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In some instances, these wastes have been indiscriminately<br />

dumped into pits, streams, lakes, septic tanks, and along the<br />

roadside.<br />

Cleaning up a seized clandestine drug laboratory can be a<br />

complex, dangerous, and expensive undertaking. <strong>The</strong> DEA<br />

hazardous waste program has been successful, however, in<br />

promoting the safety of law enforcement personnel and the<br />

public, protecting the environment, and minimizing the<br />

agency’s liability. Through the use of nation-wide contracts,<br />

DEA’s program promoted the safety of law enforcement personnel<br />

and the public by using highly qualified companies<br />

with specialized training and equipment to perform the removal<br />

of the wastes at the seized laboratory. Using these<br />

contractors reduces the risk of injury to law enforcement personnel<br />

and the public from the clean up of the seized laboratory.<br />

<strong>The</strong> program has become increasingly more efficient as DEA<br />

gained more experience in cleaning up clandestine drug laboratories.<br />

<strong>The</strong> average cost per cleanup in the FY1991-1992<br />

time frame was $17,000. While the number of clandestine<br />

drug laboratory cleanups rose, the average cost per cleanup<br />

continued to go down. Through contract improvements and<br />

DEA’s contract management experience, the costs of a removal<br />

were subsequently reduced to approximately $4,000 in<br />

FY2000 and to less than $3,300 in FY2002.<br />

New hazardous waste contracts became effective in FY2003.<br />

<strong>The</strong> new contracts include many time and cost saving tools<br />

to help address the field’s concerns and the dramatic increase<br />

in workload. <strong>The</strong> new contracts are expected to significantly<br />

improve the response time by increasing the number of Contract<br />

Areas from 29 to 44 and requiring response facilities in<br />

each. <strong>The</strong> greater competition created by smaller Contract<br />

Areas and new cost reduction factors should result in additional<br />

cost savings for the government, while maintaining<br />

strict environmental compliance standards. In addition, the<br />

new contracts contain provisions for weekly pickups from<br />

containers in states that establish a container storage program<br />

and have entered into a Letter of Agreement with DEA<br />

to provide this service. DEA began discussions regarding a<br />

pilot container program with several states in FY2002 to determine<br />

the feasibility and degree of cost savings associated<br />

with the approach.<br />

63<br />

Targeting the Arellano-Felix<br />

Trafficking Organization<br />

(2000-2002)<br />

<strong>The</strong> Arellano Felix Organization (AFO), often referred to as<br />

the Tijuana Cartel, was considered one of the most powerful<br />

and violent drug trafficking organizations in Mexico. At the<br />

height of its power, the AFO was responsible for the transportation,<br />

importation, and distribution of multi-ton quantities<br />

of cocaine, marijuana, and large quantities of heroin and<br />

methamphetamine into the United States from Mexico—primarily<br />

from Tijuana into San Diego and Los Angeles.<br />

DEA offices in Mexico and the United States, most notably<br />

Tijuana, San Diego, and Los Angeles, relentlessly pursued<br />

the principal members of this organization in an effort to<br />

bring about their downfall. <strong>The</strong> most prominent members of<br />

the AFO were brothers Benjamin, Eduardo, Ramon, and Francisco<br />

Javier Arellano Felix; Ismael Higuera Guerrero; Jesus<br />

Labra Aviles; Manuel Aguirre Galindo; and Ismael Higuera-<br />

Guerrero. Jesus Labra Aviles, long considered the financial<br />

mastermind of the organization, was arrested in Mexico City<br />

in March 2000 by the Government of Mexico with the support<br />

of DEA’s Tijuana office. <strong>This</strong> was followed by the arrest<br />

of major AFO Lieutenant Ismael Higuera-Guerrero two months<br />

later in May 2000. He, too, was arrested by the Mexican<br />

Government in coordination with DEA’s Tijuana<br />

office.

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