- Page 1 and 2: Punishment and Personal Responsibil
- Page 3 and 4: ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...................
- Page 5: 8.6 MORAL AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCE
- Page 9: 3 Outside the Department of politic
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- Page 15 and 16: 9 abuses, it is an acceptable insti
- Page 17 and 18: 11 follows from the nature of the a
- Page 19 and 20: 13 would merely serve to produce di
- Page 21 and 22: 15 1.3 CLASH OF INTUITIONS The theo
- Page 23 and 24: 17 ment is instead primarily about
- Page 25 and 26: 19 Sticking point 3. Personal respo
- Page 27 and 28: esponsiveness (see e.g. Fischer & R
- Page 29 and 30: 23 ample clean, that the quality of
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- Page 33 and 34: 27 The point of contention here goe
- Page 35 and 36: 29 Penal policy over time Let’s b
- Page 37 and 38: 31 port, authorities should in the
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- Page 41 and 42: 35 tion is in effect also to provid
- Page 43 and 44: 37 als unimportant, you can safely
- Page 45 and 46: 39 seem, as Marx once said, as corr
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- Page 49 and 50: of justice. I here follow James Rac
- Page 51 and 52: 45 2. Rules, Wrongs and Punishment
- Page 53 and 54: 47 A second reason to presuppose a
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51 2.3 CRIME AND WRONGDOING What ki
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53 mate. There may be cases where i
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55 The upshot of Durkheim’s argum
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57 How many type R rules there are
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59 and uphold rules that are legiti
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62 By design, I shall only be able
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64 independent and coherent justifi
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66 ter 1, Bentham thus wrote: “Al
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68 To make deterrence the chief aim
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70 guilt plays no principled part i
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72 empirical claim, which may well
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74 on a person for having broken a
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76 that, as far as rehabilitation g
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78 Furthermore, some are troubled b
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80 breakers. At a more principled l
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82 desert-based theories of justice
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84 would be most instrumental in gi
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86 The kind of retributivism I will
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88 RETRIBUTIVISM IS NECESSARILY TOU
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90 fracture for fracture, eye for e
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92 The relative interpretation of p
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94 Table 3.1 Two proportional penal
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96 ploy. Lacking an absolute standa
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98 bly worked as a conservative pri
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100 would be incorrect to say that
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102 My claim will be that retributi
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104 nately (e. g between five and t
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106 and/or different institutional
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108 These are the kind of questions
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110 punish those who deserve it: if
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112 treated if he is granted clemen
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114 too. First of all, some crimes
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116 being treated in accordance wit
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119 4. The Strange ‘Right to be P
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121 Kant wrote a fuming denunciatio
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123 breaking being punished, this i
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its are such that all can and shoul
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127 5. The Institutional Reason for
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129 retributivists to defend not on
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131 an important element when punis
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133 The only principle out of the f
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135 of punishment, it trivially fol
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137 most just penal regime possible
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139 plastic and without specific co
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141 it is also the theory upon whic
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143 one, Rawls concludes. As long a
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145 A rule-utilitarian might object
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persons. In short, a retributive co
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150 These models are foundational t
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152 fective institutional design. I
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154 behaviour is fully caused by ne
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156 From such a conception of rule
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158 In spite of these problems, the
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160 committed in the sense of being
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162 tuition: it is the fact that pe
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164 explanations are explanations i
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166 in this respect, the retributiv
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168 so. One of the most straightfor
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170 other job-markets. Commenting o
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172 “For, within any rationalist
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174 cally false, in the RM and the
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176 6.6 RESPECT FOR PERSONS AND THE
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178 ing from a disorder that underm
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180 also agree that the punishment
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182 This is true (although one coul
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184 reasons given above: the point
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186 Let us begin this task by analy
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188 pose there is a perfectly clear
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190 ders. This seems to clearly con
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192 (1) One could wonder whether it
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194 6.10 TAKING STOCK: THE OBJECTIO
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196 suffices to say that the instit
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198 sible for what he does and just
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Part III. An Objection to Retributi
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204 more we become able to understa
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206 The view that there is a differ
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208 conscience deny the patient the
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210 7.3 EXPLANATIONS AS EXCUSES As
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212 In more technical words, an exp
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214 explanation of how our life unf
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216 could have done otherwise and d
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218 P 1 : Homosexuality is an inher
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220 propose that the possible biolo
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222 The proposal adds that homosexu
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224 What is the present view of hom
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226 happened - at least to such an
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228 Thus, if Goldhagen is right in
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230 Philipson and Posner assume all
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232 towards regress. But above all,
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234 Strawson believes that the part
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236 and the human isolation which t
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238 cumstances, characters, anteced
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240 sible to adopt something like t
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242 seems rational and normal. We t
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245 8. The Thesis of Hard Determini
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247 Socio-economic (Patterson 1998)
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249 1a) Libertarianism. If D were t
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251 in action. In short, D is a pre
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253 for both good and evil in the f
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255 The argument for hard determini
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257 is nothing logically incoherent
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259 it is still the case that some
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261 want to do so. Moreover, he or
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263 Appraising compatibilism Compat
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265 then Y” is an example of a de
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267 offered can be said to rely on
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difference if anomalies are genuine
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271 Social scientist who deal with
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273 sense in which I was 0.7 likely
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8.5 OBJECTION 3: THE DIFFERENCE BET
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277 good way to get food can just a
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279 to point out, identify the diff
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281 it is crucial to see that even
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283 A rehabilitationalist penal reg
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285 This question may seem unwarran
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287 context) if her choice determin
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289 choice can thus be motivated in
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291 uniquely human capacity for aut
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293 The unifying account of B.F. Sk
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295 creates, and in doing so he rem
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297 Of direct relevance for our pur
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299 8.7 CONCLUSIONS In Skinner’s
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301 9. Betting Against Hard Determi
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303 sume that the principle of insu
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305 true or false (with respects to
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sponses to rule breaking, and Rache
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309 dated standing of quantum physi
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311 cord, to treat determinism as t
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313 9.2 Four outcomes of the bet Q1
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315 9.3 The payoff tree T We are ri
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317 question the claim that we do n
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319 be written as they are written
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321 nity. He is the one who control
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323 tion for themselves, which, if
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327 10. A Justified Penal Regime?
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329 10.2 WHY HOLD RESPONSIBLE? The
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331 reader. Does it make any sense
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333 regime should be fashioned, but
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335 patible with a retributive pena
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337 out punishment per se. But as w
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339 jection runs as follows: a retr
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341 to claim. A severely deprived c
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343 fewer crimes are committed and
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345 Social Background is an excuse,
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347 excuses, then, the Rotten Socia
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349 regime. Given that we all have
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351 logical or consequentialist rea
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353 REFERENCES Anderson, Elizabeth
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Darwall, Stepehn L, 2005: »Theorie
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Glover, Jonathan, 1970: Responsibil
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Knobe, Joshua, 2007: »Experimental
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—, 2001: Living Without Free Will
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Smart, J.J.C., 1961: »Free Will, P