The Letter - Bordier & Cie
The Letter - Bordier & Cie
The Letter - Bordier & Cie
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Letter</strong><br />
______________________<br />
Number II – 2009<br />
B ORDIER & C IE<br />
Banquiers privés depuis 1844
Preamble: Economic scenario<br />
•<br />
•<br />
•<br />
Growth<br />
Rates<br />
Currencies<br />
Hedging against<br />
future infl ation<br />
1. Introduction: anticipation is vital<br />
2. Gold<br />
3. Commodities<br />
4. Property<br />
5. Equities<br />
6. Focus on infl ation and growth<br />
7. Infl ation-linked government bonds<br />
8. Conclusion: it will soon be time to buy infl ation-linked<br />
bonds
Economic scenario<br />
Growth<br />
In the United States, the ISM manufacturing and services indexes<br />
have become slightly more encouraging, as are most of the Fed’s regional<br />
surveys. <strong>The</strong> weakness of housing investment is beginning to<br />
spread to other sectors. Consumers will have to contend with two<br />
problems: fi rstly, the steep rise in unemployment and an inadequate<br />
savings rate; secondly, the house price bubble which gave homeowners<br />
the impression of being rich has burst, to judge by the stocks of<br />
houses for sale with no buyers forthcoming. Recession in 2009: -2.5<br />
to -2.9%. In the euro zone, the EU Commission’s global index of<br />
economic sentiment and the IFO index of German industrial confi -<br />
dence remain at very low levels. <strong>The</strong>re is no longer any growth driver.<br />
Household morale is too low to expect any signifi cant rebound of<br />
consumer spending. <strong>The</strong> recession is likely to reach -2.4 to -2.8% in<br />
2009 if the euro remains stable. In Japan, core CPI suggests incipient<br />
defl ation and the GDP defl ator remains in negative territory; Japan is<br />
at risk of another period of defl ation. <strong>The</strong> future is still looking bleak<br />
with a confi rmed downturn of exports to all the Asian countries and<br />
the United States, while consumer spending is not getting off the<br />
ground as yet. Capital spending by corporations is collapsing. <strong>The</strong><br />
recession will be in the order of -5.4 to -5.8% in 2009.<br />
Rates<br />
In the United States, the Fed funds target rate was cut by 500 basis<br />
points between September 2007 and 16 December last. <strong>The</strong> Fed is<br />
fi ghting hard against recession; the collapse of the oil price is also<br />
generating rapid disinfl ation and some observers are already predicting<br />
defl ation. <strong>The</strong> Fed has put in place a programme to buy up treasury<br />
bonds on the secondary market in order to hold yields down to<br />
a fairly low level. In Europe, the ECB was obliged to act in the light<br />
of the onset of recession and the fi nancial crisis by cutting its base<br />
rate to 1% on 7 May last. <strong>The</strong> ECB has also decided to buy up securitized<br />
bonds of the “Pfandbrief” (mortgage bond) type in a programme<br />
2<br />
which may involve expenditure of as much as EUR 60 billion. Ten-<br />
year bond yields may rise to 4% before the year is out. In Japan, the<br />
BoJ has to all intents and purposes reverted to its zero interest rate<br />
policy by cutting its base rate to 0.1% on 19 December last. Ten-year<br />
JGB yields may rise to 1.8% in 2009.<br />
Currencies<br />
<strong>The</strong> USD index gained 21% between March 2008 and March 2009.<br />
<strong>The</strong> main factors cited to explain this strong upturn are: a sharp recovery<br />
of the trade balance, reversal of the commodity price trend,<br />
together with the determination shown by the Fed and Treasury to<br />
rescue some fi nancial institutions, foremost among them Bear Stearns,<br />
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. <strong>The</strong> rise of the dollar seems to have<br />
run out of steam. Investors are now focussing again on the double<br />
defi cit (balance of payments on current account with a defi cit equivalent<br />
to as much as 5% of GDP, galloping deterioration of the budget<br />
balance running at 12.9% of GDP for the 2008/2009 fi nancial year).<br />
Even if the ECB’s base rates remain above those of the Fed and the<br />
recession in the euro zone is likely to be very much in line with that<br />
of the United States this year, we still believe that the euro hit a lasting<br />
high at USD 1.55 to 1.59 in March 2008. This year’s trading range will<br />
be 1.25 to 1.35. For the past two years, the yen has been a victim of<br />
excessively low short-term rates which encouraged carry trade transactions<br />
(borrowing in yen to invest elsewhere) by foreign investors. This<br />
practice disappeared with the onset of the subprime loans fi nancial crisis<br />
which generated risk aversion. <strong>The</strong> yen has therefore gained fresh<br />
vigour, rising from 110 to 96 per USD since early August 2008. We<br />
now expect a trading range of 95 to 105 for the rest of the year. <strong>The</strong><br />
GBP bottomed out last January. <strong>The</strong> SNB is determined to maintain<br />
a parity of CHF 1.50 to 1 euro.<br />
3
How to hedge<br />
against future infl ation<br />
1. Introduction: anticipation is vital<br />
2. Gold<br />
3. Commodities<br />
4. Property<br />
5. Equities<br />
6. Focus on infl ation and growth<br />
7. Infl ation-linked government bonds<br />
8. Conclusion: it will soon be time to buy infl ation-linked bonds<br />
1. Introduction : anticipation is vital<br />
United States, euro zone, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Japan: deep<br />
recession is everywhere. Back in July 2008 observers had still been<br />
forecasting the risk of stagfl ation with a barrel of crude priced at<br />
USD 150, but in the meantime many countries have either gone into<br />
defl ation or are about to do so. <strong>The</strong>n again the property crisis in<br />
the United States has caused a serious deterioration of bank balance<br />
sheets on both sides of the Atlantic.<br />
To fi ght the fi nancial crisis and recession, the central banks have<br />
cut their base rates to historically low levels, close to zero. As this<br />
did not seem enough to drag us out of the crisis, the central banks<br />
have even begun to practice quantitative easing policies, by which<br />
is meant that they are buying up massive quantities of government<br />
bonds, commercial paper or property-backed securities (commonly<br />
known as toxic assets). All of these purchases are helping to swell<br />
money supply hugely and in fact represent a return to the old habit<br />
of printing new bank notes. In the course of history that practice<br />
has always preceded bouts of infl ation; infl ation therefore awaits us<br />
4<br />
round the corner, sooner or later. To hedge against infl ation, economic<br />
literature identifi es gold, commodities, property and equities;<br />
more recently, infl ation-linked issues have made their appearance on<br />
the bond market.<br />
Our approach in this article will be to study the performance of<br />
these different vehicles in relation to the consumer price index in the<br />
United States (the familiar CPI) over a period of forty years in principle.<br />
We will endeavour to refi ne our analysis by looking at six periods<br />
typifi ed by different levels of infl ation, with an imminent or existing<br />
recession or on the contrary a period of vigorous growth. We have<br />
focussed on the United States because that country has the benefi t of<br />
long statistical series.<br />
15<br />
10<br />
5<br />
0<br />
8<br />
6<br />
4<br />
2<br />
0<br />
INFLATION IN THE UNITED STATES YEAR ON YEAR VARIATION<br />
FROM 01/01/69 TO 31/12/78 15 15 FROM 01/01/79 TO 31/12/88<br />
69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78<br />
FROM 01/01/89 TO 31/12/98<br />
89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98<br />
8<br />
6<br />
4<br />
2<br />
0<br />
10<br />
5<br />
0<br />
5<br />
10<br />
6<br />
4<br />
2<br />
0<br />
-2<br />
5<br />
0<br />
79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88<br />
SINCE 01/01/99<br />
99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09<br />
15<br />
10<br />
5<br />
0<br />
6<br />
4<br />
2<br />
0<br />
-2<br />
Source: Thomson Datastream
200<br />
150<br />
100<br />
INDEXED INFLATION IN THE UNITED STATES<br />
FROM 01/01/69 TO 31/12/78 200 180 FROM 01/01/79 TO 31/12/88<br />
50<br />
69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78<br />
US CPI - ALL URBAN SAMPLE: ALL I<br />
140<br />
130<br />
120<br />
110<br />
100<br />
90<br />
FROM 01/01/89 TO 31/12/98<br />
89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98<br />
US CPI - ALL URBAN SAMPLE: ALL I<br />
150<br />
100<br />
50<br />
140<br />
130<br />
120<br />
110<br />
100<br />
90<br />
6<br />
160<br />
140<br />
120<br />
100<br />
140<br />
130<br />
120<br />
110<br />
100<br />
80<br />
79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88<br />
US CPI - ALL URBAN SAMPLE: ALL<br />
90<br />
SINCE 01/01/99<br />
99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09<br />
US CPI - ALL URBAN SAMPLE: ALL I<br />
180<br />
160<br />
140<br />
120<br />
100<br />
80<br />
140<br />
130<br />
120<br />
110<br />
100<br />
90<br />
Source: Thomson Datastream<br />
<strong>The</strong> CPI rose by 490% over the period covered by our study with<br />
steep infl ation in the 70s and 80s, reaching a peak of 15% in 1980.<br />
2. Gold<br />
INDEX-LINKED INFLATION AND OUNCE OF GOLD INDEXED SINCE 19/03/73<br />
1400<br />
1200<br />
1000<br />
800<br />
600<br />
400<br />
200<br />
0<br />
73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09<br />
US CPI - ALL URBAN SAMPLE: ALL ITEMS NADJ<br />
Gold Bullion LBM U$/Troy Ounce<br />
1400<br />
1200<br />
1000<br />
800<br />
600<br />
400<br />
200<br />
Source: Thomson Datastream<br />
0<br />
<strong>The</strong> chart for gold begins on 19 March 1973, a historical date on<br />
which a majority of major developed countries decided to allow their<br />
exchange rates to fl oat freely. On that day one ounce of gold was<br />
priced at USD 81.70. If you were clever enough to buy 100 ounces<br />
of gold on 20 March 1973 at a price of USD 8,170, your investment<br />
would now (18.05.2009) be worth USD 93,000, a multiple of 11.4 as<br />
against infl ation multiplied by 3.9 over the same period.<br />
However, it would be wrong to reach a hasty conclusion. If you had<br />
been ill-advised enough to buy your 100 ounces of gold in January<br />
1980 (average price for the month USD 660, peaking at USD 835 on<br />
18 January), your investment of USD 66,000 would have been multiplied<br />
by just 1.41, while infl ation rose by a factor of 3.5 between<br />
31.12.1979 and 30.04.2009. What is more in the 1990s gold seriously<br />
underperformed infl ation with -30% for gold against infl ation at<br />
+35%. <strong>The</strong> buyer of gold must therefore adopt a very long-term buy<br />
and hold strategy; although such a strategy may well be suitable for a<br />
pension fund, it is unlikely to suit an individual saver.<br />
In our opinion, using gold to hedge against infl ation is heavily dependent<br />
on the right buy timing, which is hard to determine.<br />
3. Commodities<br />
We will take three examples: the index of farm prices and metal prices<br />
over forty years, together with the price of oil since its fi rst inclusion<br />
in the Datastream database on 05.02.1982.<br />
7
600<br />
550<br />
500<br />
450<br />
400<br />
350<br />
300<br />
250<br />
200<br />
150<br />
100<br />
50<br />
INDEX-LINKED INFLATION IN THE UNITED STATES<br />
AND INDEX-LINKED SPOT FARM PRICE<br />
70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08<br />
US CPI - ALL URBAN SAMPLE: ALL ITEMS NADJ<br />
S&P GSCI Agriculturl Spot - PRICE INDEX<br />
900<br />
800<br />
700<br />
600<br />
500<br />
400<br />
300<br />
200<br />
100<br />
0<br />
INDEX-LINKED INFLATION AND CRB SPOT METALS INDEX<br />
8<br />
600<br />
550<br />
500<br />
450<br />
400<br />
350<br />
300<br />
250<br />
200<br />
150<br />
100<br />
50<br />
Source: Thomson Datastream<br />
69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09<br />
US CPI - ALL URBAN SAMPLE: ALL ITEMS NADJ<br />
CRB Spot Index Metals - PRICE INDEX<br />
900<br />
800<br />
700<br />
600<br />
500<br />
400<br />
300<br />
200<br />
100<br />
Source: Thomson Datastream<br />
0<br />
INDEX-LINKED INFLATION AND INDEX-LINKED PRICE PER BARREL OF OIL<br />
450<br />
400<br />
350<br />
300<br />
250<br />
200<br />
150<br />
100<br />
50<br />
0<br />
82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08<br />
US CPI - ALL URBAN SAMPLE: ALL ITEMS NADJ<br />
Crude Oil-WTI Near Month FOB U$/BBL<br />
9<br />
450<br />
400<br />
350<br />
300<br />
250<br />
200<br />
150<br />
100<br />
50<br />
Source: Thomson Datastream<br />
Farm prices are extremely volatile. Quite recently, the spot farm price<br />
index rose from 214 in August 2006 to 483 in June 2008 (+116%), before<br />
falling back to 247 in December 2008 (down 49% in six months).<br />
Especially between 1982 and the present day farm prices have completely<br />
failed to keep pace with the rate of infl ation.<br />
<strong>The</strong> industrial metals index did not beat infl ation at any time between<br />
1981 and 2004. <strong>The</strong> price of metals took off between 2006 and early<br />
2008 before suddenly falling back; index on 31.12.2005: 260, index<br />
on 04.05.2007: 476 (+83%), index on 19.12.2008: 167 (-65%). Here<br />
again we are confronted with steep price volatility and the opportunity<br />
of beating infl ation existed for two years only.<br />
<strong>The</strong> performance of the West Texas barrel price has been still more<br />
disappointing; this protection against infl ation only functioned between<br />
early 2007 and autumn 2008 under conditions of extreme volatility<br />
with the barrel price rising from USD 38 on 18.01.2007 to 144<br />
on 11.07.2008 (+279%), going on to fall back to 36 on 26.12.2008<br />
(-75%). Once again, excellent timing is imperative to buy crude oil as<br />
a hedge against infl ation.<br />
0
4. Property<br />
INDEX-LINKED INFLATION AND INDEX-LINKED HOUSE PRICES OVER 40 YEARS<br />
1100<br />
1000<br />
900<br />
800<br />
700<br />
600<br />
500<br />
400<br />
300<br />
200<br />
100<br />
0<br />
69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09<br />
US CPI - ALL URBAN SAMPLE: ALL ITEMS NADJ<br />
US MEDIAN PRICE OF EXISTING ONE-FAMILY HOMES SOLD CURN<br />
Over forty years, the trend of house prices has easily beaten infl ation,<br />
despite the correction which began in 2005 and currently stands<br />
at around 27%. Analysis of each ten-year tranche shows that house<br />
prices either beat or equal infl ation.<br />
10<br />
1100<br />
1000<br />
900<br />
800<br />
700<br />
600<br />
500<br />
400<br />
300<br />
200<br />
100<br />
Source: Thomson Datastream<br />
INDEX-LINKED INFLATION IN THE USA AND INDEX-LINKED MEDIAN HOUSE<br />
PRICE<br />
250 FROM 01/01/69 TO 31/12/78<br />
250 180 FROM 01/01/79 TO 31/12/88 180<br />
200<br />
150<br />
100<br />
50<br />
69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78<br />
US CPI - ALL URBAN SAMPLE: ALL I<br />
US MEDIAN PRICE OF EXISTING ONE-<br />
160<br />
140<br />
120<br />
100<br />
80<br />
FROM 01/01/89 TO 31/12/98<br />
89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98<br />
US CPI - ALL URBAN SAMPLE: ALL I<br />
US MEDIAN PRICE OF EXISTING ONE-<br />
200<br />
150<br />
100<br />
50<br />
160<br />
140<br />
120<br />
100<br />
80<br />
160<br />
140<br />
120<br />
100<br />
80<br />
79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88<br />
US CPI - ALL URBAN SAMPLE: ALL<br />
US MEDIAN PRICE OF EXISTING ONE<br />
180<br />
160<br />
140<br />
120<br />
100<br />
80<br />
SINCE 01/01/99<br />
99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09<br />
US CPI - ALL URBAN SAMPLE: ALL I<br />
US MEDIAN PRICE OF EXISTING ONE-<br />
160<br />
140<br />
120<br />
100<br />
80<br />
180<br />
160<br />
140<br />
120<br />
100<br />
80<br />
Source: Thomson Datastream<br />
0<br />
300<br />
280<br />
260<br />
240<br />
220<br />
200<br />
180<br />
160<br />
140<br />
120<br />
100<br />
GREAT BRITAIN: INFLATION AND INDEX-LINKED HOUSE PRICES<br />
80<br />
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009<br />
UK CPI-HARMONISED EUROPEAN UNION BASIS EST.D PRE-97 2005=100<br />
UK HALIFAX HOUSE PRICE INDEX - NEW HOUSES<br />
UK HALIFAX HOUSE PRICE INDEX - EXISTING HOUSES<br />
150<br />
140<br />
130<br />
120<br />
110<br />
100<br />
90<br />
80<br />
GREAT BRITAIN: INFLATION AND INDEX-LINKED HOUSE PRICES<br />
300<br />
280<br />
260<br />
240<br />
220<br />
200<br />
180<br />
160<br />
140<br />
120<br />
100<br />
80<br />
Source: Thomson Datastream<br />
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998<br />
UK CPI-HARMONISED EUROPEAN UNION BASIS EST.D PRE-97 2005=100<br />
UK HALIFAX HOUSE PRICE INDEX - NEW HOUSES<br />
UK HALIFAX HOUSE PRICE INDEX - EXISTING HOUSES<br />
150<br />
140<br />
130<br />
120<br />
110<br />
100<br />
90<br />
80<br />
Source: Thomson Datastream<br />
Looking now at Great Britain, the situation is more complex. Since<br />
1999, house prices have easily beaten infl ation despite a sharp correction.<br />
On the other hand, between 1989 and 1999 infl ation rose by<br />
30% more than house prices.<br />
11
This means that house prices are distinctly less volatile than those of<br />
commodities, but investors must not buy property during a speculative<br />
price bubble.<br />
5. Equities<br />
In principle, the equity market does not like infl ation; this is because<br />
PER (price/earnings ratio) fi gures narrow when infl ation is high; conversely<br />
PERs widen when infl ation is very low.<br />
How can this ratio between PER and infl ation be explained? Acceleration<br />
of infl ation will encourage the central bank to raise its base<br />
rate. High interest rates make the fi nancing of heavily indebted corporations<br />
more diffi cult in cash fl ow terms.<br />
16<br />
14<br />
12<br />
10<br />
8<br />
6<br />
4<br />
2<br />
0<br />
-2<br />
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INFLATION AND PER<br />
69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09<br />
CPI VAR. 1 AN<br />
S&P 500 COMPOSITE - PER(R.H.SCALE)<br />
Source: Thomson Datastream<br />
However, some economists maintain that during periods of high infl<br />
ation, companies are able to increase their invoiced prices faster than<br />
before, in other words pricing power rises; this is good for profi ts.<br />
12<br />
45<br />
40<br />
35<br />
30<br />
25<br />
20<br />
15<br />
10<br />
5<br />
For the record, Anglo-Saxon investors were greatly infl uenced by a<br />
book written by Jeremy Siegel, a professor of fi nance at Pennsylvania<br />
University, entitled “Stocks for the Long Run” published for the fi rst<br />
time in 1994. In the main, beginning his research in 1802 (sic), Siegel<br />
claims that for 190 years (re-sic), equities brought a return on investment<br />
which beat infl ation by an average of 6.5 to 7%.<br />
For the time being, we will simply examine what has happened in the<br />
past forty years.<br />
1600<br />
1400<br />
1200<br />
1000<br />
800<br />
600<br />
400<br />
200<br />
0<br />
INDEX-LINKED INFLATION IN THE UNITED STATES<br />
AND S&P 500 INDEXED OVER 40 YEARS<br />
69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09<br />
US CPI - ALL URBAN SAMPLE: ALL ITEMS NADJ<br />
S&P 500 COMPOSITE - PRICE INDEX<br />
13<br />
1600<br />
1400<br />
1200<br />
1000<br />
800<br />
600<br />
400<br />
200<br />
Source: Thomson Datastream<br />
<strong>The</strong> S&P 500 easily beats infl ation despite the correction in 2000-<br />
2003 and despite the more recent correction which has been under<br />
way since 2007.<br />
0
6. Focus on infl ation and growth<br />
6.1 Period 1972-1974<br />
130<br />
125<br />
120<br />
115<br />
110<br />
105<br />
100<br />
95<br />
INFLATION<br />
OUNCE OF GOLD (R.H.SCALE)<br />
METALS INDEX (R.H.SCALE)<br />
FOCUS ON 1972-1974<br />
1972 1973 1974<br />
14<br />
FARM PRICE INDEX (R.H.SCALE)<br />
HOUSE PRICES (R.H.SCALE)<br />
450<br />
400<br />
350<br />
300<br />
250<br />
200<br />
150<br />
100<br />
S&P 500(R.H.SCALE) Source: Thomson Datastream<br />
Infl ation climbed by 26% over a three-year period. Year on year,<br />
growth moved from 7.5% in early 1973 to -2% at the end of 1974.<br />
Commodities and property have made faster gains than infl ation,<br />
while the equity market which correctly anticipated the recession reported<br />
disastrous performance.<br />
50<br />
6.2 Period 1977-1979<br />
135<br />
130<br />
125<br />
120<br />
115<br />
110<br />
105<br />
100<br />
95<br />
INFLATION<br />
OUNCE OF GOLD (R.H.SCALE)<br />
METALS INDEX (R.H.SCALE)<br />
FOCUS ON 1977-1979<br />
1977 1978 1979<br />
15<br />
FARM PRICE INDEX (R.H.SCALE)<br />
HOUSE PRICES (R.H.SCALE)<br />
400<br />
350<br />
300<br />
250<br />
200<br />
150<br />
100<br />
S&P 500(R.H.SCALE) Source: Thomson Datastream<br />
Infl ation climbed by 30% over three years. Growth slipped from 7%<br />
in late 1978 to -1.5% in the autumn. Gold easily beats infl ation, commodities<br />
and property are practically on an equal footing, while the<br />
equity market which held up well remained stable and was therefore<br />
outstripped by 30% by infl ation.<br />
50
6.3 Period 1987-1990<br />
125<br />
120<br />
115<br />
110<br />
105<br />
100<br />
95<br />
FOCUS ON 1987-1990<br />
1987 1988 1989 1990<br />
INFLATION<br />
OUNCE OF GOLD (R.H.SCALE)<br />
METALS INDEX (R.H.SCALE)<br />
FARM PRICE INDEX (R.H.SCALE)<br />
HOUSE PRICES (R.H.SCALE)<br />
180<br />
170<br />
160<br />
150<br />
140<br />
130<br />
120<br />
110<br />
100<br />
S&P 500(R.H.SCALE) Source: Thomson Datastream<br />
Infl ation advanced by 19% over the four-year period. Growth was<br />
in the range of 2.5% to 4.25% between 1987 and early 1990, before<br />
turning negative in early 1991. <strong>The</strong> economic trend during this period<br />
may be described as moderate stagfl ation. In this environment,<br />
equities held up well, while infl ation was 30% higher than the price<br />
of gold.<br />
16<br />
90<br />
80<br />
6.4 Period 1997-1999<br />
106<br />
105<br />
104<br />
103<br />
102<br />
101<br />
100<br />
99<br />
INFLATION<br />
OUNCE OF GOLD (R.H.SCALE)<br />
METALS INDEX (R.H.SCALE)<br />
FOCUS ON 1997-1999<br />
1997 1998 1999<br />
FARM PRICE INDEX (R.H.SCALE)<br />
HOUSE PRICES (R.H.SCALE)<br />
200<br />
180<br />
160<br />
140<br />
120<br />
100<br />
S&P 500(R.H.SCALE) Source: Thomson Datastream<br />
This was a dream period with infl ation running at less than 6% over<br />
the two years and average growth in the order of 4%. Commodities<br />
were beaten heavily by infl ation, while property gained in relation to<br />
infl ation and the equity market took off by an impressive 90%.<br />
17<br />
80<br />
60
6.5 Period 2004-2006<br />
112<br />
110<br />
108<br />
106<br />
104<br />
102<br />
100<br />
98<br />
INFLATION<br />
OUNCE OF GOLD (R.H.SCALE)<br />
METALS INDEX (R.H.SCALE)<br />
FOCUS ON 2004-2006<br />
2004 2005 2006<br />
FARM PRICE INDEX (R.H.SCALE)<br />
HOUSE PRICE(R.H.SCALE)<br />
260<br />
240<br />
220<br />
200<br />
180<br />
160<br />
140<br />
120<br />
100<br />
S&P 500(R.H.SCALE) Source: Thomson Datastream<br />
Infl ation rose by 9% over a two-year period. Growth slipped gradually<br />
from 4.1% to 2.4%. <strong>The</strong> recession to come was not yet perceptible.<br />
A new factor now came onto the scene: the ferocious appetite<br />
of the emerging countries, especially China, for commodities. All the<br />
forms of hedging easily beat infl ation, including equities, with a special<br />
mention for industrial metals and gold.<br />
7. Infl ation-linked Government bonds<br />
<strong>The</strong> number of States which offer at least one infl ation-linked bond<br />
traded on the bond market is limited and currently stands at twelve.<br />
<strong>The</strong> fi rst market for infl ation-linked state bonds was opened by Great<br />
Britain in 1981, in particular to strengthen the government’s credibility<br />
in its fi ght against infl ation at a time when this was particularly<br />
high.<br />
<strong>The</strong> basic principle of an index-linked bond is to vary the value of<br />
18<br />
80<br />
60<br />
the coupons and redemption of the principal in the light of the trend<br />
of a reference infl ation index.<br />
<strong>The</strong>re are three important variables which differ from one issuing<br />
country to another:<br />
• <strong>The</strong> frequency of the coupon which may be quarterly, halfyearly<br />
or annual.<br />
• <strong>The</strong> monthly or quarterly reference infl ation rate which will<br />
infl uence the price of the bond on the secondary market.<br />
• <strong>The</strong> existence or otherwise of a redemption guarantee at par<br />
for the principal in the event of defl ation.<br />
Because of the hedge against the infl ation risk, the indexed bond<br />
has a signifi cantly lower nominal coupon than that of a conventional<br />
bond with an equivalent time to maturity (see the example below of<br />
cash fl ow simulation).<br />
In the United States, the Treasury Department issued the fi rst loan indexed<br />
on the Consumer Price Index (CPI) on 29 January 1997; this type<br />
of loan has been called Treasury Infl ation-Protection Securities (TIPS).<br />
<strong>The</strong> index-linked coupons are paid every six months and a guarantee<br />
on redemption of the principal in the event of defl ation is provided.<br />
In France, the Government issued for the fi rst time on 15 September<br />
1998 a bond Obligation Assimilable du Trésor (OAT) indexed on<br />
the national rate of infl ation (OATi), this being calculated excluding<br />
the tobacco price. In October 2001, the State issued an OAT€i, with<br />
the harmonized price index for the euro zone as its reference index.<br />
To illustrate the difference between the cash fl ow generated by a conventional<br />
bond and an infl ation-linked bond we have designed a simplifi<br />
ed example: during the ten year lifetime, linear infl ation of 2%<br />
per year, with an annual coupon, no reinvestment of the coupons<br />
paid, nominal rate of 4% for a conventional OAT, an initial nominal<br />
19
ate of 2.5% for an OATi, both issues being kept until maturity and<br />
having a principal sum of EUR 10,000.<br />
Cash-fl ow of the conventional bond:<br />
• 10 coupons of EUR 400 = EUR 4000<br />
• Redemption of the principal EUR 10,000<br />
• Loss on the principal because of aggregate infl ation of 21.9%<br />
= EUR 2190<br />
• Result of the investment EUR 14,000 – EUR 2190 =<br />
EUR 11,810.<br />
Cash-fl ow of the index-linked issue:<br />
• 10 indexed coupons ranging from EUR 256.25 in the fi rst year<br />
to EUR 320 in the tenth year = EUR 2870.80<br />
• Redemption of the principal at EUR 12,190<br />
• Result of the investment EUR 12,190 + EUR 2870.80 =<br />
EUR 15,060.80<br />
Clearly, the higher the rate of infl ation the more advantageous it will<br />
be to hold index-linked bond issues.<br />
114<br />
112<br />
110<br />
108<br />
106<br />
104<br />
102<br />
100<br />
98<br />
COMPARATIVE TREND OF PRICES OF AN OAT AND OATI<br />
96<br />
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009<br />
OAT FRANCE 2003 4% 25/04/13 - DEFAULT PRICE<br />
OAT-I FRANCE 2003 2 1/2% 25/07/13 INDXLK. - DEFAULT PRICE<br />
20<br />
114<br />
112<br />
110<br />
108<br />
106<br />
104<br />
102<br />
100<br />
98<br />
96<br />
Source: Thomson Datastream<br />
8. Conclusion: it will soon be time to buy infl ation-linked<br />
bond issues<br />
Gold provides a long-term hedge against infl ation, but buy timing<br />
is vitally important. Moreover the two steep rises in the gold price<br />
are not due solely to infl ation because the fi rst was set in motion by<br />
the hostage taking in Teheran which sparked off an oil price shock,<br />
followed by infl ation, while the second was motivated by economic<br />
euphoria and then by the crisis of the American banking system. In<br />
view of the recent gold price trend we believe that an investor who<br />
buys gold now would be taking a very bold step.<br />
Commodities are an appropriate way of hedging against infl ation at<br />
a time when it is accelerating. <strong>The</strong>y are at one and the same time the<br />
cause and the consequence of infl ation. However, their price trend<br />
depends on factors which have little to do with infl ation: fl oods,<br />
droughts, extremely high growth in some emerging crises, geopolitical<br />
crises, inadequate relationship between supply and demand on<br />
some markets.<br />
Property certainly provides good protection against infl ation unless<br />
it is acquired during a speculative bubble. However, property is an<br />
asset which lacks liquidity and for family or other reasons it is often<br />
hard to take the profi ts on such an asset.<br />
<strong>The</strong> debate over equities as a vehicle to fi ght infl ation is still open.<br />
To overcome the obstacle of narrowing PERs and rising interest rates<br />
against a background of steep infl ation, stock picking would seem<br />
to be vital; of course we must identify companies which manage to<br />
pass on price rises. Equities are the best asset in periods of economic<br />
growth with low infl ation.<br />
Infl ation-linked bonds by their very nature provide effective protection<br />
against infl ation and enable the investor to avoid damage<br />
caused by infl ation which the bond market has not anticipated cor-<br />
21
ectly. Unlike real property for instance this is a highly liquid asset<br />
even if many investors adopt a buy and hold strategy on these bonds.<br />
Unfortunately, the Swiss Confederation has not yet issued an infl ation-linked<br />
bond; this creates an exchange risk for a Swiss resident<br />
who buys TIPS or OATi.<br />
22<br />
Jacques Nicola / CP / May 2009
WE ARE AT YOUR DISPOSAL<br />
PARTNERS Pierre PONCET<br />
Gaétan BORDIER<br />
Grégoire BORDIER<br />
EXECUTIVE BOARD David HOLZER<br />
Michel JUVET<br />
François KOESSLER<br />
INVESTMENT MANAGERS<br />
Adrien BALZLI<br />
Bernard CHOLLET, Nyon<br />
Bertrand CLAVIEN<br />
Roman DOUBROVKINE<br />
Martin DURST, Zürich<br />
Niloufar EGHTEDAR<br />
Michael EGLI, Bern<br />
Sébastien GIOVANNA, Zürich<br />
Joseph GOMEZ<br />
Véronique GROSSEN<br />
Markus HAUSHERR, Zürich<br />
Carine IMHOF<br />
Frank ISOZ<br />
François JACOBI<br />
Eric JOYAU<br />
Patrice LAGNAUX, Zürich<br />
Bernadette LARDI<br />
Hubert LECLERC<br />
Ruth MERCIER, Nyon<br />
Manuel MORA<br />
Ernest MORGELI, Nyon<br />
René MOZER<br />
Philippe NABAA<br />
Lisa NATALINI TISSOT, Nyon<br />
Thierry PERRET<br />
Daniel ROTH, Bern<br />
Philippe RUDLOFF<br />
Stephan SCHNYDER, Bern<br />
Aloïs SOMMER, Zürich<br />
Patrick STOCKHAMMER<br />
Masaki TSUNOOKA<br />
EXTERNAL MANAGERS DEPARTMENT Pierre-Louis CHARDIER<br />
FINANCIAL RESEARCH Rafaël ANCHISI<br />
Loïc BHEND<br />
Pascale BOYER BARRESI<br />
Christophe LABORDE<br />
Nicolas MASSON<br />
Jacques NICOLA<br />
Daniel PELLET<br />
Frédéric POTELLE<br />
MARKETING Radan STATKOW<br />
Camille BORDIER<br />
LEGAL AND TAX ADVICE Dominique FELLAY<br />
Jérôme MACHEREL<br />
ACCOUNTING/CREDITS Veronica VERDIAL<br />
FOREIGN EXCHANGE & TREASURY Juan-Luis CALERO<br />
CAPITAL MARKETS Reynald DUCOMMUN<br />
BANKING SERVICE Didier GRANDJEAN<br />
TRANSFERS Yves FOURNET<br />
CASHIER Jean-Marc SCHWAB
Head Offi ce<br />
<strong>Bordier</strong> & <strong>Cie</strong><br />
Rue de Hollande 16<br />
CP 5515<br />
CH - 1211 Genève 11<br />
T. +41 22 317 12 12<br />
F. +41 22 311 29 73<br />
Swift BORD CH GG<br />
www.bordier.com<br />
research@bordier.com<br />
Representative offi ce in Berne<br />
<strong>Bordier</strong> & <strong>Cie</strong><br />
Zeughausgasse 28<br />
Postfach 213<br />
CH - 3000 Bern 7<br />
T. +41 31 313 12 12<br />
F. +41 31 313 12 00<br />
bern@bordier.com<br />
Representative offi ce in Zürich<br />
<strong>Bordier</strong> & <strong>Cie</strong><br />
Bahnhofstrasse 62<br />
CH - 8001 Zürich<br />
T. +41 44 213 12 12<br />
F. +41 44 213 12 00<br />
zurich@bordier.com<br />
Representative offi ce in Nyon<br />
<strong>Bordier</strong> & <strong>Cie</strong><br />
Rue de la Porcelaine 13<br />
CP 1045<br />
CH - 1260 Nyon<br />
T. +41 22 317 70 50<br />
F. +41 22 362 04 68<br />
nyon@bordier.com