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Copyright by Jeffrey C. Rutherford 2007 - University of Texas ...

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The importance <strong>of</strong> regional homogeneity in creating cohesive combat units has<br />

been emphasized <strong>by</strong> Martin Van Creveld in his study comparing American and German<br />

“fighting power” during the Second World War. 190 Creveld stated that the emphasis on<br />

the traditional “national basis” <strong>of</strong> Prussians, Bavarians, Saxons and other regional groups<br />

ensured that “German divisions, especially at the lowest levels, were and remained tight<br />

bunches <strong>of</strong> men who suffered, fought and died together,” as they all originated from the<br />

same region and carried the same cultural baggage. 191 Creveld believed that the<br />

replacement system performed well enough up through late 1944 to keep the German<br />

Army in the field.<br />

The actual functioning <strong>of</strong> this system received its first thorough examination <strong>by</strong><br />

Bernhard Kroener. 192 Placing the Wehrmacht’s manpower procurement policies in the<br />

context <strong>of</strong> the larger struggle between industry and the Army for workers and soldiers,<br />

Kroener argued that the already appalling number <strong>of</strong> casualties suffered <strong>by</strong> the German<br />

Army in mid-August 1941 as well as the extreme difficulty in delivering reinforcements<br />

to the ever-advancing fronts required a complete overhaul <strong>of</strong> the system. In Western<br />

Europe, the Germans suffered approximately 171,000 casualties in just under four<br />

months <strong>of</strong> fighting; on the eastern front, Red Army resistance led to higher casualties<br />

totals <strong>by</strong> August 3, a mere 42 days into the Soviet campaign. Within the first three<br />

months <strong>of</strong> Operation Barbarossa, the number had spiked to 583,000 losses. 193 The<br />

190 Creveld, Fighting Power, p. 45.<br />

191 Ibid.<br />

192 Bernhard Kroener, “The Manpower Resources <strong>of</strong> the Third Reich in the Area <strong>of</strong> Conflict between<br />

Wehrmacht, Bureaucracy, and the War Economy, 1939-1942,” in Bernhard Kroener, et. al., Germany and<br />

the Second World War, Volume 5/1, Organization and Mobilization <strong>of</strong> the German Sphere <strong>of</strong> Power<br />

(Oxford, 2000), pp. 789-1154.<br />

193 On casualties from the fighting in the Low Countries and France, see Hans Umbreit, “German Victory<br />

in Western Europe,” in Klaus A. Maier, et. al., Germany and the Second World War, vol. II, Germany’s<br />

Initial Conquests in Europe (Oxford, 2000), p. 304. For casualty numbers during Operation Barbarossa,<br />

see Halder, Kriegstagebuch. Tägliche Aufzeichnungen des Chefs des Generalstabes des Heeres 1939-1942 ,<br />

vol. III, 2.8.41, p. 145; 28.9.41, p. 257.<br />

56

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