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addition to his primary, and extremely arduous, task of fighting the Red Army; on the other hand, his own political and military leadership considered him “a bearer of an inexorable racial value” in its ideological war that demanded any and all means to destroy the “Jewish-Bolshevik system.” 8 The extent to which these two aspects of the Wehrmacht’s war in Russia were in reality two sides of the same coin has sparked a historical as well as a more far-reaching political controversy in Germany. As illustrated by the following survey of the literature, the involvement of the “average” German soldier in the war of extermination demanded by his political and military leadership remains stridently debated. I. THE GENESIS OF OPERATION BARBAROSSA On March 30, 1941, Adolf Hitler lectured his leading military commanders for over two and a half hours concerning Germany’s strategic situation. 9 After touching on affairs in the Mediterranean area, Hitler focused on the upcoming clash with the Soviet Union. While couching the discussion in strategic terms, his description of the imminent conflict left no doubt in the minds of his audience that this would be a new type of war. According to the diary of Colonel-General Franz Halder, Chief of the German General Staff, Hitler declared that this would be a “war between two ideologies.” Since 8 The cited phrases are drawn from Colonel-General Walter von Reichenau’s infamous order issued to his 6 th Army on October 10, 1941; as the order corresponded to Hitler’s own conception of the campaign, it was later circulated to other units of the Ostheer. The order is printed in Gerd R. Ueberschär and Wolfram Wette (ed.), “Unternehmen Barbarossa”: Der Deutsche Überfall auf die Sowjetunion 1941, (Frankfurt am Main, 1997) , pp. 285-6. For an extended discussion of Reichenau’s order that goes beyond the standard ideological explanation, see Timm C. Richter, “Handlungsspielräume am Beispiel der 6. Armee,” in Christian Hartmann, Johannes Hürter, and Ulrike Jureit (ed.) Verbrechen der Wehrmacht: Bilanz einer Debatte, (Munich, 2005), pp. 60-69. 9 For a concise and informative discussion of this meeting; see Johannes Hürter, Hitlers Heerführer: Die deutschen Oberbefehlshaber im Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion 1941/42, (Munich, 2006), pp. 1-13. 3
Communism [is] an enormous danger for our future . . . we need to move away from the idea of soldiery camaraderie. The Communist is neither a comrade before or after the battle. This is a war of extermination . . . We are not fighting a war to preserve the enemy. Hitler continued by stating that “Bolshevik Commissars” as well as the “Soviet Intelligentsia” needed to be destroyed. Notions of normal military justice were dismissed as the troops needed “to defend themselves with the means” that the criminal Bolsheviks themselves would surely employ. 10 The commissars “devastated everywhere they went in an Asiatic manner. They had earned no mercy.” 11 He concluded with the statement that “this war will be very different from the war in the West,” especially as this conflict was predicated on “colonial tasks.” 12 These words served as the fundamental basis for the planning of the invasion. As Halder’s notes indicate, the war against the Soviet Union was structured around both ideological and imperial goals. From an ideological standpoint, the conquest of the European portion of the Soviet Union would supply the German nation with a vast expanse for settlement – the Lebensraum so desperately desired by Hitler and his coterie. The war would also allow a reckoning with the ‘Judeo-Bolshevik’ clique that governed the Soviet Union which, in Hitler’s view, threatened Germany’s existence. 13 Economic 10Franz Halder, (ed. Hans-Adolf Jacobson), Kriegstagebuch. Tägliche Aufzeichnungen des Chefs des Generalstabes des Heeres 1939-1942, 3 volumes (Stuttgart, 1962-64), volume II, entry for 30.3.1941, pp. 335-337. 11 Colonel-General Hermann Hoth’s notes from the meeting; quoted in Hürter, Hitlers Heerführer: Die deutschen Oberbefehlshaber im Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion 1941/42, p. 7. 12 Halder, Kriegstagebuch. Tägliche Aufzeichnungen des Chefs des Generalstabes des Heeres 1939-1942, p. 337. 13 Andreas Hillgruber, Hitler’s Strategie. Politik und Kriegsführung 1940-1941 3rd. Edition (Bonn, 1993), p. 519; Jürgen Förster, “Operation Barbarossa as a War of Conquest and Annihilation,” in Boog et.al., Germany and the Second World War, Band IV, pp. 481-521; for Hitler’s own views on Lebensraum and Bolshevism, see Mein Kampf, trans. Ralph Mannheim, (Boston, 1971), pp. 641-667, esp. 643-646, 654- 655, 659-64. 4
Page 1 and 2: Copyright by Jeffrey C. Rutherford
Page 3 and 4: Soldiers into Nazis? The German Inf
Page 5 and 6: Acknowledgements This dissertation
Page 7 and 8: Soldiers into Nazis? The German Inf
Page 9 and 10: Table of Contents List of Tables ..
Page 11 and 12: List of Tables Table 1: Casualties
Page 13 and 14: List of Illustrations Illustration
Page 15: fulfill numerous duties outside of
Page 19 and 20: “systematic starvation of million
Page 21 and 22: national-socialist German Volk,”
Page 23 and 24: German Army had “finally [become]
Page 25 and 26: Heer, the exhibition claimed that
Page 27 and 28: the taboo:” the Army’s particip
Page 29 and 30: seriously implicated in National So
Page 31 and 32: June 1941, only nine were Security
Page 33 and 34: official doctrine and kept alive th
Page 35 and 36: looms large. Fundamentally, this me
Page 37 and 38: was seen as desirable, either due t
Page 39 and 40: would have been fought as a particu
Page 41 and 42: method in looking at the German Arm
Page 43 and 44: northernmost Army Group have receiv
Page 45 and 46: which these crimes were committed a
Page 47 and 48: the content of even one letter, to
Page 49 and 50: to the exigencies of the Cold War,
Page 51 and 52: indispensable source for investigat
Page 53 and 54: SECTION ONE: REGIONAL COHESION AND
Page 55 and 56: a series of wars fought in the Balt
Page 57 and 58: emaining 40% of the population was
Page 59 and 60: ecently as May 1928, the NSDAP rece
Page 61 and 62: As the preceding discussion intimat
Page 63 and 64: moderate Left following a successfu
Page 65 and 66: IV. CONCLUSION While the Weimar Rep
Page 67 and 68:
The system ran into major difficult
Page 69 and 70:
The importance of regional homogene
Page 71 and 72:
“equivalent of its initial streng
Page 73 and 74:
alternative existed between the Shi
Page 75 and 76:
In an attempt to gauge the effectiv
Page 77 and 78:
trained reserves. 219 90,000 of the
Page 79 and 80:
Monthly Casualties 3000 2500 2000 1
Page 81 and 82:
Monthly Casualties 3000 2500 2000 1
Page 83 and 84:
to lead offensive operations. 240 T
Page 85 and 86:
Replacements began entering the 126
Page 87 and 88:
Number of Men 140 120 100 80 60 40
Page 89 and 90:
46% of the troops were native to Mi
Page 91 and 92:
flank such as the 123 rd ID, did ex
Page 93 and 94:
attle for the Volkhov Pocket as 4,8
Page 95 and 96:
A similar rollercoaster pattern als
Page 97 and 98:
Number of Men 180 160 140 120 100 8
Page 99 and 100:
Number of Men 1600 1400 1200 1000 8
Page 101 and 102:
An astounding number of over 12,000
Page 103 and 104:
dilution of the units’ bonds. Reg
Page 105 and 106:
groups of men constituted only 44%
Page 107 and 108:
men, since March. 290 From August t
Page 109 and 110:
Numbers of Men 2500 2000 1500 1000
Page 111 and 112:
one soldier who had any ties to the
Page 113 and 114:
a large scale - this is something n
Page 115 and 116:
Westphalian 254 th ID related a sim
Page 117 and 118:
of the 1,567 replacements received
Page 119 and 120:
winter of 1941/1942. This meant tha
Page 121 and 122:
propaganda has been overstated in e
Page 123 and 124:
In addition to receiving military i
Page 125 and 126:
and political commissars were to be
Page 127 and 128:
Führer against the center of this
Page 129 and 130:
Army men were quickly changing into
Page 131 and 132:
with the behavior of the men earlie
Page 133 and 134:
however, they were well aware of th
Page 135 and 136:
1; a report sent to II Corps indica
Page 137 and 138:
fortifications. 388 The medic in th
Page 139 and 140:
While the German Infantry learned t
Page 141 and 142:
only a few lean pigs - what will we
Page 143 and 144:
quotations reveals ideological warr
Page 145 and 146:
In what seemed to be a universal re
Page 147 and 148:
measures” in “hopes [of] stop[p
Page 149 and 150:
as artillery, supply and communicat
Page 151 and 152:
intensified as the fighting neared
Page 153 and 154:
marks. 460 Lt. W. was far more scor
Page 155 and 156:
east of the Leningrad encirclement,
Page 157 and 158:
however, was limited to the tempora
Page 159 and 160:
of artillery approximate that of th
Page 161 and 162:
are near the end of their physical
Page 163 and 164:
first netted 93 prisoners as well 2
Page 165 and 166:
“thoroughly positive” attitude
Page 167 and 168:
operation. 522 The Rhinelanders con
Page 169 and 170:
in attempts on rear-area connection
Page 171 and 172:
In comparison to the logistical sit
Page 173 and 174:
proper winter equipment, reporting
Page 175 and 176:
While the 123 rd ID struggled to se
Page 177 and 178:
in the 123 rd ID carried out severa
Page 179 and 180:
Army were assigned to cooperate wit
Page 181 and 182:
only limited to defensive combat.
Page 183 and 184:
positions with the outcome of the b
Page 185 and 186:
The division ordered the clearing o
Page 187 and 188:
equired evacuation. The civilians n
Page 189 and 190:
quartermaster of the 123 rd ID orde
Page 191 and 192:
villagers, both under threats of vi
Page 193 and 194:
five months later, Colonel-General
Page 195 and 196:
Once again, each division had its o
Page 197 and 198:
Cooperation between the German Army
Page 199 and 200:
frequently stripped of any possessi
Page 201 and 202:
126 th and especially the 123 rd ID
Page 203 and 204:
individual soldiers did circumvent
Page 205 and 206:
were “undesirable . . . on espion
Page 207 and 208:
authorities deemed anyone who “su
Page 209 and 210:
etc., etc.” 692 These degrading m
Page 211 and 212:
odied males led to a labor shortage
Page 213 and 214:
Individual soldiers claimed that th
Page 215 and 216:
direction of Petersburg, to turn ba
Page 217 and 218:
economic agencies believed that the
Page 219 and 220:
the troops’ discipline caused by
Page 221 and 222:
there are in Leningrad increases th
Page 223 and 224:
The population’s mood in the comb
Page 225 and 226:
lack of transport capacity limited
Page 227 and 228:
hanged for cannibalism in February
Page 229 and 230:
the question of sustenance [for civ
Page 231 and 232:
Einsatzgruppe A also noted that the
Page 233 and 234:
the food it could lay its hands on.
Page 235 and 236:
the exhaustion felt by the 121 st I
Page 237 and 238:
day of the entire Eastern Campaign,
Page 239 and 240:
This cracking morale was caused in
Page 241 and 242:
Volkhov River. 821 The East Prussia
Page 243 and 244:
possessed little chance of success,
Page 245 and 246:
worsened daily. No supply, constant
Page 247 and 248:
on every man through fortification
Page 249 and 250:
without break. 850 Within two weeks
Page 251 and 252:
than part of an ideological war aga
Page 253 and 254:
ehind us is nothing more than furth
Page 255 and 256:
The 126 th ID informed XXXVIII Corp
Page 257 and 258:
celebration. 883 According to the 4
Page 259 and 260:
feelings such as these translated i
Page 261 and 262:
Secondly, as the latter entry notes
Page 263 and 264:
foot were able to traverse the corr
Page 265 and 266:
good spirits, though in individual
Page 267 and 268:
The Germans began to recruit as wel
Page 269 and 270:
terrain, which provided partisans w
Page 271 and 272:
destroy a section of Novgorod-Luga
Page 273 and 274:
the inside. 956 Troops operating un
Page 275 and 276:
Since 12.3.42 290 ID Rgts-Staff and
Page 277 and 278:
Regiment, prepared to meet the resc
Page 279 and 280:
well as prisoners-of-war for these
Page 281 and 282:
January as it did not possess the n
Page 283 and 284:
“emergency measures” in those v
Page 285 and 286:
ehavior and ruthlessly exploiting t
Page 287 and 288:
“special meaning . . . due to the
Page 289 and 290:
the deaths of only two partisans fr
Page 291 and 292:
Wehrmacht. 1027 The individual sold
Page 293 and 294:
Chapter 8: “From One Mess to Anot
Page 295 and 296:
altogether, 27.9.42 was one of the
Page 297 and 298:
surrounding population. Division co
Page 299 and 300:
had their passes marked “A” whi
Page 301 and 302:
were soon washed away as the 121 st
Page 303 and 304:
The 121 st ID certainly shoulders r
Page 305 and 306:
ordered Manstein to take command of
Page 307 and 308:
the Hilfswilligen for voluntary and
Page 309 and 310:
The 121 st ID also worked closely w
Page 311 and 312:
the High Command, they do demonstra
Page 313 and 314:
SECTION FOUR: RETREAT - SCORCHED EA
Page 315 and 316:
etreat, participating in what perha
Page 317 and 318:
Soviet pressure on the southern fro
Page 319 and 320:
and successful combat.” 1128 The
Page 321 and 322:
and seizure of all men ages 16-65 w
Page 323 and 324:
the Demiansk pocket thought to be r
Page 325 and 326:
Chapter 10: “War and fire . . . t
Page 327 and 328:
was bought at a steep price. The 12
Page 329 and 330:
superior at Corps that the division
Page 331 and 332:
Division to ship its Jagd-Kommando
Page 333 and 334:
eported the shooting of six partisa
Page 335 and 336:
indicate that it suffered relativel
Page 337 and 338:
were only allowed enough “food ne
Page 339 and 340:
thirty-five villages. 1233 While a
Page 341 and 342:
we don’t have it easy out here [a
Page 343 and 344:
In addition to the implementation o
Page 345 and 346:
troops through a mixture of militar
Page 347 and 348:
were to compile lists of inhabitant
Page 349 and 350:
Corps informed the 126 th ID that i
Page 351 and 352:
problem. 1292 In the monthly report
Page 353 and 354:
126 th ID’s commander commented o
Page 355 and 356:
Improper treatment, inadequate care
Page 357 and 358:
supplies from both the civilian col
Page 359 and 360:
Chapter 11: “Even from far away,
Page 361 and 362:
“continuous and eventful combat
Page 363 and 364:
division was virtually destroyed in
Page 365 and 366:
its units in the line; by February
Page 367 and 368:
one week later, while the East Prus
Page 369 and 370:
a whole had deported 13,351 individ
Page 371 and 372:
e pulled out of the line before it
Page 373 and 374:
do not want to hear the screams of
Page 375 and 376:
Chapter 12: Conclusion Sometime nea
Page 377 and 378:
and the machinery of the Holocaust
Page 379 and 380:
immediate military crisis in the po
Page 381 and 382:
participation in the Reich Labor Ac
Page 383 and 384:
favor of the application of force,
Page 385 and 386:
The importance of ideology in expla
Page 387 and 388:
and the onset of the National Socia
Page 389 and 390:
Illustration 2: The German Assault
Page 391 and 392:
Illustration 4: Front Line 31.12.41
Page 393 and 394:
Illustration 6: The Soviet Winter O
Page 395 and 396:
Illustration 8: The Eastern Front,
Page 397 and 398:
Archival Sources: Bibliography I. B
Page 399 and 400:
XVII Army Corps: RH 24-17/111, RH 2
Page 401 and 402:
MSg 2/2779: Geschichte der 21. Inf.
Page 403 and 404:
V. Geheimes Staatsarchiv PK (GStA),
Page 405 and 406:
Guderian, Heinz, Panzer Leader, New
Page 407 and 408:
Absolon, Rudolf, Die personelle Erg
Page 409 and 410:
-------, et. al., Germany and the S
Page 411 and 412:
-------, “Die Weltanschauuliche E
Page 413 and 414:
-------- (ed.), Besucher einer Auss
Page 415 and 416:
Jacobson, Hans-Adolf, “The Commis
Page 417 and 418:
-------, “What is the History of
Page 419 and 420:
Overmans, Rüdiger, Deutsche milit
Page 421 and 422:
Sheehan, James, “What is German H
Page 423 and 424:
-------, (ed.) Deserteure der Wehrm
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