 

187 “West African ECOWAS Leaders Impose Mali 

Sanctions.” BBC News. BBC, 04 Mar. 2012. Web. 

188 Ibid. 


n.d. Web. 

190 Ibid. 

191 “Explainer: Tuareg-led Rebellion in North Mali - Africa - Al 

Jazeera English.” Explainer: Tuareg-led Rebellion in North 

Mali - Africa - Al Jazeera English. N.p., n.d. Web. 

192 Ibid. 




194 Fessy, Thomas. “Mali Tuareg Rebels Declare Independence 

in the North.” BBC News. BBC, 04 June 2012. Web. 




196 “Mali: War Crimes by Northern Rebels | Human Rights 

Watch.” Mali: War Crimes by Northern Rebels | Human 

Rights Watch. N.p., n.d. Web. 

197 “New North Mali Arab Force Seeks to “defend” 

Timbuktu.” Reuters. N.p., 10 Apr. 2012. Web. 

198 Diallo, Tiemoko, and Adama Diarra. “Islamists Declare Full 

Control of Mali’s North.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 28 

June 2012. Web. 

199 “Mali Islamists Take Strategic Town of Douentza.” BBC 

News. BBC, 09 Jan. 2012. Web. 

200 “Mali: At Security Council Meeting, Ban Urges More 

Action, including Targeted Sanctions.” UN News Center. 

UN, 08 Aug. 2012. Web. 

201 “Mali: War Crimes by Northern Rebels | Human Rights 

Watch.” Mali: War Crimes by Northern Rebels | Human 

Rights Watch. N.p., n.d. Web. 

202 Ibid. 

203 “Top UN Official Condemns Amputations, Human Rights 

Violations in Northern Mali.” UN News Center. UN, 17 Sept. 

2012. Web. 

204 Ibid. 

205 Ibid. 

206 

“Women Primary Victims of Violence in Northern Mali, Says UN 

Rights Official.” UN News Center. UN, 09 Oct. 2012. Web. 

207 “Women in Northern Mali Hold Protest Against Islamist in 

Charge of Veil Requirement.” The Washington Post. N.p., 

n.d. Web. 

208 Reuters. “Women Protest Shariah Law in Mali.” The New 

York Times. N.p., n.d. Web. 

209 “Women Primary Victims of Violence in Northern Mali, 

Says UN Rights Official.” UN News Center. UN, 09 Oct. 

2012. Web. 

210 “Africa Facing Intensified ‘food Crisis’ - Africa - Al Jazeera 

English.” Africa Facing Intensified ‘food Crisis’ - Africa - Al 


211 “MALI: Struggling to Deliver Aid to Rebel-held 

North.” IRINnews. N.p., n.d. Web. 

212 Ibid. 

213 Ibid. 

214 Ibid. 

215 “Repression of Peaceful Protests in Mauritania.” Annual 

Report 2011. Amnesty International, n.d. Web. 

216 Brulliard, Karin. “Radical Islam Meets Buffer in West 

Africa.” Washington Post. The Washington Post, 21 Dec. 

2009. Web. 

217 “Security Council Paves Way for Possible Intervention 

Force in Northern Mali.” UN News Center. UN, 12 Oct. 2012. 

Web. 

218 “Mali Rebels Threaten France over Intervention - Africa - Al 

Jazeera English.” Al Jazeera English. N.p., n.d. Web. 

219 Ibid. 

220 “AFP: EU Greenlights Military Back-up for Mali.” Google 

News. N.p., n.d. Web. 

221 “Situation in Mali Not Only a Humanitarian Crisis but Also 

a Powder Keg: Clinton.” United Nations Multimedia, Radio, 

Photo and Television. N.p., n.d. Web. 

38 


222 Chester, Penelope. “Mali: Imminent Intervention, 

Uncertain Future.” UN Dispatch. N.p., n.d. Web. 

223 “Video Remarks on Mali.” U.S. Department of State. U.S. 

Department of State, 26 Sept. 2012. Web. 

224 “Algeria Key Partner for UK, Military Intervention in Mali 

Last Resort.” Echorouk Online. N.p., n.d. Web. 

225 “Laurent Fabius Sets out French Position on Mali 

Crisis.” France in the United Kingdom. French Embassy in 

London, n.d. Web. 

226 “Backgrounder: China-Mali Ties in Continuous 

Development_English_Xinhua.” Xinhua News, n.d. Web. 

227 “Afghan, Pakistani Jihadists ‘operating in Northern Mali’” 

FRANCE 24, n.d. Web. 

228 “Coup in Mali: Situation Remains Unclear.” Voice of Russia. 


229 “Relations of Latin America and the Caribbean with 

Africa: Current Status and Areas of Opportunity.” Sistema 

Económico Latinoamericano Y Del Caribe. Permanent 

Secretariat of SELA, n.d. Web. 

230 “Morocco: Mr. El Othmani’s Missteps in Mali.” 

Moroccoboard, n.d. Web. 

39 


Bibliographic Essay 

Emerson, Stephen A. “Desert Insurgency: Lessons from the Third Tuareg Rebellion.” Small Wars & Insurgencies 

22.4 (2011): 669-87. Web. 

Keita, Kalifa. Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali. [Carlisle Barracks, 

Pa.]: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1998. Print. 

Krings, Thomas. “Marginalisation and Revolt among the Tuareg in Mali and Niger.” GeoJournal 36.1 (1995): 

57-63. JSTOR. Web. 

Lecocq, Jean Sebastian. Disputed Desert: Decolonisation, Competing Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in 

Northern Mali. Leiden: Brill, 2010. Print. 

Noueihed, Lin, and Alex Warren. The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, Counter-revolution and the 

Making of a New Era. New Haven: Yale UP, 2012. Print. 

Pipes, Daniel. Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition. New York: Oxford UP, 1990. Print. 

Walt, Stephen M. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1987. Print. 

Zahler, Kathy A. The Assads’ Syria. Minneapolis, MN: Twenty-First Century, 2010. Print. 

40 


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