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09HDC01565 - Health and Disability Commissioner

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Opinion <strong>09HDC01565</strong><br />

night <strong>and</strong> early morning. This is what department <strong>and</strong> patient protocols are for…‖. Dr<br />

E does not consider there was any lack of supervision on his part.<br />

164. Dr E states that ―there is no clear evidence that [Mr A] died of a respiratory event, <strong>and</strong><br />

[…] it could equally have been a (sudden) cardiac or other event‖. Dr E states there is<br />

―definitely no consensus amongst the treating physicians with the [CDHB‘s] RCA<br />

opinion of a possible respiratory event‖.<br />

Dr F<br />

165. Dr F submits there was no indication that there was any confusion with regard to his<br />

postoperative instructions, <strong>and</strong> as such, he does not consider he should have been<br />

expected to clarify his instructions in this specific case. He states that in his<br />

experience it is usual practice for postoperative orders to be followed if there is a<br />

perceived conflict with the unit‘s protocol, ―that is, where a protocol is expected to be<br />

followed, instructions directing staff to follow the specific protocol would normally<br />

be prescribed‖.<br />

166. Dr F states that while he accepts the criticism regarding the lack of specific<br />

instructions in the postoperative orders, he considers ―it is a reasonable expectation of<br />

all medical staff that regular general/vital observations would be performed in all<br />

postoperative patients regardless of whether they are on a PCA or have had cranial<br />

surgery‖.<br />

167. Dr F also notes his concern regarding the fact that Mr A was found with no oxygen<br />

saturation monitor attached <strong>and</strong> with the monitor switched off. In these circumstances,<br />

he states, it is uncertain ―whether specific postoperative instructions would have<br />

changed or prevented the outcome as prescribed parameters could never have<br />

triggered an alert‖.<br />

168. Dr F notes that he is pleased to hear about the new measures <strong>and</strong> monitors that have<br />

been put in place at CDHB. He considers the ―single most important change, which is<br />

indispensable, is the reinforcement of continuous nursing (including h<strong>and</strong>over within<br />

the [SCU])‖.<br />

RN Ms I<br />

169. RN Ms I‘s legal counsel, Mr P, notes that RN Ms I conducted many of Mr A‘s<br />

observations on an hourly basis, <strong>and</strong> she was observing him regularly. Mr P submits<br />

that ―RN [Ms I‘s] failure to record [Mr A‘s] respiratory rate on no more than a few<br />

occasions had no influence on the outcome of this tragedy‖ <strong>and</strong> was not a causative<br />

factor.<br />

170. Mr P states that the advice of my nursing expert, Janet Hewson, that respiratory rates<br />

should be recorded at all times, is accepted. He submits that any disapproval of RN<br />

Ms I in relation to this matter would be mild, given the other observations undertaken<br />

by RN Ms I.<br />

29 5 September 2012<br />

Names have been removed (except Canterbury DHB <strong>and</strong> the experts who advised on this case) to<br />

protect privacy. Identifying letters are assigned in alphabetical order <strong>and</strong> bear no relationship to the<br />

person’s actual name.

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