Entrepreneurializing the Organization: Archetypes of Commitment to ...

Entrepreneurializing the Organization: Archetypes of Commitment to
Corporate Entrepreneurship and Implications for Strategic
Entrepreneurship
Theodore T. Herbert and Deborah V. Brazeal
Abstract
Institutionalizing entrepreneurship within the corporation can be an effective means by which to gain competitive
advantage. Yet there are many approaches by which this can be done. We propose four archetypes which represent
gradations of commitment to corporate entrepreneurship and discuss their various attributes and potential for
gaining sustainable competitive advantage. The linkage between these archetypes and their "fits" (Miller, 1983)
with the strategic and competitive postures of the firm is explored as a crucial and initiating point for corporate
entrepreneurship programs. The traditional role of the top management team is re-defined in formulating a strategy
for innovativeness.
Introduction
In response to the rapid rate of change in competition and the pressures of technological advances, corporate
executives are unanimous in their stated desire to make their employees and their organizations more
"entrepreneurial". The traditional view has been that this is accomplished through individual creative people and,
more recently, teams of individual creative people. Consequently, the stereotypical "entrepreneurial" organization
has been seen less as an organization in which innovativeness is an embedded part of the organization's process and
structure, and more the "place" within which (a) innovations have been developed, (b) innovative people happen to
reside and work, and (c) whose controls are capable of being overcome so that top management can reluctantly
agree to accept the innovation. Corporate executives then seek to find means by which to unleash the creative
talents of their people and to lower the built-in barriers to new ideas that could bubble up from the depths of the
organization.
On the short list of approaches that encourage the creativity that leads to profitable innovations is to inundate
marketing people and scientists (or other "creatively-inclined" people such as knowledge workers) with
exhortations to "think outside the box", to think "sidewise" about problems, and to "network" with others with
different perspectives. Another approach is to offer rewards and recognition's to successful innovators. Too,
supervisors and other gatekeepers are exhorted to be receptive to new ideas, to wink at and ignore time taken from
assigned projects and applied to pet (although unauthorized) ideas. By-passes to bureaucratic procedures similarly
are created for new ideas. And formal procedures may be established by which to winnow out and bless for further
development those project proposals which seem most likely to fit the needs for new product development
schedules or have the potential to provide useful new directions for research or development. There is a wide range
of corporate approaches to overcoming built-in barriers to creativity and innovation, and the approaches range
widely in how well they work.

A listing of all the various techniques employed to encourage creativity in organizational settings would fill a book
(for a partial listing and discussion, see Herbert & Brazeal, 1998). A great deal of importance and attention has
been given, appropriately enough, to the need to enhance innovation in organizations. At the same time, the study
and application of Corporate Entrepreneurship has been developing in encouraging directions and rates. We then
feel that there may be some utility in considering the relative effectiveness of corporate efforts to enhance their
innovativeness, adopting a contingency approach of exploring the conditions under which such efforts are
differentially appropriate or differentially effective. We also believe there to be some usefulness to be gained by
framing and understanding patterns of entrepreneurial devices and entrepreneurship-enhancing methods. These
patterns of practice can be, we believe, stipulated and organized by considering them as a finite number of
archetypes or models of common practice. Our paper makes that attempt.
Entrepreneurship and the Organization
Making a corporation more creative, more innovative, more entrepreneurial has gone from being a nicety or a
slogan; it is now a minimum requirement in many industries simply to stay in the competitive game. Since it has
become a challenge taken more seriously than ever before, the question of how to do it has become one asked in
deadly earnestness. And, in fact, the notion of introducing entrepreneurship within the established organization is
even more complicated than it might seem. The complication is two-fold.
First, while there are similarities between the two, (individual) entrepreneurship and corporate entrepreneurship are
very different, but rather rarely differentiated when one speaks of increasing the corporation's entrepreneurial
potential. Indeed, the (unspoken) presumption is that increasing the entrepreneurial potential of (some of) the
corporation's employees is the same as increasing the entrepreneurial potential of the corporation as a whole. The
classic conception of entrepreneurship is that of the individual, independent entrepreneur who assumes financial
and other risks in order to exploit a new idea or product possibility; and that the risks of failure uniquely devolve
upon the entrepreneur. In corporate entrepreneurship, however, individual or group entrepreneurship is fostered
within a preexisting organizational setting; the organization provides support for the development and exploitation
of one or more innovations which are deemed strategically and financially consistent with the supporting
organization's mission. Thus, executives attempting to implant entrepreneurial activities, support for them, and
rewards for them typically and by definition are interested in corporate entrepreneurship. Corporate executives are
attempting to introduce new procedures by which to induce higher levels of innovation; higher levels of
innovativeness will yield, it is intended, greater market share, product-line extensions, technological dominance, or
other profitability-related states. The conditions and intentions within spin-offs, LBOs or MBOs (management buyouts),
or other instances of similar nature are exceptions.
The second complication stems from the functionality of entrepreneurship: Entrepreneurship for what? If the intent
is to get burned-out employees to take more interest in their jobs by making suggestions on how to do their work
better, then there will be a specific list or menu of focused programs (such as suggestion boxes, job re-engineering,
"empowerment" programs, etc.) from which to choose. These entrepreneurial efforts will differ dramatically from
those employed by the corporation for which the intent is to develop and introduce radical new means of
technological advances at all steps in its value chain, (Porter, 1980) in order to revolutionize its industry. The
content of any entrepreneurial program is highly contingent on the purpose(s) sought, a point which should be
rather obvious.

However, there are those who prefer to (1) emphasize entrepreneurial activity as specific outcome-enhancer, (2)
propose an organization-wide shift to an entrepreneurial culture, (3) focus on the attributes of the individual who
displays entrepreneurial skills, or (4) opt for structural solutions to organizationally-sourced restrictions to
entrepreneurial activity, among others. Each brings with it a very different set of prescriptions for accomplishing
that perspective, as well as the potential breadth and depth of entrepreneurial behaviors and achievements. Some of
the means (Lengnick-Hall, 1992) by which the firm's internally-focused entrepreneurial activities can be undertaken
are: through traditional R&D units (structural), through the efforts of individual employees or intrapreneurship
(individual), or through units dedicated to the development of new products or technologies by internal ventures
(structural outcome-enhancer). An additional vehicle is available through external means to achieve innovation,
that of joint venture activities and acquisition, by which to import entrepreneurial talent or traditions. In other
words, there exist multiple means or venues to achieving the entrepreneurial spirit within today's corporate form.
Understanding these two complications deeply leads to another understanding. "Entrepreneurship" is not a unitary,
monolithic consideration, but is rather a concept that covers a broad range or menu of activities and intentions. The
activities undertaken should be a function of their intended purposes. The obvious (or at least the more commonly
cited) purpose is to increase the innovation productivity of the corporation's employees.
The strategic rationale for that purpose apparently is rarely articulated, however. Why is it important to increase the
innovation productivity or innovation potential? Is it to revive a moribund set of products? To solve long-standing
inadequacies that have led to poor financial performance? To attract and retain crucial highly talented knowledge
workers? To achieve a distinctive cost advantage at each stage of the firm's value chain? To find and provide
competitive advantage in exceeding customers' expectations through high value-added and premium prices?
Each of these alternative objectives have important strategic and competitive implications. Each determine (or at
the least, suggests) the type of corporate entrepreneurship efforts to be undertaken. One notices that this insight
implies strongly that the driving competitive strategy of the firm dictates the broad entrepreneurial nature of the
firm's efforts and those resources supportive of those efforts. In short, strategy and entrepreneurial efforts must "fit"
(Miller, 1985) or be consistent with each other if corporate entrepreneurship is to succeed in any particular
corporation.
Note that this perspective is not entirely consistent with the corporate entrepreneurship literature, which tends to
emphasize an internal, process-oriented view of innovation. In scope and context, this literature seems to take as
given (1) the externally-imposed (but generalized) necessity for innovation and (2) the organizational impetus (or
the granting of slack) for the development of new initiatives. Specifically, individuals at non-executive levels
realistically perceive that their organizational structural boundaries, the corporate culture, and current strategic
priorities and directions are fixed, closed both to negotiation or to radically different interpretations other than those
established by upper management. Thus, entrepreneurs embedded within the organizational layers are continually
attempting to operate within (or despite) predefined organizational parameters. To innovate outside the strategic
context or mission of the organization is not likely ever to gain top management approval or resources; research and
development, product development, and business development units are explicit organizational mechanisms
normally given the assignment to ensure innovations or innovative programs in selected, strategically important
areas. The innovator, then, must operate within organizational boundaries and processes which are (for all intents
and purposes) fixed; it still may be possible to navigate the set boundaries, but probably not without difficulty.

Since discretion is a function of the member's authority level in the organization, in other words, forward-thinking
top management teams can and do actively perceive a broader range of alternatives which may also be riskier and
more costly in nature. Simply put, individuals at lower organizational levels are more likely to limit innovations to
those of an incremental nature entirely within the strategic context of the organization; top management teams have
the authority to change strategic direction radically and, thus, perceive no internal limits to the kinds of innovations
pursued. Entrepreneurship then is a variable, not a fixed process or a constant -- except when it is explicitly defined
to be so by higher authority.
Entrepreneurship as a Strategic Variable
In other words, the specific means by which "entrepreneurship" is implanted within a corporation and the
specification of the content of the "entrepreneurship" program depend on the firm's objectives and strategies. And if
corporate entrepreneurship is strategic, then its content should be the result of a process of strategic decisionmaking
or formulation. The corporate entrepreneurship approach best suited to the corporation's competitive
situation should be formulated as an explicit process by the corporation's top management team ("TMT"), typically
the top two executive levels in the corporation, including the President/CEO (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). One
reason for such an assignment of responsibility is that the decision involves organization-wide considerations.
Another is that the result requires a re-formulation of executive responsibilities and resources to implement the new
strategy for entrepreneurship, no matter how minor or how far-reaching it may prove to be. The point is that the
decision for strategic entrepreneurship (Herbert & Brazeal, 1998) leads to resource re-allocations and tough
decisions on where the future of the organization lies, and not upon mouthing pretty (but empty) words.
Top Management's Role
In fact, this recognition of the TMT's strategic role runs contrary to the historical view of senior executives'
responsibilities in corporate applications of entrepreneurship. Heretofore, the roles of the TMT have been viewed as
strategy formulation, setting policy, and championing the status quo, i.e., as being the harsh evaluator of new or
provocative ideas from lower levels. The TMT has often been seen, then, as a major stumbling block to innovative
efforts, if not by direct involvement in obstructing new ideas, then by the sin of apathy or by omitting the
establishing of processes and vehicles supportive of innovativeness.
The traditional perception of the TMT at best has been as a collective facilitator of entrepreneurial activities which
are pursued at lower levels in the organizational structure.
Yet strong executive leadership may prove to be a central factor by which to infuse the organizational context with
opportunity-seeking values and cultural norms, since innovations created by lower level employees reside within
the existing strategic context of the organization as defined by the TMT. The top management team, however,
views and has responsibility for the organization as an entity, rather than as an amalgam of isolated and technicallyspecialized
sets of resources separated by departmental or project boundaries.
Collectively, TMT members have the capability to initiate decisions and strategic directions that impact the
complete organization's operations. The TMT has almost absolute authority to redefine or reconceptualize the
organization's strategic context; to establish, reinforce, or extinguish entrepreneurial or more traditional cultural
norms; to undertake significantly different strategic directions for the organization; or to commit resources to
untried or untested programs or strategic directions, such as expanding internationally. In fact, Barringer and
Bluedorn (1996) found that the extent of corporate entrepreneurship was highly dependent on a variety of strategic
management activities, such as environmental scanning, planning flexibility, broad locus of planning, and an
emphasis on strategic controls.

Such an intimate intertwining of strategy, top executives, and entrepreneurship is evocative of a need to
reconceptualize the relationship as that of "strategic entrepreneurship" (Herbert & Brazeal, 1998). The role of the
TMT as a direct participant or generator of innovations opens the door for more dramatic, radical innovations
indicative of discontinuous changes and potentially industry-altering changes. The TMT must prove to be a major
player in championing, managing, and transitioning the processes of change and innovation (Bantel & Jackson,
1989). We think that this contextual and driving factor has the opportunity to identify and explain much of
corporate entrepreneurial conditions, processes, and outcomes, from the unique perspective of environment,
competition, and strategy -- entrepreneurship as competitive advantage.
Resultant States of Entrepreneurialism in Corporations
If, as we have argued, TMT values, economic realities, and strategic considerations lead to varying degrees of
entrepreneurialism within organizations -- as an explicit outcome of strategic decision-making by top executives --
then it should follow logically that there exists no one condition of corporate entrepreneurship. Supportive of the
concept is Covin and Slevin's (1989) suggesting a continuum along which firms may be arrayed, that of
conservativism-entrepreneurialism. Their "conservative" firm was risk-averse, noninnovative, and reactive, while
"entrepreneurial" firms were risk-taking, innovative, and proactive; by implication, many different configurations
lie between the two end points. Firms may be more entrepreneurial or less entrepreneurial, and may be identified
and categorized according to some criterion. Building on the notion that definitive configurations of entrepreneurial
orientation exist across corporations, we anticipate that some corporations will
• remain staunchly un-entrepreneurial in their actions while preaching the virtues of being responsive and
entrepreneurial,
• others will focus on fostering innovations in products or in processes,
• another set will seek to encourage their employees to submit new ideas to their hierarchical superiors for
approval or implementation,
• still others will lurch toward instilling an ongoing culture of entrepreneurship, and
• a remainder will remain clueless as to what entrepreneurship is but will, with surprise and pleasure,
welcome the random instances of innovative behaviors by employees (when they don't contradict the biases
of upper management or prove to be inconvenient to exploit).
Archetypes of Entrepreneurialism in Corporations
Thus, we suggest a range of outcome-configurations associated with the organization's orientation to
entrepreneurship, shown as Figure 1. The intent is to represent the different, systematic outcomes of totality (or
non-existence, or intermediate levels) of focus engendered within the organization on wide-ranging and deeplyengrained
entrepreneurial activities. Each of the four is discussed below as an archetype, or model or prototype,
which is intended to capture its distinguishing characteristics.

Level of
Commitment:
Figure 1 -- Archetypes as Gradations of Commitment to
Entrepreneurship within Organizations
Non-existent Low Medium
Total
Commitment
Type of
Organization:
The
Entrepreneurially
Challenged Firm
The Accidentally
Entrepreneurial
Organization
The
Entrepreneurially
Oriented
Organization
The
Entrepreneurial
Organization
The Entrepreneurially-Challenged Firm
Anchoring the near end of the continuum is the Entrepreneurially-Challenged Firm, which is oblivious to the
concept of new methods or products/services, and which employs a culture of denial to any new idea or risk.
Employees wishing to incrementally modify or improve even considerably outdated processes and procedures are
shunned, punished financially and in other ways, and viewed as trouble-makers.
Is this an effective archetype? Surprisingly, the answer is "Yes", but under very specific conditions. This type of
firm must exist in a placid, non-turbulent environment, with competitive protection such as having been granted a
governmental monopoly and with little or no possibility of technological substitutes or advances. It must also have
an internal structure and work process finely-tuned either to efficiency or to lack of excesses which are guaranteed
to alienate its governmental benefactor. In this case, the strategy is that nothing is broken (no realistic challenges
exist), and hence nothing needs to change. Is this realistic over the long term? Probably not. When the inevitable
requirements for change, creativity, innovation, and adaptation occur, such an organization is highly vulnerable.
But this "strategy" of being non-entrepreneurial does have a logic.
The Entrepreneurial Organization
At the far end of the continuum, we suggest, is the archetype of the entire organization which is dedicated to and
structured to facilitate the development, creation, and implementation of innovative processes, concepts, products,
or services. This represents the emerging conceptualization of the Entrepreneurial Organization. Organizations
which are "entrepreneurial" are those that have serious commitments to both incremental and radical innovations as
strategically important to the competitiveness of the organization and tactically important to its operations and
processes. Successful entrepreneurial organizations are able to produce a stream of innovations, systematically and
consistently. This firm is likely to employ programs of Corporate Entrepreneurship, Intrapreneuring, or New
Enterprise Venturing within the confines of the existing (traditional) corporate structure. Examples include the 3M
Corporation (which introduced 500 new products in 1997 alone (O'Reilly, 1997) or other paragons of
institutionalized innovation, such as smaller software companies, in which all employees, regardless of position,
department, or rank, are expected (if not required) to spend a given percentage of their time working on projects of
their own undertaking, if not interest; some have formalized expectations of rates of new product introductions, for
example, or of market share proportions between "old" and "new" products or services. Such firms do not limit
their projects to product enhancements or cost-saving production engineering endeavors, but are likely to be found
in other portions of their value chains, such as in the warehouse, logistics, evaluation procedures, and other
fundamental business responsibilities.

For those organizations which have strategic intentions of developing, nurturing, and maintaining entrepreneuriallyoriented
individuals and innovation-spawning processes and an internal environment of creativity, the involvement
of top management can be inferred when consistent innovation is observed in a firm. Implanting major
entrepreneurial initiatives has been realistically noted as necessitating a massive structural overhaul of the current
organizational system (Cooper, Willard, & Woo, 1986). Without the TMT's explicit and vigorous support, most
organizations simply cannot make the significant and necessary changes demanded for flexible assignments, fluid
structural arrangements, and personal responsiveness on a day-to-day basis in marketing, operations, finance, and
development. By being proactive in the defining and establishing of appropriate conditions, the top management
team explicitly encourages the innovation process among interested parties through the building of an
entrepreneurial organizational environment and human resource practices that actively promote entrepreneurial
activities and thinking. The probability of innovative outcomes is enhanced substantially when the entrepreneurial
process is defined as a systemic institutional phenomenon of crucial strategic importance. Thus, effective corporate
entrepreneurship is strategic, mission-driven, and institutionalized within the entrepreneurial organization.
The Entrepreneurially-Oriented Organization
Somewhere to the left of the Entrepreneurial Organization is the Entrepreneurially-Oriented Organization within
which members' improvements to pre-existing process or products are encouraged by policy and by process, toward
incremental improvements, but without the single-minded focus on turning all organizational resources to the end
of developing breakthrough technologies. Entrepreneurially-Oriented Organizations are less likely to develop
radical innovations which might necessitate dramatic departures from current organizational strategy, although
refinements which do not impact negatively (that is, requiring interfacing processes with or procedures in, say,
another department to be changed to accommodate the innovation) on the status quo, are considered rather
positively. Stereotypical suggestion-box inputs might be good examples of the types of improvements deemed
proper within such an organization.
There are a number of situations within which one might expect to find the Entrepreneurially-Oriented
Organization. One instance in which this archetype is effective is that of a mature industry with a relatively nonturbulent
environment, modest product/service substitutes potentially or actually available, non-intense rivalry
among relatively equally-sized competitors, and relatively powerful suppliers and/or customers. Under these
circumstances, industry change occurs slowly, and profits are fairly-equally distributed; given the maturity of the
industry and thus its normal value chains, incremental improvements are useful for modest profitability and
productivity improvements, since major innovations are not likely to occur and other innovations are nonproprietary
or easily copied. In this instance, then, the archetype seems appropriate for its orientation to
entrepreneurship, which "fits" its likely competitive strategy.
This archetype can be less effective, too, under other circumstances. A timid or ineffective TMT can hide behind a
random or half-hearted commitment to corporate entrepreneurship in this archetype, while still claiming to
encourage innovativeness. Since we have argued that corporate entrepreneurship is a strategic function, that is,
derived from a firm's strategic and competitive position and also of crucial importance to fulfilling the firm's
strategy, a tepid stance on innovativeness and absent a strategic posture on building competitive advantage through
innovation places the firm as being "stuck in the middle" (Porter, 1980) with no discernable advantage or direction.
Under many competitive realities, such a position is dangerous.

The Accidentally-Innovative Organization
And, of course, to the left of the Entrepreneurially-Oriented Organization must lie the Accidentally-Innovative
Organization, in which individual improvements, modifications, or innovative applications happen by chance rather
than by intent. As much as we would prefer otherwise, we suspect that a plurality, if not a majority, of firms today
would be categorized under this archetype. Why should this be so common? We believe that many TMTs perceive
their responsibilities as being divorced from the difficult integrative task of relating the firm's competitive strategy
to building its advantage through institutionalized programs of innovativeness/entrepreneurship. They may place
too much faith on technical or technological skills as determining factors in marketing success, for example, and
assume that the critical factor may be budget and resource allocations based on hoped-for outcomes (like increases
in market share or product development) rather than the more subtle processes involved in building the strategic
intent for widespread entrepreneurship. The randomsuccess pattern often experienced of such a non-strategy
reinforces the archetype, and becomes the conventional wisdom of the firm, that beefing up the marketing (or
R&D) budget leads to success and that a more inclusive approach is not necessary. And that may be sufficient for
such a firm. But as a matter of opportunity foregone, such an approach may not be sustainable or effective for long.
Are Archetypes Useful?
As a perspective on the preceding archetypes and their bases or effects on the strategic realities of corporations, we
note again that configurations of entrepreneurial efforts may be derived by academician or business
practitioner/executive. Each archetype has a foundational logic which can be used as a test for consistency of
strategy or for consistency of entrepreneurial elements. For example, if cost competition drives the need for
innovation within the firm, then a tightly-coordinated program for reviewing all steps in the value chain of the
corporation may well be a first and logical step to undertake. Other programs may be valuable on their own merits,
such as brainstorming sessions by promotion and advertising specialists, but may divert time and budget away from
the critical issue facing the corporation. We suggest that understanding the functionality of entrepreneurship
"entrepreneurship for what?" -- is a crucial determining factor in corporate entrepreneurship. The alignment of
corporate entrepreneurship with competitive advantages sought and with competitive challenges is earnestly to be
sought by responsible executives. Given such an environment, then the creative and innovative efforts undertaken
within the corporation may properly and approvingly be termed, "strategic entrepreneurship", and the corporation
and its various innovation programs properly and approvingly be considered, "entrepreneurialized."
Conclusion and Summary
The role of innovations in organizations is central: Not the random innovation or the chance breakthrough, but
innovations created as the result of a corporate strategy for entrepreneurship. Incremental innovations are minima,
not maxima, and are the bare minimum simply for keeping up with competitors. But true competitive advantage
stems from radical innovations. While the occasional or one-off innovation -- incremental and/or radical -- is not
unusual, what is difficult is creating and managing the sustained process by which multiple innovations --
incremental and/or radical -- across multiple organizational levels at different stages of the innovation process,
demanding significant and system-wide changes (Brazeal & Herbert, in press).
We point out that archetypes of commitment to corporate entrepreneurship may prove useful in considering the
relationship between strategy and nature of entrepreneurial efforts, and thence to sustainable competitive advantage
and performance (Zahra, 1991). As one archetype, the successful entrepreneurial organization produces
systematically and consistently a stream of innovations. The ability to do so is dependent on having an appropriate
internal state, culture, and legitimizing processes, these having been initiated and structured through the TMT's
commitment to a philosophy of risk taking, proactivity, and innovative behaviors (Covin & Slevin, 1991; Guth &

Ginsberg, 1990; Jennings & Lumpkin, 1989). Other archetypes are the entrepreneurially-oriented firm, the
accidentally-entrepreneurial firm, and the entrepreneurially-challenged firm. Despite the tendency to highly-value
entrepreneurship as a concept, without further investigation, we caution that gradations of commitment to
entrepreneurship are a more effective vehicle for evaluating the effectiveness of the entrepreneurial efforts as they
relate to the firm's strategic and competitive challenges.
Crucial as an underpinning to our suggestions is the observation that corporate entrepreneurship is -- or must
become -- a strategic function of the corporation, an activity the responsibility for which lies in the top executive
offices because of TMT duties for the strategic direction and control of the corporation. Corporate entrepreneurship
will rest, not with the individual innovator but within the structural framework and deliberatively-imposed
processes of the corporation, carefully initiated, cultivated, and maintained by top executives through structure and
cultural engineering to ensure that entrepreneurial values, behaviors, and processes are consistently implemented
throughout the entire organization.
The more complex configuration of entrepreneurial program contents, the firm's strategic and competitive intents,
and top management team processes are felt to offer a view more consistent with the realities faced by corporations
today. The configuration is also believed to offer opportunities by which to evaluate corporate entrepreneurship
programs and strategies, and to offer insights for prescribing an appropriate process for optimizing the
entrepreneurial potential of firms.
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About the Authors
Theodore T. Herbert is Professor of Management in the Crummer Graduate School of Business at
Rollins College. Deborah V. Brazeal is Associate Professor of Management in the Center for Entrepreneurship and
Innovation at California State Polytechnic University.
Contact details:
Dr. Theodore T. Herbert
Crummer Graduate School of Business
Rollins College
1000 Holt Avenue 2722,
Winter Park, Florida 32789-4499 U.S.A.
Tel. (407) 646-2530
Fax (407) 646-1550
E-Mail: THerbert@Rollins.edu
Dr. Deborah V. Brazeal
Center for Entrepreneurship and Innovation
California State Polytechnic University
Pomona, California 91768 U.S.A.
Tel. (909) 869-2368
Fax (909) 869-4353
E-Mail: DBrazeal@CSUPomona.edu