On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
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ELR Bound - Single Item <strong>Auctions</strong> with i.i.d. Buyers<br />
Moving beyond binary valu<strong>at</strong>ions but restricting to single item.<br />
Reduction to a rel<strong>at</strong>ively simpler optimiz<strong>at</strong>ion problem involving<br />
only <strong>the</strong> common probability vector of <strong>the</strong> buyers.<br />
Lower and upper bounds (asymptotically tight as K → ∞) on <strong>the</strong><br />
worst case ELR.<br />
The worst case ELR → 0 as N → ∞ <strong>at</strong> <strong>the</strong> r<strong>at</strong>e O ( (1 − 1/r) N) .<br />
The worst case ELR → 1 as K → ∞ and r → ∞.
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