26.10.2012 Views

The Letter - Bordier & Cie

The Letter - Bordier & Cie

The Letter - Bordier & Cie

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Letter</strong><br />

______________________<br />

Number II – 2009<br />

B ORDIER & C IE<br />

Banquiers privés depuis 1844


Preamble: Economic scenario<br />

•<br />

•<br />

•<br />

Growth<br />

Rates<br />

Currencies<br />

Hedging against<br />

future infl ation<br />

1. Introduction: anticipation is vital<br />

2. Gold<br />

3. Commodities<br />

4. Property<br />

5. Equities<br />

6. Focus on infl ation and growth<br />

7. Infl ation-linked government bonds<br />

8. Conclusion: it will soon be time to buy infl ation-linked<br />

bonds


Economic scenario<br />

Growth<br />

In the United States, the ISM manufacturing and services indexes<br />

have become slightly more encouraging, as are most of the Fed’s regional<br />

surveys. <strong>The</strong> weakness of housing investment is beginning to<br />

spread to other sectors. Consumers will have to contend with two<br />

problems: fi rstly, the steep rise in unemployment and an inadequate<br />

savings rate; secondly, the house price bubble which gave homeowners<br />

the impression of being rich has burst, to judge by the stocks of<br />

houses for sale with no buyers forthcoming. Recession in 2009: -2.5<br />

to -2.9%. In the euro zone, the EU Commission’s global index of<br />

economic sentiment and the IFO index of German industrial confi -<br />

dence remain at very low levels. <strong>The</strong>re is no longer any growth driver.<br />

Household morale is too low to expect any signifi cant rebound of<br />

consumer spending. <strong>The</strong> recession is likely to reach -2.4 to -2.8% in<br />

2009 if the euro remains stable. In Japan, core CPI suggests incipient<br />

defl ation and the GDP defl ator remains in negative territory; Japan is<br />

at risk of another period of defl ation. <strong>The</strong> future is still looking bleak<br />

with a confi rmed downturn of exports to all the Asian countries and<br />

the United States, while consumer spending is not getting off the<br />

ground as yet. Capital spending by corporations is collapsing. <strong>The</strong><br />

recession will be in the order of -5.4 to -5.8% in 2009.<br />

Rates<br />

In the United States, the Fed funds target rate was cut by 500 basis<br />

points between September 2007 and 16 December last. <strong>The</strong> Fed is<br />

fi ghting hard against recession; the collapse of the oil price is also<br />

generating rapid disinfl ation and some observers are already predicting<br />

defl ation. <strong>The</strong> Fed has put in place a programme to buy up treasury<br />

bonds on the secondary market in order to hold yields down to<br />

a fairly low level. In Europe, the ECB was obliged to act in the light<br />

of the onset of recession and the fi nancial crisis by cutting its base<br />

rate to 1% on 7 May last. <strong>The</strong> ECB has also decided to buy up securitized<br />

bonds of the “Pfandbrief” (mortgage bond) type in a programme<br />

2<br />

which may involve expenditure of as much as EUR 60 billion. Ten-<br />

year bond yields may rise to 4% before the year is out. In Japan, the<br />

BoJ has to all intents and purposes reverted to its zero interest rate<br />

policy by cutting its base rate to 0.1% on 19 December last. Ten-year<br />

JGB yields may rise to 1.8% in 2009.<br />

Currencies<br />

<strong>The</strong> USD index gained 21% between March 2008 and March 2009.<br />

<strong>The</strong> main factors cited to explain this strong upturn are: a sharp recovery<br />

of the trade balance, reversal of the commodity price trend,<br />

together with the determination shown by the Fed and Treasury to<br />

rescue some fi nancial institutions, foremost among them Bear Stearns,<br />

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. <strong>The</strong> rise of the dollar seems to have<br />

run out of steam. Investors are now focussing again on the double<br />

defi cit (balance of payments on current account with a defi cit equivalent<br />

to as much as 5% of GDP, galloping deterioration of the budget<br />

balance running at 12.9% of GDP for the 2008/2009 fi nancial year).<br />

Even if the ECB’s base rates remain above those of the Fed and the<br />

recession in the euro zone is likely to be very much in line with that<br />

of the United States this year, we still believe that the euro hit a lasting<br />

high at USD 1.55 to 1.59 in March 2008. This year’s trading range will<br />

be 1.25 to 1.35. For the past two years, the yen has been a victim of<br />

excessively low short-term rates which encouraged carry trade transactions<br />

(borrowing in yen to invest elsewhere) by foreign investors. This<br />

practice disappeared with the onset of the subprime loans fi nancial crisis<br />

which generated risk aversion. <strong>The</strong> yen has therefore gained fresh<br />

vigour, rising from 110 to 96 per USD since early August 2008. We<br />

now expect a trading range of 95 to 105 for the rest of the year. <strong>The</strong><br />

GBP bottomed out last January. <strong>The</strong> SNB is determined to maintain<br />

a parity of CHF 1.50 to 1 euro.<br />

3


How to hedge<br />

against future infl ation<br />

1. Introduction: anticipation is vital<br />

2. Gold<br />

3. Commodities<br />

4. Property<br />

5. Equities<br />

6. Focus on infl ation and growth<br />

7. Infl ation-linked government bonds<br />

8. Conclusion: it will soon be time to buy infl ation-linked bonds<br />

1. Introduction : anticipation is vital<br />

United States, euro zone, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Japan: deep<br />

recession is everywhere. Back in July 2008 observers had still been<br />

forecasting the risk of stagfl ation with a barrel of crude priced at<br />

USD 150, but in the meantime many countries have either gone into<br />

defl ation or are about to do so. <strong>The</strong>n again the property crisis in<br />

the United States has caused a serious deterioration of bank balance<br />

sheets on both sides of the Atlantic.<br />

To fi ght the fi nancial crisis and recession, the central banks have<br />

cut their base rates to historically low levels, close to zero. As this<br />

did not seem enough to drag us out of the crisis, the central banks<br />

have even begun to practice quantitative easing policies, by which<br />

is meant that they are buying up massive quantities of government<br />

bonds, commercial paper or property-backed securities (commonly<br />

known as toxic assets). All of these purchases are helping to swell<br />

money supply hugely and in fact represent a return to the old habit<br />

of printing new bank notes. In the course of history that practice<br />

has always preceded bouts of infl ation; infl ation therefore awaits us<br />

4<br />

round the corner, sooner or later. To hedge against infl ation, economic<br />

literature identifi es gold, commodities, property and equities;<br />

more recently, infl ation-linked issues have made their appearance on<br />

the bond market.<br />

Our approach in this article will be to study the performance of<br />

these different vehicles in relation to the consumer price index in the<br />

United States (the familiar CPI) over a period of forty years in principle.<br />

We will endeavour to refi ne our analysis by looking at six periods<br />

typifi ed by different levels of infl ation, with an imminent or existing<br />

recession or on the contrary a period of vigorous growth. We have<br />

focussed on the United States because that country has the benefi t of<br />

long statistical series.<br />

15<br />

10<br />

5<br />

0<br />

8<br />

6<br />

4<br />

2<br />

0<br />

INFLATION IN THE UNITED STATES YEAR ON YEAR VARIATION<br />

FROM 01/01/69 TO 31/12/78 15 15 FROM 01/01/79 TO 31/12/88<br />

69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78<br />

FROM 01/01/89 TO 31/12/98<br />

89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98<br />

8<br />

6<br />

4<br />

2<br />

0<br />

10<br />

5<br />

0<br />

5<br />

10<br />

6<br />

4<br />

2<br />

0<br />

-2<br />

5<br />

0<br />

79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88<br />

SINCE 01/01/99<br />

99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09<br />

15<br />

10<br />

5<br />

0<br />

6<br />

4<br />

2<br />

0<br />

-2<br />

Source: Thomson Datastream


200<br />

150<br />

100<br />

INDEXED INFLATION IN THE UNITED STATES<br />

FROM 01/01/69 TO 31/12/78 200 180 FROM 01/01/79 TO 31/12/88<br />

50<br />

69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78<br />

US CPI - ALL URBAN SAMPLE: ALL I<br />

140<br />

130<br />

120<br />

110<br />

100<br />

90<br />

FROM 01/01/89 TO 31/12/98<br />

89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98<br />

US CPI - ALL URBAN SAMPLE: ALL I<br />

150<br />

100<br />

50<br />

140<br />

130<br />

120<br />

110<br />

100<br />

90<br />

6<br />

160<br />

140<br />

120<br />

100<br />

140<br />

130<br />

120<br />

110<br />

100<br />

80<br />

79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88<br />

US CPI - ALL URBAN SAMPLE: ALL<br />

90<br />

SINCE 01/01/99<br />

99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09<br />

US CPI - ALL URBAN SAMPLE: ALL I<br />

180<br />

160<br />

140<br />

120<br />

100<br />

80<br />

140<br />

130<br />

120<br />

110<br />

100<br />

90<br />

Source: Thomson Datastream<br />

<strong>The</strong> CPI rose by 490% over the period covered by our study with<br />

steep infl ation in the 70s and 80s, reaching a peak of 15% in 1980.<br />

2. Gold<br />

INDEX-LINKED INFLATION AND OUNCE OF GOLD INDEXED SINCE 19/03/73<br />

1400<br />

1200<br />

1000<br />

800<br />

600<br />

400<br />

200<br />

0<br />

73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09<br />

US CPI - ALL URBAN SAMPLE: ALL ITEMS NADJ<br />

Gold Bullion LBM U$/Troy Ounce<br />

1400<br />

1200<br />

1000<br />

800<br />

600<br />

400<br />

200<br />

Source: Thomson Datastream<br />

0<br />

<strong>The</strong> chart for gold begins on 19 March 1973, a historical date on<br />

which a majority of major developed countries decided to allow their<br />

exchange rates to fl oat freely. On that day one ounce of gold was<br />

priced at USD 81.70. If you were clever enough to buy 100 ounces<br />

of gold on 20 March 1973 at a price of USD 8,170, your investment<br />

would now (18.05.2009) be worth USD 93,000, a multiple of 11.4 as<br />

against infl ation multiplied by 3.9 over the same period.<br />

However, it would be wrong to reach a hasty conclusion. If you had<br />

been ill-advised enough to buy your 100 ounces of gold in January<br />

1980 (average price for the month USD 660, peaking at USD 835 on<br />

18 January), your investment of USD 66,000 would have been multiplied<br />

by just 1.41, while infl ation rose by a factor of 3.5 between<br />

31.12.1979 and 30.04.2009. What is more in the 1990s gold seriously<br />

underperformed infl ation with -30% for gold against infl ation at<br />

+35%. <strong>The</strong> buyer of gold must therefore adopt a very long-term buy<br />

and hold strategy; although such a strategy may well be suitable for a<br />

pension fund, it is unlikely to suit an individual saver.<br />

In our opinion, using gold to hedge against infl ation is heavily dependent<br />

on the right buy timing, which is hard to determine.<br />

3. Commodities<br />

We will take three examples: the index of farm prices and metal prices<br />

over forty years, together with the price of oil since its fi rst inclusion<br />

in the Datastream database on 05.02.1982.<br />

7


600<br />

550<br />

500<br />

450<br />

400<br />

350<br />

300<br />

250<br />

200<br />

150<br />

100<br />

50<br />

INDEX-LINKED INFLATION IN THE UNITED STATES<br />

AND INDEX-LINKED SPOT FARM PRICE<br />

70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08<br />

US CPI - ALL URBAN SAMPLE: ALL ITEMS NADJ<br />

S&P GSCI Agriculturl Spot - PRICE INDEX<br />

900<br />

800<br />

700<br />

600<br />

500<br />

400<br />

300<br />

200<br />

100<br />

0<br />

INDEX-LINKED INFLATION AND CRB SPOT METALS INDEX<br />

8<br />

600<br />

550<br />

500<br />

450<br />

400<br />

350<br />

300<br />

250<br />

200<br />

150<br />

100<br />

50<br />

Source: Thomson Datastream<br />

69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09<br />

US CPI - ALL URBAN SAMPLE: ALL ITEMS NADJ<br />

CRB Spot Index Metals - PRICE INDEX<br />

900<br />

800<br />

700<br />

600<br />

500<br />

400<br />

300<br />

200<br />

100<br />

Source: Thomson Datastream<br />

0<br />

INDEX-LINKED INFLATION AND INDEX-LINKED PRICE PER BARREL OF OIL<br />

450<br />

400<br />

350<br />

300<br />

250<br />

200<br />

150<br />

100<br />

50<br />

0<br />

82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08<br />

US CPI - ALL URBAN SAMPLE: ALL ITEMS NADJ<br />

Crude Oil-WTI Near Month FOB U$/BBL<br />

9<br />

450<br />

400<br />

350<br />

300<br />

250<br />

200<br />

150<br />

100<br />

50<br />

Source: Thomson Datastream<br />

Farm prices are extremely volatile. Quite recently, the spot farm price<br />

index rose from 214 in August 2006 to 483 in June 2008 (+116%), before<br />

falling back to 247 in December 2008 (down 49% in six months).<br />

Especially between 1982 and the present day farm prices have completely<br />

failed to keep pace with the rate of infl ation.<br />

<strong>The</strong> industrial metals index did not beat infl ation at any time between<br />

1981 and 2004. <strong>The</strong> price of metals took off between 2006 and early<br />

2008 before suddenly falling back; index on 31.12.2005: 260, index<br />

on 04.05.2007: 476 (+83%), index on 19.12.2008: 167 (-65%). Here<br />

again we are confronted with steep price volatility and the opportunity<br />

of beating infl ation existed for two years only.<br />

<strong>The</strong> performance of the West Texas barrel price has been still more<br />

disappointing; this protection against infl ation only functioned between<br />

early 2007 and autumn 2008 under conditions of extreme volatility<br />

with the barrel price rising from USD 38 on 18.01.2007 to 144<br />

on 11.07.2008 (+279%), going on to fall back to 36 on 26.12.2008<br />

(-75%). Once again, excellent timing is imperative to buy crude oil as<br />

a hedge against infl ation.<br />

0


4. Property<br />

INDEX-LINKED INFLATION AND INDEX-LINKED HOUSE PRICES OVER 40 YEARS<br />

1100<br />

1000<br />

900<br />

800<br />

700<br />

600<br />

500<br />

400<br />

300<br />

200<br />

100<br />

0<br />

69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09<br />

US CPI - ALL URBAN SAMPLE: ALL ITEMS NADJ<br />

US MEDIAN PRICE OF EXISTING ONE-FAMILY HOMES SOLD CURN<br />

Over forty years, the trend of house prices has easily beaten infl ation,<br />

despite the correction which began in 2005 and currently stands<br />

at around 27%. Analysis of each ten-year tranche shows that house<br />

prices either beat or equal infl ation.<br />

10<br />

1100<br />

1000<br />

900<br />

800<br />

700<br />

600<br />

500<br />

400<br />

300<br />

200<br />

100<br />

Source: Thomson Datastream<br />

INDEX-LINKED INFLATION IN THE USA AND INDEX-LINKED MEDIAN HOUSE<br />

PRICE<br />

250 FROM 01/01/69 TO 31/12/78<br />

250 180 FROM 01/01/79 TO 31/12/88 180<br />

200<br />

150<br />

100<br />

50<br />

69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78<br />

US CPI - ALL URBAN SAMPLE: ALL I<br />

US MEDIAN PRICE OF EXISTING ONE-<br />

160<br />

140<br />

120<br />

100<br />

80<br />

FROM 01/01/89 TO 31/12/98<br />

89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98<br />

US CPI - ALL URBAN SAMPLE: ALL I<br />

US MEDIAN PRICE OF EXISTING ONE-<br />

200<br />

150<br />

100<br />

50<br />

160<br />

140<br />

120<br />

100<br />

80<br />

160<br />

140<br />

120<br />

100<br />

80<br />

79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88<br />

US CPI - ALL URBAN SAMPLE: ALL<br />

US MEDIAN PRICE OF EXISTING ONE<br />

180<br />

160<br />

140<br />

120<br />

100<br />

80<br />

SINCE 01/01/99<br />

99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09<br />

US CPI - ALL URBAN SAMPLE: ALL I<br />

US MEDIAN PRICE OF EXISTING ONE-<br />

160<br />

140<br />

120<br />

100<br />

80<br />

180<br />

160<br />

140<br />

120<br />

100<br />

80<br />

Source: Thomson Datastream<br />

0<br />

300<br />

280<br />

260<br />

240<br />

220<br />

200<br />

180<br />

160<br />

140<br />

120<br />

100<br />

GREAT BRITAIN: INFLATION AND INDEX-LINKED HOUSE PRICES<br />

80<br />

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009<br />

UK CPI-HARMONISED EUROPEAN UNION BASIS EST.D PRE-97 2005=100<br />

UK HALIFAX HOUSE PRICE INDEX - NEW HOUSES<br />

UK HALIFAX HOUSE PRICE INDEX - EXISTING HOUSES<br />

150<br />

140<br />

130<br />

120<br />

110<br />

100<br />

90<br />

80<br />

GREAT BRITAIN: INFLATION AND INDEX-LINKED HOUSE PRICES<br />

300<br />

280<br />

260<br />

240<br />

220<br />

200<br />

180<br />

160<br />

140<br />

120<br />

100<br />

80<br />

Source: Thomson Datastream<br />

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998<br />

UK CPI-HARMONISED EUROPEAN UNION BASIS EST.D PRE-97 2005=100<br />

UK HALIFAX HOUSE PRICE INDEX - NEW HOUSES<br />

UK HALIFAX HOUSE PRICE INDEX - EXISTING HOUSES<br />

150<br />

140<br />

130<br />

120<br />

110<br />

100<br />

90<br />

80<br />

Source: Thomson Datastream<br />

Looking now at Great Britain, the situation is more complex. Since<br />

1999, house prices have easily beaten infl ation despite a sharp correction.<br />

On the other hand, between 1989 and 1999 infl ation rose by<br />

30% more than house prices.<br />

11


This means that house prices are distinctly less volatile than those of<br />

commodities, but investors must not buy property during a speculative<br />

price bubble.<br />

5. Equities<br />

In principle, the equity market does not like infl ation; this is because<br />

PER (price/earnings ratio) fi gures narrow when infl ation is high; conversely<br />

PERs widen when infl ation is very low.<br />

How can this ratio between PER and infl ation be explained? Acceleration<br />

of infl ation will encourage the central bank to raise its base<br />

rate. High interest rates make the fi nancing of heavily indebted corporations<br />

more diffi cult in cash fl ow terms.<br />

16<br />

14<br />

12<br />

10<br />

8<br />

6<br />

4<br />

2<br />

0<br />

-2<br />

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INFLATION AND PER<br />

69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09<br />

CPI VAR. 1 AN<br />

S&P 500 COMPOSITE - PER(R.H.SCALE)<br />

Source: Thomson Datastream<br />

However, some economists maintain that during periods of high infl<br />

ation, companies are able to increase their invoiced prices faster than<br />

before, in other words pricing power rises; this is good for profi ts.<br />

12<br />

45<br />

40<br />

35<br />

30<br />

25<br />

20<br />

15<br />

10<br />

5<br />

For the record, Anglo-Saxon investors were greatly infl uenced by a<br />

book written by Jeremy Siegel, a professor of fi nance at Pennsylvania<br />

University, entitled “Stocks for the Long Run” published for the fi rst<br />

time in 1994. In the main, beginning his research in 1802 (sic), Siegel<br />

claims that for 190 years (re-sic), equities brought a return on investment<br />

which beat infl ation by an average of 6.5 to 7%.<br />

For the time being, we will simply examine what has happened in the<br />

past forty years.<br />

1600<br />

1400<br />

1200<br />

1000<br />

800<br />

600<br />

400<br />

200<br />

0<br />

INDEX-LINKED INFLATION IN THE UNITED STATES<br />

AND S&P 500 INDEXED OVER 40 YEARS<br />

69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09<br />

US CPI - ALL URBAN SAMPLE: ALL ITEMS NADJ<br />

S&P 500 COMPOSITE - PRICE INDEX<br />

13<br />

1600<br />

1400<br />

1200<br />

1000<br />

800<br />

600<br />

400<br />

200<br />

Source: Thomson Datastream<br />

<strong>The</strong> S&P 500 easily beats infl ation despite the correction in 2000-<br />

2003 and despite the more recent correction which has been under<br />

way since 2007.<br />

0


6. Focus on infl ation and growth<br />

6.1 Period 1972-1974<br />

130<br />

125<br />

120<br />

115<br />

110<br />

105<br />

100<br />

95<br />

INFLATION<br />

OUNCE OF GOLD (R.H.SCALE)<br />

METALS INDEX (R.H.SCALE)<br />

FOCUS ON 1972-1974<br />

1972 1973 1974<br />

14<br />

FARM PRICE INDEX (R.H.SCALE)<br />

HOUSE PRICES (R.H.SCALE)<br />

450<br />

400<br />

350<br />

300<br />

250<br />

200<br />

150<br />

100<br />

S&P 500(R.H.SCALE) Source: Thomson Datastream<br />

Infl ation climbed by 26% over a three-year period. Year on year,<br />

growth moved from 7.5% in early 1973 to -2% at the end of 1974.<br />

Commodities and property have made faster gains than infl ation,<br />

while the equity market which correctly anticipated the recession reported<br />

disastrous performance.<br />

50<br />

6.2 Period 1977-1979<br />

135<br />

130<br />

125<br />

120<br />

115<br />

110<br />

105<br />

100<br />

95<br />

INFLATION<br />

OUNCE OF GOLD (R.H.SCALE)<br />

METALS INDEX (R.H.SCALE)<br />

FOCUS ON 1977-1979<br />

1977 1978 1979<br />

15<br />

FARM PRICE INDEX (R.H.SCALE)<br />

HOUSE PRICES (R.H.SCALE)<br />

400<br />

350<br />

300<br />

250<br />

200<br />

150<br />

100<br />

S&P 500(R.H.SCALE) Source: Thomson Datastream<br />

Infl ation climbed by 30% over three years. Growth slipped from 7%<br />

in late 1978 to -1.5% in the autumn. Gold easily beats infl ation, commodities<br />

and property are practically on an equal footing, while the<br />

equity market which held up well remained stable and was therefore<br />

outstripped by 30% by infl ation.<br />

50


6.3 Period 1987-1990<br />

125<br />

120<br />

115<br />

110<br />

105<br />

100<br />

95<br />

FOCUS ON 1987-1990<br />

1987 1988 1989 1990<br />

INFLATION<br />

OUNCE OF GOLD (R.H.SCALE)<br />

METALS INDEX (R.H.SCALE)<br />

FARM PRICE INDEX (R.H.SCALE)<br />

HOUSE PRICES (R.H.SCALE)<br />

180<br />

170<br />

160<br />

150<br />

140<br />

130<br />

120<br />

110<br />

100<br />

S&P 500(R.H.SCALE) Source: Thomson Datastream<br />

Infl ation advanced by 19% over the four-year period. Growth was<br />

in the range of 2.5% to 4.25% between 1987 and early 1990, before<br />

turning negative in early 1991. <strong>The</strong> economic trend during this period<br />

may be described as moderate stagfl ation. In this environment,<br />

equities held up well, while infl ation was 30% higher than the price<br />

of gold.<br />

16<br />

90<br />

80<br />

6.4 Period 1997-1999<br />

106<br />

105<br />

104<br />

103<br />

102<br />

101<br />

100<br />

99<br />

INFLATION<br />

OUNCE OF GOLD (R.H.SCALE)<br />

METALS INDEX (R.H.SCALE)<br />

FOCUS ON 1997-1999<br />

1997 1998 1999<br />

FARM PRICE INDEX (R.H.SCALE)<br />

HOUSE PRICES (R.H.SCALE)<br />

200<br />

180<br />

160<br />

140<br />

120<br />

100<br />

S&P 500(R.H.SCALE) Source: Thomson Datastream<br />

This was a dream period with infl ation running at less than 6% over<br />

the two years and average growth in the order of 4%. Commodities<br />

were beaten heavily by infl ation, while property gained in relation to<br />

infl ation and the equity market took off by an impressive 90%.<br />

17<br />

80<br />

60


6.5 Period 2004-2006<br />

112<br />

110<br />

108<br />

106<br />

104<br />

102<br />

100<br />

98<br />

INFLATION<br />

OUNCE OF GOLD (R.H.SCALE)<br />

METALS INDEX (R.H.SCALE)<br />

FOCUS ON 2004-2006<br />

2004 2005 2006<br />

FARM PRICE INDEX (R.H.SCALE)<br />

HOUSE PRICE(R.H.SCALE)<br />

260<br />

240<br />

220<br />

200<br />

180<br />

160<br />

140<br />

120<br />

100<br />

S&P 500(R.H.SCALE) Source: Thomson Datastream<br />

Infl ation rose by 9% over a two-year period. Growth slipped gradually<br />

from 4.1% to 2.4%. <strong>The</strong> recession to come was not yet perceptible.<br />

A new factor now came onto the scene: the ferocious appetite<br />

of the emerging countries, especially China, for commodities. All the<br />

forms of hedging easily beat infl ation, including equities, with a special<br />

mention for industrial metals and gold.<br />

7. Infl ation-linked Government bonds<br />

<strong>The</strong> number of States which offer at least one infl ation-linked bond<br />

traded on the bond market is limited and currently stands at twelve.<br />

<strong>The</strong> fi rst market for infl ation-linked state bonds was opened by Great<br />

Britain in 1981, in particular to strengthen the government’s credibility<br />

in its fi ght against infl ation at a time when this was particularly<br />

high.<br />

<strong>The</strong> basic principle of an index-linked bond is to vary the value of<br />

18<br />

80<br />

60<br />

the coupons and redemption of the principal in the light of the trend<br />

of a reference infl ation index.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re are three important variables which differ from one issuing<br />

country to another:<br />

• <strong>The</strong> frequency of the coupon which may be quarterly, halfyearly<br />

or annual.<br />

• <strong>The</strong> monthly or quarterly reference infl ation rate which will<br />

infl uence the price of the bond on the secondary market.<br />

• <strong>The</strong> existence or otherwise of a redemption guarantee at par<br />

for the principal in the event of defl ation.<br />

Because of the hedge against the infl ation risk, the indexed bond<br />

has a signifi cantly lower nominal coupon than that of a conventional<br />

bond with an equivalent time to maturity (see the example below of<br />

cash fl ow simulation).<br />

In the United States, the Treasury Department issued the fi rst loan indexed<br />

on the Consumer Price Index (CPI) on 29 January 1997; this type<br />

of loan has been called Treasury Infl ation-Protection Securities (TIPS).<br />

<strong>The</strong> index-linked coupons are paid every six months and a guarantee<br />

on redemption of the principal in the event of defl ation is provided.<br />

In France, the Government issued for the fi rst time on 15 September<br />

1998 a bond Obligation Assimilable du Trésor (OAT) indexed on<br />

the national rate of infl ation (OATi), this being calculated excluding<br />

the tobacco price. In October 2001, the State issued an OAT€i, with<br />

the harmonized price index for the euro zone as its reference index.<br />

To illustrate the difference between the cash fl ow generated by a conventional<br />

bond and an infl ation-linked bond we have designed a simplifi<br />

ed example: during the ten year lifetime, linear infl ation of 2%<br />

per year, with an annual coupon, no reinvestment of the coupons<br />

paid, nominal rate of 4% for a conventional OAT, an initial nominal<br />

19


ate of 2.5% for an OATi, both issues being kept until maturity and<br />

having a principal sum of EUR 10,000.<br />

Cash-fl ow of the conventional bond:<br />

• 10 coupons of EUR 400 = EUR 4000<br />

• Redemption of the principal EUR 10,000<br />

• Loss on the principal because of aggregate infl ation of 21.9%<br />

= EUR 2190<br />

• Result of the investment EUR 14,000 – EUR 2190 =<br />

EUR 11,810.<br />

Cash-fl ow of the index-linked issue:<br />

• 10 indexed coupons ranging from EUR 256.25 in the fi rst year<br />

to EUR 320 in the tenth year = EUR 2870.80<br />

• Redemption of the principal at EUR 12,190<br />

• Result of the investment EUR 12,190 + EUR 2870.80 =<br />

EUR 15,060.80<br />

Clearly, the higher the rate of infl ation the more advantageous it will<br />

be to hold index-linked bond issues.<br />

114<br />

112<br />

110<br />

108<br />

106<br />

104<br />

102<br />

100<br />

98<br />

COMPARATIVE TREND OF PRICES OF AN OAT AND OATI<br />

96<br />

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009<br />

OAT FRANCE 2003 4% 25/04/13 - DEFAULT PRICE<br />

OAT-I FRANCE 2003 2 1/2% 25/07/13 INDXLK. - DEFAULT PRICE<br />

20<br />

114<br />

112<br />

110<br />

108<br />

106<br />

104<br />

102<br />

100<br />

98<br />

96<br />

Source: Thomson Datastream<br />

8. Conclusion: it will soon be time to buy infl ation-linked<br />

bond issues<br />

Gold provides a long-term hedge against infl ation, but buy timing<br />

is vitally important. Moreover the two steep rises in the gold price<br />

are not due solely to infl ation because the fi rst was set in motion by<br />

the hostage taking in Teheran which sparked off an oil price shock,<br />

followed by infl ation, while the second was motivated by economic<br />

euphoria and then by the crisis of the American banking system. In<br />

view of the recent gold price trend we believe that an investor who<br />

buys gold now would be taking a very bold step.<br />

Commodities are an appropriate way of hedging against infl ation at<br />

a time when it is accelerating. <strong>The</strong>y are at one and the same time the<br />

cause and the consequence of infl ation. However, their price trend<br />

depends on factors which have little to do with infl ation: fl oods,<br />

droughts, extremely high growth in some emerging crises, geopolitical<br />

crises, inadequate relationship between supply and demand on<br />

some markets.<br />

Property certainly provides good protection against infl ation unless<br />

it is acquired during a speculative bubble. However, property is an<br />

asset which lacks liquidity and for family or other reasons it is often<br />

hard to take the profi ts on such an asset.<br />

<strong>The</strong> debate over equities as a vehicle to fi ght infl ation is still open.<br />

To overcome the obstacle of narrowing PERs and rising interest rates<br />

against a background of steep infl ation, stock picking would seem<br />

to be vital; of course we must identify companies which manage to<br />

pass on price rises. Equities are the best asset in periods of economic<br />

growth with low infl ation.<br />

Infl ation-linked bonds by their very nature provide effective protection<br />

against infl ation and enable the investor to avoid damage<br />

caused by infl ation which the bond market has not anticipated cor-<br />

21


ectly. Unlike real property for instance this is a highly liquid asset<br />

even if many investors adopt a buy and hold strategy on these bonds.<br />

Unfortunately, the Swiss Confederation has not yet issued an infl ation-linked<br />

bond; this creates an exchange risk for a Swiss resident<br />

who buys TIPS or OATi.<br />

22<br />

Jacques Nicola / CP / May 2009


WE ARE AT YOUR DISPOSAL<br />

PARTNERS Pierre PONCET<br />

Gaétan BORDIER<br />

Grégoire BORDIER<br />

EXECUTIVE BOARD David HOLZER<br />

Michel JUVET<br />

François KOESSLER<br />

INVESTMENT MANAGERS<br />

Adrien BALZLI<br />

Bernard CHOLLET, Nyon<br />

Bertrand CLAVIEN<br />

Roman DOUBROVKINE<br />

Martin DURST, Zürich<br />

Niloufar EGHTEDAR<br />

Michael EGLI, Bern<br />

Sébastien GIOVANNA, Zürich<br />

Joseph GOMEZ<br />

Véronique GROSSEN<br />

Markus HAUSHERR, Zürich<br />

Carine IMHOF<br />

Frank ISOZ<br />

François JACOBI<br />

Eric JOYAU<br />

Patrice LAGNAUX, Zürich<br />

Bernadette LARDI<br />

Hubert LECLERC<br />

Ruth MERCIER, Nyon<br />

Manuel MORA<br />

Ernest MORGELI, Nyon<br />

René MOZER<br />

Philippe NABAA<br />

Lisa NATALINI TISSOT, Nyon<br />

Thierry PERRET<br />

Daniel ROTH, Bern<br />

Philippe RUDLOFF<br />

Stephan SCHNYDER, Bern<br />

Aloïs SOMMER, Zürich<br />

Patrick STOCKHAMMER<br />

Masaki TSUNOOKA<br />

EXTERNAL MANAGERS DEPARTMENT Pierre-Louis CHARDIER<br />

FINANCIAL RESEARCH Rafaël ANCHISI<br />

Loïc BHEND<br />

Pascale BOYER BARRESI<br />

Christophe LABORDE<br />

Nicolas MASSON<br />

Jacques NICOLA<br />

Daniel PELLET<br />

Frédéric POTELLE<br />

MARKETING Radan STATKOW<br />

Camille BORDIER<br />

LEGAL AND TAX ADVICE Dominique FELLAY<br />

Jérôme MACHEREL<br />

ACCOUNTING/CREDITS Veronica VERDIAL<br />

FOREIGN EXCHANGE & TREASURY Juan-Luis CALERO<br />

CAPITAL MARKETS Reynald DUCOMMUN<br />

BANKING SERVICE Didier GRANDJEAN<br />

TRANSFERS Yves FOURNET<br />

CASHIER Jean-Marc SCHWAB


Head Offi ce<br />

<strong>Bordier</strong> & <strong>Cie</strong><br />

Rue de Hollande 16<br />

CP 5515<br />

CH - 1211 Genève 11<br />

T. +41 22 317 12 12<br />

F. +41 22 311 29 73<br />

Swift BORD CH GG<br />

www.bordier.com<br />

research@bordier.com<br />

Representative offi ce in Berne<br />

<strong>Bordier</strong> & <strong>Cie</strong><br />

Zeughausgasse 28<br />

Postfach 213<br />

CH - 3000 Bern 7<br />

T. +41 31 313 12 12<br />

F. +41 31 313 12 00<br />

bern@bordier.com<br />

Representative offi ce in Zürich<br />

<strong>Bordier</strong> & <strong>Cie</strong><br />

Bahnhofstrasse 62<br />

CH - 8001 Zürich<br />

T. +41 44 213 12 12<br />

F. +41 44 213 12 00<br />

zurich@bordier.com<br />

Representative offi ce in Nyon<br />

<strong>Bordier</strong> & <strong>Cie</strong><br />

Rue de la Porcelaine 13<br />

CP 1045<br />

CH - 1260 Nyon<br />

T. +41 22 317 70 50<br />

F. +41 22 362 04 68<br />

nyon@bordier.com

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!