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Corporate Governance for Banks in Southeast Europe: Policy - IFC

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A5. Role of the chair 29<br />

The chair of the board plays a crucial role <strong>in</strong> the<br />

governance of the bank. A good chairperson can br<strong>in</strong>g<br />

out the talents of board members and provide the<br />

leadership and context necessary <strong>for</strong> board members<br />

to contribute. A bad chairperson can stifle debate and<br />

hamper the board <strong>in</strong> achiev<strong>in</strong>g its objectives. One of<br />

the most important responsibilities of the chair is to set<br />

the board agenda and ensure that important decisions<br />

are subject to proper discussion and exam<strong>in</strong>ation.<br />

The Need <strong>for</strong> Strong Board Leadership<br />

“If push comes to shove, and you asked<br />

me to choose between f<strong>in</strong>ancial <strong>in</strong>dustry<br />

expertise and leadership skills, I would<br />

say go with leadership skills.”<br />

Cather<strong>in</strong>e Lawton, United K<strong>in</strong>gdom<br />

More specifically, the chair’s responsibilities are to ensure that 1) the board receives accurate, timely, and clear<br />

<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation from management to enable the board to make sound decisions; 2) sufficient time is allowed<br />

<strong>for</strong> discussion of complex or contentious issues; 3) constructive debate and criticism flourish; 4) effective<br />

communication with board committees occurs; 5) <strong>in</strong>duction and other tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g opportunities exist; 6) the<br />

per<strong>for</strong>mance of the board is evaluated at least once a year; and 7) plans are made <strong>for</strong> strengthen<strong>in</strong>g the<br />

board and bank governance.<br />

SEE chairpersons may not fully appreciate some of these general and specific responsibilities that contribute<br />

to the sound governance of the bank. They tend, understandably, to be more focused on per<strong>for</strong>mance<br />

issues. However, governance ultimately <strong>in</strong>fluences bank per<strong>for</strong>mance by affect<strong>in</strong>g the quality of decision<br />

mak<strong>in</strong>g at the board level. More progressive and <strong>for</strong>ward-look<strong>in</strong>g board leadership is a key to improv<strong>in</strong>g bank<br />

governance. The need <strong>for</strong> leadership may be particularly important <strong>in</strong> boards of subsidiaries of <strong>for</strong>eign groups,<br />

where the work may focus narrowly on implement<strong>in</strong>g directions from the home office.<br />

Best practice <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly suggests that the roles of chief executive officer and chairperson be separated<br />

or that other means be found to provide an appropriate counterbalance to the powers of the executive. In<br />

countries with two-tier boards, the roles should be separate by def<strong>in</strong>ition, s<strong>in</strong>ce executives should not sit on<br />

supervisory boards. In countries where s<strong>in</strong>gle-tier boards exist, there is cont<strong>in</strong>ued discussion on whether the<br />

roles of chairperson and chief executive officer should be separated.<br />

The argument <strong>in</strong> favor of comb<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the two is that it provides a better understand<strong>in</strong>g of the operational<br />

issues at board level, fewer decision-mak<strong>in</strong>g hurdles, better <strong>in</strong>tegration of strategy and tactics, and clearer<br />

direction. The arguments aga<strong>in</strong>st are that it is hard <strong>for</strong> other board members to challenge a powerful chief<br />

executive officer who is also chairperson, <strong>in</strong>dependent board members can be <strong>in</strong>timidated and neutralized,<br />

and the evaluation of board and executive per<strong>for</strong>mance becomes biased. In the end, the argument <strong>for</strong> is<br />

based on the notion that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the roles of monitor and executor.<br />

In SEE, the chair of <strong>for</strong>eign subsidiaries are usually executives from the home office of the bank. So, <strong>in</strong> effect,<br />

there is a separation of the roles of chairperson and chief executive officer among the vast majority of banks,<br />

though such separation does not automatically guarantee sufficient control of the executive. Among locally<br />

owned banks, the chair is often the major shareholder or the major shareholder’s representative, and the<br />

roles of chair and chief executive officer may be comb<strong>in</strong>ed.<br />

29 2010 BIS Pr<strong>in</strong>ciples, Section III.A, p. 12.<br />

<strong>Corporate</strong> <strong>Governance</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Banks</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Southeast</strong> <strong>Europe</strong> <strong>Policy</strong> Brief 23

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