Mar/Apr 2013 - Korean War Veterans Association

68
Vicinity of Tang-Yang, South Korea
The Taking of Punji Pass
December 1950-January 1951
By Col William E. Weber, USA (Ret)
Following the entrance to combat in
Korea of the Chinese forces in
November 1950, the situation
became rather perilous for the UN Forces
in the west in the area from Pyongyang
south along the MSR to Kaesong and
eventually Seoul and the crossings along
the Han River.
Similarly, on the East Coast, X Corps
was forced into a retrograde action to
avoid encirclement, eventually resulting
in evacuating all UN forces (primarily the
U.S. X Corps), north of the 38th parallel
through the port of Wonsan-ni back to
Pusan.
In both the east and west coast lines of
the peninsula, ROK forces that had not
been demoralized and overrun were also
engaged in retrograde movement to areas
south of the 38th parallel. In effect, the
Chinese had achieved a major victory
resulting in regaining all of North Korea,
saving the remnants of the North Korean
Army and government, and threatening to
defeat the UN and ROK Forces.
In essence, what saved the situation is
that the Chinese had overextended their
capability to resupply their forces and had
to dampen their advance. This gave the
UN forces an opportunity to recoil and
conduct a somewhat orderly withdrawal,
albeit with significant reduction of combat
potential of two U.S. Divisions, the 1st
Cavalry and 2nd Infantry.
The circumstances were such that any
ability to reestablish a viable defensive
position north of the Han River was not
possible. The gap between Eighth Army
and X Corps, and its ultimate evacuation,
would have allowed the enemy to flank
Eighth Army.
Along the central mountain spine of
Korea, the Chinese and reconstituted
North Korean forces had almost uncontested
ability to move forces south
between Eighth Army’s I and IX Corps
and its separated X Corps. The only real
military hindrance was the lack of adequate
road and rail networks to take
advantage of the gap in UN lines.
Accordingly, the Chinese and North
Korean forces infiltrated that area, striving
to take and secure the passes through the
mountains to control the limited road network
that existed. Their goal was to
enable them to encircle the rear of Eighth
Army and either defeat it or force a disastrous
retreat towards the port of Pusan and
evacuation. They came dangerously close
to succeeding!
It was apparent that any routes of
egress through the mountains became
areas that had to be secured and defended—held
at all costs until the UN forces
could establish a defensive position that
extended across the entirety of the peninsula.
In short, the ‘win or lose’ of the war
rested on who could gain control and hold
the limited routes of egress in central
Korea.
During the abrupt withdrawal from
North Korea, the 187th ARCT and the
29th British Brigade composed the rear
guard forces holding the MSR and surrounding
area from the west coast to the
spine of the peninsula. Key to this action
was ensuring that the MSR was denied to
the enemy south of Pyongyang through
Kaesong and then to Seoul. The 187th and
29th did that!!!!! However, the end result
was inevitable, as it was very apparent that
the UN forces would have to retreat below
Seoul and the Han River before they could
stem the tide of the Chinese hordes.
After successfully extricating itself
from North Korea and crossing the Han
River, a reconstituted Eighth Army and X
Corps, having rejoined, set about rebuilding
their offensive potential and restoring
ROK forces to a semblance of combat
readiness. First, the enemy had to be
denied egress through the central spine.
That meant securing and holding passes!
The Chinese had regrouped and resupplied
after their surprise assault in early
November and by mid-December were
prepared to reinitiate offensive operations.
Similarly, U.S., UN and ROK had
regrouped and were establishing a defensive
line south of the Han River, running
east through Wonju and thence east to the
east coast. Probing operations established
that the Chinese were preparing for a
major offensive operation in east-central
Korea. But, to do so they needed control
of the passes through the mountains. It
was clear their strategy was to penetrate
the center of the UN line, and thereby
envelop both exposed flanks.
One of the most critical routes of
egress was Punji Pass. The Pass consisted
of a viable road network and a closely
adjacent railroad line that was capable of
handling vehicular traffic of sufficient
scope to move and supply major forces
during wintry weather conditions when
surfaces were frozen. Absent having to
contest for control of passes such as the
Punji, the enemy would have been able to
enfilade Eighth Army.
Punji Pass is situated in the east central
mountainous spine of the Korean
Peninsula. It is one of the few passes
through the mountainous terrain that
enable reasonably heavy movement
through the area. The road is secondary,
but can support heavy vehicular and personnel
traffic subject to ice and snow conditions
in winter months. Loss of the pass
to CCF would have enabled CCF to pour
major forces into the plains area around
and south of the greater Wonju plain area
defensive positions and capitalize on the
penetration of UN lines.
The 187th ARCT, having successfully
completed its rearguard mission, was
assigned the task of securing and holding
Punji Pass, denying its use to the enemy.
Moving by foot to positions immediately
before the Pass, the 187th attacked to take
the high ground overlooking the pass on
both sides of the road, as well as the road
itself.
Enemy resistance was light, but fierce,
as their main forces had not yet reached
the pass. Only reconnaissance and light
infantry forces were present. As a result,
the 187th secured the pass area and its
environs, and prepared defensive positions
to hold the pass.
As was typical for the winter of ‘50-‘51
all over Korea, one of the greatest impediments
to effective combat performance
was the severity of the weather. The only
equalizing factor was that the enemy was
March - April 2013
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