Mar/Apr 2013 - Korean War Veterans Association
Mar/Apr 2013 - Korean War Veterans Association
Mar/Apr 2013 - Korean War Veterans Association
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16<br />
Recognition of the Ongoing Nature of the<br />
<strong>Korean</strong> <strong>War</strong> from 1953 to Date<br />
By John Gavel<br />
Does an armistice end a war? Is there still an armistice<br />
in effect? How will peace be achieved? What is the<br />
appropriate way to view duty in Korea, peacetime or<br />
wartime?<br />
Does an armistice end a war?<br />
An armistice is not a peace treaty. While the objective of<br />
an armistice agreement is to bring about a cease-fire, a halt to<br />
hostilities, that halt may be indefinite or for a specified period<br />
of time only. An armistice agreement does not terminate<br />
the state of war between the belligerents. A state of war continues<br />
to exist with all of its implications for the belligerents<br />
and for the neutrals.<br />
In the only other instance in which this issue has arisen,<br />
the 1949 armistices between Israel and the Arab States, peace<br />
treaties have expressly superseded the armistices between<br />
Egypt and Israel and Egypt and Jordan. Syria has continued<br />
to maintain that it is in a state of war with Israel despite the<br />
armistice.<br />
Sixteen nations signed a Joint Policy Declaration supporting<br />
the armistice and pledging that if there is a renewal of the<br />
armed attack, challenging again the principles of the UN, we<br />
should again be united and prompt to resist.<br />
Is there still an armistice in effect?<br />
First, let us address the armistice agreement itself, then the<br />
efforts to enforce it.<br />
Clause 62, Article V, of the Armistice Agreement says that<br />
it shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either by<br />
mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by an<br />
appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political<br />
level between both sides.<br />
Article 5 on the South-North Agreement in Principle states<br />
that South and North will make every effort together to<br />
replace the current Armistice Agreement by a permanent<br />
peace settlement and must follow the current Armistice<br />
Agreement.<br />
Provisions and mechanisms of the agreement have not survived<br />
totally intact. When one side ignored provisions, notice<br />
was given that the other side would no longer abide by them.<br />
Unified Command’s report A/3631 in 1957 announced that in<br />
order to maintain the relative military balance in the face of<br />
violation by the Communist side of subparagraph 13(d), it<br />
was relieved of compliance with this provision in order to<br />
prevent the resumption of war in Korea rather than invite it.<br />
The UNC intends to fully observe the ceasefire provision and<br />
all other provisions, as it has in the past.<br />
In the 1990s, North Korea openly concentrated on ending<br />
the Armistice Agreement system, including the MAC and<br />
NNSC. After refusal of MAC meetings in 1991, North Korea<br />
requested General Officer (GO) talks between the United<br />
States and North Korea in <strong>Mar</strong>ch 1995. This suggestion<br />
The defense structure in Korea was eventually<br />
overtaken by the professional growth<br />
and development of the Republic of Korea’s<br />
(ROK) armed forces. It is remarkable that<br />
control of ROK forces in peacetime and<br />
wartime was ceded to the U.S. from 1950<br />
almost to date.<br />
divulged North Korea’s intention to ignore the UNC.<br />
However, it could not avoid accepting a February 1998<br />
amendment by the UNC and ROK Ministry of National<br />
Defense (MND) that the GO Talks are not between the<br />
United States and North Korea, but between the UNC and<br />
North Korea.<br />
GO Talks were held 15 times through 2003, and carried<br />
out the role of maintaining the Armistice Agreement and the<br />
function of managing crises in Korea.<br />
In 1993 Poland and Czechoslovakia withdrew from Korea<br />
because of the political upheavals in Eastern Europe. Today,<br />
five Swiss representatives and five Swedish representatives<br />
stationed in Panmunjom, South Korea are on duty for the<br />
NNSC. Presently, their main task is to show a presence at the<br />
inner <strong>Korean</strong> border and demonstrate that the cease-fire is<br />
still in force.<br />
Occasionally, Polish delegates attend the meetings at<br />
Panmunjom, albeit through South Korea, as Poland has<br />
changed sides politically.<br />
North Korea formally withdrew from the MAC in 1994<br />
and had previously declared the NNSC defunct in 1991. In<br />
February 1996, North Korea recommended a so-called “U.S.-<br />
DPRK Temporary Agreement and Military Authority,” and<br />
even declared that it had abandoned its responsibility to<br />
maintain the DMZ.<br />
In October 1996, the Security Council made its most<br />
definitive statement on the status of the armistice since its<br />
original resolutions in the early 1950s. The President of the<br />
Council made a statement on behalf of the Council, which<br />
“urge[d] that the <strong>Korean</strong> Armistice Agreement should be<br />
fully observed” and “stress[ed] that the Armistice Agreement<br />
shall remain in force until it is replaced by a new peace<br />
mechanism.”<br />
All members of the Council, including the United States<br />
and China, i.e., two of the principal belligerents whose generals<br />
signed the Armistice, approved the statement. This<br />
statement was intended to effectively refute any suggestion<br />
that the armistice is no longer in full force and effect. North<br />
Korea responded by denouncing the armistice agreement in<br />
<strong>Mar</strong>ch - <strong>Apr</strong>il <strong>2013</strong><br />
The Graybeards