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Paris Peace Summit, 1971 - World Model United Nations

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While the campaign achieved its goal of weakening the<br />

communist bases and network in the countryside, the<br />

brutality and corruption surrounding the anti-communist<br />

eorts increased rural and urban opposition to Diem and his<br />

family.<br />

Diem augmented his repression of his political opponents by<br />

issuing Public Law 10/59 in May 1959. e draconian law<br />

expanded the category of political crimes to mean any form<br />

of political opposition. Tribunals roamed the countryside,<br />

setting up kangaroo courts to try, convict, and execute<br />

subversives. Local ocials, their powers greatly widened<br />

by the Public Law, could now imprison for life or execute<br />

anyone they designated as a communist—and they used<br />

these powers to extend the practices of bribery already<br />

common under the Denounce the Communists campaign. 86<br />

By the end of 1959, the Southern Communists counted as<br />

few as 5,000 members in their party.<br />

To further neutralize the threat of the DRV’s southern<br />

supporters, whom Diem’s forces pejoratively called Viet<br />

Cong—short for Viet Nam Cong San, or Vietnamese<br />

Communists—Diem organized “agrovilles” (khu tru mat)<br />

in the countryside to protect villages from communist<br />

inltration. While development and urban life were<br />

touted as the benets of life in the agrovilles, the political<br />

motivation behind their establishment was rural security<br />

and population control. 87 Peasants were relocated to new<br />

settlements of 2 square km, and forced to provide labor for<br />

construction, which meant that villagers had to dismantle<br />

their current homes near their rice elds and build new<br />

ones at some distance from the source of their livelihood. 88<br />

While the agrovilles were easier than traditional villages for<br />

the national army to defend, the brutal experience for the<br />

peasantry led many to join the southern communist cause.<br />

e Road to the South<br />

Through the late 1950s, Communists in the South and<br />

the leadership of the DRV watched in alarm as Diem<br />

consolidated his power over Saigon and the countryside.<br />

When they nally decided to endorse armed struggle in the<br />

South at the end of 1960, it was aer a long period discord,<br />

between Northern and Southern cadres and their allies in<br />

Moscow and Beijing.<br />

As the Geneva Agreements wrapped up, Ho and his top<br />

leadership were certain of their victory in the promised<br />

reunication elections. But even when Diem rejected the<br />

Geneva-mandated election processes, many in the DRV<br />

leadership continued to advocate a peaceful, gradual<br />

campaign for national reunication. 89 Part of this reluctance<br />

to ght came from Soviet and Chinese urgings at Geneva.<br />

Pushing the Vietnamese towards acceptance of a truce, the<br />

Soviet Union and China stated that if war broke out again,<br />

the DRV might have to ght alone. 90 At the same time,<br />

the DRV needed to consolidate their regime in the North.<br />

eir problem was not one of illegitimacy, but rather one of<br />

infrastructure and economy; as they withdrew, the French<br />

had devastated basic services and dismantled industries.<br />

Professionals had ed, and the cadres, though capable<br />

guerrillas, found their skills lacking when it came to<br />

administration. 91 Cut o from the rice elds of the Mekong<br />

Delta, the Northerners turned to the Chinese for aid when<br />

food shortage struck.<br />

e DRV faced greater challenges to their authority. Ethnic<br />

minorities who fought alongside the French held out against<br />

the Vietminh in their hillside bases. Catholics in one district<br />

rebelled, forcing Hanoi to send a division of the People’s<br />

Army to suppress the insurrection. Land reform and local<br />

administrative reorganization in late 1956 was so excessive<br />

that DRV leadership felt compelled to make a public<br />

apology. 92 Prominent writers and intellectuals who had<br />

previously stood stalwart by the revolution ridiculed these<br />

policies.<br />

As a result of the food shortage and political turbulence, in<br />

June 1956, the DRV issued a memorandum to its Southern<br />

colleagues titled “e Path of Revolution in the South.”<br />

Southern cadres were not to attempt to stage a coup; they<br />

were instead to concentrate on building up their movement,<br />

“because a weak movement would be unable to take advantage<br />

of favorable trends”—growing popular dissatisfaction with<br />

Protesting the Diem regime’s oppressive tactics, Buddhist<br />

monk ichQuangDuc immolated himself in the street.<br />

Harvard <strong>World</strong>MUN 2012 PARIS PEACE SUMMIT <strong>1971</strong> 16

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