National Transitional Council of Libya - World Model United Nations

National 

Transitional Council 

of Libya 

World Model United Nations 2013 

Study Guide

Contact Us 

World Model united Nations 2013 

info@worldmun.org 

www.worldmun.org 

Letters 

Letter from the Secretary General 04 

Letter from the Under-Secretary General 05 

Letter from the Chair 06 

CONteNtS 

Introduction 

Letter from Mustafa Abdul Jalil 07 

07 

History of Libya 

Italian Rule 

07 King Idris 

08 Rise of a Revolutionary 

09 New Leadership 

11 Qaddafi’s New Political Structure 

14 International Terrorism 

16 Libya and the US 

17 Sanctions in the 90s 

18 A New Direction in the 20th Century 

20 

Current Situation 

The Arab Spring 

24 Libya Pre-Revolution 

25 Libyan Revolution 

29 Role of the National Transitional Council 

30 Questions a Resolution Must Answer 

31 Suggestions for Further Research 

31 

Conclusion 

Position Papers and Committee Dynamics 

32 Closing Remarks 

38 Bibliography 

Melbourne Host Directorate PTY LTD | Office of Media and Design

Letters 


Letter from the Secretary-General 

dear delegates, 

it is my pleasure and honor to welcome you to the 22nd session of World Model united 

Nations! My name is Charlene Wong, and i am the Secretary-General of WorldMuN 2013. 

Within this document you will find the study guide for your committee. The conference 

staff for WorldMUN 2013 has been working tirelessly over the past months to provide 

you with an unparalleled conference experience, beginning with this guide. Each Head 

Chair has researched extensively to provide you with a foundation for each committee’s 

topic areas. 

We encourage you to use this study guide as the starting point for your exploration of 

your committee’s topics, and your country or character’s policies. The WorldMUN Spirit 

invites you to step into the shoes of your country or character, and to immerse yourself in 

the committee by researching and developing a full understanding of the issues, perspectives, 

and possible solutions on the table. We offer several additional resources online, 

including our WorldMuN 101 Guide and Rules of Procedure, updated for this year. Both 

are available at www.worldmun.org. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to 

contact your Head Chair or Under-Secretary-General. 

Please enjoy reading this study guide, and I look forward to meeting you in Melbourne 

in March! 

Sincerely, 

Charlene S. Wong 

Secretary-General 


secretarygeneral@worldmun.org 

Melbourne Host Directorate PTY LTD | Office of Media and Design 

4

Letter from the Under-Secretary-General 


it is with the utmost honor and pleasure that i welcome you to the Specialized Agencies. 

the SA holds a special place in the heart of Model united Nations; it is here that 

crises are born and delegates rise to the challenge to address quickly evolving issues in 

real-time. With an average size of 20 delegates per committee, the SA promises to deliver 

an intimate and tight-knit environment where every delegate’s voice can be heard and 

appreciated. 

The SA has always made a firm commitment to substantive excellence and lifelike simulations. 

The first measure of that promise starts here with this study guide. Your chair has 

worked tirelessly over these past few months pouring over books in deep Harvard dungeons 

to breathe life into these topics. I am so proud of their work and hope you make 

the most of this initial resource to inspire and guide your preparation for WorldMuN. 

Come March, your chair and the junior staff will be working to deliver a MUN simulation 

that raises the bar of your delegate experience. 

All that being said, the SA would be nothing without you, her committed delegates, who 

challenge and dedicate themselves to addressing head-on the world’s greatest problems, 

both past, present, and future. With ample preparation, devotion, and creativity, 

you will find success in this SA home. 

As a former MUN delegate and SA staffer, I know what it means to live and breathe a 

thrilling and informative MUN experience. Along with our chairs and junior staff, I hope 

to deliver that same experience to you all. Take care, and I cannot wait to meet you in 

person in Melbourne! 

Sincerely, 

Michael Chilazi 

under-Secretary-General of the Specialized 

Agencies 


sa@worldmun.org 


5

Letter from the Chair 


Welcome to the best Model United Nations experience you will ever have! Of course, I 

am talking about the Libyan National Transitional Council, 2011! This recent historical crisis 

committee will begin during one of the most turbulent times for Northern Africa and 

the Middle East – the recent Arab Spring. Obviously, Libya had one of the most radical 

responses to the Arab Spring uprisings, and much work has had to be done to rebuild the 

nation in the wake of the Libyan civil war and the fall of Muammar Qaddafi. At WorldMUN 

2013, you will have the opportunity to shape the rebuilding of a nation wrested from the 

decades-old grip of a dictator. The fall of Qaddafi was one of the most radical events of 

2011, and Libya’s future in the aftermath of this fall is a vital issue that is unfolding as you 

are reading these words. It will be your mission to step into the shoes of the Libyan leaders 

now faced with this goal of nation building, just after the fall of Tripoli. Whether the 

Council decides to follow in the footsteps of history or decides that it can do a better job, 

it is up to you, the delegates, to steer Libya to a bright future. 

My name is Richard Ebright, and I will be serving as the Chair of this committee, as well as 

presiding over committee sessions as Mahmoud Jibril. Be warned, I will not be taking my 

role as Chairman lightly; the preservation of Libya is at the forefront of my mind, and I will 

not accept anything less than the same dedication from all of you. In real life, however, I 

hail from North Brunswick, New Jersey, and I am now a third-year at Harvard College, majoring 

in Chemical and Physical Biology. Outside of science, I am very involved with Model 

uN – i Chaired third Party Actors at WorldMuN 2011, i was the under-Secretary-General 

for Operations at WorldMuN 2012, and i currently am the under-Secretary-General for 

the Specialized Agencies at HNMUN 2013 (Harvard’s college conference in Boston). I also 

participate in cancer research and breakdance at Harvard, and I enjoy Ultimate Frisbee, 

frequent cups of coffee, and rare naps. 

I am thrilled to be directing the Libyan National Transitional Council, and I hope you are 

looking forward to the conference, and to Melbourne, as much as I am. If you have any 

questions about the study guide, committee procedures, WorldMUN in general, or just 

want to chat, please don’t hesitate to contact me. I am here to ensure that you have an 

exciting and enriching experience, so I would be more than happy to help you prepare 

adequately. See you in sunny Melbourne in March, and congratulations on taking on this 

exciting challenge! 

Sincerely, 

Richard Ebright 

Chair, National transitional Council, 2011 

WorldMuN 2013 

libya@worldmun.org 


6

Introduction 

Ministers – 

Today, 28 August 2011, we have finally captured 

Tripoli. After years of repression, the Libyan people 

are finally free from Qaddafi’s tyranny, and a new 

dawn rises over Libya. As Ministers of the National 

Transitional Council, you all have the sacred duty of 

leading Libya into a new age. 

This transition, however, will certainly not be an 

easy one. Libya has just gone through many months 

of turmoil, as our people valiantly fought against 

Qaddafi’s forces for the freedom of our nation, and 

the infrastructure of the nation has been destroyed. 

Libyan people throughout the nation have been 

displaced, and thousands upon thousands of our 

people have been wounded or killed in the past 

months. Qaddafi is still at-large, and the city of Sirte 

is still under his control. the oil industry, our primary 

source of income before the revolution, has all-butceased 

operation during the revolution. As the new 

leadership of a nation, we will need to prove to our 

people and to the leaders of the rest of the world that 

we are capable and competent leaders, and we will 

need to garner their support to lead Libya to prosper. 

In the wake of the revolution, Libya can either 

transition toward a brighter future or it can collapse 

into anarchy. the future of our nation depends upon 

your actions in our meeting on 29 August 2011; do not 

let the sacrificed lives of our brothers go to waste. 

– National transitional Council Chairman Mustafa 

Abdul Jalil 

HISTORY OF LIBYA 

italian Rule 

On 24 December 1951, the Kingdom of Libya 

became the first country in North Africa to gain full 

independence and autonomy. Prior to independence, 

however, Libya had been subjugated to the aggression 

and oppressive rule of the Italians, primarily under 

Benito Mussolini. The Italians regarded Libya as their 

“fourth shore,” and Rudolfo Graziani, Mussolini’s 

most respected general, was sent to pacify resistance 

to foreign rule, and to oversee the region in the late 

1920s. Graziani’s rule was marked by destruction, 

with up to 12,000 Libyan natives being executed each 

year. 1 These hostilities finally ended in 1937, when 

Mussolini began integrating Libya into metropolitan 

Italy and encouraging immigration from Italy to Libya. 

By 1940, nearly 40,000 Italian immigrants had flocked 

to Libya’s shores. 2 However, the Italian control of 

Libya was not to last long. After British Field Marshal 

Bernard Montgomery captured tripoli from the 

Italians in January of 1943, it was only a matter of 

time until Libya’s independence. Despite protests by 

the British and the French, both of whom had control 

of portions of the country after the end of World War 

II, the United Nations General Assembly called for 

the establishment of an independent Libyan nation 

before 1952. 

King Idris 

The leader of the newly independent Libya was 

King Muhammed Idris, a well respected religious 

leader with claims of descent from the Prophet 

Mohammad himself. 3 He was also supported by 

the West, including the Americans and the British, 

who thought that he would be a holdout against 

communism in North Africa. idris did not disappoint 

King Idris, the first leader of an independent Libya. 

their expectations. He was a weak leader, often 

deferring to his Western allies, and within three 

years, he had signed treaties with the British and the 


7

Americans authorizing their use of several airbases 

within Libya. He also granted air and surface transit 

rights to the French, allowing them to send in troops 

to counter the Algerian insurgency of the late 1950s 

more easily. It was quickly clear that, while Idris may 

have claimed to be primarily allied with his Arab 

neighbors, he was very willing and eager to work with 

the West. 

Despite his weak leadership and lack of support 

for neighboring Arab nations, Idris was able to stay 

in power for eighteen years because of the ban on 

political opposition that he put in place shortly after 

coming to power. 4 He also later took steps to curb 

membership in trade unions, further hindering the 

growth of opposing factions. 

In 1959, Libya’s greatest natural resources were 

discovered. Huge oil strikes were made in the Sirtic 

desert. Beneath its barren sands, Libya’s desert 

held enough oil to propel the nation to the position 

of fourth-largest oil producer in the world. 5 the 

Americans and British used their airbases and troops 

in the region to protect the oilfields from non- 

Western influence, and international oil companies 

rushed to claim a share in these newfound desert 

treasures. Oil became Libya’s largest export, and 

previously unimaginable funds flowed into Libya’s 

coffers. However, Idris was not able to adequately 

manage this new income. Most of the oil money 

went into the pockets of a few businessmen and 

friends of Idris, and any trickle-down to the Libyan 

people was slow and barely noticeable. Corruption 

ran rampant throughout the upper echelons of the 

government, and as early as 1962, the funds had been 

so badly managed that Libya was requesting money 

from the united States to deal with a cash shortage. 6 

Lack of improvement in standards of living, despite 

an infinitely greater national income, created much 

dissent among the Libyan people – dissent that would 

come to the forefront within the next few years. 

In June 1967, the Six-Day War broke out between 

Egypt and Israel. Tensions had been building between 

Israel and its Arab neighbors for years, and these 

tensions finally erupted in a conflict that would 

result in Israel quickly and decisively beating all 

of its neighbors. Idris quickly pledged support for 

Egypt, condemning Zionism, but due to the financial 

mishandlings of the past decade, Libya was unable to 

provide support for its Arab neighbor. This did not sit 

well with the Libyan people, who protested against 

Idris’ inaction by holding demonstrations and killing 

Jews in Libya. After Israel soundly defeated its Arab 

enemies, many Libyan oil workers also went on strike 

in protest. The strike lasted for about a month, and 

cost about $1.5 million a day. 7 This was the beginning 

of the end for Idris. By 1969, revolutionary plots were 

in no short supply. At least four different groups were 

preparing to unseat the king, including one led by 

Abdul Aziz, the chief of staff of the army, and one 

led by Abdul Bakoush, a former Prime Minister. Idris 

himself realized the inevitability of his removal, and in 

the summer of 1969, he prepared abdication letters to 

use when he determined his successor. it was only a 

matter of time before he was formally dethroned. On 

1 September 1969, a relatively unknown army colonel 

took advantage of the political unrest and was the 

first to lead his supporters to action, overthrowing 

the king’s forces in a nearly bloodless coup d’etat. 

The colonel’s name was Muammar Qaddafi. 

Rise of a Revolutionary 

Born in the early 1940s, Muammar Qaddafi grew 

up to the sound of tanks rumbling across the Sahara 

during World War II. His parents were poor Bedouin 

herders of the lowly Qaddafa tribe, whose name 

means “those who spit out, or vomit.” 8 Qaddafi was 

the first of his family to receive a formal education, 

living at and attending a primary school in the city of 

Sirte six days a week. When he was fourteen, Qaddafi 

and his family moved to the town of Sebha, where 

Qaddafi was enrolled in a secondary school. It was 

in Sebha that his revolutionary feelings blossomed. 

A charismatic and passionate teenager, Qaddafi 

attracted many followers, some of whom were to 

stay by his side throughout his revolution. He was 

a passionate follower of Gamal Abdul Nasser, the 

President of Egypt, and he frequently listened to 

Nasser’s speeches on the radio. In fact, Qaddafi 

frequently memorized the entirety of Nasser’s 

speeches, which denounced the West, especially 

condemning the presence of the American and 

British bases on Libyan land. He would then recite 


8

the speeches for his classmates, followed by his own 

speeches against idris, promoting nationalism and 

Arab unity. Qaddafi’s early revolutionary feelings 

were further revealed when, in October 1961, he 

organized a demonstration in protest of Syria’s 

decision to break its union with Egypt. Even though 

the protest was not controversial, it resulted in twenty 

participants being arrested by the police and Qaddafi 

being expelled from the Sebha school. Already too 

old to continue schooling, he obtained a false birth 

certificate to enroll in a different school. 9 At his new 

school, Qaddafi quickly found more followers. He 

laid down strict rules for his to-be revolutionaries: 

alcohol, gambling, and women were forbidden. Even 

so, his followers were quite loyal, and eager to heed 

Qaddafi’s bidding. 

In 1963, Qaddafi joined the Libyan army to gain 

more supporters in greater positions of power. 

British officers led cadets in the training academy, and 

Qaddafi’s scorn for the West began to publicly show. 

He frequently disobeyed the orders of his British 

superiors, going out of his way to cause trouble, and 

it is rumored that Qaddafi himself was responsible for 

the death and mistreatment of some of his peers, just 

to cause grief for the British commanders. 10 Qaddafi 

was frequently punished, but he earned the respect 

and trust of many of the other cadets. He began to 

gather the more revolutionary cadets, forming a 

Qaddafi speaks on Libyan national radio after overthrowing King Idris. 

central group of followers, which he called the Free 

Officer’s Movement. In 1966, Qaddafi attended a 

four-month training course in Britain, which further 

increased his dislike for the West, particularly its 

emphasis on wages and capitalism. 

By 1969, Qaddafi had decided that the time was 

ripe for the Free Officer’s Movement to take control 

of the country, with himself at the helm. On the 

night of 31 August, Qaddafi’s forces began deploying 

throughout tripoli, Benghazi, and Al Bayda, capturing 

radio stations, military installations, and police 

stations. Idris was out of the country on vacation at 

the time, allowing the coup to be executed quickly 

and successfully, with only a single casualty. 

On the morning of 1 September, Qaddafi made a 

radio broadcast declaring that, according to the will 

of the people, the treasonous and corrupt reign of 

King Idris had been brought to an end. He did not 

reveal his identity for a week (for protection’s sake), 

but the new Libya was immediately recognized by 

other Arab nations, such as Iraq, Syria, Sudan, and 

egypt. 11 While Western nations did not recognize the 

new leaders of Libya, they did not intervene on Idris’ 

behalf, thereby solidifying Qaddafi’s rule. Qaddafi had 

successfully taken over Libya. 

New Leadership 

Qaddafi quickly set out to change many of the 

policies of King Idris. Within a week, he reached 


9

out to the Egyptian government, stressing his 

allegiance to Nasser and to the cause of Arab unity. 

The Egyptian government, though happy to have a 

loyal follower, was horrified by Qaddafi’s simplicity, 

after he reportedly stated that he wanted Nasser 

to tell the Libyan government what to do to bring 

about Arab unity. 12 Within two months, he informed 

the British and Americans that their military bases 

Map of Libyan Arab Jamahiriya . 

would have to be evacuated, and Western forces 

were forced to leave Libya by spring of the next year. 

Qaddafi also expelled as many as 30,000 Italians 

from Libya, nationalizing their farms and land for the 

Libyan government. It was quickly clear that Qaddafi 

did not respect or trust the West as his predecessor 

had. Western governments quickly grasped the new 

situation, and they worked to appease Qaddafi in the 

hope of retaining their rights to drill oil. 

Qaddafi also made clear his intentions to fully 

control Libyan politics. He formed the Revolutionary 

Command Council (RCC), a group of twelve of 

Qaddafi’s most trusted colleagues, and placed all 

executive powers within the Council’s hands. In 

December 1969, the new constitution designated 

the RCC as the “highest authority in the Libyan Arab 

Republic” and furthermore declared that “measures 

adopted by the RCC may not be challenged before 

anybody.” 13 Qaddafi and his RCC worked quickly to 

ensure that they would remain in power. early on, 

they banned political parties. By January 1970, all 

newspapers had their licenses suspended and were 

replaced by a government-funded newspaper, Al 

Thawra. By May, trade unions were prohibited, and 

RCC members presided over the courts. Finally, the 

number of officers in the Libyan army was whittled 

down from roughly 600 to 170, reducing the chance 

of a military-led coup. despite the security measures, 

however, coup attempts still took place. The first, led 

by two military officers who had helped Qaddafi take 

over Libya, was dealt with before it could gain steam. 

Word had quickly spread to those loyal to Qaddafi, 

and the officers were executed. The next, led by 

Prince Abid, the nephew of King Idris, was thwarted 

when Abid’s scouts were caught sneaking into the 

country by Libyan security. A final attempt, led by Idris’ 

former counselor, Omar Shehli, attempted to free 

hundreds of prisoners from the main Libyan prison 

in tripoli. this plan was halted when italian police, 

in conjunction with British intelligence, found and 

arrested the plotters, in an attempt to send a message 

of Western goodwill to Qaddafi. Though none of the 

plots were successful, the number of attempts within 

a year shook Qaddafi and the RCC and hardened their 

resolve to hold onto their newfound power. 

The new Libyan regime began to flex its political 

muscles in September 1970. When Western oil 

companies resisted the government’s request for a 

modest increase in the price per barrel, the government 

retaliated by severely limiting the output allowed 

by the major American oil company, Occidental. To 

avoid further cuts to output, the oil companies had 

to agree to Libya’s price increases. After a taste of 

its control over the Western companies, Qaddafi’s 

government began to make increasingly greater 

demands. In March 1971, oil companies were forced 

to sign the Tripoli Agreement, which gave Libya an 

even greater share of the revenue produced from 

its oil. Later that year, the regime nationalized all of 

10 


British Petroleum’s rights and assets in Libya. This 

was widely seen as a political statement in protest 

of Britain’s refusal to protect Arab islands in the 

Persian Sea from iran. 14 British troops had pulled out 

of the Persian Sea islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, 

and Lesser Tunb, and Iranian troops subsequently 

seized the islands, much to the chagrin of the large 

Arab civilian populations. Over the next three years, 

Libya continued to nationalize varying portions of 

the eleven oil companies operating on its territory, 

including 100% of BP, Bunker Hunt, and Amoseas. By 

1974, Libya’s receipts on each barrel of oil exported 

had risen from about $2 to above $11. 15 With their hold 

over the Libyan oil market lost, many Western oil 

companies began turning away from Libya’s shores in 

search of more compliant producers. 

Having secured their positions as the new leaders 

of Libya and having made known their scorn for 

the West, Qaddafi and the RCC initiated an internal 

revolution of Libyan society. One of their primary 

goals was to even out the political power of Libyan 

citizens, so that tribal leaders and industry bosses 

had the same power as their followers and workers. 

Qaddafi’s chosen method was the creation of popular 

rule – he wanted all citizens to be directly involved 

with the running of the nation. In early 1971, Qaddafi 

introduced Popular Congresses, which would allow 

the general population to appoint representatives 

to the Libyan parliament and elect the president. 

However, the Libyan people were largely apathetic 

to these new changes, and Qaddafi’s first attempts at 

popular rule were quickly abandoned. He tried again 

later that year with the creation of the Libyan Arab 

Socialist Union (ASU). Modeled on Nasser’s Egyptian 

ASU, which aimed to heighten Arab nationalism within 

egypt and put power into the hands of the people, the 

Libyan ASU sought to increase Libyan participation 

in politics. During the first ASU National Congress in 

the following year, public debate seemed to increase, 

but like Qaddafi’s previous attempt at popular rule, 

the ASu was doomed to fail. the primary participants 

were middle-class citizens and entrepreneurs, most of 

whom were politically neutral. 16 Contrary to Qaddafi’s 

wishes, the voices of the Libyan people were still not 

heard. One potential reason for this apathy may be 

that, up to this point, there was not much reason for 

the Libyan people to be actually involved in politics. 

They had only recently acquired a new leader, and he 

had quickly increased Libya’s both prominence in the 

world and its income. they had nothing to complain 

about. 

Qaddafi’s New Political Structure 

After the failure of the Libyan ASU, Qaddafi decided 

to kick the revolution into high gear. On 16 April 1973, 

he announced the Libyan Popular Revolution, which 

would rely on grassroots mobilization to prod the 

people of Libya into governing themselves. 17 the 

Popular Revolution, as Qaddafi described it, would 

destroy existing political organizations and strip 

the powerful members of Libyan society of their 

ranks. Over the course of the next few months, 

many bureaucrats deemed hostile to Qaddafi’s 

government lost their positions in the name of 

the Popular Revolution. Governors of major cities 

and managers of major companies were removed 

from power, paving the way for the second step of 

the Popular Revolution. To replace them, Qaddafi 

instituted Popular Committees, groups of people 

that represented public and private organizations. 

Members of a company or other organizations 

comprised a Popular Committee, and the various 

Popular Committees were instructed to rule the state 

jointly. By late August, there were roughly 2,400 

Popular Committees in place. However, it quickly 

became clear that, even though he labeled his reforms 

as a Popular Revolution, Qaddafi’s changes did not 

put true power in the hands of the people. When 

the Popular Committees sought to create laws that 

would allow some sectors of the economy to remain 

free from popular rule, Qaddafi overruled them. 18 

The contradictions between Qaddafi’s rhetoric in 

support of the Popular Revolution and his autocratic 

rule threw Libya into a short period of political limbo. 

He appeared to be outwardly giving full power to the 

people, while he, along with the RCC, actually had real 

control of the country. To make matters worse, the 

ASU had never been formally dismantled, and the line 

of division between the weak ASU and the Popular 

Committees was unclear. this disparity and confusion 

led to rifts within the RCC. Between late 1973 and 

11 


1975, the RCC split into two factions – one that 

supported a more carefully designed economic and 

social plan for Libya and one that supported radical, 

popular rule. these factions were further estranged 

by student unrest and protests in early 1975, as well 

as the recruitment of army officers to their respective 

causes. The political divide culminated in August 1975, 

when two members of the RCC, Bashir Hawadi and 

Umar Muhayshi, spearheaded a coup against Qaddafi 

and his allies within the 

RCC. Muhayshi, who was 

the Minister of Planning, 

refused to surrender 

funds earmarked for 

Qaddafi’s reforms but 

was forced to flee when 

the coup was discovered 

and made public by those 

loyal to Qaddafi. In the 

aftermath of the coup, 

the RCC was restructured 

and consolidated to five 

positions: Qaddafi and 

his four closest advisors. 

With no more opposition 

within the RCC, Qaddafi 

was free to rule the 

country as he saw fit. He 

first systematically purged 

all personnel suspected of 

having possible disloyalty. 

After strengthening his 

position further, Qaddafi 

then returned to pursuing 

popular revolution within 

Libya. However, this time, 

the revolution was purely 

Qaddafi’s vision, unchecked by less radical members 

of the RCC. 

Just weeks after the attempted coup, Qaddafi 

released an ideological treatise that would serve as 

the basis for his popular revolution. This treatise, 

containing Qaddafi’s views on economics, politics, 

and social justice, consisted of three volumes and 

was known as The Green Book. Declaring that within 

The Green Book, Qaddafi’s treatise on government. 

its pages was the groundwork for a “Third Universal 

theory,” as opposed to capitalism and communism, 

Qaddafi presented his treatise as the foundation 

for a reformed Libya. The Green Book begins with 

Qaddafi’s views on political structures, stating that 

any political system that relies on representation 

or political parties is repressive. He declares that, 

instead of accurately depicting the views of entire 

regions or populaces, representatives only present 

their own personal views. 

He goes on to state that 

victorious political parties 

only present the views of 

the majority, blocking out 

the wishes of defeated 

minorities, noting that if a 

political party wins 51% of the 

vote, and its opposition wins 

49% of the vote, supporters 

of the latter are ruled and 

represented by leaders that 

they did not vote for and 

do not support. 19 Qaddafi 

uses such reasoning to come 

to the conclusion that the 

only possible fair solution is 

direct democracy, through 

the creation of popular 

congresses and popular 

committees. Popular 

congresses consist of the 

people at all basic levels, and 

these popular congresses 

elect administrative popular 

committees from members 

of their ranks to run 

companies, organizations, 

and the country. the popular committees answer to 

the General People’s Congress, the most powerful 

political organization, comprised of members chosen 

by the popular congresses. 

After discussing politics, The Green Book goes on 

to discuss economics. Qaddafi adamantly espouses 

extreme socialism, arguing that all members of a 

country should profit equally from its wealth. He 

12 


In 1977, Qaddafi declared a “people’s revolution” and renamed Libya “The Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya”. Here seen standing 

with then president of Egypt, Anwar Sadat, and future president of Syria, General Hafez Assad. 

declares that “wage-earners” are slaves to their 

employers and that they must become “partners in 

production;” in addition to being workers, they should 

be partial owners of the organization. 20 Qaddafi goes 

on to declare that no individual or group should be 

able to exploit other citizens, so that no citizen is 

dependent on another. Therefore, no services, such 

as renting apartments, using taxis, or hiring maids, 

should be procured. 21 

The theories presented in The Green Book were 

immediately implemented in Libyan society. In January 

1976, the Libyan ASU was reformed as the General 

People’s Congress (GPC), representing the highest 

form of government. From the GPC, secretaries were 

elected to the GPC Secretariat, which was to guide 

the GPC. At the same time, the remainder of the RCC 

was abolished to put full command in the hands of 

the GPC. On 2 March 1977, Qaddafi formally declared 

the Libyan state to have been radically changed in 

favor of the people. Libya was renamed “The Socialist 

People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.” According to The 

Green Book, a Jamahiriya is a political community 

controlled by consultation instead of representation, 

and the formal change in Libya’s name was to 

represent a perceived success in the implementation 

of Qaddafi’s political ideals. 

However, as had been the case with Qaddafi’s 

previous reforms, it was clear who actually had control 

of power within the Libyan society. Although they no 

longer had positions as members of the RCC, Qaddafi 

and his closest allies still had crucial positions within 

the Libyan government. Qaddafi himself was the head 

of the army. Additionally, though members of the 

GPC Secretariat were supposed to be elected by the 

GPC, in practice they were appointed by Qaddafi and 

his cohorts, a system that continued through 2011. 22 

Finally, the GPC Secretariat, along with the former 

members of the RCC, determined the proceedings of 

GPC meetings and effectively carried out most of the 

day-to-day business of the nation. In addition to the 

lack of popular control in the GPC, in November 1977, 

Qaddafi designed and implemented Revolutionary 

Committees, a change not mentioned in the Green 

Book. These Revolutionary Committees consisted of 

young individuals selected for their devotion to the 

regime and were directly accountable to Qaddafi. 

Formally, their role was to encourage greater popular 

participation in People’s Congresses. In reality, 

however, their purpose was to act as a further 

security measure for the regime and its plans, with 

the power to “replace” those deemed unacceptable 

to the goals of the government. 23 This act served to 

further estrange Qaddafi’s rhetoric from his formal 

policy. 

At the same time, the regime began implementing 

the economic directives outlined in The Green Book. 

In May 1978, the government prohibited owning 

multiple homes for rental purposes. Other free 

13 


market services quickly became outlawed as well. 

That same year, the abolishment of wage-labor 

began in earnest, following Qaddafi’s impassioned 

speech in favor of joint ownership. Almost overnight, 

merchants and high-ranking businessmen were 

stripped of power and ownership in their companies, 

and replaced by popular committees consisting of 

their former employees. Only the banking system 

and oil companies were saved from these mass 

takeovers. 24 In late 1980, Qaddafi declared that all 

entrepreneurs were detrimental to the country’s 

economic activities, and private businesses were 

shut down and outlawed. they were replaced, for 

the most part, by state-run supermarkets, which sold 

nearly all consumer staples. Finally, that same year, 

the regime decided to change Libya’s currency to 

the dinar. Libyans were required to exchange their 

old currency for limited amounts of the new dinar, 

further evening the assets of the general populace. 

Between 1976 and 1980, Qaddafi implemented the 

Five-Year Social and Economic Development Plan. 

This plan called for the government to use Libya’s 

vast oil revenues, which represented 99.9% of the 

total national income, to benefit the people. Of a 

roughly $26 billion budget, $23 billion would be used 

by the government to develop Libya’s non-oil sectors. 

Qaddafi envisioned that the extensive cash infusions 

into the other sectors of the Libyan economy, 

especially agriculture, manufacturing, and utilities, 

would create long-term growth. In order to provide 

the necessary manpower for the technological 

growth of the nation, the plan called for extensive 

investment in education, resulting in a six-fold 

increase in the number of universities by the end of 

the 1970s. 25 Unfortunately, despite having a budget 

that was roughly four times larger per capita than 

the rest of the Arab world combined, the plan failed 

to meet its lofty goals. Poor popular management of 

oil funds led to significant amounts of money going 

into the pockets of those who were responsible for 

spreading the funds to the nation. Additionally, oil 

income began to decline, as many Western nations 

began to place restrictions on trade with Libya 

in response to suspected Libyan involvement in 

international terrorism, an image that Libya would 

embrace and enlarge over the next decade. 

international terrorism 

From the beginning of his rule, Qaddafi expressed 

his strong anti-West and anti-Semitic sentiments 

frequently. However, besides forcing the British 

and American forces off Libyan land and extracting 

concessions from Western oil companies, Qaddafi did 

not take much action against the West during the first 

few years of the new regime. However, this quickly 

changed. 

Beginning with the 1972 assassination of Israeli 

athletes at the Munich Olympics and the 1973 killing 

of the US ambassador to Sudan, links began to form 

between Libya and terrorist activities worldwide. 

Though there was no clear proof of Libyan involvement 

in these murders, international investigations, 

conducted by various intelligence organizations 

throughout Europe, identified probable connections 

to the government in Tripoli. After 1973, Libya began 

Many Western nations linked the Munich Olympics assassinations 

to Libya, marking the beginning of Libya’s entrance onto the world 

stage as a supporter of international terrorism. 

to publicly express support for radical revolutionary 

groups throughout the world. Many radical 

Palestinian movements, as well as revolutionary 

groups in Western nations (most notably, the Irish 

Republican Army), found support, both in rhetoric 

and financial aid, from Qaddafi and his allies. Libya 

also aided revolutionary groups in many Arab nations, 

as Qaddafi considered many Arab leaders to be not 

radical enough or committed enough to Arab unity. 

14 


According to Israeli intelligence, by 1986, Qaddafi had 

supported roughly fifty terrorist organizations, as 

well as about forty radical governments throughout 

the world. In addition, he provided training grounds 

in Libya for some 7,000 terrorists. 26 Finally, though 

the exact figures are not known, American and British 

intelligence estimate that Qaddafi provided incredible 

sums of money in support of international terrorism, 

with the US State Department estimating a figure of 

roughly $100 million in 1985 alone. 27 

Support for revolutionary groups in Arab nations 

was extensive throughout the 1970s. Scores of 

assassination plots were linked back to funding 

or organization by Tripoli, but far more often than 

not, the attempts were thwarted, either through 

discovery or through failed execution. Qaddafi was 

apparently content with the rare successes, even at 

the cost of many failed attempts. Libya’s support of 

terrorism further increased in the late 1970s, after 

Qaddafi’s support for revolutionary groups and state terrorism 

increased his notoriety and inspired fear in world neighbors. 

Egypt and Israel signed the Camp David accords. 

Qaddafi considered this a betrayal to the Arab world 

and publicly denounced the agreement, as well 

as the Egyptian government. Following the Camp 

David accords, he also funded several assassination 

attempts of key American targets within Egypt. 

in addition to sponsoring terrorist and 

revolutionary organizations throughout the world, 

Qaddafi also supported state terrorism, with the goal 

of eliminating opponents of the regime and former 

Libyans who had left or fled the country. Qaddafi 

placed heavy emphasis on arming the Libyan army, 

purchasing the latest weapons technology from 

europe and the united States, often illegally. As 

early as 1975, the Libyan army used these weapons 

against dissenters, and in 1979, Qaddafi publicly 

declared that he intended to “follow [Libyan exiles] 

even if they go to the North Pole.” 28 The year 1979 

marked the beginning of Qaddafi’s campaign against 

‘stray dogs’—opposition members who had fled 

the country. Libyan hitmen were recruited in Tripoli 

and Benghazi by members of the government 

and were assigned targets, usually in europe. the 

hitmen were often given overly generous budgets 

and much freedom, as long as they eventually 

attempted to kill their targets. Interestingly, Qaddafi 

and his associates did not make much use of Libya’s 

extensive intelligence agencies for the assassinations, 

choosing instead to let the hitmen do the planning. 

Beginning with two failed assassination attempts of 

a defected RCC member in 1976, Qaddafi’s campaign 

to eliminate ‘stray dogs’ was to be only slightly more 

successful than the Libyan-supported terrorism 

plots, with many failed assassinations. However, 

the campaign struck fear into the hearts of Libyans 

living abroad, as the targeting of ‘stray dogs’ was 

often arbitrary and unexpected. The plots reached 

their peak in 1980, when scores of Libyan expatriates 

were targeted. During a three-month span, twelve 

Libyans were found murdered in Europe, and many 

other failed attempts were also made. the targets 

included lawyers, merchants, and even ordinary 

former citizens. 29 Western governments soon began 

to complain and deport Libyans, with the fear that 

any Libyan could be an undercover assassin working 

for Qaddafi; however, action was generally limited 

because most nations did not want to endanger their 

oil trade with Libya. The limited Western response did 

not deter Qaddafi, and he continued to hunt down 

Libyan ‘stray dogs’ for the next few years. 

Finally, Qaddafi himself was directly involved in the 

planning of a handful of terrorism plots throughout 

the late 1970s and early 1980s. Around 1980, he 

began actively pursuing the assassination of King 

Hussein of Jordan. Qaddafi claimed that Hussein 

15 


was too moderate and lacked commitment to Arab 

unity. The carefully organized plan involved shooting 

down Hussein’s private jet. Though the assassination 

was well planned and elaborate, at the last minute, 

Qaddafi’s personal assassin defected and warned 

Hussein about the plot. 30 In 1984, Qaddafi ordered a 

bombing run of a radio station in Omdurman, Sudan. 

The radio station had been broadcasting anti-Qaddafi 

propaganda, and Qaddafi wanted to send a powerful 

message to the Sudanese government. However, 

like many of his other initiatives, this too failed when 

the bomber missed, killing only a street vendor. 31 

That July, ships began experiencing explosions while 

passing through the Red Sea. By August, seventeen 

ships had been sunk by small underwater mines; 

these were traced back to Qaddafi, who had claimed 

that ships carrying goods to Israel should be sunk and 

that Arab oil “should be destroyed if it is not used for 

the liberation of Palestine.” 32 Qaddafi continued to 

support, sponsor, and promote terrorism throughout 

the world for the next half decade, only slowing down 

when the world began to actively turn against him in 

the early 1990s. 

Libya and the US 

In response to Qaddafi’s increasing support of 

terrorism, the US began taking steps against Libya. In 

1978, President Carter prohibited the sale of military 

equipment to Qaddafi’s forces, and in February 

1980, Carter closed down the US embassy in Tripoli. 

However, these steps were relatively minor. In January 

1981, Ronald Reagan replaced Carter, a change that 

would cause problems for Libya. Reagan was far 

more outspoken against Libya and its actions, viewing 

Libya as a visible target against which he could assert 

American power and strength. Labeling Qaddafi as 

the “Mad Dog of the Middle East,” Reagan actively 

worked against his regime. By early 1982, Reagan had 

closed the Libyan embassy in Washington, prohibited 

travel to Libya, embargoed crude oil imports from 

Libya, and prohibited US export of refined oil and gas 

to Libya. 33 

In mid-1981, the conflict took a sharp turn for the 

worse when two Libyan jet fighters were shot down 

by the United States’ Sixth Fleet. The fighters had 

been in a dogfight over the Gulf of Sirte, which Libya 

claimed as its own but which the West considered 

international waters. Qaddafi attempted to use the 

attack as a catalyst to mobilize Libyans against the 

United States. Armed with fiery anti-West rhetoric, 

Qaddafi proposed the creation of a popular army. The 

goal behind the creation of this army was to increase 

nationalism and anti-Western feelings among the 

general public. However, as had been the case in the 

past, the Libyan people were not eager to participate 

in Qaddafi’s popular movement, and the push for a 

popular army was unsuccessful. However, in the wake 

of the Sirte confrontation, Libya signed a treaty with 

the pro-Soviet nations of Ethiopia and South Yemen, 

indicating its support for the uSSR against “American 

aggression” in the Arab world. 34 

Tensions between Libya and the US continued to 

rise throughout the early 1980s. In early 1983, Qaddafi 

adopted the term “devil on earth” when referring to 

the US, and on 18 February 1983, he orchestrated 

massive anti-US demonstrations, publicly burning 

effigies of Reagan. Later that year, a suicide bomber 

linked to Libya attacked the US embassy in Lebanon. 

A year later, in 1984, a major attack on Qaddafi’s 

Tripoli office was carried out by the National Front for 

the Salvation of Libya, an opposition group organized 

by the pro-American government of Sudan. When 

the same pro-American Sudanese government was 

overthrown in 1985, Washington naturally suspected 

Libya. Their suspicions were heightened when 

Qaddafi declared, “Reagan has nothing to do with 

Sudan. Sudan is ours.” 35 Libya continued to work 

against American policy in Africa and the Middle 

east, supporting Palestinian terrorist groups, and 

hijacking ships and jets with American citizens on 

board. Tensions came to a head in March 1986, when 

a second incident occurred in the Gulf of Sirte, in 

which missiles were exchanged between Libyan and 

American forces. Then, on 5 April 1986, a German 

discotheque named La Belle was bombed by Libyans, 

wounding hundreds and killing two US soldiers. 

For the United States, the bombing of La Belle 

was the last straw. Washington immediately sought 

European aid against Libya, and within a few weeks, 

Great Britain agreed to let uS aircraft use British 

bases, and the European Economic Community 

16 


placed economic sanctions on Libya. A few days later, 

on 15 April 1986, the United States launched an assault 

against Tripoli. Dubbed Operation El Dorado Canyon, 

the United States bombed key military installations 

within Tripoli, including Qaddafi’s compound. Though 

Qaddafi himself was not harmed, his adopted 

daughter was killed in the assault, along with a few 

dozen other Libyans. Though clearly shaken by 

the brazen American attack, Qaddafi continued to 

accuse the united States of terrorism, again trying to 

convince his apathetic people to act. However, the 

Libyan people continued to question his motives, and 

little popular action was taken. Realizing his people’s 

apathy, Qaddafi began to display a high level of 

political nervousness following the attack. 36 

The United States continued to work against 

Qaddafi and his interests for the next five years, 

planning coups, funding anti-Libya Chadian forces, 

and shooting down Libyan jet fighters. The continued 

aggression wore down Qaddafi, and he hoped the 

election of George H.W. Bush would ease tensions 

with Washington. However, Bush continued the 

aggressive policies of his predecessor. In defiance, 

Libya began building two facilities with chemical 

weapon capabilities in early 1990. Qaddafi denied 

the existence of these facilities, while simultaneously 

declaring that the Arab world should develop chemical 

and nuclear weapons “in defiance of America.” 37 

Despite his rhetoric and fierce resolve, Qaddafi was 

unwilling to face America alone. the collapse of the 

Soviet Union in 1991 cost Libya its one ally strong 

enough to stand up to the united States. With the fall 

of the USSR, Libya was left single-handedly facing the 

world’s sole superpower. 

Sanctions in the 90s 

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the United 

States expanded its involvement in the Middle East. 

American successes in operations against Iraq, along 

with Moscow’s support of Washington’s policies, 

left Qaddafi worried about further American efforts 

to destabilize Libya. These fears were justified in 

late 1991, when the united States, in conjunction 

with Britain, accused Libya of the explosion of a Pan 

American aircraft over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988. 

Washington and London demanded that Tripoli turn 

over two Libyan nationals suspected of orchestrating 

the Lockerbie bombing. Qaddafi flatly refused. 

The United States and Britain, however, increased 

pressure on Libya by pushing United Nations Security 

Council Resolution 748 to adoption, which banned air 

travel and arms sales to and from Libya until the two 

suspects were surrendered. 38 The resolution took 

effect on 15 April 1992. Qaddafi continued to refuse to 

surrender the Libyan nationals. 

President William Clinton’s inauguration in January 

1993 gave Qaddafi hope of eased relations with 

the United States. However, instead of easing the 

Lockerbie situation, Clinton elevated sanctions, 

pushing uN Security Council Resolution 883 to 

Remains of Pan Am Flight 103, which crashed in Lockerbie, Scotland. Two Libyans were accused of causing the crash. 

17 


adoption on 1 December 1993, which froze overseas 

Libyan assets and banned sales of oil equipment. 

The sanctions began to take a toll on both Libya’s 

economy and its citizens. The inability to export crops 

and a decline in oil exports cost the state $19 billion. 

The lack of appropriate international medical care led 

to roughly 21,000 deaths between 1992 and 1995. 39 

By 1995, Qaddafi decided that he needed to take 

action against the sanctions, adopting a policy of 

sanction-busting. In order to allow air traffic into 

and out of the country, he claimed that all who left 

were performing pilgrimages to Mecca, a major part 

of the Muslim faith. On 19 April 1995, the first Libyan 

aircraft crossed out of Libyan airspace, without UN 

permission. the uN and the uS were essentially 

powerless to respond, as the sanction-breaking was 

in the name of Islam, and it was clear that Qaddafi had 

won a major political victory. He continued to exploit 

this political victory over the next few years, sending 

aircraft all over Africa and simply declaring that the 

aircraft were carrying Muslim pilgrims. in 1998, much 

to the dismay of the West, the Organization of African 

Unity (OAU) sided with Libya, calling on African 

nations to override the UN travel sanctions. 

Despite its political successes, Libya decided that 

it needed to compromise with the wishes of the 

West. The economic sanctions that had been in place 

throughout the 90s had severely hurt the country’s 

economy. On 5 April 1999, Qaddafi decided to turn 

over the two suspects involved with the Lockerbie 

bombing in exchange for the immediate lifting of 

UN sanctions. With just this relatively simple action, 

although there was no easing of tensions with the 

United States, Tripoli’s relations with European 

nations improved exponentially, and even Britain 

established full diplomatic ties three months later. 

The United States continued to resist breaking the 

ice between Tripoli and Washington and persisted in 

enforcing the terms of the previous UN sanctions for 

American citizens. 

A new direction in the 20th century 

On 31 January 2001, the Lockerbie case was finally 

settled, with one of the two Libyan suspects being 

found guilty and sentenced to life in prison. Qaddafi 

was not implicated in any way during the trial, and 

after the decision was released, he organized mass 

protests in Libya. The protests denounced the 

“disgraceful” and “unfair” decision and the wrongful 

“hostage” status of the convicted Libyan. 40 Qaddafi 

also denounced the united States, accusing it of 

bullying smaller nations, especially Libya. The United 

States responded by extending its imposition of the 

United Nations sanctions for another five years. 

Even so, Qaddafi’s anti-American behavior was 

soon to change. immediately following the terrorist 

attacks of 11 September 2001, Tripoli was quick to 

condemn those responsible and call for humanitarian 

aid. It even went so far as to start a blood drive for the 

American people. 41 Qaddafi denied that these moves 

El Saharara oil field. Oil exports provide the vast majority of Libya’s 

income. 

were made with the intent of softening Libya-United 

States relations, but cooperation between the two 

nations quickly ensued. Libyan intelligence agencies 

aided the United States in its search for Al-Qaeda, 

and the United States agreed to add members of 

the Libyan Militant Islamic Group (which opposed 

Qaddafi) to its list of terrorist groups. However, this 

was a very shaky alliance. The United States refused 

to remove its sanctions and also opposed Libya’s 

bid for chair of the UN Human Rights Commission. 

Nevertheless, Qaddafi declared that Libya would 

never again become a rogue state, and Libya won the 

vote to preside over the Human Rights Commission. 

This victory was a clear indicator of Libya’s renewed 

relations with the rest of the world, except for the 

18 


united States. 

in May 2003, American-led forces toppled Saddam 

Hussein’s regime in Iraq. Hussein’s control was lost, 

his sons were killed, and his capture was imminent. 

Qaddafi watched the events in Iraq unfold, fully aware 

that Libya could be next on the United States’ hit list. 

Immediately, Tripoli began aggressively pursuing 

better diplomatic relations with Washington. The 

regime issued a statement that it neither possessed 

nor planned to possess weapons of mass destruction. 

That August, Libya accepted full responsibility for the 

The toppling of Iraq and realization of Libya’s vulnerability motivated Qaddafi 

to dramatically redefine Libya’s stance towards the West. 

Lockerbie bombings and compensated the families of 

the victims with $2.7 billion US dollars. 42 At the same 

time, Libya offered deals to American oil companies, 

guaranteeing them full access to Libyan reserves. As 

a result, major uS oil companies increased pressure 

on Washington to lift sanctions, so that they could 

resume dealings with Libya. However, Washington 

refused to normalize its relations with tripoli, citing 

Libya’s continued pursuit of WMDs. 

Desperate to fix its relations with the United 

States, Libya continued to make concessions. Though 

Qaddafi had adamantly declared that Libya did not 

have weapons of mass destruction, on 19 December 

2003, he announced that Libya would dismantle its 

WMD, halt development of missiles, and open its 

weapon stocks to the world. 43 In doing so, Qaddafi 

not only acknowledged that Libya had such weapons, 

but also showed that he was willing to abide by 

international laws. This announcement shocked the 

world, which had become used to Qaddafi’s radically 

anti-West and pro-WMD rhetoric. Washington finally 

decided to reward Libya’s efforts. In February 2004, 

the United States Department of State lifted the ban 

on travel between Libya and the United States, and in 

April, lifted some of the American trade sanctions. By 

June, the United States had renewed direct diplomatic 

ties with Libya. The strength of the renewed 

relationship was proven just one month later, 

when Saudi Arabia, a close American ally, 

accused Libya of plotting to assassinate its 

crown prince. Instead of reprimanding Libya, 

the United States lifted even more sanctions. 

Following suit, the European Union lifted 

its arms embargo on Libya one month later. 

Qaddafi continued down the path towards 

normalization by agreeing to compensate the 

families of the victims of the La Belle bombing 

of 1986. He also began giving speeches 

outlining his new view of international politics: 

that the fate of every state was dependent on 

its becoming part of an “international bloc,” 

which often would need to consist of members 

of the West. 44 This new view was in clear 

opposition to his previous pro-Arab, anti-West 

rhetoric. In doing so, Qaddafi also denounced 

the terrorism being propagated in the name of radical 

Islam. In about a dozen years, he had gone from a 

supporter of terrorism to one of its most outspoken 

Arab critics. 

On 15 May 2005, the United States finally removed 

Libya from its list of states sponsoring international 

terrorism and resumed full diplomatic ties. the 

roughly two decades of confrontation with the 

United States had left Libya with an extremely 

weak economy and a discontented population, but 

the resumption of diplomatic ties with Washington 

allowed Tripoli to begin a new series of economic 

reforms. Modernization initiatives were launched, 

and foreign investors were encouraged to participate 

in the Libyan economy. These goals were aided by an 

19 


increase in oil prices in 2005, which helped to pump 

precious cash into Qaddafi’s economic reforms. 

Domestic reform was more difficult, with many 

powerful members of the Libyan society calling for 

continuation of the status quo. Qaddafi took steps 

to appease these powerful citizens, replacing his 

reformist Prime Minister with the less powerful 

Baghdadi Mahmudi. At the same time, he took steps 

back from the international stage, concentrating on 

rebuilding his power within Libya after decades of 

political conflict. 

CURRENT SITUATION 

THE ARAB SPRING 

Tunisia 

On 17 December 2010, a virtually unknown street 

vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, sent the Arab world into 

disarray. A native of the Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid, 

Mohamed Bouazizi was a twenty-six years old fruit 

and vegetable salesman who was often abused by 

the local government forces. Throughout his life, 

he had been arbitrarily fined and degraded by local 

police, and so it seemed normal when a policewoman 

confiscated his unlicensed vegetable cart and its 

contents early in the morning on 17 December. In 

addition to refusing the standard fine of a day’s 

earnings, the policewoman slapped Bouazizi, spat 

on him, and insulted his dead father. 45 Bouazizi then 

went to the provincial headquarters to complain and 

hopefully reclaim his vegetable cart, but the officials 

refused to see him. Humiliated and devoid of his means 

of making money, Bouazizi left the headquarters, 

only to return within an hour with gasoline. Without 

informing his family or loved ones, he doused himself 

in fuel and set himself on fire, suffering burns that 

have left him hospitalized with serious injuries. 

Public response to Bouazizi’s self-immolation was 

rapid and intense. Beginning in Sidi Bouzid as outrage 

against the abuse and death of a popular, well-known 

citizen, revolt quickly spread to the neighboring 

cities of Kasserine, Thala, and Menzel Bouzaiene. 46 

Police cracked down on the protestors, which only 

incited more anger among the tunisian citizens 

and strengthened the protests. Police responded 

with further violence, injuring and killing scores of 

protestors, serving to further spur the revolution. 

Tunisian President Zine Abidine Ben Ali took only 

small steps to appease the protestors, firing a few 

ministers and promising to inject $4.5 billion U.S. 

dollars into the economy.3 He also visited Bouazizi in 

a hospital outside Tunis, but these attempts to make 

peace with the protestors failed when Bouazizi died 

on 4 January 2011. 47 

Protests continued, and intensified, in the first 

few weeks of January 2011. By 7 January, it was 

clear that the middle and upper classes of tunisia 

Low resolution image taken from a cell phone of Mohamed Bouazizi, 

shortly after he set himself on fire in protest of government abuse. 

were also supporting the protestors, spurred by 

the indiscriminate attacks of the Tunisian police 

and military forces. A week later, the protests had 

spread to the capital city of Tunis, and were marked 

by violent clashes between the protestors and police 

forces. Amid a large rally on 14 January, Ben Ali fled 

20 


the city and the country, escaping to Saudi Arabia. 48 

A new government was announced three days 

later, on 17 January. Many of the members of the new 

government were members of the Constitutional 

Democratic Rally (RCD), the ruling party of Ben Ali, 

and were close allies of the former president. 49 Shortly 

after the announcement of this new government, 

street protests began again throughout Tunisia, as 

protesters called for a removal of all RCD members 

from the new government. All members of the former 

government resigned by 27 January 2011, except for 

Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi, who had been 

Ben Ali’s closest confidant. 50 Ghannouchi promised 

to relinquish power after elections in mid-July, but 

protests continued and grew. Finally, after multiple 

protests consisting of more than 100,000 tunisians 

each, Ghannouchi stepped down and was replaced. 51 

Since the resignation of Ghannouchi, further 

interim government reshuffling has occurred, in 

attempts to quell unrest, which lasted well into 

March. The interim government also had to deal 

with refugees who had fled the country during the 

revolution. Thousands of Tunisians had fled across 

the Mediterranean, mainly to Sicily and other areas of 

italy. 52 Finally, the interim government declared that 

a Constituent Assembly would be formed in order 

to determine the future government of Tunisia, and 

that elections to the Assembly would take place on 

24 July 2011. However, it is now August, and no such 

elections have been held. 

The Tunisian unrest seemed to stem from both 

economic and political woes. unemployment is a 

major cause of concern, as, prior to the revolution, 

roughly 13% of Tunisians were out of work. The 

majority of this figure came from the younger Tunisian 

population, with more than 25% of recent college 

graduates unemployed. 53 Even for the employed 

youth, the available work was generally menial and 

below their qualifications, creating discontent. In 

addition to high unemployment, the major prosperity 

gap between the coast and the interior, with Tunisia’s 

coastal cities having a much greater share of the 

country’s wealth, increased discontent in Tunisia’s 

inland cities. Interestingly, however, the economic 

situation of tunisians had steadily progressed since 

Ben Ali overthrew his predecessor twenty-three 

years ago. Family income, health, education, and 

levels of peace have slowly increased over the last 

two decades. 

In exchange for this growing prosperity, however, 

Tunisians had to sacrifice significant political and 

personal freedoms. the press and internet were 

censored, citizens were arrested and tried arbitrarily, 

and all democratic opposition was prohibited. 54 to 

Thousands march in protests throughout Tunis, the capital of 

Tunisia. 

make matters worse, Ben Ali very obviously engaged 

in corruption. He and his family had made fortunes 

for themselves through their control of the economy. 

According to WikiLeaks documents made widely 

available to the Tunisian people, Ben Ali’s family was 

primarily characterized by corruption. Ruling above 

the law, many members of Ben Ali’s extended family 

had comfortable government positions and lived in 

opulence. For instance, Ben Ali’s son-in-law, El Materi, 

lived in a mansion with an infinity pool and countless 

artifacts, and he owned a pet tiger. 55 in addition to 

living lives of wealth, Ben Ali’s family, as well as his 

close business allies, often took advantage of the 

banking sector, refusing to repay loans and arbitrarily 

confiscating citizens’ funds. 

The information in the WikiLeaks documents 

quickly spread throughout the nation with the help of 

social media. Even though there was heavy internet 

censorship in Tunisia, Facebook use is common, with 

roughly a fifth of the nation’s ten million citizens 

owning accounts. 56 Activists quickly spread the 

21 


information from the WikiLeaks documents across 

Facebook, adding to and solidifying the public’s 

knowledge of Ben Ali’s corruption. In fact, it was 

these Facebook activists and their compatriots who 

continued to fuel the protests, even after Ben Ali was 

ousted. 

Egypt 

Following the success of the Tunisian revolution 

and the beginnings of uprisings in neighboring Arab 

nations, uprisings began in Egypt on 25 January 2011. 

Aimed at Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian President 

for the last thirty years, the protests stemmed from 

many of the same grievances 

causing the tunisian uprising. 

Since 1967, emergency law 

has been enacted in Egypt, 

legalizing scores of activities 

that would otherwise be 

considered human rights 

violations, such as suspending 

constitutional rights in the 

name of security, civilian 

trials by military tribunals, 

arbitrary detainment, state 

censorship, police brutality, 

and indefinite imprisonment 

without reason. 57 Mubarak 

continued this emergency 

law when he took power in 

1981, using the law to justify 

crackdowns on activists 

and political dissidents. 

The removal of rights was 

used frequently during 

Mubarak’s reign, with up to 

10,000 people being held in 

indefinite detention without 

trial in 2010. 58 

Mubarak. 

in addition to human 

rights violations, a major concern of the Egyptian 

people was their lack of political freedom or say in 

the government. Via police brutality, corruption, and 

coercion, political dissidents were dissuaded from 

voicing their opinions, and were prevented from 

running for office. In fact, since Mubarak came to 

power, he only faced one opponent in presidential 

elections, and that opponent was imprisoned before 

the elections. 59 Criticism of Mubarak’s government 

was illegal, and punishable by incarceration, and 

outlets with which to express political views, such 

as newspapers and internet access, were widely 

monitored, regulated, and censored. 60 

Finally, like in Tunisia, corruption among the political 

elite led to discontent among the egyptian people. in 

order to maintain power, Mubarak facilitated the rise 

of a select few businessmen by granting industrial 

monopolies. In addition, major political figures, 

such as members of 

Mubarak’s ministry, 

often had incomes in 

the hundreds of millions 

to billions of US dollars. 

Mubarak himself was 

estimated at having a 

net worth of 40 to 70 

billion US dollars. 61 the 

prevalence of extremely 

wealthy businessmen 

and politicians with 

ties to Mubarak had 

led to the belief that 

only Mubarak’s closest 

allies could achieve 

overwhelming success 

in egypt. in contrast, 

unemployment 

and poverty were 

commonplace among 

the people of the 

nation, especially the 

youth. Roughly 10% of 

the population was 

unemployed and roughly 

50% of the population 

lived at or below the World Bank poverty line of 2USD 

a day. 62 The stark differences between the income 

of the common Egyptian and that of Mubarak and 

his allies further increased the anti-government 

sentiment of the egyptian people. 

Protests began on 25 January 2011, as a planned 

Protestors step on an image of former president of Egypt, Hosni 

22 


“Day of Revolt.” Thousands of protestors swarmed 

the streets of Cairo and other major egyptian cities, 

speaking out against the Mubarak regime and for 

the end of the emergency law. Protests continued 

throughout the night and the next day, resulting in a 

government shutdown of internet access throughout 

most of the nation on 27 January. 63 the next day, 

hundreds of thousands of protestors gathered in 

Cairo in a “day of Rage.” during the protests, tear 

gas, water cannons, and rubber bullets were used 

in attempts to subdue the crowds, and Mubarak 

announced that he would commission a new 

government to replace the members of the existing 

one. 64 This, however, did not appease the protestors, 

who set a National Democratic Party (NDP; Mubarak’s 

party) headquarters aflame. In response, the Egyptian 

military was deployed throughout the nation in 

attempts to quell the protests via shows of force. 

Riots continued, and on 30 January, opposition 

leaders declared that they would negotiate only with 

the army, and not with Mubarak, further confirming 

that an ultimate goal of the protests was the removal 

of Mubarak from power. 65 the next day, the military 

refused orders to use live ammunition on rioters, 

declaring that they were “acknowledging the 

legitimate rights of the people” and “have not and 

will not use force against the egyptian people.” 66 

Simultaneously, Mubarak announced his newly 

reshuffled cabinet, but hundreds of thousands of 

protestors continued to call for his resignation during 

mass marches and demonstrations in Tahrir Square in 

Cairo. 

Protests continued throughout early February, with 

violence steadily increasing. Interestingly, protesting 

egyptian Muslims and Christians came together to 

support one another during the demonstrations. 

On Friday, 4 February, more than a million Egyptian 

Muslims gathered for Friday Prayer in Tahrir Square 

in a demonstration of religious unity, as egyptian 

Christians formed a ring of protection around the 

praying protestors. 67 Later, Muslims formed a ring of 

protection around Christians participating in Sunday 

Mass in Tahrir. Throughout early February, Mubarak 

proposed several other government reshufflings, as 

well as a rewriting of the constitution, to no avail. 

Finally, as protests intensified and protestors began 

marching toward the Presidential Palace, Mubarak 

and his family fled the city, and Vice President Omar 

Suleiman announced that the military, led by the 

Supreme Council of Egyptian Armed Forces, would 

take control of the country’s affairs. 68 

The military leadership quickly dissolved the 

egyptian parliament and declared that it would 

remain in power for six months or until elections 

were held. in mid-March, a constitutional referendum 

was held and passed, leading to limits on presidential 

terms and measures to increase fairness in elections. 69 

throughout March, small protests continued to go on 

throughout Cairo and other major cities, urging the 

interim government to act more quickly. However, 

on 1 April, thousands of demonstrators filled Tahrir 

Square once again, demanding that the military move 

more quickly toward the formation of an entirely new 

government. Of special concern to the protestors was 

the lack of arrests of political leaders in Mubarak’s 

government, public trials for Mubarak’s allies, and 

the actual arrest of Mubarak himself, who was living 

in the Egyptian resort city of Sharm el-Sheikh at the 

time. 70 Protests continued, and a week later, on April 

8, tens of thousands of protestors gathered in tahrir, 

demanding more rapid action and the prosecution 

of Mubarak, in the largest demonstrations since 

Mubarak’s resignation. 71 The military forcibly broke 

up the protests with hundreds of troops armed with 

electric batons the next day, but quickly set about to 

further remove all signs of the former government. 

Over the next two weeks, Mubarak and his sons were 

detained ahead of corruption investigations, the NDP 

was dissolved, and Mubarak’s name was ordered to 

be removed from all public places. 72 Nevertheless, on 

27 May, thousands of protestors returned to Tahrir 

in a “Second Friday of Anger,” urging the military 

government to act even more quickly, especially with 

regards to the trials of former regime members. 

Minor protests continued throughout June, and 

in July, tens of thousands of protestors repeatedly 

flooded Tahrir and other major locations throughout 

Egypt, demanding plans for democracy, job and wage 

changes, and infrastructure improvements from the 

interim government. These protests were supported 

23 


More than a quarter of a million protestors gather in Tahrir Square in Egypt on 1 February 2011. 

by most of Egypt’s political parties, who claimed that 

few of the original goals of the uprising have been 

addressed. 73 

Protests have been increasing in frequency and in 

size since July, as the Egyptian public grows more and 

more discontent with the progress of the egyptian 

military. Further cabinet reshufflings and arrests 

of former regime members have not appeased the 

public. Even the trial of Mubarak, which began on 3 

August with Mubarak pleading not guilty to corruption 

and killing of protestors, has not completely placated 

the protestors, who demand swift retribution for the 

former leader. 74 At this point, it is not clear whether a 

speedy trial will reduce protests or whether protests 

will continue until the interim government gives 

way to elections and a democratically elected new 

government. As the interim government nears its 

self-imposed six month expiration date, plans for 

elections have not been made clear, and worries are 

high that the military will try to forcibly remain in 

power. 

LIBYA PRE-REVOLUTION 

Economic Growth 

Before the Libyan revolution began, Libya had 

been enjoying a period of relative prosperity and 

growth, as well as improved international relations. 

A majority of Libya’s income continued to come from 

oil and gas production, which accounted for over 95% 

of export earnings in 2010. 75 Libya has the largest oil 

reserves in Africa, and in 2010, oil production was 

nearly 1.8 million barrels per day. The majority of this 

oil production went to european nations, primarily 

Italy, Germany, France, and Spain, which together 

make up more than 60% of exports. Libya was also 

working on improving its natural gas production. In 

2011, natural gas accounted for nearly 50% of Libyan 

electricity, but that number was expected to grow as 

infrastructure projects vastly increase the production 

of natural gas. 

Libyan citizens had enjoyed far greater qualities of 

life than the world average, and this greater quality 

of life continued to grow in recent years. According 

to the United Nations Development Programme’s 

2010 Human Development Report, the average life 

expectancy of Libyan citizens was 74.5 years and 

the average yearly income was roughly US $17,000. 

The report ranked Libya as the 53rd most developed 

nation in the world. 76 According to the Global Peace 

Index, Libya also enjoyed the highest GDP per capita 

in Africa, at US $12,110. 77 

Unemployment 

Although they enjoyed high incomes and 

relatively high qualities of life, Libyan citizens 

suffered from extremely high unemployment rates. 

24 


Unofficial estimates put the rate at roughly 30%, 

with many more accepting jobs for which they are 

overqualified. 78 Job availability has stagnated in the 

past decade, as foreign workers began migrating to 

Libya for its high quality of life and as roughly 80,000 

students graduated from Libya’s universities each 

year. Many of these graduates were unable to find 

work, adding significantly to the high unemployment 

figures. Massive infrastructure projects were in 

progress under Qaddafi, in the hopes of reducing 

unemployment; however, they had little impact on 

employment. 

unemployment is a major issue to consider when 

planning future government activity, as it was a major 

complaint cited during the revolution. According to 

a 2010 Gallup survey conducted within Tripoli and 

Benghazi, roughly a third of citizens were dissatisfied 

with the availability of jobs in their communities. 79 

Political Freedom 

in addition to unemployment, the other major 

complaint of Libyan citizens was a lack of political 

freedom. Since the 1970s, political parties had been 

illegal, and political dissent was punishable by long 

prison sentences or, in extreme cases, death. it 

was well known that Qaddafi’s government closely 

monitored mosques for Islamist activity, and the only 

allowed demonstrations were those in favor of the 

government. The justice system was controlled by 

the state, and there was no right to a fair, public trial. 

According to the 2010 Freedom in the World survey, 

Libya’s political freedom was comparable to those of 

North Korea and Burma. 80 

The lack of political freedom allowed some of the 

political reforms presented in The Green Book to be 

implemented and allowed Qaddafi’s influence on the 

government to continue, which served as a major 

source of discontent among Libyan citizens. The same 

Gallup poll mentioned previously found that nearly a 

third of Libyans were dissatisfied with the amount of 

freedom in their lives in 2010. 81 

Perhaps the most major point of discontent 

was the permanence of the influence of Colonel 

Qaddafi, as well as the rest of the members of the 

original Revolutionary Committees, in domestic 

decision-making. As they were not officially elected, 

they could not be voted out of office, and they 

ultimately made the final decisions on any legislation, 

as well as all governmental actions. As such, they 

clearly undermined their declarations that Libya 

is a democracy. Only those approved by their 

committees could run for executive offices, and 

Qaddafi and his ministers had absolute veto power, 

despite the alleged rule of the people. 82 Power was 

ultimately in the hands of Qaddafi and his close 

followers, instead of in the hands of the roughly 

1,500 Local People’s Congresses, 32 regional People’s 

Congresses, and National General People’s Congress. 

This was no secret, however, and the Libyan people, 

who were encouraged to participate in politics, were 

increasingly displeased with their effectual inability to 

do so. 

Libyan people were also displeased with the 

frequent promises of increased political freedom 

that were not delivered upon. A prime example of 

these promises was the creation of two private press 

organizations, Oea and Cyrene, in 2007. Marketed 

as independent and free press, the organizations 

were actually owned by Qaddafi’s son, Saif al-Islam. 

Additionally, as early as 2008, Qaddafi announced 

that the nation was on track to open up to the world 

and no longer need him as leader. 83 However, this 

was clearly an empty promise, as there were no plans 

for Qaddafi and his government to relinquish their 

power, a fact well known to the Libyan people. 

LIBYAN REVOLUTION 

in the light of the growing momentum of protests 

in Tunisia and Algeria, demonstrations broke out 

in a number of Libyan cities on 13 January 2011, in 

response to announced delays in the construction 

of housing units. Demonstrators broke into the 

unfinished housing units, which had been promised 

for years, and the occupation of these housing units 

lasted for four days. 84 demonstrations momentarily 

ended when the Libyan government promised to 

invest $24-billion USD into local development and 

housing on 27 January. 85 

Protests began again on 15 February, with a few 

hundred demonstrators protesting in Benghazi. 

Despite police intervention, protests increased and 

on 17 February, a “Day of Anger” protest was held, 

25 


inspired by similar mass protests in Tunisia and Egypt. 

Hundreds of protestors took to the streets of major 

cities throughout the nation and were met with 

lethal force by Libyan security forces, with dozens 

of protestors being killed throughout the country. 86 

Protests continued in Benghazi, and quickly became 

violent on 19 February. As funeral processions passed 

for the fallen from the previous days’ protests, 

protestors began throwing rocks at government 

forces, resulting in heavy, lethal gunfire. Incensed, 

protestors pushed for the capture of the military 

barracks in the center of the city. Known as the Katiba, 

the military barracks was the center of government 

control of the city, and over the next two 

days, Benghazi citizens attacked the Katiba 

with rocks, homemade explosives, and 

construction materials. 87 Using trucks and 

carbombs to tear down the walls of the 

Katiba, Benghazi protestors were making 

progress, when, on 21 February, Interior 

Minister Abdel Fattah Younis was sent with 

a team of specialized forces to contain the 

protest. However, Younis announced his 

defection from the Libyan government 

upon his arrival, and the city was wrenched 

from the hands of the Libyan government. 88 

That same day, Minister of Justice Mustafa 

Abdel Jalil also traveled to Benghazi and 

defected from the Libyan government. 89 

the defection of these two major players 

in the Libyan government signaled major cracks 

beginning to form in Qaddafi’s hold over the nation. 

As protests continued across the country, Jalil led 

other defectors and civilian leaders in Benghazi to 

form the National Transitional Council of Libya (NTC) 

on 27 February 2011, to serve as the face of a nationwide 

revolution. 90 Formed with the flag of the former 

Kingdom of Libya, the council was quick to declare 

itself the only legitimate governing organization 

in Libya, condemning Qaddafi and the Jamahiriya. 

Protestors soon after took control of major cities in 

East Libya, including Tobruk, Ajdablya, and Misrata, 

and these protestors joined the NtC, calling for the 

end of Qaddafi’s regime. As protests began breaking 

out in the capitol city of tripoli throughout late 

February, the efforts of the NTC and its forces seemed 

to be quickly succeeding. Further corroborating the 

success of these efforts, thousands of military and 

police defections occurred in the proceeding days. 91 

However, beginning on 6 March, amidst pushes 

by opposition forces toward the capitol, loyalist 

forces of the Libyan Army began pushing back 

against the rebels and shelling the rebel-controlled 

city of Misrata. these forces were trained and well 

equipped, as opposed to the majority of the rebel 

forces, who were armed with captured weapons 

and generally untrained. The Libyan Army also had 

complete control of the skies, as Qaddafi’s air force 

Defiant Libyan rebels wave the flag of the National Transitional Council. 

continued to pound rebel positions. 92 Over the 

course of the next few days, loyalist forces continued 

to push east, demolishing the city of Zawiya with 

tank-fire, taking control of the town of Bin Jawad, 

and launching air strikes against rebel forces 

holding onto the city of Ra’s Lanuf. Loyalist forces 

indiscriminately demolished residential portions of 

cities they captured, killing many civilians. As a result, 

on 10 March, France officially recognized the NTC as 

the only legitimate government of Libya, and other 

nations soon followed suit. 93 The Arab League also 

recognized the NTC as the legitimate government on 

12 March, and called for the united Nations Security 

Council to impose a no-fly zone over Libya. Over the 

course of the next week, Libyan forces continued 

26 


to make major gains eastward, as they continued to 

siege Misrata, captured more cities, and forced rebel 

retreats. 

On 17 March, the United Nations Security Council 

adopted UNSC Resolution 1973, which demanded an 

immediate ceasefire and the establishment of a nofly 

zone in Libya. 94 Approved with 10 votes for and 5 

abstentions, the resolution was welcomed by rebel 

forces, who were struggling against Qaddafi’s forces 

without foreign intervention. The next day, Moussa 

Koussa, the Foreign Minister of the Jamahiriya, 

declared that the Libyan government would abide by 

the ceasefire and no-fly zone, despite his declaration 

that the resolution would “increase the suffering 

of Libyan people and [would] have negative impact 

on the general life of the Libyan people” by helping 

NATO airstrikes hit key loyalist targets, supported by UN Security 

Council Resolution 1973. 

rebel forces. 95 However, despite Koussa’s acceptance 

of the ceasefire, that same day, government forces 

continued to shell Misrata and other cities, and 

ground forces continued to march toward Benghazi. 96 

The Jamahiriya was clearly not abiding by the terms 

of the ceasefire. 

By 19 March, government forces had reached 

and entered Benghazi, while artillery and mortars 

bombarded the city. 97 that same day, foreign 

intervention came as French jets destroyed loyalist 

tanks and armored vehicles in the name of enforcing 

the UN resolution. Later that day, UK planes also 

targeted government forces, and the US fired Cruise 

missiles into the nation, as Resolution 1793 allowed 

“all necessary measures” to protect civilians from 

Qaddafi’s forces. 98 The combination of foreign air 

strikes against the loyalist forces, as well as tactical 

maneuvering on the ground under forces led by 

General Younis, led to government forces retreating 

from Benghazi. 

On 25 March, NATO forces took command 

of enforcing the no-fly zone and the ceasefire, 

essentially committing to help the rebels fend off 

government forces. With the air support of coalition 

forces taking out Libyan fighter planes and targeting 

Libyan ground forces, rebels were able to make 

quick gains westward, recapturing the major cities 

of Ajdabiya and Brega by 27 March, and continuing 

west. 99 Government resistance intensified to match 

the rebel offensive, though major government 

officials continued to defect – notably, Foreign 

Minister Koussa defected to the UK on 31 March. 100 

Despite NATO and coalition support, heavy fighting 

continued for the next month, with neither loyalists 

nor rebel forces gaining much ground. NATO forces 

were unwilling to commit to ground support in 

Libya, and as such, could only target obvious loyalist 

forces from the air. Throughout most of April, heavy 

fighting occurred in Misrata and Brega, with each 

side struggling to gain any ground in the embattled 

cities. Though the front lines of the rebel forces had 

only numbered in the low thousands in March, rebel 

forces continued to swell, allowing them to match up 

to the Libyan Army, which had nearly 100,000 soldiers 

before unrest began. 101 

Near the end of April, NAtO forces increased their 

efforts, providing military advisors to the rebels and 

beginning continuous patrols with US unmanned 

drones. 102 On 30 April, Qaddafi’s second youngest son, 

Saif al-Arab, was killed in an air strike on Qaddafi’s 

Bab al-Azizia military complex in Tripoli. Fighting 

continued throughout May, with rebels slowly making 

advances. On 15 May, rebels declared victory in the 

three-month battle for Misrata, as loyalist forces fell 

back from the city and rebels declared themselves in 

full control of the city proper. 103 As May continued, 

NATO forces intensified their air strikes in Tripoli, 

and dozens of high ranking Libyan military officials 

defected to the opposition. Asked for his reason for 

defection, one officer replied: “killing, genocide […] 

27 


violence against women. No wise, rational person 

with the minimum of dignity can do what we saw 

with our eyes and what [Qaddafi] asked us do.” 104 On 

27 May, Qaddafi called for a new ceasefire, along with 

an end to NATO bombings. His proposal was rejected 

by both rebels and NATO. 

On 1 June, the NATO Secretary General extended 

the mission in Libya for an additional 90 days, 

vowing to stand with the rebels against the Qaddafi 

regime. 105 In the first weeks of June, reports came in 

that Qaddafi’s son Mutassim was killed in an airstrike. 

At roughly the same time, it was reported that Libyan 

Major General Abu-Bakr Yunis Jabr was executed by 

Qaddafi for not killing protestors. 106 in an increasingly 

desperate bid for a truce, on 16 June, another of 

Qaddafi’s sons, Saif al-Islam, announced that his 

father’s regime would allow elections in three months. 

This proposal for a ceasefire was again rejected by all 

parties, as rebel forces were closing in on Tripoli. 107 

On 27 June, as NATO bombing of Tripoli continued, 

the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued 

arrest warrants for Qaddafi, Saif al-Islam, and Libyan 

Chief of Military Intelligence Abdullah al-Senussi for 

the murder and abuse of hundreds to thousands of 

Libyan civilians between February and June 2011. 108 

NTC forces and officials in Benghazi and the rest of 

the nation greeted these arrest warrants warmly, 

Libyan revolutionaries celebrate in Martyr Square (formerly Green Square) in Tripoli. 

declaring that international justice had been served, 

and that the warrants further increased the legitimacy 

of the revolution. 

Rebel forces continued to make major gains 

throughout July, pushing toward Tripoli by late 

July. However, on 29 July, General Younis, the 

Libyan Interior Minister-turned-NTC-general, was 

assassinated by rebel forces. 109 the assassination 

has created rifts within the NTC and rebel forces as 

a whole. NTC president Jalil had called for Younis’ 

arrest for potential ties to the Qaddafi regime, but it 

is unclear whether the assassination was a result of 

such alleged ties to the regime or of rogue soldiers in 

the rebel army. Upon news of Younis’ death, minor 

chaos broke out among rebel soldiers in Benghazi, 

as Younis had come to be either loved or hated by 

his soldiers. In his announcement of Younis’ death, 

Jalil declared him “one of the heroes of the 17th of 

February revolution.” 110 As of the present, Younis’ 

assassination is still outstanding, and many within 

the NTC and associated forces have called for those 

responsible for his death to be brought to justice. 

despite the assassination of younis and internal 

rifts that it has created, rebel forces continued to press 

forward to Tripoli through August. Major fighting 

was still occurring in the cities of Zawiya, Sibrata, and 

Gharyan, but rebels quickly gained ground, capturing 

28 


these major cities between 15 August and 20 August. 

Beginning on 20 August, rebel forces launched their 

major offensive against Tripoli. With the aid of rebels 

within the city, opposition forces quickly claimed 

much of the city. By the morning of 22 August, rebel 

forces held nearly 90% of the city, including the city 

center, the Green Square. The majority of loyalist 

opposition remained in and around Qaddafi’s military 

complex, Bab al-Azizia. An assault on Bab al-Azizia 

began on 23 August, and the complex was cleared 

over the course of the next day. Loyalist forces were 

in full retreat in the following days, as rebel forces 

eliminated the last pockets of resistance in the nation. 

As they retreated, loyalist forces indiscriminately and 

brutally killed civilians – notably, the charred bodies 

of roughly 50 civilians were found near an abandoned 

military base on 27 August. 111 this morning, on 28 

August, NtC forces captured the last remaining army 

base in Tripoli. With this capture, the whole of Tripoli 

has fallen to the NTC forces, and Qaddafi and his 

loyalist forces have lost their central base. 

ROLE OF THE NATIONAL TRANSITIONAL 

COUNCIL 

Now that we have captured Tripoli, the Libyan 

revolution is all but over. However, our work is just 

beginning. The fall of Tripoli signals the fall of the 

Qaddafi regime, after 32 years of oppression. And it 

signals the breaking of a new dawn for Libya and the 

Libyan people, who have so bravely and passionately 

demanded it. As the leaders of the National 

transitional Council, it is our sacred and greatest duty 

to ensure that this is indeed a new dawn for Libya, 

and that the lives of our brothers in revolution will 

not have been given in vain. 

The task that lies before us will not be an easy 

one. Much of Libya has been reduced to ruins, after 

seven months of street-by-street combat. Our people 

are restless, and there is much to be done. It is of 

the utmost importance that we meet the needs of 

the Libyan people; however, we must take care to 

maintain our leadership over our people. With the 

previous government of Libya removed, we, the 

NTC, have become the ruling body, and any loss of 

legitimacy in the eyes of our people may result in 

our own downfalls, as well as the collapse of the 

revolution and of Libya as a whole. To that end, the 

two most important and long-term goals of this body 

should be the consolidation of power around the NTC 

and the rebuilding of Libya and the lives of its people. 

international organizations and foreign nations, 

especially coalition nations, have promised us aid as 

we consolidate as a government, but we will need to 

determine the best ways to appropriate these funds. 

That being said, however, there are many obstacles 

that we will face in the coming months. 

The largest and most pressing of these obstacles 

is the cleaning up of loyalist resistance across the 

country. There are still a few pockets of resistance. 

in particular, Sirte and Bani Walid are the major 

remaining pro-Qaddafi strongholds. In addition to 

these strongholds, Qaddafi himself and his sons Saif 

al-Islam and Khamis are still at large. It is believed 

that they fled during the battle of Tripoli to either 

Sirte or Bani Walid. The capture or killing of Qaddafi 

or his sons will obviously have a demoralizing effect 

on loyalist forces, perhaps even ending opposition 

for good. However, the cities of Sirte and Bani Walid 

are relatively well-stocked, and major attacks may 

be ill-advised. An alternative strategy would be to 

lay siege to the cities until a loyalist surrender; this, 

of course, would increase the risk of Qaddafi and 

his sons escaping further, perhaps to a neighboring 

nation offering amnesty. 

The next largest set of obstacles is, of course, 

the huge social and economic consequences of the 

revolution. Socially, there are roughly one million 

Libyan refugees who have fled to foreign nations 

since the beginning of the revolution. The majority of 

these refugees can be found in Tunisia and in Egypt; 

however, given the recent turmoil in each of these 

two nations, it is likely that care for Libyan refugees 

is not a high priority. Efforts should be made to 

reintegrate these refugees back into Libyan society in 

a sensible and effective way. Of course, this will mean 

providing homes and work for these refugees, as well 

as for those still residing within Libya. Economically, 

as previously mentioned, Libya relies heavily on oil 

output. Pushing for the speedy reopening of Libya’s 

oil flow will bring funds to our new government, 

but it will take much time and effort to resume oil 

29 


production at even a fraction of what it was before 

the revolution. As of July, oil production was down 

to roughly 22,000 barrels/day, as opposed to roughly 

1.8 million barrels/day immediately prior. 112 However, 

as long as we are able to continually pump oil, this 

remains the major way for us to increase Libya’s 

GDP and rebuild our economy. Additionally, we have 

billions of funds that are currently frozen in foreign 

accounts. At the beginning of the revolution, the UN 

SC froze roughly $150 billion USD worth of Libyan 

assets. 113 We should work to have these funds released 

as soon as possible. 

Another cause for concern as we take command 

is the accountability of our own organization. The 

executive body of the NTC has been criticized for 

poor handling of follow-up to the assassination of 

Major Younis. Many have called for any responsible 

members of the NTC to be removed from office, 

and the people of Libya have demanded answers. 

As of yet, we have not provided any, and have tried 

to brush aside the issue* [see note at end of this 

letter]*. However, closing the Younis case, as well as 

increasing our general accountability will be key to 

maintaining power and legitimacy in the eyes of our 

people. 

Finally, we must realize that, though the UN and 

NATO have been supporting us throughout our 

struggle, we cannot forever rely on them. Billions 

of USD have been funneled into the support of our 

people by NATO and its allies, particularly by the US, 

the UK, and France, who combined have provided 

roughly $3 billion USD. 114 Foreign supporters of our 

struggle have also been criticized, both nationally and 

internationally. President Barack Obama of the United 

States has been called out by allies and opposition 

in the US Congress for authorizing military strikes in 

Libya without consulting the Congress. 115 Likewise, 

Russia has decried French arms drops to our fighters 

in late June, declaring that such support for the NTC 

went beyond the scope of, and even violated, UNSC 

Resolution 1973. Though we can expect support from 

NATO and its allies, who have helped to get us this 

far, we must realize that this support may be limited 

due to national and international politics. 

As you prepare for our meeting on 29 August 2011, 

please consider these factors in great detail. it is 

imperative that we lead our people to the greatness 

that only their bravery, courage, and dedication 

to our cause could deserve. As we are close to the 

completion of our revolution, we must now think 

about a Libya post-revolution. The lives of our fallen 

comrades cannot have been in vain. 

Mustafa Abdul Jalil 

Chairman of the National Transitional Council* 

*Please note that, in real life, Chairman Jalil 

disbanded this body (the executive body of the 

National Transitional Council) on 9 August 2011, 

following poor handling of follow-up to the 

assassination of General Abdel Younis. 116 the rifts 

formed within the rebel leadership following the 

assassination led to accusations of traitorous activity 

within the cabinet, and distrust in the cabinet was 

prevalent because of the lack of a clear explanation 

for the assassination. For the sake of this simulation, I 

have slightly altered history – Jalil has not disbanded 

the executive body of the NTC, but has instead 

brushed the assassination of General Younis aside as 

rebel forces reached and assaulted Tripoli. However, 

this issue is a poignant one, and should be dealt with 

quickly. Remember, in real life, it was serious enough 

to warrant the disbanding of the entire executive 

body of the NTC. 

Questions a Resolution Must Answer 

1. How are we going to ensure that the National 

Transition Council continues to have the 

support of the Libyan people and is able to 

hold onto its power in Libya? 

2. How should the NTC go about rebuilding Libya, 

in the wake of the civil war? What are the 

most immediate social, economic, and political 

issues that we need to address? 

3. What should be done about Qaddafi, who is still 

at large and in Libya? Where do our priorities lie: 

in rebuilding Libya or pursuing him to the end? 

And if found, how do we define and decide due 

justice? 

4. How will we go about building relations with 

Western nations, in order that they may 

30 


continue to support us? 

5. What is our vision for a Libya led by the National 

Transition Council? 

Suggestions for Further Research 

While this guide summarizes the main events 

leading up to the Libyan revolution, major events in 

the Arab Spring, and the Libyan revolution itself, it 

is certainly not a complete review of these events. 

in order for delegates to get the most out of their 

experience in this committee, they will have to 

research beyond the material presented in this guide. 

To provide the most insight during the conference, 

I recommend that delegates dedicate themselves 

to getting a strong understanding of Libya before, 

during, and after the revolution. 

For information about Qaddafi and Libya before 

2011, I found David Blundy and Andrew Lycett’s 

Qaddafi and the Libyan revolution to be very helpful. 

Though talking about Qaddafi’s policies (and not the 

2011 revolution), the book details what Qaddafi did 

after taking power and what results his actions had 

in Libyan society. Yehudit Ronen’s Qaddafi’s Libya 

in world politics was also very helpful, as it provided 

input about Libya’s relationship with the rest of the 

world through the 1990s and the 2000s. Finally, I 

found Qaddafi’s Green Book quite interesting, as it 

indicates the policies by which Qaddafi ruled and 

provides some insight into why he did what he did. 

For more recent information about the 2011 

revolution and its aftermath, very little is included in 

published books because the events were so recent, 

so most or all information can be found via online 

news sources and journalism. Al Jazeera: Africa and 

the BBC are extremely reputable sources, which 

generally provide relatively unbiased accounts of 

events. The New York Times and other major news 

sites are also good sources of information, though 

they tend to come with some Western biases. Using 

reputable news articles will be essential to getting a 

firm understanding of why the Libyan people pursued 

an overthrow of Qaddafi and what they hoped to get 

out of the revolution, which will be very important 

during committee. delegates should also realize that 

Libya is not isolated in the world and should research 

the concurrent actions of neighboring countries 

during the Arab Spring. 

In their preparation, delegates will surely find 

it useful and interesting to research what actually 

happened in real life after 29 August 2011. Seeing 

what directions the NTC took and their results will 

certainly provide input as to what policies may be 

effective; however, delegates should be aware that 

the committee will not necessarily follow history and 

that such policies may be ineffective in committee. 

POSITION PAPERS AND 

COMMITTEE DYNAMICS 

the position paper is meant to ensure that you are 

well prepared for debate during committee sessions, 

so keep in mind that you are the one who will benefit 

the most from preparing a well-researched, insightful 

paper. The position paper should be divided into 

three sections. First of all, you should provide some 

researched background on the character that 

has been assigned to you. This should include the 

character’s personal biases, and should be more than 

just the information in the background guide. 

Next, you should propose the most immediate 

action that you believe should be taken with regards 

to rebuilding our nation. There are many things that 

will need to be done in committee quickly, but you 

should indicate what you think is the most important 

topic at hand, why, and what you think we should do 

about it. Some obvious choices are listed in the “Role 

of the National Transitional Council” section, but they 

are not the only issues facing our nation, and if you 

deem something more urgent, definitely write about 

it. Remember that your position should align with 

that of your character. 

Finally, you should provide suggestions for more 

long-term goals of the committee. Should the NtC 

plan to stay in power indefinitely? Or should we pass 

off power for general elections eventually, if we 

deem that idea safe for the people of Libya? And if the 

latter, when should those happen? Other questions 

to answer include where and how to focus rebuilding, 

as well as what to do with captured loyalists. Of 

course, there are many other long-term goals that 

we can work on. Please indicate one that you think is 

especially important to the committee, why you think 

31 


that it is so important, and steps that we can take to 

prepare ourselves for success in the long haul. Again, 

innovation is strongly encouraged, and innovation 

within the committee room will be rewarded. 

With regards to the actual structure of debate 

in committee, the National transitional Council 

will be run as a continual crisis committee. This is a 

very different style of committee from those of the 

General Assembly or the ECOSOCs. There will be no 

speakers’ list; debate shall run in continual moderated 

caucus. If deemed appropriate, straw poll votes 

and unmoderated caucuses may be allowed at the 

discretion of the chair. As we are a crisis committee, 

instead of resolutions, we will work to pass committee 

directives. Like resolutions, committee directives will 

need to be written up and voted on as a body, but 

unlike resolutions, committee directives may dictate 

immediate action. The directives that you pass will 

immediately go into effect, and our crisis staff will 

incorporate them into future committee happenings. 

In addition to writing committee directives, 

delegates will be able to use their own character’s 

personal powers (as described in the character list 

and indicated to delegates) to effect change via 

personal directives. These personal directives, which 

are private and do not need to be voted on, may be 

requests for information that your character is privy 

to, or may be directions for your character’s servants 

or followers to carry out. Each character is privy to 

different information, as well as able to use different 

powers, based on his connections and personal 

affluence. Do realize, however, that there will not 

be a crisis room or a crisis director, and crisis will be 

handled by the small staff of the Chair and Assistant 

Chairs. As such, though this committee will be run in 

continual crisis, the emphasis will be on substantive 

action and effective committee directives, as opposed 

to constant crisis action. So try to limit personal 

directives to actually relevant, useful actions. 

CLOSING REMARKS 

During the writing of this guide (summer 2012), 

there was much turmoil in Egypt. Following the 2011 

uprisings and overthrow of Mubarak, many Egyptians 

felt that their wishes had been heard and that they 

would be freed. However, the military tribunal, which 

had been ruling since early 2011 did not provide the 

people of egypt with the future they were expecting. 

In the words of one Egyptian, “the revolution was 

like a beautiful woman. She charmed us, and we fell 

in love with her and killed the tyrant to marry her, 

but she was just a trick.” 117 Mass uprisings filled Tahrir 

Square once again in late spring and early summer, as 

Egyptians called for a new ruling body. 118 

Though the aftermath of the Libyan revolution has 

not been as apparently unsuccessful, Libya is far from 

perfect now. Foreign governments have become 

worried, as reports of economic stagnation, arbitrary 

detention, and general pessimism come out of the 

nation. 119 This committee will give delegates the 

opportunity not only to rebuild a nation, both literally 

and figuratively, but also to do a better job than their 

real life counterparts. The successful building and 

running of a nation is a situation that many in Model 

United Nations may one day face (and is a legitimate 

and relatively common demand, as the world 

moves ever toward democracy and the overthrow 

of tyrants), and delegates will have the chance to 

simulate these situations before ever actually being 

forced into them. 

Though the events that this simulation mimics have 

happened in the last two years, do not expect the 

committee to necessarily follow the actual path of 

history. As a continual crisis committee, be prepared 

for major deviations from what actually happened, 

both through your own actions and through the twists 

of fate that crisis committees naturally provide. Come 

to the committee prepared to deal with any plausible 

events in the aftermath of the Libyan revolution – 

the more research and thinking you do about the 

necessary things that this nascent government will 

have to act upon, the better you will do in committee. 

As the new leaders of Libya, you have the power to 

shape history as you deem fit, for better or for worse. 

With this in mind, i hope that your research goes 

well. You may have trouble finding too much more 

information about the aftermath of the Libyan 

revolution (remember, the only reports to use are 

those from before 29 August 2011!), so I would 

recommend finding out more about the demands 

32 


of the people, especially from before the revolution, 

as well as learning about the difficulties that the 

revolutionaries in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya have faced 

after the successful overthrowing of their respective 

leaders. Books will certainly be effective to find out 

more about the social and political structures of 

Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, but internet articles may 

provide the most relevant information about the 

various issues facing the committee. 

After completing your research and position 

papers, I have no doubt that you will be well-prepared 

to lead Libya through any crises that we may throw at 

you at WorldMUN 2013. Remember, above anything 

else, this committee is supposed to be an enjoyable 

and educational experience, and the preparation 

process will certainly help to shape what you get out 

of the conference. I hope that this committee will be 

an exciting opportunity for you to view events that 

occurred so recently in a new light, and i encourage 

you to embrace all of the challenges that come from 

such an innovative committee. Of course, be ready 

to become experts on Libya, and be prepared and 

open to meet others with as much expertise and 

preparation as you. WorldMUN is first and foremost 

about international understanding and friendship, 

and for newcomers to WorldMUN, be prepared for 

the best and most engaging Model United Nations 

experience of your life! I look forward to meeting 

each and every one of you, and please don’t hesitate 

to contact me at libya@worldmun.org if you have 

any questions! 

Endnotes 

1 Belkaoui, Janice. Qaddafi: the man and his policies. 

Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1996. 3. 





4 Blundy, David, and Andrew Lycett. Qaddafi and the Libyan 

revolution. Boston: Little, Brown, 1987. 41. 



















14 Wright, John. A history of Libya. London: Hurst, 2010. 204. 

15 Wright, John. A history of Libya. London: Hurst, 2010. 206. 

16 Vandewalle, Dirk. A history of modern Libya. Cambridge: 

Cambridge University Press, 2006. 83. 





19 Qaddafi, Muammar. The Green Book. Buffalo: Prometheus 

Books, 1988. 39. 


Books, 1988. 74. 


Books, 1988. 79. 
















33 


evolution. Boston: Little, Brown, 1987. 138. 









34 Ronen, Yehudit. Qaddafi’s Libya in world politics. Boulder: 

Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008. 22. 





















45 Abouzeid, Rania. “Bouazizi: The Man Who Set Himself 

and Tunisia on Fire.” Time Magazine World 21 Jan 2001. 

Web. 16 Sep. 2011. . 

46 Ryan, Yasmine. “The tragic life of a street 

vendor.” Al Jazeera English 20 Jan 2011. Web. 16 

Sep. 2011. . 

47 “Tunisian who sparked rare protests dies: relatives.”Reuters: 

Africa [Tunis] 05 Jan 2011, Web. 9 Sep. 2012. . 

48 “Uprising in Tunisia: People Power topples Ben Ali 

regime.”Australia Indymedia 16 Jan 2011, Web. 9 Sep. 2012. 

. 

49 “8 Tunisian leaders quit ruling party.” UPI [Tunis] 20 Jan 

2011, Web. 9 Sep. 2012. . 

50 Kirkpatrick, David. “Most Members of Old Cabinet in 

Tunisia Step Down.” New York Times [Tunis] 27 Jan 2011, 

Web. 9 Sep. 2012. . 

51 “Tunisians want PM Ghannouchi gone.” Press TV [Tunis] 

25 Feb 2011, Web. 9 Sep. 2012. . 

52 “Italy struggles with Tunisia influx.” Al Jazeera Africa 14 

Feb 2011, n. pag. Web. 9 Sep. 2012. . 

53 “Sour young men.” Economist 6 Jan 2011. Web. 16 Sep. 

2011. . 

54 Rocard, Michel. “Profound crisis in Tunisia has 

bourgeois roots.” Taipei Times 29 Jan 2011. Web. 16 Sep. 

2011. . 

55 Sanina, Mila. “WikiLeaks Cables Help Uncover What Made 

Tunisians Revolt.” PBS Newshour 25 Jan 2011. Web. 16 Sep. 

2011. . 

56 Sanina, Mila. “WikiLeaks Cables Help Uncover What Made 

Tunisians Revolt.” PBS Newshour 25 Jan 2011. Web. 16 Sep. 

2011. . 

57 Shehata, Samer. “Egypt After 9/11: Perceptions of the 

United States.” Contemporary Conflicts 26 Mar 2004, Web. 

9 Sep. 2012. . 

58 “Egypt: Keep Promise to Free Detainees by End 

of June.”Amnesty International 29 Jun 2010, Web. 

9 Sep. 2012. . 

59 Sharp, Jeremy. “Egypt: Transition under Military 

Rule.”Congressional Research Service. N.p., 21 Jun 2012. 

Web. . 

60 Robertson, Jordan. “The day part of the Internet died: 

Egypt goes dark.” Washington Times [San Francisco] 28 

Jan 2011, Web. 9 Sep. 2012. . 

61 “How did Egypt become so corrupt?.” Al Jazeera 8 

Feb 2011, Web. 9 Sep. 2012. . 

62 Reske, Henry. “Egypt’s Poverty, Unemployment, Push 

Youths to Breaking Point.” Newsmax 31 Jan 2011, Web. 9 

Sep. 2012.

poverty-unemployment-unrest/2011/01/31/id/384555>. 

63 Cowie, James. “Egypt Leaves the Internet.” Renseys 27 

Jan 2011, Web. 9 Sep. 2012. . 

64 “Egypt cracks down on mass protests as Mubarak 

dissolves government.” CNN World 28 Jan 2011, Web. 9 

Sep. 2012. . 

65 Hennessy-Fiske, Molly. “EGYPT: Opposition plans to 

negotiate with military, not president.” Los Angeles 

News 30 Jan 2011, Web. 9 Sep. 2012. . 

66 Naylor, Hugh, and Chris Stanton. “Egypt’s army pledges: 

we will not open fire on protest.” National 1 Feb 2011, Web. 

9 Sep. 2012. . 

67 “Egypt Christians, Muslims Unite in Tahrir.” On Islam[Cairo] 

6 Feb 2011, Web. 9 Sep. 2012. . 

68 “Live blog Feb 11 - Egypt protests.” Al Jazeera [Doha] 11 

Feb 2011, Web. 9 Sep. 2012. . 

69 El-Hennawy, Noha. “Commission announces proposed 

changes to Egyptian Constitution.” Egypt Independent 26 

Feb 2011, Web. 9 Sep. 2012. . 

70 MacFarquhar, Neil. “Protesters Scold Egypt’s Military 

Council.” New York Times 1 Apr 2011, Web. 9 Sep. 

2012. . 

71 Afify, Heba. “Tens of thousands in Tahrir as some threaten 

to extend protests.” Egypt Independent 4 Aug 2011, Web. 

9 Sep. 2012. . 

72 “Egypt: Mubarak and sons detained amid corruption 

probe.”BBC News: Middle East 13 Apr 2011, Web. 9 Sep. 2012. 

. 

73 “New protests rage across Egypt.” Al Jazeera 8 Jul 2011, 

Web. 9 Sep. 2012. . 

74 Afify, Heba, and Kareem Fahim. “Judge Says TV Will Show 

Mubarak on Trial.” New York Times [Cairo] 31 Jul 2011, Web. 

9 Sep. 2012. . 

75 “Libya.” Energy Information Administration. Feb 2011. 

Web. 16 Sep 2011. . 

76 “Libya.” International Human Development Indicators. 

Web. 16 Sep 2011. . 

77 “2011 Methodology, Results, & Findings.”Vision of 

Humanity. Institute for Economics & Peace, Web. 16 Sep 

2011. . 

78 Dimireva, Ina. “Libya Investment Climate 2009.” EU 

Business. European Union, 15 Feb 2010. Web. 16 Sep 2011. 

. 

79 “Ahead of Protests, Many Libyans Discontent with 

Freedom and Hobs.”Gallup Polls. 25 Feb 2011. Web. 16 Sep 

2011. . 

80 Cohen, Ben. “Libya Launders its Reputation.”Huffington 

Post 12 Jul 2010. Web. 16 Sep. 2011. . 

81 “Ahead of Protests, Many Libyans Discontent with 

Freedom and Hobs.”Gallup Polls. 25 Feb 2011. Web. 16 Sep 

2011. . 

82 “Libya Country Report.” Bertelsmann Transformation 

Index. Bertelsmann, n.d. Web. 16 Sep 2011. . 

83 “Libya Country Report.” Bertelsmann Transformation 

Index. Bertelsmann, n.d. Web. 16 Sep 2011. . 

84 “Libyans protest over delayed subsidized housing 

units.”Egypt Independent 16 Jan 2011, Web. 9 Sep. 2012. 

. 

85 “Libya sets up $24 bln fund for housing.” Reuters 27 

Jan 2011, Web. 9 Sep. 2012. . 

86 “Libya: Security Forces Fire on ‘Day of Anger’ 

Demonstrations.” Human Rights Watch [New York] 

18 Feb 2011, Web. 9 Sep. 2012. . 

87 Schemm, Paul. “Battle at army base broke Gadhafi hold in 

Benghazi.” Washington Post [Benghazi] 25 Feb 2011, Web. 

9 Sep. 2012. . 

88 Schemm, Paul. “Battle at army base broke Gadhafi hold in 

Benghazi.” Washington Post [Benghazi] 25 Feb 2011, Web. 

9 Sep. 2012. . 

89 Levinson, Charles. “Rebel Leadership Casts a Wide 

35 


Net.”Wall Street Journal [Benghazi] 10 Mar 2011, Web. 9 

Sep. 2012. . 

90 “Libya opposition launches council.” Al Jazeera 27 Feb 

2011, Web. 9 Sep. 2012. . 

91 Kirkpatrick, David, and Karim Faheem. “Libya rebels 

gain arms, defectors.” New York Times 27 Feb 2011, 

Web. 9 Sep. 2012. . 

92 “Rebel push stalls outside Ras Lanuf.” Al Jazeera 10 Mar 

2011, Web. 9 Sep. 2012. . 

93 “Clinton to meet Libyan rebels.” Al Jazeera 10 Mar 2011, 

Web. 9 Sep. 2012. . 

94 Roth, Richard. “U.N. Security Council approves no-fly 

zone in Libya.” CNN 18 Mar 2011, Web. 9 Sep. 2012. . 

95 Shackle, Samira. “Libya declares ceasefire.” New 

Statesman 18 Mar 2011, Web. 9 Sep. 2012. . 

96 Amara, Tamek, and Mariam Karouny. “Gaddafi forces 

shell west Libya.” Reuters 18 Mar 2011, Web. 9 Sep. 2012. 

. 

97 “Libya: Gaddafi forces attacking rebel-held Benghazi.” BBC 

News: Africa 19 Mar 2011, Web. 9 Sep. 2012. . 

98 “Libya: French plane fires on military vehicle.” BBC News: 

Africa 19 Mar 2011, Web. 9 Sep. 2012. . 

99 “Libyan Rebels Push West To Capture Brega.” Sky 

News27 Mar 2011, Web. 9 Sep. 2012. . 

100 “Libya’s foreign minister flees to Britain.” Al Jazeera 31 

Mar 2011, Web. 9 Sep. 2012. . 

101 “Libya: How the opposing sides are armed.” BBC News: 

Africa 23 Aug 2011, Web. 9 Sep. 2012. . 

102 “Death of Saif Al-Arab Gaddafi may backfire for Nato.”BBC 

News: Africa 1 May 2011, Web. 9 Sep. 2012. . 

103 “Libyan Rebels Say They Control Port City of Misrata.”Fox 

News [Tripoli] 15 May 2011, Web. 9 Sep. 2012. . 

104 Graff, Peter. “Officers disown Gaddafi as peace bid 

stalls.”Reuters [Tripoli] 15 May 2011, Web. 9 Sep. 2012. 

. 

105 “Statement by the NATO Secretary General on the 

extension of the mission in Libya.” North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization 1 Jun 2011, Web. 9 Sep. 2012. . 

106 Devlin, Michelle. “Mutassim Gaddafi Is Dead: Killed in 

Brega by NATO airstrike.” All Voices [Tripoli] 7 Jun 2011, 

Web. 9 Sep. 2012. . 

107 Carey, Nick. “Rebels dismiss election offer, NATO 

pounds Tripoli.” Reuters 16 Jun 2011, Web. 9 Sep. 2012. 

. 

108 Lynch, Colum. “International court issues Gaddafi 

arrest warrant.” Washington Post 27 Jun 2011, Web. 9 

Sep. 2012. . 

109 Stephen, Chris, Lizzie Davies, and Ian Traynor. “Abdel 

Fatah Younis assassination creates division among Libya 

rebels.” Guardian 29 Jul 2011, Web. 9 Sep. 2012. . 

110 Stephen, Chris, and Haroon Siddique. “Libyan rebels fear 

rift after death of Abdel Fatah Younis.” Guardian29 Jul 2011, 

Web. 9 Sep. 2012. . 

111 “Rebels claim capture of last army base in Tripoli.” News: 

International [Tripoli] 28 Aug 2011, Web. 9 Sep. 2012. 

. 

112 “Libya on Recovery Path but Faces Long Rebuilding 

Effort.”International Monetary Fund 16 Apr 2011, Web. 9 

Sep. 2012. . 

113 “UN council wants to free more Libyan assetsenvoy.”Reuters: 

Africa 30 Nov 2011, Web. 9 Sep. 2012. 

117 “Egypt’s revolution: ‘We fell in love, but it was a trick’.”CNN 

World [Cairo] 23 May 2012, Web. 9 Sep. 2012. . 

118 Batrawy, Aya. “Egypt Protests: Thousands Gather In Tahrir 

Square To Demonstrate Against Military Rule.”Huffington 

Post: World [Cairo] 20 Apr 2012, Web. 9 Sep. 2012. . 

119 “Libya revolution one year on: Better after Gaddafi?” BBC 

News [Tripoli] 16 Feb 2012, Web. 9 Sep. 2012. . 

37 


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. 

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39 


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40 


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National Transitional Council of Libya - World Model United Nations

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