On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
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Does It Work?<br />
Buyer 1 Buyer 2<br />
1<br />
1/2 1/2<br />
Bundle {A}<br />
Bundle {A} Bundle {A,B}<br />
1<br />
1/2 1/2 9/10 1/10<br />
$1 $2 $4 $2 $4<br />
__ __ __ __ __<br />
W = $1 W = $0 W = $4 W = $16/9 W = $4<br />
For <strong>the</strong> bid ({A}, $4), buyer 2 gets <strong>the</strong> bundle {A} for $4.<br />
For <strong>the</strong> bid ({A, B}, $4), buyer 2 gets <strong>the</strong> bundle {A, B} for $2.<br />
Thus, buyer 2 will misreport type ({A}, $4) as ({A, B}, $4).<br />
A counter example!