Part 3 of 7 - Ibiblio

118 ATLANTIC THEATER
tions, when its size was such that naval officers had doubts about its
continued existence. Only with much argument had the secretary
managed to persuade Congress to refit ships laid up in ordinary. New
construction before the commencement of the War of 1812 was out of
the question.
The onset of war, however, brought a new dimension to the
secretary's job. Whether the navy should be used if war came had been
a question debated in the presence of President Madison in February
1812. Secretary Hamilton, perhaps playing deviL's advocate, suggested
that with such a smaLL navy, the United States would risk losing it entirely
in sending ships against the British fleet . According to Irving
Brant, Madison's biographer, the president took the side of the navy's
more aggressive captains and argued that victories would be needed
and that if our ships were lost in seeking them, they could be replaced. I
With this phase of the argument settled, the question of precisely
how the navy would be used remained at issue. Secretary Hamilton was
careful to solicit the opinions of two of the most experienced and successful
of the navy's commanders, Commodores John Rodgers and
Stephen Decatur. Letters containing their replies foLLow in the order in
which they were received. Their opinions differ particularly in regard
to the proper disposition of warshIps at sea. Commodore Rodgers saw
great advantages to be gained from combining aLL shIps in a cruising
squadron that would search out British convoys and force the British to
concentrate, drawing their warshIps away from A merican harbors.
Commodore Decatur argued that navy ships would have better results
if they were to operate either singly or in pairs.
J Irvcng Brant, "r",ud Presidentl Futile War!" Am~rican H~ritage .
Yol X . No. 6 (Oct.
19"). PI' . • 6 .f7. 8'-89, Linda Maloney, "Tile War of 1812 WhGt Role/or Sea Power!" In
Kenneth J. Hagan, ed., In Peace and War: Interpretations or American Naval History
(Westport, Conn .. 1978), pp 46- 62.
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY HAMILTON TO COMMODORE JOHN ROOCERS
Comre Rodgers
NYork
Nav: Dep'mt
21 May 1812
As a war appears now inevitable, I request you to state to me, a plan
of operations, which, in your judgment, will enable our little navy to
annoy in the utmost extent, the Trade of Gt Britain while it least
exposes it to the immense naval force of that Government. State also,
JANUARY- AUGUST 1812 119
the Pons of the US which you think the safest as assylums for our navy,
In time of war.
P. Hamilton
Copy, DNA . RG45 , SNL, Vol. 10, pp. 41 -42. On the same day, Secretary
Hamilton sent an identical letter to Commodore Decatur: see Hamilton to
Decatur. 21 May 1812 , ibid. , p. 42.
Sir.
COMMODORE JOHN RODGERS TO
SECRETARY OF TIlE NAVY HAMILTON
U.S. Frigate President
Staten Island June 3d, 1812
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 21st
ult, and in answer to your enquiries permit me to state, that in my
humble opinion to annoy the trade of Great Britain with the greatest
effect would be at the commencement of a War, to dispose our comparatively
very small force , in such a way as to harrass her W India
commerce by our lightest vessels: and her coasting trade, East India
trade & other foreign trade by our Frigates & one or two of our fastest
sailing sloops of war: our small vessels to be disposed in a way, according
to circumstances, to annoy to the greatest extent all the avem:es
leading to & from her West India Islands, Surinam, Berbice, &
D~namara: a. small squadron of two, or three of our fastest sailing
fngates & a slOgle sloop of War, to cruise on the coasts of England,
Ireland, & Scotland; & the residue of our frigates to to act seperately,
or In squadron on our own coasts to harrass the enemy by cruising in
the tracts of his ships trading between him & his colonies of Canada
Nova Scotia, & Newfoundland; and occasionally to unite all ou~
Frigates & attack his East India convoys. -
This, Sir, would in my opinion, be the most advisable disposition
that could be made of our little navy, at least for the first six months,
perhaps during the whole of the War: as it would be menacing them
10 the very teeth, & effecting the the distruction of their commerce in a
manner the most perplexing to their government, & in a way the least
expected by the nation generally, including those belonging to the
Navy: the self styled Lords of the Oceanll