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Chapter 12<br />

<strong><strong>MARKET</strong>S</strong> <strong>WITH</strong> <strong>MARKET</strong> <strong>POWER</strong><br />

Microeconomics in Context (Goodwin, et al.), 2 nd Edition<br />

Overview and Objectives<br />

This chapter covers traditional models of monopoly, monopolistic competition, and oligopoly.<br />

An important complement to this chapter is Chapter 16, which goes beyond these traditional<br />

analytical models to discuss contemporary issues of globalization and corporate power.<br />

As in earlier chapters, graphs that include the average total cost curve are presented in an<br />

appendix.<br />

After reading and reviewing this chapter, the student should be able to:<br />

1. Define a monopoly and describe how a monopolist maximizes profits.<br />

2. Understand why a monopoly may or may not be efficient.<br />

3. Define monopolistic competition and describe how profits are maximized in these<br />

markets.<br />

4. Define oligopoly and discuss firm behavior under conditions of oligopoly.<br />

Key Term Review<br />

barriers to entry<br />

exclusionary practices<br />

dumping<br />

regulated monopoly<br />

rent-seeking behavior<br />

nonprice competition<br />

duopoly<br />

price war<br />

tacit collusion<br />

price leadership<br />

natural monopoly<br />

predatory pricing<br />

local monopoly<br />

price-maker<br />

price discrimination<br />

concentration ratio<br />

payoff matrix<br />

collusion<br />

price-fixing<br />

Lecture Outline<br />

1. The Three Models<br />

• The three idealized market structures where sellers have some market power are pure<br />

monopoly (only one seller), monopolistic competition (many sellers selling slightly<br />

Chapter 12 − Markets with Power 1


different things), and oligopoly (so few sellers that each needs to watch what the others<br />

are doing).<br />

• The cases of monopoly and monopolistic competition can be analyzed using the<br />

traditional economic model. That model is not applicable to oligopoly because oligopoly<br />

markets are evolving social institutions.<br />

Teaching strategy: See the Extension “Competition and Concentration” (below) for more<br />

discussion of how these two forces interact, and why competition does not always win out.<br />

2. Pure Monopoly: One Seller<br />

2.1 The Conditions of Monopoly<br />

• The three conditions of monopoly are: only one seller, the good being sold has no close<br />

substitutes, and barriers exist to prevent new firms from entering the market.<br />

• One reason new firms may be prevented from entering monopoly markets is economic.<br />

The fixed costs to enter the market may be very high. A natural monopoly means that the<br />

minimum efficient scale of production is large relative to the market demand.<br />

• Barriers to entry may also be legal, such as through copyrights, patents, and trademarks.<br />

• Barriers to entry may also be deliberate. Through exclusionary practices a firm may get<br />

its suppliers to agree to not sell to competitors. Through predatory pricing a firm may<br />

temporarily sell at a price below its costs to drive competitors out of business.<br />

2.2 Examples of Monopoly<br />

• Examples of local monopolies (limited to a specific geographical region) are relatively<br />

common, such as the only theatre in a small town.<br />

• A regulated monopoly is a private company that is run under government supervision,<br />

such as AT&T in the past.<br />

2.3 Profit Maximization for a Monopolist<br />

• A monopolist will choose to produce where marginal cost equals marginal revenue.<br />

• Unlike a firm in a perfectly competitive market, a monopolist faces the entire demand<br />

curve and can adjust its selling price.<br />

• As a price-maker, a monopolist faces a downward-sloping marginal revenue curve.<br />

• Rather than setting price equal to marginal cost, a monopolist will set price at the<br />

maximum willingness to pay (the point on the demand curve).<br />

• A monopolist can make a sustained economic profit because new firms cannot enter the<br />

market to drive down prices.<br />

Teaching strategy: See the Extensions section (below) for additional numerical examples.<br />

2.4 Monopoly and Inefficiency<br />

• A deadweight loss exists in a monopoly market. Because the monopolist produces at an<br />

output level at which price exceeds marginal cost, society could gain from increased<br />

output of the product.<br />

• Graphical analysis illustrates that a monopoly market, as compared to the case of perfect<br />

competition, results in a transfer of benefits from consumers to the monopolist, as well as<br />

a deadweight loss.<br />

Chapter 12 − Markets with Power 2


• Monopolists may also use their market power to create other inefficiencies, such as<br />

engaging in rent-seeking behavior to obtain transfers or favors.<br />

2.5 Can Monopoly be Efficient?<br />

• In the case of a natural monopoly, multiple firms would have higher per-unit production<br />

costs than a monopolist. A firm operating under conditions of natural monopoly is<br />

normally regulated to produce at higher levels and sell at a lower price than the firm<br />

would on its own.<br />

• The granting of a monopoly through copyrights and patents can be a way to encourage<br />

research and innovation.<br />

• Monopolists may behave more like a competitive firm if they fear potential competitors<br />

or government regulation.<br />

• In the case of price discrimination, a firm can sell its product to different buyers at<br />

different prices. Buyers that are less responsive to price are charged a higher price. This<br />

allows the firm to capture more of potential consumer surplus as profits.<br />

3. Monopolist Competition<br />

3.1 The Conditions of Monopolist Competition<br />

• The four conditions of monopolistic competition are: numerous small buyers and sellers,<br />

the sellers produce goods that are similar but differentiated, producers can freely enter or<br />

exit the market, and buyers and sellers have perfect information.<br />

3.2 Examples of Monopolistic Competition<br />

• Examples of monopolistic competition are very common, such as fast-food restaurants<br />

and different types of bookstores.<br />

3.3 Profit Maximization with Monopolistic Competition<br />

• Monopolistically competitive firms face a downward-sloping demand curve. Their<br />

marginal revenue curve will lie below their demand curve.<br />

• Profit maximization occurs at the point where marginal revenue equals marginal cost.<br />

• If monopolistically competitive firms are making positive economic profits, then new<br />

firms will enter the market. This will increase supply, drive down prices, and eventually<br />

result in all firms earning zero economic profits.<br />

3.4 Monopolistic Competition and Long-Run Efficiency<br />

• Monopolistically competitive firms produce below the level where the social benefits of<br />

production are equal to the social costs. Thus, they operate inefficiently.<br />

• Monopolistically competitive firms may engage in non-price competition, such as<br />

through advertising or being open for long hours.<br />

4. Oligopoly<br />

4.1 The Conditions of Oligopoly<br />

• Oligopoly markets are characterized by containing only a few sellers (at least some of<br />

which are large enough to influence the market price); and conditions exist which make<br />

entry into such market difficult.<br />

• In making decisions, an oligopolist must anticipate the likely reaction of its rivals.<br />

Chapter 12 − Markets with Power 3


4.2 Examples of Oligopoly<br />

• Automobile manufacturing is a classic example of an oligopoly. There are only a handful<br />

of major automobile manufacturers.<br />

• The concentration ratio is the proportion of total market sales that go to the largest firms<br />

in the industry. The concentration ratio for the four largest firms in some oligopoly<br />

markets is above 0.80.<br />

4.3 Oligopoly and the Behavior of Firms<br />

• One model for analyzing the behavior of oligopolists is game theory, where firms plot<br />

their moves as if engaged in a competitive game.<br />

• A payoff matrix shows the benefits of one seller as a function of the behavior of another<br />

seller. While each firm would benefit by selling at a lower price than its competitor, if<br />

they engage in a price war they will both end up making relatively low profits.<br />

• A payoff matrix illustrates that two such firms could do better if they were able to<br />

cooperate. Through collusion, the firms could both agree not to lower their prices.<br />

Collusion is difficult to sustain because each firm has an incentive to lower its prices and,<br />

at least temporarily, increase its own profits.<br />

Teaching Strategy: The analysis of oligopoly in the text is mostly static. You might want to<br />

discuss that oligopoly and payoff matrices are dynamic. If one firm gains a temporary<br />

advantage, the other will likely respond quickly by cutting its own price. Thus, the<br />

cooperative equilibrium is very unstable. It is like being on the top of a steep hill – a small<br />

move away from the top can result in a big fall. If one firm “cheats,” it may be able to<br />

cooperate again but the other firm will likely be very suspicious.<br />

Teaching Strategy: See the Extensions section (below) for two in-class “games” illustrating<br />

the behavior of cartels.<br />

4.4 Is Oligopoly Rampant?<br />

• The key feature of oligopoly is the degree of interdependence among the firms. In<br />

reality, most any real-world firm will consider the actions of its rivals. A more complete<br />

analysis of oligopoly must consider more than just economic factors – it must also<br />

consider social factors in the firms’ response.<br />

5. Summary and a Final Note<br />

• In the real world, markets may not easily be categorized into just one of the four basic<br />

structures.<br />

• Arguments in favor of “free” markets rely on the perfectly competitive model which<br />

maximizes efficiency. But examples of markets with some degree of market power are<br />

much more common than markets with perfect competition.<br />

Appendix: A Formal Analysis of Market Structures with Market Power<br />

• The profit levels achieved by monopolists and by firms in monopolistic competition can<br />

be illustrated using the demand, MC, MR and ATC curves.<br />

Chapter 12 − Markets with Power 4


Notes on Text Discussion Questions<br />

2.1. This would represent a case of a local monopoly because students could still travel to a<br />

different university bookstore to buy their books. However, they would most likely find that<br />

the prices of books across different university bookstores are very similar. You might ask<br />

them why several university bookstores in a small geographical area (such as when several<br />

colleges are found in a metropolitan area) all have similar prices, when one bookstore could<br />

potentially capture a large share of the market by lowering their prices. This could<br />

foreshadow the discussion of oligopoly later in the chapter. Most students will be aware of<br />

some alternatives to buying textbooks at their college bookstore, such as a student-run<br />

cooperative or the Internet. Still, these alternatives haven’t driven down the price of texts at<br />

university bookstores much, if at all. Perceptive students might realize that monopoly power<br />

also resides with publishers who set prices for their books and continually revise books to<br />

limit the impact of the used book market. They may also note that professors, who don’t<br />

have to pay for their books, have little incentive to try to reduce students’ book costs by<br />

possibly using older editions or encouraging students to share books.<br />

2.2. This question should help reinforce the efficiency/inefficiency issues related to monopolies.<br />

Having just one company make all electronic goods would clearly improve compatibility.<br />

Other potential benefits include greater availability of repair choices and lower production<br />

costs through economies of scale. But there would be several disadvantages of having just<br />

one electronics company, including the potential for higher monopoly prices, reduced<br />

innovation, and fewer consumer choices. If students believe that having just one company is<br />

a good idea, you can ask them why this hasn’t happened. Electronics is not an industry<br />

where market forces have produced a natural monopoly. A discussion about why this is not<br />

the case can focus on production costs, consumer preferences, and innovation.<br />

3.1. This question is best used for discussion, where students could compare the prices they pay<br />

for certain goods. Coffee is a good that likely varies significantly in price across firms.<br />

While some of the difference can be attributed to quality differences, ask students to consider<br />

other differences as well (convenience, status, atmosphere, etc.). Gas, on the other hand, is a<br />

good that varies less in quality. Ask students why gas prices often vary in a region and why<br />

everyone doesn’t simply buy gas from the cheapest station in the area. Note that, even after<br />

considering many factors, some slight differences in price might remain puzzling. This could<br />

be explained by using the “thick curves” that were described in the Extension to Chapter 4<br />

notes in the IRM, where equilibrium is represented by a range of outcomes rather than a<br />

single point.<br />

3.2. Students are most likely faced with a tremendous variety of goods and services. Hopefully,<br />

an interesting discussion could be structured around whether this variety is “too much.” For<br />

example, would five brands of toothpaste be enough for society or is society better off with<br />

fifteen choices? Ask students to consider the resources devoted to developing and promoting<br />

many different brands, and the benefits consumers receive from additional choices. Some<br />

students might offer a situation of declining marginal benefits – the first few choices<br />

significantly benefit consumers but eventually more choices yield few benefits. Non-price<br />

competition can provide consumers with benefits such as improved quality, greater<br />

Chapter 12 − Markets with Power 5


convenience, etc., but it can also reduce social well-being. Students should recognize that<br />

advertising can impose costs on society by increasing prices, encouraging irresponsible<br />

spending, and targeting children. Some non-price competition, such as disposable products<br />

and single-serve portions can increase environmental impacts.<br />

4.1. a) In a prisoner’s dilemma situation, each firm would benefit from having the lower price.<br />

However, with both firms taking a low-price strategy and no cooperation, neither firm will<br />

gain a price advantage. The result will likely be lower profits for both due to a price war.<br />

b) If the two firms collude to set price, they can both maintain high profits. Note, however,<br />

that each firm also has an incentive to lower price and capture a larger market share and<br />

higher profits.<br />

4.2. The payoff matrix with revised labels is given below. The “Low Price” labels are replaced<br />

with “Spend a lot” and “High Price” is replaced with “Spend a little.” Firms undertake<br />

advertising because they want to increase sales and revenues (and raise profits), but<br />

advertising also costs money (an expense which reduces profits). In this case, each firm<br />

perceives a benefit from a lot of advertising because, if its rival doesn’t advertise as much, it<br />

will be able to steal the other’s customers and make high profits. If one chooses not to spend<br />

much while its rival spends a lot, the situation is reversed, and the first firm will make losses.<br />

However, if both spend a lot, they have to split the customer base while having high<br />

expenses, yielding low profits. If both spend only a little, they will again split the customer<br />

base, but their expenses (for ads that essentially cancel each other out) aren’t as high, so their<br />

profits will be moderate. Each one will realize that the worst they can do if they spend a lot is<br />

get a low profit, while if they only spend a little they could end up making losses. As a<br />

result, the noncooperative outcome is for both firms to spend a lot of money on advertising,<br />

and make low profits (the upper left cell in the figure below). If advertising were severely<br />

limited by law, each firm would save on ineffective advertising costs and the moderate profit<br />

(lower right cell) payoff could be reached instead. Thus, the companies’ profits would<br />

increase if they are both forced to cut back. While the government has limited advertising of<br />

cigarettes and alcohol for public health reasons, this could have the somewhat perverse result<br />

of increasing profits to the cigarette and alcohol manufacturers!<br />

Firm 2’s Options<br />

Firm 1’s Options<br />

Spend a<br />

lot<br />

Spend a<br />

little<br />

Spend a lot<br />

low profit<br />

low profit<br />

high profit<br />

loss<br />

Spend a little<br />

loss<br />

high profit<br />

moderate profit<br />

moderate profit<br />

5.1. Recall from Chapter 5 that Braeburn does have a monopoly on the particular book of<br />

poetry they are selling, but they compete with many other publishing firms. Thus, the market<br />

structure of monopolistic competition corresponds most with Braeburn’s position. As they<br />

increase the price of the book, they will lose some (but not all) customers. Braeburn will<br />

Chapter 12 − Markets with Power 6


most likely engage in non-price competition to differentiate themselves from other<br />

publishers. They may advertise to specific markets, sponsor books signings, and use other<br />

tactics to promote their books.<br />

5.2. This question is designed to tap into the real-world knowledge that some students might<br />

have about market structure. It may be best run as a full-class exercise, taking the<br />

experience of one or a few students, and having a full-class discussion of each case.<br />

Students should be encouraged not just to tell stories, but rather use the stories to unravel<br />

and illustrate (and even critique) the “conditions” for the various market structures<br />

described in the text. For less experienced classes, you might substitute a general call for<br />

examples, with an example of your own of a well-known consumer-good manufacturer that<br />

has been in the news.<br />

Answers to End-of-Chapter Review Questions<br />

1. The three idealized market structures with market power are: pure monopoly (only one<br />

seller), monopolistic competition (many sellers, but they sell slightly different things),<br />

and oligopoly (so few sellers that they each need to watch what the others are doing).<br />

2. Pure monopoly is characterized by: only one seller, the good being sold has no close<br />

substitutes, and barriers of entry exist.<br />

3. Three types of barriers to entry are: economic barriers (high fixed costs, network<br />

externalities, economies of scale), legal barriers (copyrights, franchises, patents,<br />

trademarks), and deliberate barriers (exclusionary practices, predatory pricing, dumping).<br />

4. A pure monopolist is imagined to maximize profits by producing where marginal revenue<br />

equals marginal cost but charging as high a price as it can on the market demand curve.<br />

5. Monopolists are inefficient because: deadweight loss is created (the price level exceeds<br />

marginal cost), innovations may be reduced, costs may be spent to maintain barriers to<br />

entry, and rent-seeking behavior.<br />

6. Monopoly market power generally leads to inefficiencies in the form of deadweight loss.<br />

The monopolist produces at an output level at which price exceeds marginal cost and<br />

society could gain from increased output of the product. See Figure 12.2.<br />

7. Four cases in which a monopoly might be efficient are: natural monopolies (economies of<br />

scale dictate that one firm can produce at the minimum per-unit cost), intellectual<br />

property (the potential benefits of patents, trademarks, etc. actually encourage<br />

innovations), pressure to appear competitive (firms worry that too-high monopoly profits<br />

will attract too much attention so they operate more like a competitive firm), and perfect<br />

price discrimination (the monopolist is able to charge every buyer his or her maximum<br />

willingness to pay).<br />

Chapter 12 − Markets with Power 7


8. A price-discriminating seller charges different prices to different buyers, reducing or<br />

eliminating consumer surplus. See Figure 12.3.<br />

9. Monopolistic competition is characterized by: numerous small buyers and sellers, each<br />

seller’s product is somewhat different from that offered by the other sellers, producers of<br />

the good or service can freely enter or exit the industry, and buyers and sellers have<br />

perfect information.<br />

10. A monopolistically competitive firm is expected to maximize profits by producing where<br />

marginal revenue equals marginal cost, charging a price set by the demand curve for its<br />

product, and trying to engage in non-price competition.<br />

11. Monopolistically competitive markets are not efficient because firms, compared to<br />

perfectly competitive firms, will produce lower levels of output and charge higher prices.<br />

12. Oligopoly is characterized by a market dominated by only a few sellers and difficult<br />

entry.<br />

13. Two theories used to describe the behavior of oligopolists are: strategic interaction and<br />

game theory (firms plot their moves while considering other firms’ behavior), and<br />

collusion, cartels and price leadership (firms cooperate and form a monopoly for pricing<br />

purposes).<br />

Answers to End-of-Chapter Exercises<br />

1. a) The demand curve is given below.<br />

b) The completed cost table is given below. See the graph above for the marginal revenue<br />

curve.<br />

Chapter 12 − Markets with Power 8


Quantity of Output<br />

(Demanded)<br />

Selling Price<br />

($)<br />

Total Revenue<br />

($)<br />

Marginal Revenue<br />

($)<br />

1 17 17 17<br />

2 14 28 11<br />

3 11 33 5<br />

4 8 32 -1<br />

5 5 25 -7<br />

c) The selling price of $8 cannot be profit maximizing because the marginal revenue is<br />

negative – Braeburn decreases its revenue by producing and selling the fourth book.<br />

d) See the graph above for the horizontal marginal cost curve.<br />

e) Profit maximization occurs where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. In the graph<br />

above, this occurs at a production level of three books and a price of $11.<br />

f) At a price of $8, Braeburn would sell four books for a total revenue of $32. Total cost<br />

would be $20 (4*$5) and profits would be $12. At the profit maximizing price of $11,<br />

Braeburn’s revenues are $33, their costs are $15, and their profits are $18.<br />

2. a) Firm 1 will make high (additional) profit; Firm 2 will make no (additional) profit--as<br />

shown in the upper right cell in the payoff matrix.<br />

b) The worst that can happen to Firm 1 if it opens a new outlet is that it could make moderate<br />

profit. If it doesn’t open one, the worst that can happen is that it could make no profit. So it<br />

will open the new outlet.<br />

c) The outcome will be that each firm will open a new outlet. The end result will be that each<br />

firm will make a moderate profit.<br />

d) This situation is not like the prisoner’s dilemma because the firms could not both clearly<br />

achieve a better outcome through cooperation.<br />

e) Given the potential to open outlets in multiple towns, the firms do have potential gains<br />

through collusion. Suppose there are two potential towns. If both firms open an outlet in<br />

each town, each firm will make only a moderate profit in each town. However, if one firm<br />

opens an exclusive outlet in one town and the other firm opens an exclusive outlet in the<br />

other town, each firm would make a high profit. Thus (if “high” is greater than two<br />

“moderates”) an agreement that gives each firm exclusive access to each town has the<br />

potential to benefit both firms.<br />

3. The correct matches are a-2, b-5, c-1, d-7, e-4, f-6, g-3.<br />

Extensions<br />

1. Discussion of “Competition and Concentration” (suitable for lecture preparation or handout).<br />

(1 page)<br />

2. Extra numerical example of Monopoly. NOTE: Table 1 refers only to material covered in the<br />

text, but uses the notation “Δ” for “change in.” Table 2 includes material (average variable costs<br />

and average total costs) covered in the appendix, and also includes average fixed costs (not<br />

Chapter 12 − Markets with Power 9


covered in the appendix). Table 2 and the graph use the notation “AR=Demand” which is not<br />

used in the text. (3 pages)<br />

3. Extra exercise on “Monopoly Profit-Maximization” (suitable for in-class use or homework).<br />

and answer key. NOTE: The calculation of profit involves material covered in the appendix. (2<br />

pages)<br />

4. Question on Monopoly Profit Maximization, suitable for use on an exam, and answer key.<br />

NOTE: The calculation of profit involves material covered in the appendix. (1 page)<br />

5. A handout on the “Cartel Game” and answer sheet NOTE: THIS EXERCISE HAS BEEN<br />

WRITTEN FOR A CLASS OF 36 STUDENTS. (3 pages)<br />

6. Handout on the “Grading Game” (1 page)<br />

Chapter 12 − Markets with Power 10


Competition and Concentration<br />

There is a perpetual struggle between the forces of competition and the forces that tend toward<br />

concentration. (This will be discussed further in Chapter 16.) In one sense almost everyone is<br />

engaged in a “pan-human conspiracy” against competition: firm owners and managers don’t like<br />

it because it reduces profits, while workers don’t like it because firms that are being squeezed by<br />

competition become cost-cutters – and that usually includes making life less pleasant for the<br />

workers: faster pace of work, more supervision, and often reduced benefits, even reduced pay.<br />

(We have seen a great deal of this in the last decade, as global competition made more firms<br />

more “lean and mean.”) Most people, during most of their lives, share this<br />

owner/manager/worker point of view. At the same time, everyone is a consumer – and it’s<br />

consumers (and economists) who see competition as highly desirable, precisely because it gets<br />

firms to lower the prices of their products (which is why they are obliged to lower production<br />

costs.)<br />

Note that the advantages of bigness do not always produce high concentration, or allow firms to<br />

escape from the whip of competition. If the market for the product is large enough, or is growing<br />

fast enough, it may not produce monopoly or oligopoly. The monopolizing trend is most likely<br />

to win over the forces of competition when the market is not too big to overwhelm the<br />

advantages of large firm size.<br />

In any case, competition is not a stable situation: when it heats up, it tends to lead to shake-outs<br />

that encourage bigness and monopoly. That’s part of the explanation for the confusing picture<br />

we see when we look at global markets today. Competition seems to be increasing in many<br />

ways, as virtually all firms are competing against producers throughout the whole world; yet, at<br />

the same time, many firms have attained such enormous size that they have achieved significant<br />

power, even in the global market.<br />

Why and how do they attain such power? First of all, the motivations to escape the constraints<br />

of severe competition are very strong; corporate leaders work extremely hard, and can employ<br />

teams of very able people to help them, to figure out strategies that will give them market power.<br />

Given these strong motivations, corporate leaders also reach out to government officials who can<br />

help them, as well as to international bodies. While we see the big firms competing against one<br />

another for customers, at another level they recognize, and act on, a joint interest in reducing<br />

competition, and are often able to create and maintain local, national and international laws and<br />

regulations that can give them special advantages, or protections against would-be competitors or<br />

against constraints on their growth.<br />

Chapter 12 − Markets with Power 11


Monopoly<br />

Table 1:<br />

The Monopoly’s Demand Curve & its Total Revenue<br />

the demand curve:<br />

average<br />

revenue = price<br />

at each<br />

quantity ($/bu)<br />

q<br />

quantity<br />

of<br />

output<br />

total revenue (TR) =<br />

p×q<br />

marginal<br />

revenue<br />

ΔTR/Δq<br />

(bu) ($) ($/bu)<br />

AR = P q TR MR<br />

23 5 115 23<br />

22 10 220 21<br />

21 15 315 19<br />

20 20 400 17<br />

19 25 475 15<br />

18 30 540 13<br />

17 35 595 11<br />

16 40 640 9<br />

15 45 675 7<br />

14 50 700 5<br />

13 55 715 3<br />

12 60 720 1<br />

11 65 715 -1<br />

10 70 700 -3<br />

9 75 675 -5<br />

8 80 640 -7<br />

7 85 595 -9<br />

6 90 540 -11<br />

5 95 475 -13<br />

4 100 400 -15<br />

3 105 315 -17<br />

elastic demand: TR rises as P falls.<br />

inelastic demand: TR<br />

falls as P falls.<br />

Chapter 12 − Markets with Power 12


Table 2:<br />

Production and Costs under Monopoly.<br />

The New Example: continued.<br />

Fixed<br />

Cost =<br />

quantity<br />

of<br />

output<br />

60 price varies with quantity profit schedule<br />

average cost schedule<br />

demand<br />

curve: the<br />

price at<br />

average<br />

fixed<br />

costs<br />

average average<br />

variable total<br />

costs costs<br />

Marginal<br />

Cost<br />

ΔTC/Δq<br />

(bu) ($/bu) ($/bu) ($/bu) ($/bu)<br />

each<br />

quantity<br />

produced.<br />

total<br />

revenue =<br />

p×q<br />

marginal<br />

revenue<br />

= ΔTR/Δq<br />

Total<br />

profit =<br />

(TR–TC)<br />

extra<br />

profit =<br />

(MR –<br />

MC)<br />

($/bu) ($) ($/bu) ($) ($/bu)<br />

q AFC AVC ATC MC AR TR MR<br />

5 12.000 0.800 12.800 0.8 23 115 23 51 22.20<br />

10 6.000 0.600 6.600 0.4 22 220 21 154 20.60<br />

15 4.000 0.600 4.600 0.6 21 315 19 246 18.40<br />

20 3.000 0.750 3.750 1.2 20 400 17 325 15.80<br />

25 2.400 0.920 3.320 1.6 19 475 15 392 13.40<br />

30 2.000 1.100 3.100 2.0 18 540 13 447 11.00<br />

35 1.714 1.286 3.000 2.4 17 595 11 490 8.60<br />

40 1.500 1.475 2.975 2.8 16 640 9 521 6.20<br />

45 1.333 1.667 3.000 3.2 15 675 7 540 3.80<br />

50 1.200 1.860 3.060 3.6 14 700 5 547 1.40<br />

55 1.091 2.055 3.145 4.0 13 715 3 542 -1.00<br />

60 1.000 2.250 3.250 4.4 12 720 1 525 -3.40<br />

65 0.923 2.446 3.369 4.8 11 715 -1 496 -5.80<br />

70 0.857 2.643 3.500 5.2 10 700 -3 455 -8.20<br />

Chapter 12 − Markets with Power 13


Chapter 12 − Markets with Power 14


Exercise on Monopoly Profit-Maximization<br />

Before World War II, the Alcoa corporation had a monopoly in the production of aluminum. Assume that its demand<br />

and cost data are as follows:<br />

demand curve<br />

quantity, q<br />

average<br />

total cost,<br />

ATC<br />

price, p<br />

11 93 10<br />

12 91 11<br />

13 89 13<br />

14 87 15<br />

15 85 17<br />

16 83 20<br />

17 81 24<br />

18 79 28<br />

A) Use the numbers above to fill in the following table:<br />

quantity, q<br />

total<br />

revenue, TR<br />

marginal<br />

revenue,<br />

MR<br />

marginal<br />

cost, MC<br />

total cost,<br />

TC total profit<br />

11 _______ _______ _______ _______ _______<br />

12 _______ _______ _______ _______ _______<br />

13 _______ _______ _______ _______ _______<br />

14 _______ _______ _______ _______ _______<br />

15 _______ _______ _______ _______ _______<br />

16 _______ _______ _______ _______ _______<br />

17 _______ _______ _______ _______ _______<br />

18 _______ _______ _______ _______ _______<br />

B) What is the profit-maximizing level of output? ____________________<br />

C) What is the profit-maximizing price? ________________________<br />

D) Given the average total cost data, what profit is Alcoa making per unit of output?________<br />

E) Assume that Alcoa acted as if it were perfectly competitive, setting price equal to MC, where<br />

the price is determined by the demand curve. Then its short-run profit-maximizing output level = _______<br />

F) In this case, its short-run profit-maximizing price = _______________<br />

G) What would be the profits per unit of Alcoa in this case? ____________<br />

H) Which is more profitable to Alcoa, to act as a competitive firm or as a monopolist?<br />

Chapter 12 − Markets with Power 15


Exercise on Monopoly Profit-Maximization—Answer Key<br />

Before World War II, the Alcoa corporation had a monopoly in the production of aluminum. Assume that<br />

its demand and cost data are as follows:<br />

demand curve average total<br />

quantity price cost<br />

11 93 10<br />

12 91 11<br />

13 89 13<br />

14 87 15<br />

15 85 17<br />

16 83 20<br />

17 81 24<br />

18 79 28<br />

quantity,<br />

q<br />

11<br />

12<br />

13<br />

14<br />

15<br />

16<br />

17<br />

18<br />

A) Use the numbers above to fill in the following table: I added a column at the left, to represent prices.<br />

from the<br />

demand<br />

curve:<br />

price<br />

total<br />

revenue,<br />

TR = p×q<br />

marginal<br />

revenue,<br />

MR =<br />

ΔTR/Δq<br />

marginal<br />

cost, MC<br />

= ΔTC/Δq<br />

total cost,<br />

TC =<br />

ATC×q<br />

profit =<br />

TR – TC<br />

93 1023 n.a. n.a. 110 913<br />

91 1092 69 22 132 960<br />

89 1157 65 37 169 988<br />

87 1218 61 41 210 1008<br />

85 1275 57 45 255 1020<br />

83 1328 53 65 320 1008<br />

81 1377 49 88 408 969<br />

79 1422 45 96 504 918<br />

B) What is the profit-maximizing level of output? 15 (as close to MR = MC as possible, but not too far).<br />

C) What is the profit-maximizing price? $85 (from the demand curve at q = 15).<br />

D) Given the average total cost data, what profit is Alcoa making per unit of output? P – AC = $85 - $17 = $68.<br />

E) Assume that Alcoa acted as if it were perfectly competitive, setting price equal to MC, where<br />

the price is determined by the demand curve. Then its short-run profit-maximizing output level = 16<br />

(this what we get if output is expanded as long as P > MC, to get as close as possible to P = MC without going too<br />

far.)<br />

F) If Alcoa acted as if it were perfectly competitive, its short-run profit-maximizing price = $83 (from the demand<br />

curve at P = 15)<br />

G) What would be the profits of Alcoa if it acts like a perfectly competitive firm? P – AC = $83 - $20 = $63 per<br />

unit or $1008 total.<br />

H) Which is more profitable to Alcoa, to act as a competitive firm or as a monopolist? It’s more profitable to<br />

act as a monopolist.<br />

Chapter 12 − Markets with Power 16


Question on Monopoly Profit Maximization<br />

The graph below represents the average total cost and marginal cost curves (ATC & MC), and the<br />

marginal revenue and demand curves (MR & D), for a monopoly, the BFC (the “Big Friggin’<br />

Company”). FIRST, fill in the blanks below to indicate the name of each of the curves. (If you want, you<br />

may use the initials.) THEN answer the questions below the graph.<br />

A.__________________<br />

B.__________________<br />

C.__________________<br />

D.__________________<br />

E. If BFC acts as a profit-seeking monopoly, it would produce a quantity of about_____________<br />

units per month, while the price would equal about ____________.<br />

F. Is the company making an economic profit in this situation? _____________.<br />

G. If the BFC is forced to act like a competitive firm, the quantity equals about ________<br />

units per month while the price would equal about ___________________.<br />

Question on Monopoly Profit Maximization—Answer Key<br />

A. MC B. D C. ATC D. MR<br />

E. If BFC acts as a profit-seeking monopoly, it would produce a quantity of about____13____<br />

units per month, while the price would equal about _____50_______.<br />

F. Is the company making an economic profit in this situation? Explain. ____Yes. At 13 units of output,<br />

each unit on average costs about $30 (see the ATC) to produce, which is less than the selling price of<br />

$50____.<br />

G. If the BFC is forced to act like a competitive firm, the quantity equals about ___17_____<br />

units per month while the price would equal about _________48__________.<br />

Chapter 12 − Markets with Power 17


The Cartel Game<br />

Each student in the class is the entrepreneur of a small firm producing widgets. Each firm has the<br />

same conditions of production:<br />

1. Each firm can choose to produce either 1 or 2 widgets per day. You must decide what level of<br />

output to produce in order to maximize your profits.<br />

2. The MC of producing a widget is $0.50 at all levels of output. This equals the AC (average or<br />

per-unit costs) of producing widgets.<br />

3. All of the firms earn the same price in selling widgets. The market price is set by the total of<br />

all the firms' outputs (the total amount supplied) and the market demand curve. The demand<br />

curve appears in the first two columns in the table on the next page.<br />

4. The third column in the table shows the marginal revenue curve that would be seen if all<br />

students united to form the Association of Widget Entrepreneurs (AWE), a cartel.<br />

A. If the cartel acts to maximize profits of the group, what level of output will be produced?<br />

B. What will the profits for all of the AWE be in this case? Are they AWEsome?<br />

C. If the profits are distributed equally among the firms, what will the profits be per firm?<br />

5. The government comes in and uses anti-trust laws to break up the AWE. Now each of you has<br />

to decide how much to produce. Remember that your goal is to maximize your own profits.<br />

We will play two rounds of the game, doing it two ways:<br />

A. in the first round, hold up your hand if you want to produce two widgets; don't hold up your<br />

hand if you want to produce one. (It’s not allowed for you to produce 0.)<br />

B. in the second round, write whether you want to produce 2 or 1 widgets on a piece of paper.<br />

Do not show the papers to other students.<br />

On each we can calculate the market price (given the demand curve) and your profits (your<br />

quantity*(p – AC)).<br />

Chapter 12 − Markets with Power 18


industry demand<br />

curve<br />

AWE's<br />

MR<br />

q p<br />

23 2.48 1.60<br />

24 2.44 1.52<br />

25 2.40 1.44<br />

26 2.36 1.36<br />

27 2.32 1.28<br />

28 2.28 1.20<br />

29 2.24 1.12<br />

30 2.20 1.04<br />

31 2.16 0.96<br />

32 2.12 0.88<br />

33 2.08 0.80<br />

34 2.04 0.72<br />

35 2.00 0.64<br />

36 1.96 0.56<br />

37 1.92 0.48<br />

38 1.88 0.40<br />

39 1.84 0.32<br />

40 1.80 0.24<br />

41 1.76 0.16<br />

42 1.72 0.08<br />

43 1.68 0.00<br />

44 1.64 -0.08<br />

45 1.60 -0.16<br />

q p<br />

AWE's<br />

MR<br />

45 1.60 -0.16<br />

46 1.56 -0.24<br />

47 1.52 -0.32<br />

48 1.48 -0.40<br />

49 1.44 -0.48<br />

50 1.40 -0.56<br />

51 1.36 -0.64<br />

52 1.32 -0.72<br />

53 1.28 -0.80<br />

54 1.24 -0.88<br />

55 1.20 -0.96<br />

56 1.16 -1.04<br />

57 1.12 -1.12<br />

58 1.08 -1.20<br />

59 1.04 -1.28<br />

60 1.00 -1.36<br />

61 0.96 -1.44<br />

62 0.92 -1.52<br />

63 0.88 -1.60<br />

64 0.84 -1.68<br />

65 0.80 -1.76<br />

66 0.76 -1.84<br />

67 0.72 -1.92<br />

68 0.68 -2.00<br />

69 0.64 -2.08<br />

70 0.60 -2.16<br />

71 0.56 -2.24<br />

72 0.52 -2.32<br />

73 0.48 -2.40<br />

Chapter 12 − Markets with Power 19


Answers to the Cartel Game (class of 36 students):<br />

4A: 36 (where MC ≈ MR, .50 ≈ .56)<br />

4B: 36 × ($1.96 − $.50) = $52.56<br />

4C: $ 52.56/36 = $1.46 (assuming each firm produces 1 unit)<br />

5: (Will students maintain implicit collusion, and make profits? Or will individuals, especially when anonymous,<br />

“defect” and produce 2 units, driving down the price? )<br />

Chapter 12 − Markets with Power 20


The Grading Game<br />

a) suppose that I graded using a hard-core curve. 1/10 of the students get an "A"; 2/10 get "B";<br />

4/10 get "C"; 2/10 get "D"; and 1/10 get "F"<br />

b) Suppose that one’s relative grade reflects both relative preexisting talent, luck, and relative<br />

effort.<br />

c) Since we don’t have any control over talent or luck, if people want higher grades, they need<br />

to work harder.<br />

d) the problem is that there’s a limited number of As and Bs, so that the students are all<br />

competing over them. If I work hard and move up to an A, then someone else is pushed<br />

down.<br />

e) thus, there's an incentive for the students to restrict their efforts. If everyone colludes to not<br />

work very hard, you'd still see pretty much the same distribution of grades as when<br />

everybody works hard. The benefit is that less effort is needed, though less economics is<br />

learned. If grades are all that's important to you, then the latter is unimportant.<br />

f) the problem of free riders can undermine the attainment of the collective good. These are<br />

students who either care about the grade enough that they are willing to take advantage of<br />

their fellow students by working more than agreed upon, in order to rise in the ranks. Or<br />

these students might really want to learn economics.<br />

g) a well-organized cartel of students could make sure that free riders don't cheat. They could<br />

throw big parties the night before the exam and make sure that everyone attends. Perhaps<br />

punish the ones who "free ride" on the rest.<br />

Chapter 12 − Markets with Power 21

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