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5 ........................Chennai Chapter Report 6 ... - National HRD Network

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Employee Stock Options (ESOPs)<br />

– Dr. T.H.Chowdary<br />

Many new economy companies in the<br />

IT, software and telecommunications<br />

have been issuing employee stock options.<br />

They proudly pronounce them as part of their<br />

policy to create value for stake- holders; that<br />

is, equity share holders and employees. It<br />

has become fashionable to issue stock<br />

options. That these are a deception, a fraud<br />

on the equity share holders has been<br />

established by no less a person than the<br />

Nobel Laureate, Joseph Stiglitz in his book,<br />

"The Roaring Nineties". To state briefly, he<br />

holds that these are expenses which the<br />

company incurs but are not explicitly shown<br />

in the Profit and Loss Account or Balance<br />

Sheet of the companies. These depress the<br />

profits as well as reduce the market value<br />

of the equity shares. The share holders<br />

cannot make out this well-concealed effect<br />

from a reading of the P&L account and<br />

Balance Sheet. The following are his<br />

observations.<br />

2. Stock options, the right to buy<br />

company's stock at below market prices -<br />

and then pretending that nothing of value<br />

has changed hands was extensively<br />

resorted to by Silicon Valley companies<br />

since the 1990s…..Options were of course<br />

a terrific recruiting tool for small profitless<br />

start -ups that could never have come up<br />

with their equivalent cash. One of the<br />

corporate Manthras of the day was, through<br />

stock options, "bring manager and share<br />

holder interest into alignment." Since no<br />

actual stock got issued until they were<br />

"exercised (which might be several years<br />

down the road), they did not have to be<br />

acknowledged as an expense - a some thing<br />

the firm has spent, or a liability it has incurred<br />

in order to do business that year. Thus, a<br />

company could please employees and<br />

bottom -line conscious investors at the same<br />

time".<br />

"By 2001, options accounted for an<br />

estimated 80 percent of the compensation<br />

of American corporate managers, and the<br />

impact on the Balance Sheet wasn't exactly<br />

trivial, either. IF Microsoft had been required<br />

to acknowledge the value of the options it<br />

doled out that year, the effect would have<br />

been to reduce the company's 2001 profits<br />

(officially, $7.3 billion) by a third. The same<br />

play had enabled both Starbucks and Cisco,<br />

among other companies, to boost profits by<br />

20 percent or more. Intel's profits would have<br />

been cut to a fifth, from $1.3 billion to $254<br />

million, and Yahoo!'s losses would have<br />

increased tenfold, from $93 million to $ 983<br />

million.<br />

Using this device of stock options some of<br />

the notoriously failed companies like Enron,<br />

World Com, Adelphia , the most flagrant and<br />

well publicized of many companies, went<br />

more and more into new ways of maximizing<br />

executives' gains at unwary investors<br />

expense.<br />

The Financial Accounting Standards Board<br />

(FASB) of the USA, an independent body<br />

responsible for formulating accounting<br />

standards came out with draft rules intended<br />

to make companies put a reasonable value<br />

on options and list them as expense but the<br />

FASB was destructively criticized by the<br />

Chiefs of the then Chiefs of companies of<br />

the likes of Enron, WorldCom and Home<br />

Depot, characterizing the FASB's rules as a<br />

terrible blow to the free enterprise system"<br />

which would make it impossible to start up<br />

new businesses . In the event the FASB<br />

adopted a watered down rule that merely<br />

required companies to report all stock options<br />

in foot notes to their financial statements.<br />

Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the Securities<br />

Exchange Board (SEB) later called it the<br />

"biggest mistake" of his tenure at the SEB .<br />

3. Executive pay became a topic of<br />

growing controversy in the later part of the<br />

decade, as stock options enabled the likes<br />

of John Chambers of Cisco, Dennis<br />

Kozlowski of Tyco, Stanford I.Weill of<br />

Citicorp, and David Komansky of Merrill<br />

Lynch to pocket millions of dollars. But while<br />

there was plenty of outrage over the<br />

amounts of money involved - the popular<br />

view was simply that these executives were<br />

being paid too much-other aspects of the<br />

question got slighted.<br />

4. Stock options depressed the share<br />

value in the market in the following way.<br />

When executives (or other employees)<br />

receive stock options, a company is<br />

committing itself to issue new stock, thereby<br />

diluting the value of the existing stock.<br />

Assume a case in which there are already 1<br />

million shares outstanding, each worth $30;<br />

that would make the company's value ( or<br />

"market capitalization") $30 million. If its<br />

executives get, say, an additional 1 million<br />

shares free, then the old shareholders will<br />

have to share the company's wealth-and<br />

future profits-with these "new" shareholders,<br />

and the value of each share will fall to $15.<br />

Thus, the shareholders effectively pay the<br />

executives $15 million - not straight out of<br />

their own pockets, but through the<br />

diminution in their share value.<br />

5. The Nobel Laureate Stiglitz says , "we<br />

might speak of stock options as corporate<br />

theft -executives stealing money from their<br />

very share holders". He further wrote that it<br />

is absolutely wrong to hold that the<br />

performance of the management has<br />

anything to do with the share price in the<br />

market. He observes, "in a stock market<br />

boom most of the increase in the value of<br />

stock has nothing to do with the efforts of<br />

the management" .<br />

6. He further observes trenchantly, the<br />

incentive pay that Compensations<br />

Committees of some companies<br />

characterize the stock options is an<br />

euphemism for "big pay". Cisco's John<br />

Chambers voluntarily cut his annual pay to<br />

$1 but still received a 6 million stock option<br />

in fiscal 2001 even as his company lost $1<br />

billion and its stock price fell 70 percent. But<br />

the practice is so widespread that on<br />

average, there appears little relationship<br />

between compensation and reward.<br />

7. During the 1990s senior executive<br />

compensation rose by 442 percent in eight<br />

years, from an average of $2 million to $<br />

10.6 million. Compensation of American<br />

executives was completely out of line<br />

relative to the salaries of middle<br />

management, relative to the salaries of<br />

workers, relative to anything imaginable.<br />

While senior executive compensation rose<br />

36 percent in 1998 over 1997, the wages of<br />

the average blue-collar worker rose just 2.7<br />

percent in the same period. And the pattern<br />

was repeated over and over again. Even in<br />

2001, a disaster year of profits and stock<br />

prices, executive CEO pay increased twice<br />

as fast as the pay of the average worker.<br />

8. The Nobel Laureate goes on to compare<br />

the compensations in some countries as<br />

follows: In Japan, executive pay is typically<br />

10 times that of the average worker; in Great<br />

Britain executive pay is 25 times that of the<br />

average worker; by 2000 in America, CEOs<br />

were getting more than 500 times the wages<br />

of the average employee, up from 85 times<br />

at the beginning of the decade and 42 times<br />

two decades earlier<br />

9. He concludes most educatively; " new<br />

forms of deception have been developed.<br />

In the go-go environment of the 1990s while<br />

market values soared, human values<br />

eroded, and the playing field became terribly<br />

unlevel once again, contributing to the<br />

bubble that burst soon after the beginning<br />

Contd. on Page 32<br />

Dr. T Hanuman Choudary is Fellow: Tata Consultancy Services & Satyam Computer Services and Former Chairman & Managing Director,<br />

Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. E-Mail: hanuman.chowdary@tcs.com & thc@satyam.com<br />

| <strong>HRD</strong> News Letter | April 2008, Vol.24, Issue:1 33

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