Rosa's Story - Coady International Institute - St. Francis Xavier ...

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time) fell to USD 7/barrel. Perhaps sensing disaster, wealthy individuals began moving their money out of the country. In a two-week period in 1999 more than USD 1.5 billion was withdrawn from the financial system. Several banks collapsed, hundreds of thousands of Ecuadorians lost their savings and inflation soared. In an effort to combat this crisis, Ecuador adopted the US dollar as its currency. Dollarization stabilized the currency but had many negative impacts on Ecuador’s domestic economy and the lives of its people. The cost of labour in Ecuador rose relative to Peru and Columbia and, as a result, many of Ecuador’s manufacturers moved their operations outside the country or went bankrupt. These factors led to a mass out-migration of Ecuadorians, which began during the economic crisis, and has continued to be a major issue. Particularly hard hit are the rural areas, where some towns have seen most of their men that gripped Ecuador starting in early 2000 (see Figure 3). In response to growing debt and rapid inflation, the government took the drastic measure of adopting the US dollar as the national currency. Dollarization increased Jambi Kiwa’s costs, particularly for fresh plants and labour. In late 2001, association members were asked to pay dues and contribute labour at the factory in order to keep the business viable. As a result, some members left the organization but the committed ones remained. Rosa describes the struggle to maintain a clear vision among members: I can recall a situation when a group of producers came and wanted to become members of Jambi Kiwa. They wanted to know what the profitability was going to be each month. I said, “Our benefits are not just economic and financial – they are about learning, training, improving the biodiversity of the community and having a better diet.” That is the challenge – finding people [who] are willing to be part of this vision (personal communication, October 14). Despite financial constraints, committed members continued to emerge and Jambi Kiwa was able to grow. With growth, however, came a need to restructure the production process. A factory manager and two factory staff were hired. At the same time, a young industrial engineer, Inti Macias, was hired to offer support to the new factory manager. She improved the efficiency of the production process by developing job descriptions and adjusting the layout of the factory. As well, a bookkeeper assumed much of the day-today accounting required by CIDA for the CSI/CECI project. Wiliber Ibarra, a Jambi Kiwa producer, began training under the CECI cooperants to become the director of marketing for Jambi Kiwa. To increase potential markets for Jambi Kiwa products, producers also needed 14
training that would earn them “green seal” status, or certification from Bio Control Systems. To increase the volume of production needed to successfully commercialize the business, a permanent facility with new equipment became a priority. 1.3 Outside Organizations Respond Over the next two years, Jambi Kiwa was able to progress in terms of both commercialization and its larger social vision of reclaiming and valuing traditional knowledge and culture by forming relationships with a series of external organizations. Some of these organizations sought out Jambi Kiwa, attracted by its early success. Others were approached by Jambi Kiwa members to support a specific aspect of its work. Several relationships resulted from the reputation that Jambi Kiwa had developed within the donor community. Small grants allowed Jambi Kiwa members to make use of a second building for a temporary factory, purchase a new mill, replace an electric dryer with a gas model, and create a root drying facility . A staff member was sent to take training courses on marketing natural products at the Interamerican Cooperative <strong>Institute</strong> (ICI) in Panama. Rosa and her colleagues were also able to broker a partnership between the Association, Scarboro Missions, CIDA and the Comart Foundation (which had already agreed to supply Jambi Kiwa with a vehicle). This meant that a much-needed permanent factory could be built, solar energy technology could be acquired, a truck could be purchased, and management training for several women leaders could be arranged 2 . 2 The most significant of these was a CAD 40,000 donation by the Sisters of Notre Dame in Montreal. Like many other Jambi Kiwa relationships this one came about through the referral of another Jambi Kiwa partner, in this case CECI. 15 migrate to one of the major cities in Ecuador, Spain, Italy or the United <strong>St</strong>ates. Between 1999 and 2004, nearly 1/4 of the population left the country. While migration has depleted the rural areas of a labour force it has also proved to be a major source of income for rural families. In 2003, remittances (money sent home from family members working in cities or abroad) from Spain alone totalled USD 849 million dollars, $103 million more than the previous year. It has become Ecuador’s single largest source of foreign exchange, even greater than oil. One of the effects of these remittances is that they have allowed families to continue living in rural areas even when they lose money on their farming activities.
Page 2 and 3: Content ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . .
Page 4 and 5: AUTHOR’S NOTE I have to admit tha
Page 6 and 7: • Figure 1: Rosa’s Story My nam
Page 8 and 9: • Figure 2 1.0 THE JAMBI KIWA STO
Page 10 and 11: Riobamba, was a leader in this move
Page 12 and 13: The Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacio
Page 16 and 17: Jambi Kiwa was beginning to attract
Page 18 and 19: province (a member of RPPMMN) to he
Page 20 and 21: medicinal recipes and formulas that
Page 22 and 23: that were part of indigenous cultur
Page 24 and 25: • Figure 6 Cuatro Esquinas: In th
Page 26 and 27: The additional household income gai
Page 28 and 29: New community health services in th
Page 30 and 31: When your land was yellow and now i
Page 32 and 33: encouraged to actively participate
Page 34 and 35: some key groups, and this is import
Page 36 and 37: Responding Rather than Driving The
Page 38 and 39: Jambi Kiwapac Causai appear by harv
Page 40 and 41: Organizational Model Rotating leade
Page 42 and 43: At the core of Jambi Kiwa’s succe
Page 44 and 45: APPENDIX A 44
Page 47: REFERENCES Bebbington, A. (1999). C

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