Meditation Practice - Buddhispano

Conference
The Mind’s ‘I’ in Meditation: Early Pāi Buddhadhamma
and Transcendental Phenomenology in Mutual Reflection
Khristos Nizamis 1
Introduction
This essay provides a condensed introductory ‘snapshot’ of just a few of the many and
profound correlations existing between early (pre-Abhidhamma) Pi Buddhism and Transcendental
Phenomenology, by focusing on what is arguably the most central and essential ‘philosophical
problem’ in both traditions: the true nature and signicance of the ‘I’ of subjective intentional
consciousness. It argues that the Buddhist axiom of ‘not-self’ (anatt) is by no means incompatible
with the fundamental phenomenological irreducibility, and necessity, of transcendental subjectivity
– or, as Husserl also puts it, of the ‘pure’ or ‘transcendental ‘I’’ – a structure evidently essential to
intentional consciousness as ‘consciousness-of’. On the one hand, Husserl recognises (and struggles
with) the peculiar ‘emptiness’ of the ‘pure ‘I’’. On the other hand, a fundamental distinction must
clearly be drawn between genuine intentional subjectivity – which even Buddhas and Arahants must
of necessity possess – and the erroneous bases upon which the concept of ‘self’ (att) that Buddhism
rejects is constituted: the feeling of ‘I am’ (‘asm’ti), the sense of ‘I am this’ (‘ayam-aham-asm’ti),
and the concept/conceit of ‘I am’ (asmi-mna) – all of which Buddhas and Arahants by denition
do not possess. Hence, it is argued that, while the ‘pure I’ does not refer to some permanent ‘entity’
called ‘self’, nor is it merely an empty, non-referring, conventional linguistic marker: it has not merely
a ‘use’, but a genuine meaning, which derives from the intrinsic, irreducible, and ‘pre-linguistic’
experiential structure of ‘consciousness-of’ itself. What is more, this meaning is not only recognised
and admitted, but actively utilised, within the doctrine and methodology of early Buddhism, without
any sense of contradicting the axiom of anatt.
1. Preliminary (1): The axiom of anattā
This essay aims to provide a very condensed and merely introductory ‘snapshot’ of just
a few of the many and very deep correlations that exist between transcendental phenomenology (TP)
and early Pi Buddhadhamma (EB); but the elements of this ‘snapshot’ are organized around what
is arguably the most essential theme – one might even say, ‘philosophical problem’ – at the heart of
both TP and EB. It is the intention of this essay not to contradict the fundamental EB axiom of anatt,
‘not-self’. In other words, the arguments presented here will not posit any essentially permanent
subjective or objective entity or identity called att, or ‘self’. Nor will they assert ‘asm’ti, ‘I am’;
1
I would gratefully like to thank Peter Harvey for his helpful and encouraging comments on and questions about
the previous version of this paper. I hope that through my addressing his comments and questions, the clarity of this paper
has been improved for the benet of others. I would also like to register my respect for and appreciation of the great
work accomplished by Bhikkhus Bodhi and hnissaro: without their beautiful efforts, it would have required at least two
more lifetimes for me to gain the understanding of early Pi Buddhadhamma which they have helped me to gain within
a fraction of this lifetime. I also deeply and gratefully thank the International Association of Buddhist Universities for
accepting this paper as part of its 2011/2012 conference program.
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