Lessons Learned from the USS Stark Attack (Boulay)

•The Germans in WWII were the first to use ASCMs.
•In 1967, Egypt sunk the Israeli destroyer Eilat with four Styx ASCMs. Egypt fired the missiles from
missile boats supplied by the Soviet Union.[vii]
•During the Falklands War (1982), four Argentine Navy Super Etendard fighters sunk a British Type
42 destroyer and a support ship, the Atlantic Conveyor, with Exocet missiles. A land-based Exocet
missile also struck the Royal Navy's HMS Glamorgan, but maneuvers made by the Glamorgan
minimized damage to the ship.[viii]
•During the tanker war, Iran and Iraq used anti-ship missiles in more than half of all attacks on
shipping. Iraq used missiles in approximately 80 percent of their attacks on commercial ships.
•The U.S. Navy used Harpoon missiles to sink an Iranian patrol boat, Joshan, during Operation
Praying Mantis in 1988.
•In Operation Desert Storm, Iraqis fired a Silkworm missile in the Gulf. The Silkworm was intercepted
and destroyed by a Sea Dart missile launched by HMS Gloucester.
•In 2006, Hezbollah fired a radar-guided[ix] C-802 at the Hanit, an Israeli corvette. Four Israeli sailors
were killed and the Hanit sustained significant damage. An additional C-802 missile fired at the
corvette missed, striking a nearby Cambodian-flagged merchant ship.[x]
•Tanker War/Iran Iraq War In Gulf – COMIDEASTFOR – LaSalle + 6 old DDG’s/FFG’s
•Cold War – last stages (Berlin wall 9 November 1989)
•Closest CV – Med/China Sea
•Saudi ports unavailable/ Bahrain and Dubai only ports allowed. Refueled on south side of
Oman from anchor.
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Evening of May 17 1987 approximately 2200 local time
•Stark Underway in the Southern Operation Area
•Approved to conduct engineering casualty control drills
•Combat systems online in modified condition 3
•CIWS secured
•Other systems in standby – 50% of condition 1 manning
•“Operations Normal” in Gulf
•2 ships on station, 4 in Bahrain, 1 in North Arabian Sea
•Coontz, LaSalle allognside pier
•Conyngham, Waddell at inner anchorage
•Reid operating outside straits of Hormuz
•Saudi AWACS/F-14’s (2) on station
•Iran Shuttle Tankers making runs
•Iraq Ship Attack Profile (SAP) activity underway
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•Representation from memory of operations chart for May 1987 in MEF.
•Red line marked the Eastern/Northern limits of operations
•Black lines show track of F-8 Mirage as reported by AWACS
•Red “X” marks Starks position when attacked.
Stark had received operations rules of engagement (ROE) and intelligence threat briefs from
Commander, Middle East Force (COMIDEASTFOR) in Djibouti on February 28, prior to arrival in the
theatre of operations. The ROE brief counseled conservative action and the potential threat to U.S.
Navy ships in the Persian Gulf. The brief stated that the probability of a deliberate attack on a U.S.
warship was low, but that an indiscriminate attack in the Persian Gulf was a significant danger. Stark
entered the Gulf in early March, conducting patrol operations in both the northern and central Gulf for
a period of approximately eight weeks. During this time, there were several visible missile attacks on
foreign flag vessels, but Stark was never threatened. Stark was also preparing for an upcoming
operational propulsion plant examination (OPPE) and had started to conduct drills and speed trials
during periods of time the CO deemed safe to do so.
No Higher Honor: Bradley Peninston 2006
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MIRAGE F-1
Length: 4.69 m
Diameter: 0.35 m
Launch Weight: 670.00 kg
Payload: 165 kg HE, fragmentation
Propulsion: Solid
Range: 70.00 km
Guidance: INS, active radar
The AM-39 Exocet is a short-range, solid propellant, single
warhead, air-launched, anti-ship cruise missile developed and
manufactured by France. Several hundred were fired in combat
during the Falklands conflict and the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980’s.
Iraq launched over 100 missiles against Iran during Iran-Iraq War
between 1980 and 1988
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“At 2109 on the night of May 17, the port bridge wing lookout sighted a glow that appeared inbound
from the horizon. The seaman called, "Missile il inbound, missile il inbound," on the sound powered
circuit. This information was passed into the bridge and the JL phone talker in CIC, but not to the
tactical action officer (TAO) in CIC. The junior officer of the deck (JOOD) also sighted the missile just
before it struck the portside of Stark below the bridge at frame 110. General quarters was sounded
almost simultaneously with the first hit. The JOOD then observed a second missile inbound, grabbed
the 1MC and announced, "Inbound missile, port side." At 2110, the second Exocet missile hit Stark in
the same location as the first. The first missile which did not detonate, instead disintegrated, parts of
which passed through the starboard side of the ship at frame 172. The warhead was found later on
the second deck at frame 171. The second missile exploded about three feet inside the skin of the
ship”.
USN Damage Control Museum
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“The explosion, blast and fragmentation of the second warhead caused severe structural damage to
the ship's hull, bulkheads and superstructure on the port side at frame 110. The shrapnel and blast
also caused catastrophic damage inside Stark between frames 100 and 140, destroying watertight
integrity, cracking arresting stakes, compromising fire boundaries and severing the port firemain
which immediately started to flood the ship and create a list to port. Each missile injected
approximately 300 pounds of propellant into the berthing complex. The combustion of the burning
propellant resulted in a near instantaneous heat release of 12 million BTUs, which caused a rapid
thermal pulse seldom seen in normal fires. The fire reached "flashover" in less than one minute.
(Flashover is a condition whereby overhead temperatures reach 1400-1500º F. When heat is this
intense, all combustible materials burst into flames and fire engulfs the space.) The majority of the
casualties (25) occurred in ship's control berthing.
As the surviving crewmembers scrambled to escape the berthing spaces, several donned EEBDs
and all proceeded to their practiced egress routes. Five men went through the hole in the skin of the
ship on the port side and were later picked up. All had used EEBDs before going ginto the water. All
other survivors used designated egress routes. Later inspection revealed five men were killed in
combat systems berthing and three in chief quarters berthing. “
USN Damage Control Museum
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“Casualties suffered as a result of the explosion significantly depleted the fire teams. In fact, both
repair party leaders, number 1 hose operators and investigators for Repair 2 and 3 had been killed in
the first moments of the conflagration. Strong leadership at the department head level and the solid
professionalism of the crew drove the remaining crewmembers to continue battling the fires. At 0134,
May 18, USS Waddell arrived on scene to provide medical and damage control supplies.”
USN Damage Control Museum
A Dutch salvage tug initially rendered assistance from the undamaged starboard side,
providing large amounts of water through three on deck “monitors” but did not offer
manpower. It left Stark’s side before first light due to concern that Stark would sink, capsize
or explode. She returned later after fires were under control and this photo was taken at that
time.
Conyngham arrived at 0200.
“As morning dawned, it became very clear that Stark's exhausted crew, having mounted a
determined and persistent fight, was now too worn out and depleted to continue without assistance.
Teams from Waddell and Conyngham moved aboard.” - USN Damage Control Museum
I went aboard approximately 0400. Waddell had left behind 12 firefighters and by the time I
arrived approximately 20 Conyngham sailors were already aboard. Over time approximately
120 Conyngham sailors boarded Stark to assist in firefighting, dewatering, and recovery.
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Other problems
- Unexploded warhead discovered at bulkhead to Chief’s berthing.
- investigators (killed)
- No plotting of damage (DCC abandoned)
- Rough stability estimate ---”Critical Angle” of list determined to be 18 degrees
- Rate of increase of list: .5 degrees/hour.
- all but a handful of Stark Sailors onboard
- Dissimilar equipment
- I order firefighting to cease and dewatering to commence as ONLY priority.
- “Desert Duck” (SH3) begins to ferry men and supplies ----- flight deck cleared into smoke filled
hanger for helo ops – had to stage some through DDG-17
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Lost CIC
Fire Stopped on Bridge
Portable pumps maintaining dewatering effort
Magazine emptied
Warhead isolated
Corner turned about 1000
USS LeSalle and USS Reid join about 1100 – Fire under control, list reducing
Relieved as OIC onboard Stark about Noon by COMIDEASTFOR COS
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Fire out at 1400
Reflashes for 18 hours
1700 Conyngham takes Stark under tow to Bahrain – no way to pay out anchor chain. Tow with
nylon hawser alone.
Overnight and well into morning: recovery of remains – details gruesome
Firefighting continues overnight
Stark crewed by Coontz/ Conyngham sailors
Arrive mid morning…….slight port list, fire completely l out.
Highlights ----DDG-17 stats only - awarded Navy Unit Commendation for rescue, 1 LOM, 2 MSM’s,1
NMCM, 20+ NCM’s, 15+ NAM’s, 20+ Letters of Commendation
LOM to CO Conyngham for actions as on scene commander
NMCM – awarded to sailor who caught shipmate falling into inferno from bridge wing while himself
using a fire hose to keep from both falling through hole.
MSM – one awarded to sailor who volunteered to enter flooded ships control berthing and hold in
place an electrical submersible pump which would not take a suction any other way.
Note: space at the time contained remains of 25 sailors, integrity of wire carrying 450V power could not be guaranteed as it
was repeated lowered and hoisted through jagged metal rimmed hole.
MSM – Awarded XO Conyngham for actions as OIC of R&A teams on Stark from 0400 to 1400 18
May.
Lessons learned: OBA lasts 20 min max as this is the absolute limit of personnel exposure in the face
of a 1500-2000 deg F fire. Used 95% of OBA canisters in MEF.
The U.S. Navy needed to refresh inventories of DC lockers. Needs include better access
tools.
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Clockwise from Top Left:
Portside main deck looking aft from weatherbreak
Portside bridge wing looking down from interior of bridge
Portside exterior hull below main deck looking aft
Externally visible damage
Casualties – 3 Chief Petty Officers, 32 Men onboard
2 Men Lost overboard (one body recovered)
Seriously Wounded – 5 Men
Rescued from Sea – 5 Men
Summary of important Lessons learned
- OBA in use at that time inadequate
- Fleet wide compatibility of fittings and equipment
- Need for “jaws of life” type equipment
- Traditional 3 position nozzle ineffective – low volume spray worthless
- Amount of water required to fight modern weapons induced fires excessive
- Critical need to upgrade firefighting gear/clothing
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