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concluding that where marriage is concerned, abolition was preferable to its
expansion.
In terms of the potential for same-sex marriage to address lesbian and gay stigma,
Cheshire Calhoun (2000) has argued that recognition for same-sex couples could
increase the visibility of lesbians and gay men, usefully eroding the heterosexist
presumption that maintains heterosexuality as the dominant model of sexuality and
family life (Land and Kitzinger, 2005). Bawer (1993) identifies other potential
benefits, framing marriage as a protective factor for couples and as providing a
legally recognised context for childrearing. However, there is understandable
suspicion about the role of the state as guardian of lesbian and gay rights, with
Sullivan (2003) echoing Ettelbrick (1989) in cautioning that marriage represents a
threat to the diversity of same-sex relationships, rather than a promise of equality.
In a similar vein, Gilreath sees same-sex marriage as a project of, “erasure by
inclusion,” (2011, p. 231). Lehr (1999) expressed suspicion of same-sex marriage as
extending the hegemony of marriage; as promulgating the notion that successful
adulthood can only be achieved through marriage and procreation, with those who
build relationships outside these models presumed not worthy of rights and social
benefits. Although predating legal recognition in the UK by five years, Carl Stychin’s
assessment that “good gays” under New Labour were seen as stable, monogamous
and financially independent (2000, p. 619) could equally be applied to civil
partnerships, as well as to legislative plans for marriage equality under the 2010
coalition government. Harding and Peel’s rejection of married normativity deserves
a mention if only for their seemingly arrogant conclusion that, “If I wanted to be
ordinary, I would be heterosexual,” (2004, p. 45). This notion of same-sex couples
being somehow above marriage evokes a higher, if unelaborated, mission. This
skepticism about same-sex marriage as a form of sexual citizenship is echoed in
particularly extreme terms by Vasquez, who appears to find identification with a
minority sexuality to be incompatible with notions of citizenship, insisting that, “I will
not exchange my sexuality for citizenship.” (Vasquez, 1999, p. 272).
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