- Page 1 and 2: Copyright by Jeffrey C. Rutherford
- Page 3 and 4: Soldiers into Nazis? The German Inf
- Page 5 and 6: Acknowledgements This dissertation
- Page 7 and 8: Soldiers into Nazis? The German Inf
- Page 9 and 10: Table of Contents List of Tables ..
- Page 11 and 12: List of Tables Table 1: Casualties
- Page 13 and 14: List of Illustrations Illustration
- Page 15 and 16: fulfill numerous duties outside of
- Page 17 and 18: Communism [is] an enormous danger f
- Page 19 and 20: “systematic starvation of million
- Page 21 and 22: national-socialist German Volk,”
- Page 23 and 24: German Army had “finally [become]
- Page 25 and 26: Heer, the exhibition claimed that
- Page 27 and 28: the taboo:” the Army’s particip
- Page 29: seriously implicated in National So
- Page 33 and 34: official doctrine and kept alive th
- Page 35 and 36: looms large. Fundamentally, this me
- Page 37 and 38: was seen as desirable, either due t
- Page 39 and 40: would have been fought as a particu
- Page 41 and 42: method in looking at the German Arm
- Page 43 and 44: northernmost Army Group have receiv
- Page 45 and 46: which these crimes were committed a
- Page 47 and 48: the content of even one letter, to
- Page 49 and 50: to the exigencies of the Cold War,
- Page 51 and 52: indispensable source for investigat
- Page 53 and 54: SECTION ONE: REGIONAL COHESION AND
- Page 55 and 56: a series of wars fought in the Balt
- Page 57 and 58: emaining 40% of the population was
- Page 59 and 60: ecently as May 1928, the NSDAP rece
- Page 61 and 62: As the preceding discussion intimat
- Page 63 and 64: moderate Left following a successfu
- Page 65 and 66: IV. CONCLUSION While the Weimar Rep
- Page 67 and 68: The system ran into major difficult
- Page 69 and 70: The importance of regional homogene
- Page 71 and 72: “equivalent of its initial streng
- Page 73 and 74: alternative existed between the Shi
- Page 75 and 76: In an attempt to gauge the effectiv
- Page 77 and 78: trained reserves. 219 90,000 of the
- Page 79 and 80: Monthly Casualties 3000 2500 2000 1
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Monthly Casualties 3000 2500 2000 1
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to lead offensive operations. 240 T
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Replacements began entering the 126
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Number of Men 140 120 100 80 60 40
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46% of the troops were native to Mi
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flank such as the 123 rd ID, did ex
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attle for the Volkhov Pocket as 4,8
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A similar rollercoaster pattern als
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Number of Men 180 160 140 120 100 8
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Number of Men 1600 1400 1200 1000 8
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An astounding number of over 12,000
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dilution of the units’ bonds. Reg
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groups of men constituted only 44%
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men, since March. 290 From August t
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Numbers of Men 2500 2000 1500 1000
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one soldier who had any ties to the
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a large scale - this is something n
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Westphalian 254 th ID related a sim
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of the 1,567 replacements received
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winter of 1941/1942. This meant tha
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propaganda has been overstated in e
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In addition to receiving military i
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and political commissars were to be
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Führer against the center of this
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Army men were quickly changing into
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with the behavior of the men earlie
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however, they were well aware of th
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1; a report sent to II Corps indica
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fortifications. 388 The medic in th
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While the German Infantry learned t
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only a few lean pigs - what will we
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quotations reveals ideological warr
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In what seemed to be a universal re
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measures” in “hopes [of] stop[p
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as artillery, supply and communicat
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intensified as the fighting neared
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marks. 460 Lt. W. was far more scor
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east of the Leningrad encirclement,
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however, was limited to the tempora
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of artillery approximate that of th
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are near the end of their physical
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first netted 93 prisoners as well 2
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“thoroughly positive” attitude
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operation. 522 The Rhinelanders con
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in attempts on rear-area connection
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In comparison to the logistical sit
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proper winter equipment, reporting
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While the 123 rd ID struggled to se
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in the 123 rd ID carried out severa
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Army were assigned to cooperate wit
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only limited to defensive combat.
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positions with the outcome of the b
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The division ordered the clearing o
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equired evacuation. The civilians n
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quartermaster of the 123 rd ID orde
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villagers, both under threats of vi
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five months later, Colonel-General
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Once again, each division had its o
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Cooperation between the German Army
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frequently stripped of any possessi
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126 th and especially the 123 rd ID
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individual soldiers did circumvent
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were “undesirable . . . on espion
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authorities deemed anyone who “su
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etc., etc.” 692 These degrading m
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odied males led to a labor shortage
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Individual soldiers claimed that th
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direction of Petersburg, to turn ba
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economic agencies believed that the
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the troops’ discipline caused by
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there are in Leningrad increases th
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The population’s mood in the comb
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lack of transport capacity limited
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hanged for cannibalism in February
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the question of sustenance [for civ
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Einsatzgruppe A also noted that the
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the food it could lay its hands on.
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the exhaustion felt by the 121 st I
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day of the entire Eastern Campaign,
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This cracking morale was caused in
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Volkhov River. 821 The East Prussia
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possessed little chance of success,
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worsened daily. No supply, constant
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on every man through fortification
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without break. 850 Within two weeks
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than part of an ideological war aga
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ehind us is nothing more than furth
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The 126 th ID informed XXXVIII Corp
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celebration. 883 According to the 4
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feelings such as these translated i
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Secondly, as the latter entry notes
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foot were able to traverse the corr
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good spirits, though in individual
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The Germans began to recruit as wel
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terrain, which provided partisans w
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destroy a section of Novgorod-Luga
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the inside. 956 Troops operating un
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Since 12.3.42 290 ID Rgts-Staff and
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Regiment, prepared to meet the resc
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well as prisoners-of-war for these
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January as it did not possess the n
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“emergency measures” in those v
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ehavior and ruthlessly exploiting t
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“special meaning . . . due to the
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the deaths of only two partisans fr
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Wehrmacht. 1027 The individual sold
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Chapter 8: “From One Mess to Anot
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altogether, 27.9.42 was one of the
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surrounding population. Division co
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had their passes marked “A” whi
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were soon washed away as the 121 st
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The 121 st ID certainly shoulders r
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ordered Manstein to take command of
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the Hilfswilligen for voluntary and
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The 121 st ID also worked closely w
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the High Command, they do demonstra
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SECTION FOUR: RETREAT - SCORCHED EA
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etreat, participating in what perha
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Soviet pressure on the southern fro
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and successful combat.” 1128 The
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and seizure of all men ages 16-65 w
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the Demiansk pocket thought to be r
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Chapter 10: “War and fire . . . t
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was bought at a steep price. The 12
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superior at Corps that the division
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Division to ship its Jagd-Kommando
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eported the shooting of six partisa
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indicate that it suffered relativel
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were only allowed enough “food ne
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thirty-five villages. 1233 While a
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we don’t have it easy out here [a
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In addition to the implementation o
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troops through a mixture of militar
- Page 347 and 348:
were to compile lists of inhabitant
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Corps informed the 126 th ID that i
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problem. 1292 In the monthly report
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126 th ID’s commander commented o
- Page 355 and 356:
Improper treatment, inadequate care
- Page 357 and 358:
supplies from both the civilian col
- Page 359 and 360:
Chapter 11: “Even from far away,
- Page 361 and 362:
“continuous and eventful combat
- Page 363 and 364:
division was virtually destroyed in
- Page 365 and 366:
its units in the line; by February
- Page 367 and 368:
one week later, while the East Prus
- Page 369 and 370:
a whole had deported 13,351 individ
- Page 371 and 372:
e pulled out of the line before it
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do not want to hear the screams of
- Page 375 and 376:
Chapter 12: Conclusion Sometime nea
- Page 377 and 378:
and the machinery of the Holocaust
- Page 379 and 380:
immediate military crisis in the po
- Page 381 and 382:
participation in the Reich Labor Ac
- Page 383 and 384:
favor of the application of force,
- Page 385 and 386:
The importance of ideology in expla
- Page 387 and 388:
and the onset of the National Socia
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Illustration 2: The German Assault
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Illustration 4: Front Line 31.12.41
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Illustration 6: The Soviet Winter O
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Illustration 8: The Eastern Front,
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Archival Sources: Bibliography I. B
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XVII Army Corps: RH 24-17/111, RH 2
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MSg 2/2779: Geschichte der 21. Inf.
- Page 403 and 404:
V. Geheimes Staatsarchiv PK (GStA),
- Page 405 and 406:
Guderian, Heinz, Panzer Leader, New
- Page 407 and 408:
Absolon, Rudolf, Die personelle Erg
- Page 409 and 410:
-------, et. al., Germany and the S
- Page 411 and 412:
-------, “Die Weltanschauuliche E
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-------- (ed.), Besucher einer Auss
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Jacobson, Hans-Adolf, “The Commis
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-------, “What is the History of
- Page 419 and 420:
Overmans, Rüdiger, Deutsche milit
- Page 421 and 422:
Sheehan, James, “What is German H
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-------, (ed.) Deserteure der Wehrm