On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
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The <strong>Optimal</strong> Auction Problem<br />
Extending <strong>the</strong> analysis to N buyers:<br />
[ ∑N<br />
]<br />
Under truth-telling, <strong>the</strong> expected revenue = E<br />
n=1 M n(X) ,<br />
where <strong>the</strong> random vector X {X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X N }.<br />
The <strong>Optimal</strong> Auction Problem (OAP)<br />
maximize<br />
π,M<br />
[ N<br />
]<br />
∑<br />
E M n (X) ,<br />
n=1<br />
subject to: truth-telling and voluntary particip<strong>at</strong>ion.