Generics, Frequency Adverbs, and Probability

This requirement follows naturally from the homogeneity constraint; the reference
class must be homogeneous with respect to the property of being a
rhino, given the space partition. Therefore, for (43) to be true, rhinos must
be distributed more or less evenly across Africa.
Note that while Krifka
et al. claim that (43) would be false in a situation where all rhinos are concentrated
in one spot, it seems to me that in this case the sentence would
be bad, rather than simply false. The appropriate response to (43) seems to
be something like But they are all in the same place!, rather than a simple
denial of its truth. This is explained by the fact that the homogeneity of the
reference class of the probability judgment is a presupposition, rather than
an entailment.
4 Summary
The goal of this paper has been to provide a unified account for a variety of
puzzling properties of generics and frequency statements. I have argued that
these constructions express probability judgments, interpreted as expressions
of hypothetical relative frequency, and claimed that this move provides explanations
for eight puzzling phenomena:
1. Generics and frequency statements may be true even in the absence
of supporting instances, because they are evaluated with respect to
possible future histories, where relevant instances do occur.
2. The truth value of a generic or a frequency statement would remain
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