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implicatures. BUCLD 25 Proceedings, 157-68. Somerville, MA: Cascadilla Press. CRAIN, Stephen & Paul PIETROSKI (2002). Why language acquisition is a snap. The Linguistic Review 19: 163-83. GEURTS, Bart (1998). Scalars. In P. Ludewig & B. Geurts (eds.), Lexikalische Semantik aus kognitiver Sicht, 95-117. Tübingen: Gunter Narr. HORN, Laurence (1992). The said and the unsaid. SALT II: Proceedings of the second conference on semantics and linguistic theory, 163-92. Columbus: Ohio State University Department of Linguistics. LEVINSON, Stephen C. (2000). Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature. Cambridge: MIT Press.
1 Futurity in Default Semantics K.M. Jaszczolt University of Cambridge, U.K. http://www.cus.cam.ac.uk/~kmj21 Abstract for the International Workshop "Where Semantics Meets Pragmatics" Michigan State University, July, 11-13, 2003 1. The modality of will and the modality of the ‘future’: An overview This paper contributes to the ongoing debate concerning the status of the English will as a marker of (i) tense, (ii) modality, or (iii) ambiguous between the two (see e.g. Fleischman 1982; Enç 1996; Werth 1997; Hornstein 1990; Ludlow 1999). In particular, I concentrate on clearly modal uses of will as in (1) and (2) (epistemic and dispositional necessity respectively), as opposed to (3) where will is primarily a marker of future tense reference: (1) Mary will be in the opera now. (2) Mary will sometimes go to the opera in her tracksuit. (3) Mary will go to the opera tomorrow night. I demonstrate that when we adopt an approach to temporality based on event semantics (e.g. Parsons 1990; Kamp and Reyle 1993; Pratt and Francez 2001), the classification of will as modal turns out to be the most satisfactory solution. For this purpose I combine the analysis in Discourse Representation Theory (henceforth: DRT, Kamp and Reyle 1993) with my theory of default interpretations (Jaszczolt 1999a, b; 2002a, forthcoming) and use the properties of (i) the intentionality of mental states and (ii) its pragmatic equivalent of communicative, informative and referential intentions in communication in order to show that the degrees of intentions involved result in different interpretations of will. The strongest referential intention directed at the eventuality (state, event or process) results in the strongest commitment to the communicated eventuality and by the same token to the ‘weakest degree of modality’. The discussion of the properties of will is supplemented with a discussion of the semantic category of futurity. Sentence (3) is juxtaposed with expressions of futurity that use futurative progressive and tenseless future as in (4) and (5) respectively: (4) Mary is going to the opera tomorrow night. (5) Mary goes to the opera tomorrow night. It is demonstrated that since the three readings differ as to the degree of modality, they can be given one overarching semantic representation. Since future will is best accounted for with reference to possible worlds (see e.g. Parsons 2002, 2003), it is not qualitatively different from modal will. Independently of using world-time units, the purely future will in (3) turns out as modal since it exhibits affinities with (1) and (2) on one hand, and (4) and (5) on the other, that are best explained by a scale of epistemic modality. The gradation of intentions strongly suggests that will is modal. Instead of the ambiguity/temporality/modality trilemma, there is a gradation of the strength of intending the eventuality that results in various degrees of modal meaning communicated by will. I corroborate this argument by placing will in the framework proposed in Grice (2001). According to Grice’s Equivocality Thesis, alethic and deontic modalities are univocal, derived from one conceptual core of acceptability. I propose that Grice’s acceptability can be introduced as a modal operator (ACC) to Discourse Representation Theory, replacing the current unsatisfactory treatment of will that relies on a linear structure of the future and on representing firstly tenses and only derivatively temporality. 2. Futurity in Default Semantics The main claim of Default Semantics is that utterances come with default interpretations. The dominant view in recent semantics and pragmatics is that in order to explain multiple readings of, let us say, propositional attitude sentences, sentences with sentential conjunction and, or negation, we have to postulate that semantic representation is underspecified as to some aspects of meaning, and further pragmatic processes in the form of (i) the developments of the logical form or explicature (Relevance theory) or (ii) implicatures (neo-Griceans) produce one exact reading. In contrast to this view, the theory of Default Semantics contains only one level of representation, derived from the structure and
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