On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
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Model<br />
A Bayesian framework<br />
The value of a buyer n:<br />
A realiz<strong>at</strong>ion of a discrete random variable X n .<br />
X n ∈ {xn 1 , xn 2 , . . . , xn<br />
Kn<br />
}, where 0 ≤ xn 1 < xn 2 < . . . < xn Kn<br />
.<br />
p i n P(X n = x i n), assume p i n > 0.<br />
<strong>On</strong>e-dimensional priv<strong>at</strong>e inform<strong>at</strong>ion:<br />
Beliefs:<br />
The exact realiz<strong>at</strong>ion of X n is known only to buyer n.<br />
X n ’s are independent across <strong>the</strong> buyers.<br />
The probability distributions of X n ’s are common knowledge.