8. Harsanyi, J., 1973, Oddness of the number of equilibrium points: a new proof, International Journal of <strong>Game</strong> <strong>Theory</strong>, 2, 235-250. 9. Kakutani, S., 1941, A generalization of Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, Duke Mathematical Journal, 8, 457-459. 10. Kahneman, D., <strong>and</strong> A. Tversky, 1979, Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk, Econometrica, 47, 263-291. 11. Kohlberg, E., <strong>and</strong> J.-F. Mertens, 1986, On the strategic stability of equilibria, Econometrica, 54, 1003-1037. 12. Kreps, D., <strong>and</strong> R. Wilson, 1982, Sequential equilibria, Econometrica, 50, 863-894. 13. Kuhn, H., 1953, Extensive games <strong>and</strong> the problem of information, Annals of Mathematics Studies, No. 28, Prince<strong>to</strong>n University Press. 14. Milgrom, P., <strong>and</strong> R. Weber, 1982, A theory of auctions <strong>and</strong> competitive bidding, Econometrica, 50, 1089-1122. 15. Myerson, R., 1978, Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept, International Journal of <strong>Game</strong> <strong>Theory</strong>, 7, 73-80. 16. Nash, J., 1950, Equilibrium points in n-person games, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36, 48-49. 17. Newbery, D., 1984, Pare<strong>to</strong> inferior trade, Review of Economic Studies, 51, 1-12. 18. Orsborne, M. J., <strong>and</strong> A. Rubinstein, 1994, A Course in <strong>Game</strong> <strong>Theory</strong>, MIT Press. 19. Selten, R., 1965, Spieltheoretische Beh<strong>and</strong>lung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit, Zeitchrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 12, 301-324. 20. Selten, R., 1975, Re-examination of the prefectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games, International Journal of <strong>Game</strong> <strong>Theory</strong>, 4, 25-55. 46
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- Page 1 and 2: Game Theory with Applications to Fi
- Page 3: is a trembling-hand perfect equilib
- Page 6 and 7: Then F , inheriting the main proper
- Page 8 and 9: equilibrium for players 2 and 3, gi
- Page 10 and 11: that for all i, A i ⊂ Σ i is non
- Page 12 and 13: and Σ ∞ i Σ t i ≡ {σ i ∈
- Page 14 and 15: an (objective) correlated equilibri
- Page 16 and 17: When (1) holds, indeed a pure strat
- Page 18 and 19: terms, x is a point of jump for the
- Page 20 and 21: lemma 5, we have Π i = p i {[1 −
- Page 22 and 23: the dealing frequency for both firm
- Page 24 and 25: does. Hence, by the fact that α =
- Page 26 and 27: Note that the above indifference eq
- Page 28 and 29: 25. Example 7. Two firms A and B co
- Page 30 and 31: Segment Population Valuation for A
- Page 32 and 33: ⎧ ⎪⎨ 0, x < 2; F 6 (x) = ⎪
- Page 34 and 35: At first, note that exerting a high
- Page 36 and 37: of the firm? Solution. For part (i)
- Page 38 and 39: Solution. Consider the SPNE describ
- Page 40 and 41: firm 2 would choose to stay at date
- Page 42 and 43: The solution is q 2 = ψ ∗ (p 1 ,
- Page 44 and 45: At the beginning of period 2, firm