Stall warnings in high capacity aircraft: The Australian context 2008 ...
Stall warnings in high capacity aircraft: The Australian context 2008 ...
Stall warnings in high capacity aircraft: The Australian context 2008 ...
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ATSB – AR-2012-172<br />
altitude. This approach will also be recommended by the European Aviation Safety Authority<br />
(EASA). In a recent Advisory Circular (AC 120-109) 10 , the FAA also identified the importance of<br />
simulated stall recovery tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g for pilots. Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g should <strong>in</strong>clude stall recovery with the autopilot<br />
engaged, stick pusher response, and an emphasis on treat<strong>in</strong>g all stall <strong>warn<strong>in</strong>gs</strong> as if a full stall has<br />
occurred (FAA, 2012).<br />
Higher risk events<br />
<strong>The</strong> ATSB assesses the probable level of safety risk associated with each reported occurrence,<br />
consider<strong>in</strong>g the circumstances of the occurrence at the time it happened. 11 <strong>The</strong> safety risk of<br />
occurrences is assessed us<strong>in</strong>g a modified version of the Aviation Risk Management Solutions<br />
(ARMS) event risk classification framework. 12 This framework bases the event risk on the most<br />
credible potential accident outcome that could have eventuated, and the effectiveness of the<br />
rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g defences that stood between the occurrence and that outcome. <strong>The</strong> <strong>in</strong>tention of this<br />
assessment is to determ<strong>in</strong>e if there was a credible risk of <strong>in</strong>jury to passengers, crew, the public,<br />
and/or <strong>aircraft</strong> damage.<br />
Occurrences that are identified as medium, <strong>high</strong>, or very <strong>high</strong> risk are targeted for <strong>in</strong>vestigations,<br />
but the ATSB also focuses <strong>in</strong>vestigation effort on occurrences where a systemic safety issue is<br />
likely to have allowed that occurrence to happen. <strong>The</strong>re were four ATSB <strong>in</strong>vestigations of stall<br />
<strong>warn<strong>in</strong>gs</strong> between <strong>2008</strong> and 2012 that <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>high</strong> <strong>capacity</strong> air transport <strong>aircraft</strong>. <strong>The</strong>re was also<br />
an <strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>in</strong>to the Qantas Airbus A380 unconta<strong>in</strong>ed eng<strong>in</strong>e failure accident, <strong>in</strong> which there<br />
was a stall warn<strong>in</strong>g on land<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
As stall <strong>warn<strong>in</strong>gs</strong> are a warn<strong>in</strong>g only, and are a defence provided to ensure flight crew take<br />
corrective action to prevent a stall develop<strong>in</strong>g and a recoverable loss of control, they are generally<br />
low risk events. In some situations, they <strong>in</strong>dicate a possibility for a more serious outcome because<br />
the <strong>aircraft</strong> is fly<strong>in</strong>g at a speed that is lower than it should be for the flight condition and<br />
configuration it is <strong>in</strong>. Many stall <strong>warn<strong>in</strong>gs</strong>, such as those that occur <strong>in</strong> turbulence dur<strong>in</strong>g cruise, are<br />
not likely to <strong>in</strong>dicate a loss of control will occur (even if the <strong>aircraft</strong> stalls), and are low risk.<br />
(However, as was shown by the Air France 447 accident <strong>in</strong> 2009, a stall is still possible.) Some<br />
stall <strong>warn<strong>in</strong>gs</strong>, such as those that occur on f<strong>in</strong>al approach at a <strong>high</strong> angle of attack and at a low<br />
airspeed, are <strong>high</strong> risk because of <strong>in</strong>sufficient altitude to recover from a stall if it was to develop<br />
and the subsequent likelihood of a terra<strong>in</strong> collision.<br />
Figure 7 shows that despite more of these types of reports to the ATSB <strong>in</strong> recent years<br />
(particularly s<strong>in</strong>ce mid–2011), there cont<strong>in</strong>ued to be only a small number of stall <strong>warn<strong>in</strong>gs</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>high</strong> <strong>capacity</strong> air transport <strong>aircraft</strong> that were managed <strong>in</strong> such a way that there was an<br />
<strong>in</strong>creased risk of a stall, a temporary control loss, or <strong>in</strong>jury. <strong>The</strong> <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> stall warn<strong>in</strong>g reports<br />
with no accident risk <strong>in</strong> Figure 7 strongly suggests that the overall <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g trend is due to better<br />
report<strong>in</strong>g of stall <strong>warn<strong>in</strong>gs</strong> to the ATSB, with some seasonal spikes over summer months due to<br />
<strong>in</strong>creased turbulence.<br />
<strong>The</strong> very <strong>high</strong> risk occurrence shown <strong>in</strong> the October to December 2010 quarter was the Qantas<br />
A380 accident described earlier. <strong>The</strong>re were two stall <strong>warn<strong>in</strong>gs</strong> occurrences assessed by the<br />
ATSB as represent<strong>in</strong>g a <strong>high</strong> accident risk. Both <strong>in</strong>volved Boe<strong>in</strong>g 717 <strong>aircraft</strong>, and both were<br />
10<br />
11<br />
12<br />
This Advisory Circular provides FAA recommended practices for stall and stick pusher tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, and can be found at<br />
www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC%20120-109.pdf.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Event Risk Classification (ERC) methodology is used by the ATSB to make assessments of the safety risk<br />
associated with occurrences. For more <strong>in</strong>formation on how the ATSB uses occurrence and <strong>in</strong>vestigation data to drive<br />
proactive safety improvements, see Godley (2012).<br />
<strong>The</strong> methodology is from the report <strong>The</strong> ARMS Methodology for Operational Risk Assessment <strong>in</strong> Aviation<br />
Organisations (version 4.1, March 2010). ARMS is an <strong>in</strong>dustry work<strong>in</strong>g group set up 2007 <strong>in</strong> order to<br />
develop a new and better methodology for Operational Risk Assessments. It is a non-political, non-profit<br />
work<strong>in</strong>g group, with a mission to produce a good risk assessment methodology for the <strong>in</strong>dustry. <strong>The</strong> results<br />
are freely available to the whole <strong>in</strong>dustry and to anyone else <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> the concept.<br />
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