Management Reports Issued (continued) - Office of Inspector ...

April 1, 2012 – September 30, 2012
Semiannual Report to the Congress
operators to submit passenger data and receive
boarding pass instructions are timely and effective.
We also reviewed how the program’s screening
processes are tested for accuracy, prioritization, and
timeliness, as well as how it is protecting personally
identifiable and sensitive watch list information.
Government and private sector partners recognize
the Secure Flight program’s value, as it has
provided more consistent passenger prescreening.
The program has a defined system and processes
to conduct watch list matching. To ensure that
aircraft operators follow established procedures,
Secure Flight monitors records and uses its
discretion to forward issues for compliance investigation.
Once Secure Flight assumed advanced
passenger prescreening from aircraft operators,
program focus shifted toward addressing emerging
threats through multiple initiatives.
We made four recommendations to identify and
eliminate system overrides, prioritize passenger
data, standardize compliance, and improve
communication and collaboration with partners.
TSA concurred with Recommendations 1 and 3
and did not concur with Recommendations 2 and
4. All report recommendations are open.
(OIG-12-94, July 2012, ISP)
http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/
OIGr_12-94_ Jul12.pdf
Review of Allegations of Misconduct and
Mismanagement Within TSA’s Offce of Global
Strategies
On May 18, 2011, the TSA Administrator
received a letter from an anonymous author
who made several allegations of misconduct and
mismanagement within TSA’s Offce of Global
Strategies (OGS). The allegations fell into three
broad categories: security concerns, waste and
ineffciency, and workplace issues. We were unable
to substantiate most of the author’s allegations.
Instead, we determined that OGS has taken
corrective actions on assessments conducted in
Haiti, is methodical in determining where to
deploy its representatives around the world, and
did not circumvent the hiring process or take
improper actions to select two regional directors.
OGS’s Capacity Development Branch has spent
thousands of dollars on its training programs,
but the allegation that its programs provide little
more than basic screener training is inaccurate.
However, we did confirm that TSA did not issue a
timely Emergency Amendment for Haiti following
the 2010 earthquake, and has not evaluated all
preclearance airports as required. Our recommendations
include establishing and implementing
timeframes for issuing Emergency Amendments,
including deadlines for TSA offces involved in
reviewing and providing comments on them; and
requiring rescreening for all passengers arriving at
U.S. ports of entry from preclearance airports that
fail to achieve comparable status.
(OIG-12-96, July 2012, ISP)
http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/
OIGr_12-96_ Jul12.pdf
Circumstances Surrounding the Issuance
of a Security Clearance and Suitability
Determination to a General Manager at TSA’s
Legacy Transportation Threat Assessment and
Credentialing Offce
Congressman Bennie Thompson requested that
we assess the quality, fairness, and impartiality
of the clearance and suitability system at the
TSA Transportation Threat Assessment and
Credentialing (TTAC) Offce, and that we
examine the circumstances surrounding the
issuance of a security clearance and suitability
determination to a general manager of the TTAC
Offce. The offce plays an active role in determinations
affecting whether individuals engaged in or
with access to various aspects of the U.S. transportation
system pose a threat to transportation or
national security.
We reviewed TSA Personnel Security to
determine whether TSA complied with Federal
guidance during the personnel security process
for a legacy TSA TTAC general manager. We
also reviewed TSA’s Offce of Human Capital and
legacy TTAC Offce to determine whether TSA
adhered to standard Federal internal controls in
the hiring and supervision of general managers in
TTAC.
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