On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...

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Single-Minded Buyers A relatively more tractable class of CAs. Each buyer is interested only in a specific bundle. Both the bundle and its value are known only to the buyer. Any bundle of items not containing his desired bundle has zero value for him.
Why Study Single-Minded Buyers Model? Key is to understand and handle complementarity. A bundle as a whole can be more valuable than the sum of values of its parts. Single-minded buyers - an extreme case of complementarity. Problem is still nontrivial (two dimensional): A buyer can misreport both his bundle and its value. No general result on revenue maximization is known even for this extreme case. Some real examples where buyers are single minded.
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On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Au
Page 3 and 4: What Makes It Hard? Private values:
Page 5 and 6: Our Contributions Most of the liter
Page 7 and 8: Outline 1 Review of revenue optimal
Page 9 and 10: Model A Bayesian framework The valu
Page 11 and 12: The Components of an Auction .Bid v
Page 13 and 14: The Constraints First, focus on one
Page 15 and 16: Geometric Interpretation Let A 0 (
Page 17 and 18: Simplifying the Constraints A payme
Page 19 and 20: Graphical Construction of Virtual V
Page 27 and 28: The Optimal Auction Problem Extendi
Page 29 and 30: Simplifying OAP Revenue(π) maximu
Page 31 and 32: The Maximum Weight Algorithm (MWA)
Page 33 and 34: Outline 1 Review of revenue optimal
Page 35 and 36: Some Questions How different is a r
Page 37 and 38: Revenue vs Efficiency - Example 1 T
Page 43 and 44: Revenue vs Efficiency - Example 3 E
Page 45 and 46: Quantifying Efficiency Loss For an
Page 47 and 48: Worst Case ELR Computation - Exampl
Page 49 and 50: Worst Case ELR Computation - Exampl
Page 51 and 52: ELR Bound - Single Item Auctions wi
Page 53: Limitations of General CAs Implemen
Page 57 and 58: Extending the Model to Single-Minde
Page 59 and 60: Does It Work? Buyer 1 Buyer 2 1 1/2
Page 61 and 62: Does It Work? Buyer 1 Buyer 2 1 1/2
Page 63 and 64: The Sufficient Condition Hazard rat
Page 65: Concluding Remarks A revenue optima
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On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...

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