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Long-term Debt Limits in Saskatchewan - Nipawin

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THE POLICY SHOP<br />

<strong>Long</strong>-<strong>term</strong> <strong>Debt</strong> <strong>Limits</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong><br />

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES<br />

Kristopher Schmaltz, Sara McPhee-Knowles, Travis Reynolds,<br />

Cody Sharpe, Mike Veltri & Andrew Coff<strong>in</strong><br />

photo courtesy of BriYYZ on flickr.com


The Policy Shop is a student-managed consult<strong>in</strong>g firm run by the Johnson-Shoyama Graduate Students’<br />

Association at the University of <strong>Saskatchewan</strong>. Graduate student volunteers deliver research and analytic<br />

services to non-profits and charities on a pro-bono basis, which allows those organizations to receive policy<br />

expertise they would not otherwise have access to. At the same time, students build practical policy skills<br />

and ga<strong>in</strong> valuable hands-on experience. This project was the first completed by the Policy Shop. It was<br />

presented to SUMA <strong>in</strong> June 2012.


Executive Summary<br />

This report expla<strong>in</strong>s the policies and processes that<br />

comprise debt regulation of urban governments. Initially,<br />

the report was organized around answer<strong>in</strong>g the question<br />

of why the utilities-based debt is <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> the debt-limit<br />

calculation. Analyz<strong>in</strong>g the policy and speak<strong>in</strong>g to municipal<br />

stakeholders, made it clear that municipal concerns about<br />

debt-limits are much broader <strong>in</strong> nature.<br />

To ga<strong>in</strong> a thorough understand<strong>in</strong>g of the municipal<br />

perspective, a series of <strong>in</strong>-depth <strong>in</strong>terviews were completed<br />

with municipal adm<strong>in</strong>istrators, mayors, and senior staff. In<br />

addition, a survey was sent to members of SUMA to provide<br />

the research team with a larger sample, allow<strong>in</strong>g for more<br />

reliable generalizations.<br />

The current policy on debt-limits is as follows. Municipal<br />

Affairs regulates municipal debt through the <strong>Saskatchewan</strong><br />

Municipal Board (SMB). The formula bases debt-limits<br />

on municipal revenues. Some urban governments have<br />

suggested that utilities-based debt should be excluded from<br />

the formula; s<strong>in</strong>ce utilities are funded through user fees, they<br />

are self-fund<strong>in</strong>g and do not need to be regulated by the SMB.<br />

The SMB’s perspective is that they need to <strong>in</strong>clude utilitiesbased<br />

debt <strong>in</strong> the formula because they <strong>in</strong>clude revenue<br />

from utilities. Moreover, by <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g utilities-based debt <strong>in</strong><br />

the formula, the SMB is better able to monitor municipal<br />

f<strong>in</strong>ances and ensure susta<strong>in</strong>ability. Many municipalities<br />

believe that by exclud<strong>in</strong>g utilities-debt from the formula, they<br />

would have greater flexibility to access debt. In practice, it<br />

seems that the SMB is able to provide that flexibility so long<br />

as the municipality has a susta<strong>in</strong>able bus<strong>in</strong>ess plan. There are,<br />

however, a number of other important policy and process<br />

issues related to municipal debt among stakeholders:<br />

• n Policy Clarity: Urban governments are not clear on why<br />

the policy is the way it is, how it functions, and what they can<br />

expect from the prov<strong>in</strong>ce. There seems to be a lot of anxiety<br />

around debt-limits because urban governments are not<br />

conv<strong>in</strong>ced that they will be able to access sufficient debt <strong>in</strong><br />

the future.<br />

• n <strong>Debt</strong> Capacity for Growth: Many municipalities do not<br />

have adequate debt capacity to accommodate the costs of<br />

growth. In many cases, municipalities rely heavily on grants.<br />

Moreover, they are experienc<strong>in</strong>g an <strong>in</strong>frastructure deficit<br />

<strong>in</strong> key areas such as water and sewer, and roads. Many are<br />

concerned that without grants, they will not be able to<br />

ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> and upgrade key <strong>in</strong>frastructure, particularly as<br />

other levels of government change regulations and <strong>in</strong>crease<br />

standards.<br />

• n Lack of Flexibility: Many respondents were conv<strong>in</strong>ced<br />

that the current regulatory environment is <strong>in</strong>flexible, and<br />

that municipalities are miss<strong>in</strong>g out on opportunities to take<br />

advantage of more flexible, lower-cost debt options.<br />

• n Process Issues: Many respondents believed that processes<br />

of the SMB could be improved to serve them better, such as<br />

quicker turn-around times.<br />

In addition to diagnos<strong>in</strong>g some of the key concerns,<br />

the report provides an analysis of comparative policies<br />

on debt-regulation for municipalities <strong>in</strong> the prov<strong>in</strong>ces of<br />

Alberta, Manitoba, and Nova Scotia. The most <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g<br />

policy option was found <strong>in</strong> Alberta where utility services are<br />

often delivered through regionalized bodies called Regional<br />

Service Commissions (RSC). These organizations are able<br />

to take on debt that is separate from municipal debt, and<br />

are able to reduce utility costs for municipalities, as well<br />

as provide higher quality services by operat<strong>in</strong>g regionally.<br />

The applicability of f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> other prov<strong>in</strong>ces was found<br />

to be m<strong>in</strong>imal to moderate, with the most useful example<br />

of <strong>in</strong>novation be<strong>in</strong>g the RSC, which could potentially be<br />

emulated <strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong>. In fact, there are examples of<br />

regional municipal service-delivery partnerships tak<strong>in</strong>g place<br />

<strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong> around water.<br />

The follow<strong>in</strong>g recommendations were <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> the<br />

report, and are for SUMA to consider <strong>in</strong> de<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g its stance<br />

<strong>in</strong> negotiations with the prov<strong>in</strong>ce around policy and program<br />

changes that would serve urban municipalities, which<br />

currently have to respond to major challenges created by<br />

a grow<strong>in</strong>g economy.<br />

Key Issues<br />

Recommendations<br />

We recommend that SUMA consider the follow<strong>in</strong>g<br />

alternatives to rectify the above policy and process issues:<br />

1) <strong>Debt</strong> Capacity Issues<br />

A. Work with the SMB to Develop Guidel<strong>in</strong>es for<br />

Municipalities: Municipalities were very concerned about<br />

the lack of clarity on debt limit policy, and would like to see<br />

clear guidel<strong>in</strong>es to help them plan for their <strong>in</strong>teractions with<br />

the SMB.<br />

B. Request that the Prov<strong>in</strong>ce Develop a More Substantive<br />

Policy: Many municipalities consider the current debt-limit<br />

policy to be a “one-size-fits-all” approach. It is recommended<br />

that the prov<strong>in</strong>ce be encouraged to consider ways <strong>in</strong> which<br />

it could re-design debt limit policy so that municipalities of<br />

greater capacity are given more freedom, while still provid<strong>in</strong>g<br />

oversight and assistance to those municipalities that need it.<br />

C. Request that the Prov<strong>in</strong>ce Consider Remov<strong>in</strong>g Utilities<br />

<strong>Debt</strong> from Calculation: This option should be considered. It<br />

is unlikely that this alone would address the issues above, but<br />

it may, <strong>in</strong> some cases, provide additional flexibility to some<br />

municipalities.<br />

1


D. Advocate for a Prov<strong>in</strong>ce-wide Solution to Infrastructure<br />

Needs: Infrastructure challenges are the s<strong>in</strong>gle most<br />

important issue driv<strong>in</strong>g the concern over debt-limits, and a<br />

prov<strong>in</strong>cial strategy around <strong>in</strong>frastructure may alleviate some<br />

of these concerns.<br />

2) Infrastructure Challenges<br />

A. Survey Members about Interest <strong>in</strong> Regional Service<br />

Delivery Options: SUMA should survey members to<br />

de<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong>e if there is an <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> creat<strong>in</strong>g partnerships<br />

around service delivery.<br />

B. Communicate with Municipal Partners: Organizations<br />

such as SARM and other municipal partners should be<br />

approached about their <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>itiative to <strong>in</strong>crease<br />

regionalized service delivery.<br />

C. Approach Prov<strong>in</strong>ce about Fund<strong>in</strong>g: If there is<br />

an appetite for this, SUMA and <strong>in</strong>terested partners should<br />

approach the prov<strong>in</strong>cial and federal governments about<br />

targeted fund<strong>in</strong>g for sett<strong>in</strong>g up and implement<strong>in</strong>g regional<br />

service delivery groups. It is clear from our research that<br />

regional service delivery arrangements require fund<strong>in</strong>g<br />

to be developed.<br />

3) Process Challenges<br />

A. Approach SMB about review<strong>in</strong>g borrow<strong>in</strong>g options:<br />

Municipalities have suggested that they are miss<strong>in</strong>g out<br />

on short-<strong>term</strong> borrow<strong>in</strong>g options that would decrease<br />

<strong>in</strong>terest costs. SUMA should request that the SMB exam<strong>in</strong>e its<br />

current policies to de<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong>e if this is the case, and if so,<br />

if changes could be made to <strong>in</strong>crease flexibility and lower<br />

costs for municipalities.<br />

B. Legislated Process<strong>in</strong>g Times: The SMB should <strong>in</strong>stitute<br />

maximum application turn-around times.<br />

C. Review Application Process: It was noted by the SMB<br />

that process<strong>in</strong>g times are often lengthy due to <strong>in</strong>complete<br />

applications. The application process should be reviewed<br />

to de<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong>e the reason for this so that it may be resolved<br />

through process changes, build<strong>in</strong>g municipal capacity, or both.<br />

2


Introduction<br />

In <strong>Saskatchewan</strong>, many municipalities are tak<strong>in</strong>g on<br />

debt to f<strong>in</strong>ance the costs associated with development<br />

and a grow<strong>in</strong>g prov<strong>in</strong>cial economy. One issue that has<br />

recently become more important for urban municipalities<br />

<strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong> is the legislation surround<strong>in</strong>g municipal<br />

long-<strong>term</strong> debt. At its 107th Annual Convention, SUMA<br />

passed a resolution to work with the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Municipal<br />

Affairs to <strong>in</strong>itiate a review of the criteria for establish<strong>in</strong>g long<strong>term</strong><br />

debt limits. This report is an analysis of long-<strong>term</strong>-debt<br />

legislation <strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong>, as well as a stakeholder analysis<br />

of the issues and concerns surround<strong>in</strong>g this policy. The report<br />

conta<strong>in</strong>s four ma<strong>in</strong> sections:<br />

1. An analysis of municipal long-<strong>term</strong> debt legislation <strong>in</strong><br />

<strong>Saskatchewan</strong>: This section exam<strong>in</strong>es the legislation govern<strong>in</strong>g<br />

municipal long-<strong>term</strong> debt <strong>in</strong> the prov<strong>in</strong>ce of <strong>Saskatchewan</strong>.<br />

2. A stakeholder analysis: To ga<strong>in</strong> an adequate<br />

understand<strong>in</strong>g of the perspective of municipalities on long<strong>term</strong><br />

debt policy, a stakeholder consultation and analysis<br />

was performed utiliz<strong>in</strong>g a survey and a number of <strong>in</strong>terviews.<br />

Several urban governments were <strong>in</strong>terviewed, and over 100<br />

were surveyed. The purpose of this section is to construct<br />

a def<strong>in</strong>ition of the problems that municipalities are fac<strong>in</strong>g<br />

with regard to f<strong>in</strong>ancial capacity and long-<strong>term</strong> debt issues.<br />

3. A comparative perspective on long-<strong>term</strong> debt policy:<br />

This section provides a comparative assessment of<br />

the policies and regulations surround<strong>in</strong>g municipal long<strong>term</strong><br />

debt <strong>in</strong> other prov<strong>in</strong>ces. The purpose of this section is<br />

to provide examples of alternative policies used elsewhere<br />

that could <strong>in</strong>form discussions on potential modifications to<br />

<strong>Saskatchewan</strong> policies.<br />

4. Recommendations: This section provides some<br />

recommendations on how policies and processes might<br />

be improved.<br />

An Overview of Municipal Borrow<strong>in</strong>g<br />

Municipal expenses are generally funded <strong>in</strong> two ways:<br />

<strong>in</strong>ternal and external revenue sources. Internal revenue<br />

sources <strong>in</strong>clude: operat<strong>in</strong>g revenues; earmarked taxes,<br />

reserves and reserve funds, special charges (improvement<br />

charges or levies, lot levies, and other special fees), and<br />

development charges. External revenue sources fall <strong>in</strong>to<br />

two basic categories: grants and borrow<strong>in</strong>g. Grants are<br />

transfers from the prov<strong>in</strong>cial or federal levels of government.<br />

Borrow<strong>in</strong>g is when the municipality accesses capital through<br />

borrow<strong>in</strong>g arrangements, and this practice has become<br />

much more common as municipalities are expected to<br />

deliver a greater level of services (Kitchen 2002, 193–202).<br />

Municipal Borrow<strong>in</strong>g:<br />

Short-<strong>term</strong> Borrow<strong>in</strong>g:<br />

Short-<strong>term</strong> borrow<strong>in</strong>g can be used to f<strong>in</strong>ance capital<br />

expenditures or cover short-<strong>term</strong> deficits <strong>in</strong> general operat<strong>in</strong>g<br />

budgets (Kitchen 2002, 202).<br />

<strong>Long</strong>-<strong>term</strong> Borrow<strong>in</strong>g:<br />

<strong>Long</strong>-<strong>term</strong> borrow<strong>in</strong>g is used for capital expenditures<br />

only, and “is justified if one can reasonably expect the benefits<br />

from the project to fall on future users, so that the f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>term</strong> will match the asset’s lifespan. The project is f<strong>in</strong>anced<br />

by borrowed funds and the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple and <strong>in</strong>terest charges are<br />

repaid out of future operat<strong>in</strong>g revenues. This policy attempts<br />

to make sure that future beneficiaries are also those who<br />

bear the costs” (Kitchen 2002, 202). Borrow<strong>in</strong>g is typically<br />

controlled by prov<strong>in</strong>cial regulations. The reason for prov<strong>in</strong>cial<br />

limits be<strong>in</strong>g placed on municipalities is that “municipalities<br />

are creatures of the prov<strong>in</strong>ce and the prov<strong>in</strong>ces do not wish<br />

to be responsible for unlimited municipal borrow<strong>in</strong>g and<br />

possible repayment of municipal debt” (Kitchen 2002, 202).<br />

Borrow<strong>in</strong>g is controlled through regulations such as those<br />

that limit borrow<strong>in</strong>g to:<br />

• n Capital projects<br />

• n Tax payer approved debt<br />

• n <strong>Debt</strong> approved by prov<strong>in</strong>cial regulatory body<br />

• n A specified percentage of revenue for f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g debt<br />

• n Limit<strong>in</strong>g borrow<strong>in</strong>g to a prov<strong>in</strong>cially controlled<br />

“municipal fund” (Kitchen 2002, 202–203)<br />

Every prov<strong>in</strong>ce, with the exception of Ontario, makes use<br />

of a prov<strong>in</strong>cially-organized body that assists municipalities<br />

with undertak<strong>in</strong>g long-<strong>term</strong> borrow<strong>in</strong>g. In these prov<strong>in</strong>ces,<br />

municipalities “apply for funds through the prov<strong>in</strong>ce-wide<br />

authority which totals up all of the requests for local funds<br />

and issues long-<strong>term</strong> debentures aga<strong>in</strong>st the authority itself.<br />

. . When the authority receives the proceeds from the sale of<br />

the debentures, it distributes the funds among the request<strong>in</strong>g<br />

municipalities, usually on the basis of a loan agreement with<br />

the municipality” (Kitchen 2002, 203).<br />

Decisions on f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>struments, whether to borrow<br />

<strong>in</strong> the short-<strong>term</strong> or long-<strong>term</strong>, and whether to take<br />

on debt of any k<strong>in</strong>d are largely made based on the needs<br />

of the municipality, tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to account f<strong>in</strong>ancial capacity,<br />

<strong>in</strong>terest-rates, level of growth, and other factors. Many<br />

municipalities <strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong> are experienc<strong>in</strong>g growth,<br />

and thus are mak<strong>in</strong>g large <strong>in</strong>vestments <strong>in</strong> major capital<br />

projects such as recreational facilities, sub-division<br />

expansions, water and sewer, waste disposal, etc.<br />

With relatively low <strong>in</strong>terest rates, coupled with the recent<br />

availability of federal and prov<strong>in</strong>cial stimulus fund<strong>in</strong>g that<br />

provided matched fund<strong>in</strong>g for <strong>in</strong>frastructure projects,<br />

municipalities <strong>in</strong> the prov<strong>in</strong>ce have been <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g their<br />

3


long-<strong>term</strong> debt to take advantage of these opportunities.<br />

Municipalities are also hav<strong>in</strong>g to deal with ag<strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>in</strong>frastructure and are look<strong>in</strong>g for additional f<strong>in</strong>ancial<br />

capacity to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> and upgrade their <strong>in</strong>frastructure.<br />

Constitutional Background<br />

A few po<strong>in</strong>ts of constitutional background<br />

are important for fram<strong>in</strong>g the relationship between<br />

municipalities and the federal and prov<strong>in</strong>cial governments.<br />

The municipalities are “creatures” of the prov<strong>in</strong>ces; all<br />

municipal powers are conferred by prov<strong>in</strong>cial legislation.<br />

This has two important implications:<br />

• n Firstly, municipal powers cannot exceed those of<br />

the prov<strong>in</strong>ces, an issue that has become more press<strong>in</strong>g<br />

as certa<strong>in</strong> large, metropolitan cities’ populations have<br />

far exceeded that of the smaller prov<strong>in</strong>ces.<br />

• n Secondly, municipalities cannot <strong>in</strong>troduce bylaws<br />

that <strong>in</strong>trude <strong>in</strong>to areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction<br />

(Stefaniuk 2007, 54).<br />

A further important po<strong>in</strong>t, now conta<strong>in</strong>ed<br />

<strong>in</strong> the Interpretation Act, is that federal and prov<strong>in</strong>cial<br />

governments are not bound to comply with municipal<br />

bylaws, although they will generally make efforts to do<br />

so as a means of ensur<strong>in</strong>g positive relations. Municipalities,<br />

however, are bound to comply with all federal and prov<strong>in</strong>cial<br />

legislation (Stefaniuk 2007).<br />

Municipalities are <strong>in</strong> the difficult position of hav<strong>in</strong>g<br />

to provide basic services to urban residents, without hav<strong>in</strong>g<br />

the autonomy to do a number of th<strong>in</strong>gs, such as <strong>in</strong>crease their<br />

debt thresholds without permission from the prov<strong>in</strong>ce. Urban<br />

governments vary <strong>in</strong> size and capacity, and some of these<br />

governments <strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong> have voiced concerns that<br />

the current policy is not meet<strong>in</strong>g their needs. It is not<br />

plausible, nor constitutionally possible, for the prov<strong>in</strong>ce to stop<br />

regulat<strong>in</strong>g municipal debt, and so it is essential that the policies<br />

and processes around debt-limits be designed to meet the<br />

needs of municipalities with<strong>in</strong> these jurisdictional restrictions.<br />

Current <strong>Saskatchewan</strong> Policy<br />

Summary<br />

<strong>Debt</strong> limits <strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong> are regulated by both<br />

legislation, and by an adm<strong>in</strong>istrative body called the<br />

<strong>Saskatchewan</strong> Municipal Board (SMB). While debt limits <strong>in</strong><br />

<strong>Saskatchewan</strong> are legislated, municipalities are expected<br />

to work very closely with the SMB to establish debt-limits<br />

consistent with their operational plans. Thus, many of the<br />

decisions around debt-limits are ad hoc and depend upon<br />

the ability of the municipality to work with the SMB to<br />

establish adequate f<strong>in</strong>ancial plans.<br />

4<br />

Legislation and Regulations<br />

In <strong>Saskatchewan</strong>, three pieces of legislation and the<br />

<strong>Saskatchewan</strong> Municipal Board form the legislative foundation<br />

for long-<strong>term</strong> debt limits. Municipalities <strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong> are<br />

governed by one of three pieces of legislation, depend<strong>in</strong>g on<br />

the municipality’s particular characteristics:<br />

1. The Cities Act: governs municipalities with populations<br />

greater than 5,000.<br />

2. The Municipalities Act: governs towns, villages,<br />

and rural municipalities.<br />

Populations range from:<br />

• n Towns: generally range from 500 to 5,000.<br />

• n Villages and resort villages: populations under 500.<br />

• n Rural municipalities: established on the basis of area,<br />

not population, and <strong>in</strong>clude any un<strong>in</strong>corporated<br />

communities (hamlets and organized hamlets) that fall<br />

with<strong>in</strong> their boundaries.<br />

3. The Northern Municipalities Act, 2010: governs towns,<br />

villages, and hamlets and other un<strong>in</strong>corporated northern<br />

settlements located <strong>in</strong> northern <strong>Saskatchewan</strong>.<br />

These pieces of legislation also spell out the requirements<br />

for long-<strong>term</strong> debt limits. For the purposes of this report, we<br />

will focus on urban governments regulated by the Cities Act<br />

and the Municipalities Act. Under the Cities Act, debt limits<br />

are de<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong>ed by the <strong>Saskatchewan</strong> Municipal Board (The<br />

Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of <strong>Saskatchewan</strong> 2002). The board is responsible for<br />

review<strong>in</strong>g applications and establish<strong>in</strong>g the debt limits for<br />

cities, which are renewed every three years. If a city wishes to<br />

have a debt limit established, or its current limit exceeded, the<br />

SMB requires a resolution or bylaw be passed by city council<br />

<strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g the size of the debt limit desired, or the amount of<br />

excess borrow<strong>in</strong>g. As per the Municipalities Act, a municipality’s<br />

debt limit is equal to the total amount of own-source revenue<br />

for the previous year (The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of <strong>Saskatchewan</strong> 2005).<br />

De<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g debt limits falls under the jurisdiction of<br />

the <strong>Saskatchewan</strong> Municipal Board, which was established<br />

on October 1st, 1988. The SMB’s mandate is to decide on<br />

regulatory and judicial issues surround<strong>in</strong>g local authorities,<br />

<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g municipalities and school boards. The regulatory<br />

function of the SMB is to review debt obligations and provide<br />

oversight, particularly with respect to the f<strong>in</strong>ancial health of<br />

municipalities. The Board’s judicial function is to adjudicate,<br />

at the prov<strong>in</strong>cial level, appeals from the general public <strong>in</strong><br />

municipal matters relat<strong>in</strong>g to property tax, assessments,<br />

plann<strong>in</strong>g and development issues, and municipal orders<br />

(for example, property ma<strong>in</strong>tenance orders). Specific to<br />

municipal debt, the SMB reviews local authorities’ long <strong>term</strong><br />

debt applications, which are subject to approval. This review<br />

process is <strong>in</strong>tended to ensure the municipality’s f<strong>in</strong>ancial<br />

stability, which provides assurance to taxpayers and lenders<br />

(<strong>Saskatchewan</strong> Municipal Board).


With<strong>in</strong> the SMB, the Local Government Committee is<br />

responsible for the review and approval of a number specific<br />

issues. Borrow<strong>in</strong>g by a town, village, resort village, or rural<br />

municipality must be approved if it:<br />

• n causes the municipality to exceed its debt limit;<br />

• n is not repayable with<strong>in</strong> a three year <strong>term</strong>; or<br />

• n is secured by a debenture issue.<br />

Also subject to approval are cases where the above<br />

municipal governments:<br />

• n lend money or guarantee a loan <strong>in</strong> an amount that<br />

causes the municipality to exceed its debt limit;<br />

• n enter <strong>in</strong>to an agreement to purchase or lease capital<br />

property, if the <strong>term</strong> exceed five years; or<br />

• n share <strong>in</strong> the operat<strong>in</strong>g losses of a service, facility<br />

or project, if the <strong>term</strong> exceeds five years.<br />

In addition to this, the SMB is also responsible for approv<strong>in</strong>g:<br />

• n water and sewer utility rates for towns, villages, resort<br />

villages, rural municipalities and northern municipalities;<br />

• n <strong>in</strong>vestments made by the above local governments <strong>in</strong><br />

certa<strong>in</strong> securities not listed <strong>in</strong> the Municipalities Act; and<br />

• n local improvement projects pursuant to the Local<br />

Improvements Act, 1993.<br />

F<strong>in</strong>ally, the SMB has the general authority to <strong>in</strong>quire<br />

<strong>in</strong>to the f<strong>in</strong>ancial, and other, affairs of a city, urban, or rural<br />

municipality when the local authority’s f<strong>in</strong>ancial position<br />

warrants such an action.<br />

Challenges and Concerns<br />

To identify challenges and areas of concern among<br />

urban governments regard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Long</strong>-Term <strong>Debt</strong> (LTD) policy, a<br />

number of <strong>in</strong>terviews were conducted with six municipalities,<br />

which will be identified here as Municipalities A, B, C, D, E and<br />

F, a representative from the SMB, and representatives from<br />

Municipal Affairs.<br />

The first municipality, Municipality A, <strong>in</strong>dicated that a<br />

previous prov<strong>in</strong>cial government program, the <strong>Saskatchewan</strong><br />

Infrastructure Growth Initiative, was very helpful for<br />

municipalities experienc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>frastructure needs related to<br />

growth. This municipality was experienc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>creased costs<br />

due to a grow<strong>in</strong>g population, but was limit<strong>in</strong>g risk by build<strong>in</strong>g<br />

smaller subdivisions to account for peaks and valleys <strong>in</strong><br />

growth. A larger city, Municipality B, specifically mentioned<br />

cash-flow issues due to high growth <strong>in</strong> four sectors around<br />

the city all at once. However, this municipality <strong>in</strong>dicated<br />

that they would not be <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> borrow<strong>in</strong>g beyond the<br />

debt limit because of credit rat<strong>in</strong>g concerns. Specifically,<br />

the representatives mentioned develop<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>novative<br />

opportunities for revenue to lessen the need for additional<br />

debt. In particular, this municipality mentioned focus<strong>in</strong>g<br />

on mill rate supported debt, rather than debt supported by<br />

federal gas taxes or utility rates, s<strong>in</strong>ce mill rate supported debt<br />

is the prime concern for the city’s taxpayers.<br />

Municipality C noted that they were experienc<strong>in</strong>g<br />

exceptional growth <strong>in</strong> both population and bus<strong>in</strong>ess, and<br />

that debt limits had held back their potential for growth. This<br />

municipality’s debt has <strong>in</strong>creased significantly <strong>in</strong> the last ten<br />

years, <strong>in</strong> part due to a lack of prov<strong>in</strong>cial fund<strong>in</strong>g. Two projects<br />

have contributed to the debt limit cap: a water treatment<br />

plant and a health centre, even though these projects are<br />

both fully funded through own-source revenues. The water<br />

treatment plant is funded through utility rates and the health<br />

centre from the leases paid by medical professionals, such<br />

as dentists and optometrists. One recommendation from<br />

this municipality was to remove projects funded through<br />

own-source revenues from the debt limit calculation. This<br />

recommendation was also echoed by Municipality F; these<br />

officials felt that the current system is limit<strong>in</strong>g, and would<br />

appreciate more clarity from the prov<strong>in</strong>ce as to how ownsource<br />

revenue is currently used <strong>in</strong> calculations.<br />

The f<strong>in</strong>al municipality we <strong>in</strong>terviewed, Municipality F, is<br />

experienc<strong>in</strong>g major resource related growth. This municipality<br />

has seen its debt level double <strong>in</strong> recent years. The municipal<br />

officials were most concerned about the potential for debtlimits<br />

to constra<strong>in</strong> future growth. Currently, the municipality<br />

is able to access sufficient capital through debt arrangements<br />

approved by the SMB. However, there is a concern that the<br />

SMB could <strong>in</strong>hibit growth by not permitt<strong>in</strong>g extensions <strong>in</strong><br />

the future. The municipality expressed an explicit desire to be<br />

treated more autonomously and given more flexibility. For<br />

example, <strong>in</strong> the future there will likely be more <strong>in</strong>frastructure<br />

spend<strong>in</strong>g programs from the federal government, and<br />

the municipality needs to be ready to match those funds<br />

when they come available, otherwise it might miss out on<br />

an important opportunity. This po<strong>in</strong>t was also reflected<br />

by Municipality A. In <strong>term</strong>s of utility-related debt, it was<br />

suggested that perhaps the SMB should classify utility debt<br />

separately from regular debt; this would give the municipality<br />

more flexibility to grow. Utility debt can be larger s<strong>in</strong>ce it is<br />

paid by service fees.<br />

All municipalities mentioned their deal<strong>in</strong>gs with the<br />

SMB. One representative noted that deal<strong>in</strong>gs with the<br />

SMB had been overwhelm<strong>in</strong>gly positive, and that their<br />

adm<strong>in</strong>istrators had received help mak<strong>in</strong>g a debt plan and<br />

felt well-supported. One other representative noted that the<br />

municipality had not dealt with the SMB dur<strong>in</strong>g her tenure.<br />

Three of the six noted that the time taken to<br />

complete debt limit <strong>in</strong>creases was longer than expected.<br />

Representatives from the largest municipality, Municipality B,<br />

<strong>in</strong>dicated that, s<strong>in</strong>ce they had planned <strong>in</strong> advance, this delay<br />

was not a problem and that the whole process seemed quite<br />

smooth. Officials from Municipality A expressed that the time<br />

delay was a concern that could result <strong>in</strong> lost opportunities<br />

for growth. A potential policy recommendation mentioned<br />

by those from the larger municipality was that it would<br />

5


make sense to have debt limits <strong>in</strong>dexed to the municipality’s<br />

revenue, so that as revenue <strong>in</strong>creases the debt limit would<br />

<strong>in</strong>crease automatically rather than the municipality need<strong>in</strong>g<br />

to constantly re-apply for debt limit <strong>in</strong>creases. Municipality<br />

C’s respondent mentioned that the SMB had been difficult to<br />

work with, as it provides an unwanted layer of redundancy<br />

and bureaucracy. This representative mentioned that they<br />

have a professional staff for plann<strong>in</strong>g and account<strong>in</strong>g that<br />

prepare applications, and although the application was<br />

eventually approved, the work the professional staff did<br />

to prepare the bus<strong>in</strong>ess plan was sent back multiple times<br />

with m<strong>in</strong>ute detail changes to ultimately arrive at the same<br />

conclusion. This municipality mentioned that the SMB should<br />

take <strong>in</strong>to account the larger municipalities’ ability to handle<br />

their own affairs, particularly when those municipalities have<br />

professional staff capacity. The SMB could then take on more<br />

of a partnership or resource role for those able to prepare<br />

their own debt plans, while provid<strong>in</strong>g additional oversight for<br />

municipalities that lack capacity and need more assistance<br />

with application preparation.<br />

Officials from two of the other municipalities (D and E)<br />

were concerned about other levels of government impos<strong>in</strong>g<br />

regulations on municipalities, lead<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>in</strong>creased costs. For<br />

example, the federal government has recently changed water<br />

standards, requir<strong>in</strong>g the municipalities to make expensive<br />

upgrades. No additional support for municipalities has been<br />

provided. One municipality’s representative noted that<br />

simpler grants would be greatly appreciated, as the current<br />

applications are complex and require either a professional<br />

grant writer or multiple rejections and revisions – both of<br />

these entail high costs.<br />

A number of municipal officials mentioned the concern<br />

that utilities-related debt is <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> LTD calculations. The<br />

general perspective of these municipalities is that utilitiesrelated<br />

debt does not impact general f<strong>in</strong>ancial capacity<br />

of municipalities because utilities are paid for by user fees,<br />

which rise as costs <strong>in</strong>crease. For example, if a municipality<br />

makes upgrades to its water and sewer system, the costs<br />

associated with servic<strong>in</strong>g debt and pay<strong>in</strong>g for the upgrades is<br />

paid for by user fees; the municipality’s ability to service debt<br />

for other purposes is not impacted. For this reason, many<br />

urban governments would prefer to see the policy around<br />

LTD calculation modified to remove utilities-based debt from<br />

the formula.<br />

In summary, the ma<strong>in</strong> themes raised by the<br />

municipalities were centred on autonomy, flexibility, and<br />

preserv<strong>in</strong>g growth. These municipalities raised concerns<br />

around the current “one size fits all” policy of SMB oversight,<br />

and recommended additional flexibility so that municipalities<br />

that have sufficient capacity can be autonomous and<br />

those that need more assistance with applications and<br />

f<strong>in</strong>ancial monitor<strong>in</strong>g can receive the support they need.<br />

By <strong>in</strong>troduc<strong>in</strong>g more flexibility <strong>in</strong>to the current system, the<br />

municipalities will have access to the resources they need<br />

dur<strong>in</strong>g times of growth.<br />

6<br />

SMB Response<br />

The legislation does not clearly outl<strong>in</strong>e a rationale for the<br />

<strong>in</strong>clusion of utility debt <strong>in</strong> the formula for calculat<strong>in</strong>g LTD for<br />

municipalities. SMB was able to provide a basic explanation<br />

of the practice. First, utility debt is <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> the LTD limit<br />

calculation as are revenues from the utility. Second, SMB is<br />

responsible for approv<strong>in</strong>g sewer and water rates, and<br />

it is important for them to be able to see that utility debt is<br />

supported by utility rates. The perspective of the SMB was that<br />

whether utilities are <strong>in</strong>cluded or excluded from the formula<br />

should not be an issue; under the current system, it will<br />

not make a difference to the SMB when mak<strong>in</strong>g a decision<br />

about debt extensions. The primary issue for SMB is that the<br />

municipality has a bus<strong>in</strong>ess plan for support<strong>in</strong>g the debt when<br />

they are ask<strong>in</strong>g for a debt extension. If the bus<strong>in</strong>ess plan for<br />

utilities-based debt shows that utilities debt is covered by<br />

utility fees, then the SMB will take this <strong>in</strong>to consideration <strong>in</strong><br />

de<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g whether to approve a debt limit <strong>in</strong>crease.<br />

In response to the issue of lengthy approval times, the<br />

representative from the SMB <strong>in</strong>dicated that it does take some<br />

time for the SMB to assess applications, <strong>in</strong> part because of<br />

efforts to undertake a comprehensive review that assesses<br />

all relevant factors. The SMB representative also noted that, <strong>in</strong><br />

many cases, the received applications are <strong>in</strong>complete and this<br />

results <strong>in</strong> further delays. The SMB works with municipalities to<br />

revise applications and repayment plans to ensure they meet<br />

all of the regulations.<br />

The representative from Municipal Affairs <strong>in</strong>dicated<br />

that debt limit calculation is an area that they have flagged<br />

as potentially requir<strong>in</strong>g review, and they are quite open to<br />

consider<strong>in</strong>g potential amendments to the relevant legislation.<br />

The representative mentioned that the department has also<br />

conducted some comparative work and may be open to<br />

shar<strong>in</strong>g some of their research <strong>in</strong> this area.<br />

Survey F<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs<br />

In order to ga<strong>in</strong> an adequate understand<strong>in</strong>g of the<br />

perspective of urban governments on the issues surround<strong>in</strong>g<br />

LTD policy <strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong>, a survey was conducted. The<br />

survey was sent to all urban governments <strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong><br />

that had not already been <strong>in</strong>terviewed or surveyed by other<br />

means. The survey highlighted further issues and challenges.<br />

The majority (127 of 135) of respondents represented<br />

towns and villages. Moreover, a majority of respondents<br />

represented communities of less than 1000 residents. A<br />

number of <strong>in</strong>terviews were conducted with larger urban<br />

centers, and thus the number of small urban municipalities<br />

that responded to the survey was helpful <strong>in</strong> provid<strong>in</strong>g the<br />

research team with a better understand<strong>in</strong>g of the issues<br />

fac<strong>in</strong>g urban governments of all sizes.<br />

Of the 135 urban governments surveyed, 91 reported<br />

that their population had been <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g. Growth rates were<br />

varied with 31.8% of respondents report<strong>in</strong>g a growth rate of<br />

less than 10%, 27.4% report<strong>in</strong>g growth of 10-24%, and 4.4%


Table 1.0<br />

Very<br />

dissatisfied<br />

Somewhat<br />

dissatisfied<br />

Neither<br />

satisfied or<br />

dissatisfied<br />

Somewhat<br />

satisfied<br />

Very<br />

satisfied<br />

Responsiveness to your needs 11% (6) 6% (3) 15% (8) 20% (11) 48% (26)<br />

Timely service 11% (6) 20% (11) 17% (9) 20% (11) 31% (17)<br />

Clear communication 7% (4) 9% (5) 17% (9) 22% (12) 44% (24)<br />

Understandable decision-mak<strong>in</strong>g process 9% (5) 6% (3) 15% (8) 28% (15) 43% (23)<br />

Simplicity of applications 9% (5) 20% (11) 17% (9) 28% (15) 26% (14)<br />

report<strong>in</strong>g a growth rate of 25-50%. Growth is a common<br />

factor among the urban governments <strong>in</strong> this prov<strong>in</strong>ce.<br />

Policy Clarity<br />

Dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>terviews, responsiveness to municipal<br />

requests for debt-limit re-calculations and clarity of rationale<br />

for debt-allocation were reported as challenges <strong>in</strong> the process<br />

for obta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g debt approval through the SMB. To ga<strong>in</strong> a better<br />

understand<strong>in</strong>g of the urban government perspective on the<br />

SMB, respondents were asked to rate their satisfaction with<br />

the SMB based on past experiences:<br />

As can be seen <strong>in</strong> Table 1.0, no apparent trends emerged,<br />

with respondents report<strong>in</strong>g a mixed level of satisfaction.<br />

On average it should be noted that more respondents were<br />

satisfied than were dissatisfied, which suggests that the<br />

<strong>in</strong>teractions between the SMB and urban governments are<br />

generally positive. However, the mixed level of satisfaction<br />

does suggest that there are areas for improvement accord<strong>in</strong>g<br />

to urban governments <strong>in</strong>terviewed. For example, timely<br />

service and clear communication were two areas where<br />

urban governments would like to see the SMB improve.<br />

Perspectives on Utilities <strong>Debt</strong><br />

The issue of utilities debt has been mentioned as<br />

problematic by some municipalities. To better appreciate<br />

the level of utilities-related debt <strong>in</strong> urban governments <strong>in</strong><br />

<strong>Saskatchewan</strong>, respondents were asked to provide a rough<br />

estimate on the level of municipal debt currently used for<br />

utilities purposes. Over 58% or respondents reported that<br />

less than 25% of debt is currently associated with utilities.<br />

Utilities-related debt does appear to play a significant role <strong>in</strong><br />

the debt of urban governments <strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong>, but it does<br />

not comprise total debt capacity for the majority of urban<br />

governments: only 27% of respondents report<strong>in</strong>g utilities<br />

related debt of 50% or greater. However, 20% of respondents<br />

did note that utilities-related debt accounted for nearly 100%.<br />

In some cases, utilities debt does appear to be a significant<br />

factor, and this warrants closer <strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>in</strong>to the reasons<br />

beh<strong>in</strong>d these abnormally high utilities debt levels.<br />

<strong>Debt</strong> Capacity and Growth<br />

Respondents were asked the follow<strong>in</strong>g question: Based<br />

on your expectations for growth, and any planned projects<br />

that you know about, do you believe that the current debt<br />

limit formula for your urban government is sufficient to<br />

meet borrow<strong>in</strong>g needs over the next five years? A number of<br />

important issues and challenges arose from this question.<br />

Reliance on Grants:<br />

Many smaller communities are not eligible for loans to<br />

<strong>in</strong>crease major <strong>in</strong>frastructure because they cannot service<br />

the debt. These small communities are heavily dependent<br />

upon <strong>in</strong>frastructure grants to make any improvements to<br />

<strong>in</strong>frastructure. Some of these municipalities are experienc<strong>in</strong>g<br />

decl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g populations, or have already seen their populations<br />

shr<strong>in</strong>k considerably.<br />

Infrastructure: Water, Sewer, Roads, and Recreation<br />

The most significant <strong>in</strong>frastructure need reported is<br />

water and sewer <strong>in</strong>frastructure. Most respondents raised the<br />

concern that water and sewer upgrades were very costly, and<br />

would far exceed their municipality’s current debt threshold.<br />

Most of these municipalities would not be able to proceed<br />

with necessary upgrades without <strong>in</strong>creased debt, grant<br />

fund<strong>in</strong>g, or both. The second largest <strong>in</strong>frastructure challenge<br />

is the ma<strong>in</strong>tenance of roads, followed by recreational<br />

<strong>in</strong>frastructure. Both are a challenge, especially for smaller<br />

municipalities.<br />

The Challenges of Growth:<br />

Some municipalities reported that growth <strong>in</strong><br />

population and size of the municipality has placed pressure<br />

on the municipal governments to <strong>in</strong>crease capacity <strong>in</strong><br />

utilities such as water and sewer. One municipality was<br />

experienc<strong>in</strong>g growth of over 400 lots, and needed to upgrade<br />

<strong>in</strong>frastructure to accommodate; entail<strong>in</strong>g a debt <strong>in</strong>crease<br />

beyond current limits.<br />

7


<strong>Debt</strong>-Limit is Too Low:<br />

Over twenty respondents (out of the 39 responses)<br />

reported that the debt-limit is too low to accommodate<br />

growth <strong>in</strong> the municipality. Some reported that even if their<br />

debt-limit were <strong>in</strong>creased, they do not have the ability to<br />

service and repay <strong>in</strong>creased debt. Of these respondents,<br />

many noted that their projects will not proceed if they are<br />

unable to access more capital. Moreover, many of these<br />

respondents mentioned that they are count<strong>in</strong>g on federal,<br />

prov<strong>in</strong>cial, or other types of grants to assist with <strong>in</strong>frastructure<br />

costs. In addition to the general need to upgrade out-of-date<br />

<strong>in</strong>frastructure, many municipalities mentioned that <strong>in</strong>creased<br />

lot development was creat<strong>in</strong>g significant pressure <strong>in</strong> <strong>term</strong>s of<br />

utilities services.<br />

Other Comments:<br />

Some municipalities noted that the debt-limits were<br />

currently sufficient to accommodate municipal needs. Others<br />

were unsure of what their debt limit was. They were also<br />

unsure of how debt-limits are calculated, po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g to a lack of<br />

policy and process clarity, as well as municipal capacity.<br />

Suggested Changes to LTD Policy<br />

If you were given the authority to make changes to current<br />

legislation, regulation and process relat<strong>in</strong>g to the issue of<br />

municipal debt limits, what changes would you make?<br />

The above question was asked of municipalities to<br />

provide them with an opportunity to concisely outl<strong>in</strong>e what,<br />

<strong>in</strong> their op<strong>in</strong>ion, should be changed about current long-<strong>term</strong><br />

debt policies. This section is not meant to serve as a list of<br />

formal recommendations. Rather, it serves as a list of possible<br />

alternatives given by practitioners <strong>in</strong> the field of municipal<br />

adm<strong>in</strong>istration, and should form the basis of an <strong>in</strong>formed<br />

discussion on how to improve current process and policy<br />

accord<strong>in</strong>g to an important group of municipal stakeholders.<br />

Abolish or Limit Role of SMB<br />

<strong>in</strong> Sett<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Debt</strong> <strong>Limits</strong>:<br />

Some municipalities suggested that the SMB should<br />

be removed altogether, whereas others suggested that<br />

it needed to be reformed. In general, municipalities fell<br />

<strong>in</strong>to two camps with regard to the SMB.<br />

1. Local governments are autonomous and accountable<br />

to their residents, and thus the function of prov<strong>in</strong>cial<br />

oversight is not necessary.<br />

2. Municipalities are f<strong>in</strong>ancially responsible, and should<br />

only have to report on their f<strong>in</strong>ancial status and bus<strong>in</strong>ess<br />

plans to the SMB, but should not have to ask for their<br />

permission (see above section on constitutional limitations<br />

on municipal governments).<br />

8<br />

Dist<strong>in</strong>guish Between Utilities-Related <strong>Debt</strong><br />

and Other <strong>Debt</strong>:<br />

Many municipal representatives believed that utilities<br />

related debt should be separated from general borrow<strong>in</strong>g<br />

because utilities are self-funded, and do not actually impact<br />

the municipalities’ overall f<strong>in</strong>ancial capacity if the fee<br />

structure is susta<strong>in</strong>able and does not require subsidization<br />

by the municipality.<br />

Permit Greater Flexibility<br />

One municipality mentioned that permitt<strong>in</strong>g<br />

municipalities to <strong>in</strong>clude <strong>in</strong>come from community-owned<br />

bus<strong>in</strong>esses would <strong>in</strong>crease debt-capacity. It was believed<br />

that this practice would not only make <strong>in</strong>frastructure selfsusta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g,<br />

but also profitable <strong>in</strong> some cases.<br />

The Importance of Growth<br />

Many respondents mentioned that growth is an important<br />

factor <strong>in</strong> their municipalities, and that there was an immediate<br />

need for greater levels of <strong>in</strong>frastructure grants to ensure that<br />

they can move forward and prepare for future growth.<br />

Improvements to SMB<br />

and <strong>Debt</strong> Regulation Process<br />

Respondents recommended that the SMB be improved<br />

<strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g ways:<br />

1. Simplify the process: make applications and <strong>in</strong>teractions<br />

with the SMB much simpler.<br />

2. Increase the transparency of SMB operations.<br />

3. Clarity: Provide clear explanations of how debt-limits are<br />

calculated, as this was unclear for many municipalities. Some<br />

municipalities were concerned that the lack of clarity as to<br />

how debt-limits are arrived at makes plann<strong>in</strong>g difficult.<br />

a. Some municipalities f<strong>in</strong>d <strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong>ology, such as “own<br />

source revenue,” unclear.<br />

b. Another municipality was confused about whether<br />

the ownership of municipal controlled corporations<br />

affects municipal debt levels.<br />

4. Capital Expenditures: Some municipalities would like<br />

to see the SMB allow capital expenditures to be over the debtlimits<br />

and restrict operat<strong>in</strong>g borrow<strong>in</strong>g to current legislation<br />

and regulations. It was suggested that capital expenditures<br />

should be l<strong>in</strong>ked to capital asset management, and ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed<br />

separately from the operat<strong>in</strong>g side of the equation.<br />

5. Turnaround Time Standards: Many respondents<br />

reported a lengthy turnaround time, and suggested that<br />

the SMB have legislated turn-around times and that the<br />

prov<strong>in</strong>ce should <strong>in</strong>crease staff<strong>in</strong>g of the SMB.


6. Ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> Regulation While Increas<strong>in</strong>g Flexibility:<br />

While a number of municipalities noted their preference for<br />

the SMB to be abolished entirely, others noted a preference<br />

for the ma<strong>in</strong>tenance of the SMB as an important oversight<br />

mechanism. However, these respondents did note that the<br />

SMB’s policies and processes need to be changed to permit<br />

more discretion for municipalities to <strong>in</strong>crease or decrease<br />

debt-limits when necessary. It was also suggested that more<br />

flexibility needs to be given to municipalities to allow them<br />

to take advantage of short-<strong>term</strong> borrow<strong>in</strong>g options and lower<br />

<strong>in</strong>terest rates.<br />

7. Problem is larger than LTD: There was the general sense<br />

that the smaller municipalities are able to borrow more money<br />

than what they can afford to pay back, which is not enough<br />

to cover their <strong>in</strong>frastructure needs – thus, <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g debt-limits<br />

is not viewed as the answer, but rather <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g revenue<br />

streams and improv<strong>in</strong>g susta<strong>in</strong>ability of <strong>in</strong>frastructure.<br />

Comparative Policies<br />

In addition to <strong>in</strong>terviews and the survey, we conducted<br />

a comparative analysis of policies <strong>in</strong> Nova Scotia, Manitoba,<br />

and Alberta to ga<strong>in</strong> a better understand<strong>in</strong>g of how other<br />

prov<strong>in</strong>ces have approached municipal governance and<br />

long-<strong>term</strong> debt calculations. These prov<strong>in</strong>ces were chosen<br />

for a number of reasons: Nova Scotia does not <strong>in</strong>clude utility<br />

debt <strong>in</strong> long-<strong>term</strong> debt calculations, Manitoba has a similar<br />

population, and Alberta has led growth and implemented<br />

some <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g policies to cope with regional growth. The<br />

section to follow describes the current policy environment <strong>in</strong><br />

these three prov<strong>in</strong>ces, and provides an overview of potential<br />

lessons to be drawn from them.<br />

Nova Scotia<br />

Legislative and Regulatory Environment<br />

Rules surround<strong>in</strong>g municipal borrow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Nova Scotia are<br />

the responsibility of three bodies and one piece of legislation:<br />

the M<strong>in</strong>ister of Hous<strong>in</strong>g and Municipal Affairs; Service Nova<br />

Scotia and Municipal Relations (SNSMR); the Nova Scotia<br />

Municipal F<strong>in</strong>ance Corporation (NSMFC); and the Municipal<br />

Governance Act, 1998. The roles of each of these entities and<br />

how they <strong>in</strong>teract with one another will be discussed <strong>in</strong> turn.<br />

The M<strong>in</strong>ister of Hous<strong>in</strong>g and Municipal Affairs has control<br />

over whether or not a municipality is allowed to borrow for<br />

capital projects. Section 86 of the Municipal Governance Act,<br />

1998 gives the M<strong>in</strong>ister the power to establish borrow<strong>in</strong>g limits<br />

for each municipality; Section 87 prevents him from sett<strong>in</strong>g<br />

such limits or approv<strong>in</strong>g any borrow<strong>in</strong>g if the municipality has<br />

not filed its annual capital budget with SNSMR; and Section<br />

88 gives him the power of f<strong>in</strong>al approval over a municipality’s<br />

borrow<strong>in</strong>g request (The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Nova Scotia 1998).<br />

Service Nova Scotia and Municipal Relations (SNSMR) is<br />

the l<strong>in</strong>e department responsible for enforc<strong>in</strong>g the borrow<strong>in</strong>g<br />

limits set by the M<strong>in</strong>ister and review<strong>in</strong>g the municipal capital<br />

budgets required under the Municipal Governance Act. At<br />

present, the policy of SNSMR is that municipalities should not<br />

have a debt service ratio <strong>in</strong> excess of 30% (Service Nova Scotia<br />

and Municipal Relations 2010, sec. 3.5) . Two po<strong>in</strong>ts ought to<br />

be made about this rate. First, it is a flat rate which applies<br />

to every municipality without modification, regardless of its<br />

specific f<strong>in</strong>ancial context. While the Municipal Governance<br />

Act does allow the M<strong>in</strong>ister to set rates on a case-by-case<br />

basis, this power is apparently not exercised <strong>in</strong> Nova Scotia.<br />

Second, SNSMR’s 30% debt service ratio does not <strong>in</strong>clude the<br />

debt carried by municipalities which are attributable to water<br />

and electrical utilities, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g transmission <strong>in</strong>frastructure.<br />

M<strong>in</strong>isterial approval is still required when municipalities<br />

attempt to borrow for utility capital projects, as well as approval<br />

from the prov<strong>in</strong>ce’s Utility and Review Board.<br />

The Nova Scotia Municipal F<strong>in</strong>ance Corporation (NSMFC) is<br />

responsible for issu<strong>in</strong>g debentures on behalf of municipalities;<br />

two issues are produced per year. The Corporation also reviews<br />

the borrow<strong>in</strong>g plans produced by municipalities – suggest<strong>in</strong>g<br />

some adm<strong>in</strong>istrative overlap with SNSMR – and uses a 15% debt<br />

service ratio as a benchmark to evaluate each municipality’s<br />

fiscal situation. This 15% does not have the same stand<strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>in</strong> policy as SNSMR’s 30% ratio, but nor does it <strong>in</strong>clude debt<br />

attributable to water and electrical utilities. The Corporation<br />

provides additional services to municipalities, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g f<strong>in</strong>ancial<br />

tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g for municipal employees <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the borrow<strong>in</strong>g<br />

process, assistance with long-<strong>term</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ancial plann<strong>in</strong>g and<br />

a short-<strong>term</strong> borrow<strong>in</strong>g program for municipalities which<br />

have received approval to borrow but are still await<strong>in</strong>g the<br />

next debenture issue(Service Nova Scotia and Municipal<br />

Relations 2010, sec. 3.4). F<strong>in</strong>ally, the Corporation monitors<br />

its own performance with annual satisfaction surveys of the<br />

municipalities which participated <strong>in</strong> the borrow<strong>in</strong>g process that<br />

year (Nova Scotia Municipal F<strong>in</strong>ance Corporation 2011).<br />

F<strong>in</strong>ally, the role of the Municipal Governance Act, 1998<br />

has been mentioned, but two more sections ought to be<br />

highlighted. First, Section 91 gives municipalities the right<br />

to set rates, repayment schedules and issue debentures on<br />

their own, without go<strong>in</strong>g through the NSMFC. To date, no<br />

municipality <strong>in</strong> Nova Scotia has taken advantage of this option,<br />

suggest<strong>in</strong>g that the quality of service and adm<strong>in</strong>istrative<br />

sav<strong>in</strong>gs offered by the NSMFC are significant. Second, Section<br />

99 grants that municipalities may borrow from their own<br />

capital reserve funds to pay for capital projects at the same<br />

<strong>in</strong>terest rate the municipality would pay if it accessed outside<br />

sources of fund<strong>in</strong>g. Interest<strong>in</strong>gly, this borrow<strong>in</strong>g may be done<br />

by resolution of the council alone, and does not require the<br />

approval of the M<strong>in</strong>ister (The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Nova Scotia 1998).<br />

F<strong>in</strong>ally, while the Regional Municipality of Halifax does have its<br />

own Charter, similar to Ontario’s City of Toronto Act, its sections<br />

on municipal borrow<strong>in</strong>g are lifted verbatim from the Municipal<br />

Governance Act, 1998 and conta<strong>in</strong> no special provisions or<br />

processes (Government of Nova Scotia 2008).<br />

9


Manitoba<br />

Legislative and Regulatory Environment<br />

All borrow<strong>in</strong>g by urban governments <strong>in</strong> Manitoba is<br />

conducted <strong>in</strong> accordance with the Municipal Board Act,<br />

the Municipal Act, the City of W<strong>in</strong>nipeg Charter Act, and the<br />

<strong>Debt</strong> Management Policy of the City of W<strong>in</strong>nipeg. The City<br />

of W<strong>in</strong>nipeg Charter Act applies only to that City, while the<br />

Municipal Board Act and Municipal Act apply to the rema<strong>in</strong>der<br />

of Manitoba’s urban governments. The two provide largely<br />

similar methods and requirements regard<strong>in</strong>g municipal<br />

borrow<strong>in</strong>g and debt limits.<br />

The Municipal Board Act provides the legislative framework<br />

for the prov<strong>in</strong>ce’s twenty-five member Municipal Board, and<br />

charges it with the duty of review<strong>in</strong>g all bylaws that <strong>in</strong>clude<br />

capital borrow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> municipalities other than W<strong>in</strong>nipeg. As<br />

a quasi-judicial body, the Municipal Board is empowered to<br />

reject, amend or accept all proposed capital borrow<strong>in</strong>g bylaws;<br />

they do so accord<strong>in</strong>g to a legislated series of considerations,<br />

<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g “the nature of the work, undertak<strong>in</strong>g or proposed<br />

project,” “the necessity or expediency thereof,” and “the f<strong>in</strong>ancial<br />

position of the local authority.” The Board has some scope for<br />

discretion and further <strong>in</strong>vestigation, and may consider “any<br />

other relevant matter” (The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Manitoba 2011).<br />

In pass<strong>in</strong>g judgment, the Municipal Board may conduct<br />

public hear<strong>in</strong>gs as well as require urban governments to<br />

submit five-year capital forecasts. Furthermore, Section 69 of<br />

the Municipal Board Act states that the Board may “require the<br />

municipality to submit the by-law or contract for the sanction<br />

of the voters or ratepayers …” Municipal governments are not<br />

bound by the approval of the Municipal Board for any debts<br />

that are repayable with<strong>in</strong> the year (Amborski 1998, 19–20).<br />

Neither the Municipal Board Act nor the Municipal Act set<br />

a statutory limit to debt for urban governments. However,<br />

the ratio of debt to municipal assessment is often used by<br />

the Board to de<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong>e whether tak<strong>in</strong>g on additional debt<br />

is advisable. Amborski’s qualitative study of the Municipal<br />

Board’s actions showed that the Municipal Board often took<br />

population trends and economic growth potential <strong>in</strong>to<br />

consideration (1998, 20). In of the 33 applications made to<br />

the Board <strong>in</strong> 2008 and 2009, 9 were accepted, 10 dismissed<br />

and 14 withdrawn (Tyler 2011, 72). Unless the Board can be<br />

shown to be apply<strong>in</strong>g the law <strong>in</strong>correctly or act<strong>in</strong>g beyond its<br />

jurisdiction, its decisions cannot be appealed.<br />

The City of W<strong>in</strong>nipeg Charter Act requires that City to<br />

submit its borrow<strong>in</strong>g plans to the M<strong>in</strong>ister of F<strong>in</strong>ance for<br />

approval. The M<strong>in</strong>ister may, at his discretion, forward the<br />

application to the Municipal Board for review, though the<br />

M<strong>in</strong>ister is not bound by the Board’s advice. Like Manitoba’s<br />

other urban governments, no statutory limit on debt exists.<br />

However, W<strong>in</strong>nipeg does regulate debt accord<strong>in</strong>g to the<br />

guidel<strong>in</strong>es established <strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>ternal document, the <strong>Debt</strong><br />

Management Policy; this self-imposed policy was <strong>in</strong>tended to<br />

shift the City toward pay-as-you-go f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g for tax-supported<br />

capital works. In 1996, City Council established an annual<br />

debt limit of $61 million on both <strong>in</strong>ternally and externallyraised<br />

f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g for tax-supported capital projects. The <strong>Debt</strong><br />

Management Policy is the only document that imposes a limit<br />

on capital borrow<strong>in</strong>g and reports “no new external borrow<strong>in</strong>g<br />

for tax-supported capital expenditures has been approved<br />

s<strong>in</strong>ce 1998” (The City of W<strong>in</strong>nipeg n.d., 2) The policy also<br />

imposes a restriction on the length of f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g periods. Under<br />

normal circumstances, the repayment period will not exceed<br />

the useful life of the asset be<strong>in</strong>g f<strong>in</strong>anced.<br />

All urban governments <strong>in</strong> Manitoba are free to pursue<br />

loans <strong>in</strong> the private sector. The City of W<strong>in</strong>nipeg does not<br />

have a specific objective to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g relationships with<br />

rat<strong>in</strong>g agencies but does note <strong>in</strong> the <strong>Debt</strong> Management Policy<br />

that a high rat<strong>in</strong>g is desirable as it de<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong>es <strong>in</strong>terest rates<br />

and may be used as a comparative measure of general wellbe<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

W<strong>in</strong>nipeg is currently rated by Standard and Poor’s and<br />

Moody’s. The City of Brandon also ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s a relationship<br />

with Moody’s.<br />

None of the acts, regulations or policies explicitly mentions<br />

utility debt, or any other type of specific debt.<br />

Municipal Stakeholder Perspectives<br />

City adm<strong>in</strong>istrators who agreed to be <strong>in</strong>terviewed<br />

reported that their ability to grow was not <strong>in</strong>hibited by the<br />

decisions of Manitoba’s Municipal Board. An adm<strong>in</strong>istrator<br />

of one smaller urban government confided that the amount<br />

of debt that they had been cleared for exceeded what he<br />

deemed to be fiscally responsible.<br />

One emerg<strong>in</strong>g trend <strong>in</strong>volves f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g utility projects<br />

through ratepayer or user fees rather than taxes. Though<br />

loans are still required, these schemes are based on utility<br />

revenue forecasts and allow for <strong>in</strong>creased security for the<br />

prov<strong>in</strong>ce, which is ultimately responsible for <strong>in</strong>solvent<br />

municipalities. The adm<strong>in</strong>istrator who brought this trend to<br />

light noted that their upcom<strong>in</strong>g capital project will be funded<br />

by taxpayers but that pass<strong>in</strong>g the debt on to ratepayers<br />

entirely was considered more politically legitimate.<br />

The Association of Manitoba Municipalities is currently<br />

argu<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> favour of development fees – one-time levies on<br />

developers to f<strong>in</strong>ance the costs associated with development<br />

– to fund projects such as extend<strong>in</strong>g utility services to new<br />

hous<strong>in</strong>g projects. Their argument is that it is unfair to burden<br />

exist<strong>in</strong>g taxpayers with the expenses of municipal expansion.<br />

The Association argues <strong>in</strong>stead that development expenses<br />

ought to be transferred to buyers of new homes, commercial,<br />

and <strong>in</strong>dustrial properties (Slack 2011, 40).<br />

Alberta<br />

Legislative and Regulatory Environment<br />

Municipal debt-limits are regulated <strong>in</strong> Alberta through<br />

the Municipal Government Act. The Act outl<strong>in</strong>es how debtlimits<br />

are de<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong>ed, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g a basic formula. Alberta is<br />

unique <strong>in</strong> that it has legislation govern<strong>in</strong>g debt-limits for<br />

regional service commissions – corporate structures that<br />

are owned by municipalities and provide utility services on<br />

a regional basis. Municipalities <strong>in</strong> Alberta have established<br />

10


commissions for various reasons: the commission’s debt<br />

may be calculated separately from the municipality’s debt,<br />

commissions have higher debt-ceil<strong>in</strong>gs, and commissions<br />

create regional economies of scale because they are owned<br />

by several municipalities.<br />

<strong>Long</strong>-<strong>term</strong> <strong>Debt</strong> <strong>Limits</strong> for Municipalities <strong>in</strong> Alberta<br />

<strong>Debt</strong>-limits for municipalities <strong>in</strong> Alberta are de<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong>ed via<br />

two basic formulas. For most municipalities, total debt cannot<br />

exceed 150% of total municipal revenue, and their debt-service<br />

ratio cannot exceed 25% of municipal revenue (The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce<br />

of Alberta, sec. 2). The figures applied to Calgary, Edmonton,<br />

Medic<strong>in</strong>e Hat, and the Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo<br />

are different, however. The debt of these municipalities cannot<br />

exceed 200% of the revenue of the municipality, while their<br />

debt-service ratio may not exceed 35% of the same. (See<br />

Appendix for outl<strong>in</strong>e of formulas).<br />

Municipal Stakeholder Perspectives On Municipal <strong>Debt</strong><br />

Representatives from The City of Calgary suggested that<br />

the bulk of impediments to municipal borrow<strong>in</strong>g were selfimposed;<br />

they cited the City’s <strong>in</strong>ternal debt ceil<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong>ternal<br />

debt-service ratio limit and the desire of both elected and<br />

bureaucratic officials to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> the City’s AAA credit rat<strong>in</strong>g<br />

as examples of such self-imposed f<strong>in</strong>ancial choke-po<strong>in</strong>ts<br />

(Amborski 1998, 41). This latter goal also <strong>in</strong>fluences current<br />

behaviour <strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong>, where cities such as Saskatoon<br />

want to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> their AAA credit rat<strong>in</strong>g and restra<strong>in</strong> their<br />

borrow<strong>in</strong>g activity accord<strong>in</strong>gly.<br />

The Town of Okotoks, a town of approximately 25,000<br />

which is located 20km south of Calgary, is currently debat<strong>in</strong>g<br />

how to handle its long-<strong>term</strong> municipal debt. The town was<br />

one of the ten fastest grow<strong>in</strong>g communities <strong>in</strong> Canada<br />

between 2006 and 2011, and serves as a good comparator<br />

to small-and-medium sized <strong>Saskatchewan</strong> cities because<br />

of this susta<strong>in</strong>ed growth. The town operates under a selfimposed<br />

debt limit that is only 75% of the limit that the town<br />

is legally permitted to assume under prov<strong>in</strong>cial legislation.<br />

S<strong>in</strong>ce 2007, municipal debt has risen dramatically and<br />

both councillors and residents have been openly ask<strong>in</strong>g<br />

whether or not Okotoks will change its <strong>in</strong>ternal debt-limit<br />

to cope with the costs of growth. The current municipal<br />

government is committed to rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g fiscally conservative<br />

while simultaneously access<strong>in</strong>g as many grants as possible<br />

for <strong>in</strong>frastructure upgrades, and monitor<strong>in</strong>g whether debt<br />

<strong>in</strong>creases are actually tied to growth. In short, the municipality<br />

does not f<strong>in</strong>d prov<strong>in</strong>cial debt limits to be problematic. Rather,<br />

the municipality is be<strong>in</strong>g challenged by the costs of growth,<br />

and is exam<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g whether its own <strong>in</strong>ternal fiscal policies are<br />

exacerbat<strong>in</strong>g this stress (Patterson 2011).<br />

Okotoks is not alone <strong>in</strong> operat<strong>in</strong>g under this k<strong>in</strong>d of<br />

self-imposed fiscal responsibility. One of the fastest grow<strong>in</strong>g<br />

municipalities <strong>in</strong> Canada, the Regional Municipality of Wood<br />

Buffalo, has also imposed strict limitations on itself. As noted<br />

above, Wood Buffalo – along with the Cities of Edmonton,<br />

Calgary, and Medic<strong>in</strong>e Hat – has a total debt-limit of 200%<br />

of municipal revenue and a debt-service ratio limit of 35%.<br />

However, the RM has chosen to further restra<strong>in</strong> their debt<br />

obligations by sett<strong>in</strong>g their municipal debt-limit at 75% of<br />

total revenues (Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo 2012).<br />

This limitation is rooted <strong>in</strong> a belief that each generation should<br />

pay <strong>in</strong>to the cost of <strong>in</strong>frastructure, result<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a pay-as-you-go<br />

approach to build<strong>in</strong>g and ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>frastructure.<br />

There was no evidence that Albertan municipalities<br />

would like to see utilities based debt calculated separately<br />

from other municipal debt. However, this may have more<br />

to do with the common use of alternative regional service<br />

delivery mechanisms <strong>in</strong> Alberta, such as Regional Service<br />

Commissions, regional partnerships, or Municipal Controlled<br />

Corporations (as is the case <strong>in</strong> Calgary and Edmonton).<br />

The Role of Corporate Structures <strong>in</strong> Utilities Service<br />

Delivery: Regional Service Commissions (RSC)<br />

and Other Arrangements<br />

In Alberta, many municipalities are utiliz<strong>in</strong>g corporate<br />

structures to own/operate/ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>frastructure and to<br />

provide municipal services on a regional basis. These entities<br />

range from simple <strong>in</strong>ter-municipal partnerships to Regional<br />

Services Commissions to municipal-controlled corporations.<br />

These more complex structures, such as RSCs, enable<br />

municipalities to borrow more money from the Alberta<br />

Capital F<strong>in</strong>ance Authority, because the debt limits for these<br />

bodies are recorded separately from the municipality and<br />

are larger as a percentage of revenue (200% for RSCs vs. 150%<br />

for municipalities).<br />

Regional Service Commissions play a major role <strong>in</strong> the<br />

delivery of services to municipalities. They lower the cost and/<br />

or <strong>in</strong>crease the quality of utilities services for municipalities<br />

by deliver<strong>in</strong>g these services on a regional basis through<br />

a regional adm<strong>in</strong>istrative body. The use of RSCs allows<br />

Albertan municipalities to <strong>in</strong>crease the quality of dr<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g<br />

water, someth<strong>in</strong>g that is often a challenge for small urban<br />

and rural municipalities.<br />

RSCs are very significant <strong>in</strong> <strong>term</strong>s of their role <strong>in</strong><br />

construct<strong>in</strong>g and manag<strong>in</strong>g regional water and sewer<br />

<strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>in</strong> Alberta. There are 69 RSCs, and the majority of<br />

these are <strong>in</strong> the water/wastewater/waste management service<br />

areas. In an <strong>in</strong>terview, an official from the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Municipal<br />

Affairs was not able to provide a precise measure to quantify<br />

the significance of RSCs <strong>in</strong> <strong>term</strong>s of their role <strong>in</strong> municipal<br />

debt, but the official did note that the majority of debt limit<br />

extension approvals made by the prov<strong>in</strong>ce are for RSCs that<br />

require start-up capital for the construction of <strong>in</strong>frastructure for<br />

water/waste water utilities. In <strong>term</strong>s of adm<strong>in</strong>istration, hav<strong>in</strong>g<br />

utilities managed by a separate entity frees up adm<strong>in</strong>istrative<br />

capacity for other <strong>in</strong>itiatives. Moreover, RSCs have a higher<br />

debt-limit ratio as a percentage of revenue.<br />

RSCs have become <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly important <strong>in</strong> Alberta<br />

for the delivery of potable water. Several years ago the<br />

government <strong>in</strong>itiated the Water for Life Strategy, which came<br />

from a policy that high quality water should be available<br />

for all residents of Alberta, no matter where they live <strong>in</strong> the<br />

11


prov<strong>in</strong>ce (Government of Alberta). The prov<strong>in</strong>ce has been<br />

provid<strong>in</strong>g up to 90% grants to municipalities to set-up RSCs<br />

to deliver water on a regional basis because this <strong>in</strong>creases<br />

the quality and reduces the costs of <strong>in</strong>frastructure for<br />

municipalities, thereby reduc<strong>in</strong>g demand on the prov<strong>in</strong>ce<br />

for <strong>in</strong>frastructure dollars. Although costs for the municipality<br />

have been reduced, municipal residents have seen their<br />

water costs rise because they are now pay<strong>in</strong>g the true<br />

cost of water. This has been somewhat problematic <strong>in</strong><br />

that some residents are upset with cost <strong>in</strong>creases. In some<br />

cases, water bills may have <strong>in</strong>creased by as much as 500%,<br />

which is <strong>in</strong>credibly difficult for those customers that were<br />

not prepared for the <strong>in</strong>crease, nor given time to adjust their<br />

water consumption habits. However, <strong>in</strong> the long-<strong>term</strong>, the<br />

municipalities and residents will benefit <strong>in</strong> that <strong>in</strong>frastructure<br />

will be susta<strong>in</strong>able and consumption will be curbed.<br />

RSCs are not just used for water services. They are<br />

also utilized for the delivery of sewer, waste management<br />

(recycl<strong>in</strong>g and solid waste), community plann<strong>in</strong>g, and even<br />

public transportation. Wherever there is a public service<br />

that a number of municipalities with<strong>in</strong> a region perceive as<br />

a benefit, and where these municipalities are <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong><br />

work<strong>in</strong>g together, an RSC may be utilized. Water, sewer, and<br />

waste management are the most common forms of RSC.<br />

Why are Regional Service Commissions so Common<br />

<strong>in</strong> Alberta?<br />

Government grants have <strong>in</strong>centivized the development<br />

of RSCs. The official with Alberta Municipal Affairs noted that<br />

many of the RSCs would probably not have been created if<br />

it were not for significant prov<strong>in</strong>cial grants to assist with setup<br />

costs. For example, the Water For Life Strategy <strong>in</strong>cluded<br />

up to 90% grants for the set-up of water service delivery<br />

RSCs. Other grants have been made available for sewer, and<br />

waste management <strong>in</strong>frastructure. Organiz<strong>in</strong>g the delivery<br />

of services <strong>in</strong> this way has made possible for some fairly<br />

significant achievements <strong>in</strong> <strong>term</strong>s of service delivery. For<br />

example, one major <strong>in</strong>frastructure project <strong>in</strong>volves the pip<strong>in</strong>g<br />

of water from Edmonton, several hundred kilometres away<br />

to Vermillion, servic<strong>in</strong>g many jurisdictions along the way<br />

through a modernized web of service commissions. However,<br />

it is important to note that these would not likely have taken<br />

place without major prov<strong>in</strong>cial support.<br />

Benefits and Challenges of Regional Arrangements<br />

When asked about whether regional bodies such as<br />

RSCs, or other such regional partnerships for the delivery<br />

of utilities services <strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong> would be beneficial,<br />

one official with the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Municipal Affairs <strong>in</strong> Alberta<br />

noted that some k<strong>in</strong>d of regional service mechanism is likely<br />

a good idea, but the key is to provide an <strong>in</strong>centive, such as<br />

cover<strong>in</strong>g start-up costs, to develop them regionally and to<br />

make them competitive. This official thought that it was quite<br />

likely that many municipalities would fear the loss of control<br />

over regional entities, as well as the loss of jobs with<strong>in</strong> their<br />

community, or even the idea that water or some other service<br />

12<br />

would potentially come from a facility <strong>in</strong> another community.<br />

These challenges would need to be overcome before a<br />

regional service delivery option could be feasible. This official<br />

suggested that regardless of the challenges and hurdles, the<br />

benefits far outweigh the costs for smaller municipalities<br />

that would be able to access higher quality services for their<br />

residents, and reduce <strong>in</strong>frastructure costs through some<br />

form of regionalized service delivery mechanism. This official<br />

emphasized that though RSCs are a useful tool, they should<br />

only be one tool <strong>in</strong> the arsenal of municipalities experienc<strong>in</strong>g<br />

growth, and that there are other options. The key po<strong>in</strong>t is that<br />

municipalities need to build capacity.<br />

RSCs provide for greater utility debt flexibility <strong>in</strong> the long<strong>term</strong><br />

because they have a larger debt threshold. Alberta’s<br />

legislation says that RSCs are entitled to a debt limit of 200%<br />

of revenue. But s<strong>in</strong>ce RSCs do not have revenue when<br />

they beg<strong>in</strong> operat<strong>in</strong>g, they require prov<strong>in</strong>cial approval of<br />

a debt-limit extension to give them time to set-up and beg<strong>in</strong><br />

deliver<strong>in</strong>g services to earn revenue. Only those municipalities<br />

that have the capacity to set up an RSC with a solid bus<strong>in</strong>ess<br />

plan, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g 5 year projections on operat<strong>in</strong>g a capital<br />

budgets, will be granted base-extensions for up to five years<br />

to get them operational. Thus, the ability of municipalities to<br />

take advantage of this type of mechanism largely cont<strong>in</strong>gent<br />

upon f<strong>in</strong>ancial and development capacity. Regardless of what<br />

the debt-limit is <strong>in</strong> legislation, the government of Alberta<br />

works with municipalities and RSCs to ensure that they have<br />

solid bus<strong>in</strong>ess plans and organizational capacity. The Alberta<br />

Government is exam<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g options to give municipalities<br />

more autonomy, such as greater debt limits, but would likely<br />

<strong>in</strong>crease report<strong>in</strong>g requirements, such as quarterly report<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

An important feature of this method of service delivery is<br />

<strong>in</strong>creased operational capacity. Many of the RSCs have their<br />

own dedicated staff <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g a chief adm<strong>in</strong>istrative officer<br />

(CAO). It was noted by one official that these RSCs were the<br />

most effective because they had the management capacity<br />

to operate as an effective bus<strong>in</strong>ess.<br />

Another regional mechanism that may become more<br />

common as growth pressures <strong>in</strong>crease is the Municipal<br />

Controlled Corporation. Many municipalities would like to<br />

convert their RSCs <strong>in</strong>to municipal controlled corporations.<br />

RSCs are not permitted to make a profit, whereas Municipal<br />

Controlled Corporations are. Examples of this are Enmax<br />

<strong>in</strong> Calgary. Municipal Controlled Corporations are over<br />

50% owned by a municipality. Although regulated, these<br />

corporations can raise funds, and sell-stocks, so long as<br />

the municipality ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s control of them. This could be<br />

problematic for the prov<strong>in</strong>ce if a significant number of<br />

municipalities created municipal controlled corporations,<br />

and if those corporations experienced significant f<strong>in</strong>ancial<br />

hardships, as the prov<strong>in</strong>ce could potentially be liable for any<br />

losses. The prov<strong>in</strong>ce has much better capacity to regulate the<br />

use of RSCs than it does Municipal Controlled Corporations.


Table 2.0 Comparison with <strong>Saskatchewan</strong><br />

Who approves<br />

borrow<strong>in</strong>g<br />

What are the restrictions on borrow<strong>in</strong>g?<br />

What is the turnaround time<br />

on applications to borrow?<br />

Prov<strong>in</strong>ce M<strong>in</strong>ister Board Restrictions Turnaround<br />

Nova Scotia Yes 1 n/a<br />

• n 30% debt-service limit<br />

• n 15% debt-service limit used as<br />

a benchmark by NSMFC<br />

• n utilities debt not <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> calculation<br />

2-4 weeks<br />

Manitoba Yes 2 Yes 3 $61 million <strong>in</strong> debt on tax-funded capital<br />

expenditures, and is presently mov<strong>in</strong>g<br />

• n W<strong>in</strong>nipeg may carry no more than<br />

to pay-as-you-go f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g<br />

10-30 days<br />

Alberta Yes 4 n/a<br />

<strong>Saskatchewan</strong> No Yes<br />

• n Calgary, Edmonton, Medic<strong>in</strong>e Hat<br />

& RM of Wood Buffalo: maximum debt load<br />

of 2 times municipal revenues; debt service<br />

ratio of 35%<br />

• n all other municipal governments:<br />

maximum debt load of 1.5 times municipal<br />

revenues; debt service ratio of 25%<br />

• n Municipalities: 100 % of previous years<br />

revenue<br />

• n Cities: De<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> consultation with<br />

SMB and expressed as a percentage of<br />

revenue (very ad hoc <strong>in</strong> nature).<br />

1-4 weeks<br />

Varies<br />

Notes<br />

1) Save for borrow<strong>in</strong>g from capital reserve fund<br />

2) For the City of W<strong>in</strong>nipeg<br />

3) For all other urban areas<br />

4) For debt limits that exceed legislated limits.<br />

Summary of Alternative Service Delivery Arrangements:<br />

An Alberta Perspective<br />

The use of alternative service delivery arrangements <strong>in</strong><br />

Alberta has proved useful to both municipalities and for the<br />

prov<strong>in</strong>ce. For the prov<strong>in</strong>ce it has created a venue through<br />

which to standardize the delivery of certa<strong>in</strong> services, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g<br />

potable water, among municipalities. It has also created<br />

service delivery capacity among municipalities, which could<br />

potentially reduce the demand for grants <strong>in</strong> the future,<br />

especially among self-susta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g RSCs. For municipalities,<br />

the adoption of RSCs has improved the quality of some<br />

services, reduced <strong>in</strong>frastructure costs for the municipalities,<br />

and created regional economies of scale. Success <strong>in</strong> this<br />

area was only possible because of a will<strong>in</strong>gness on behalf<br />

of municipalities to work together, as well as leadership and<br />

support from the prov<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> the provision of grants for<br />

the creation of RSCs. Some RSCs have been challenged by<br />

f<strong>in</strong>ancial capacity, adm<strong>in</strong>istrative capacity, and other issues.<br />

Others have been hugely successful, and some have even<br />

created an adm<strong>in</strong>istrative identity that has become separate<br />

from that of the municipality. It is important to note that RSCs<br />

are only useful <strong>in</strong>sofar as municipalities are committed to<br />

<strong>in</strong>vest<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> their adm<strong>in</strong>istrative capacity, and if the prov<strong>in</strong>ce<br />

is will<strong>in</strong>g to support their development. They may be a<br />

potential opportunity for reduc<strong>in</strong>g utilities-related costs for<br />

municipalities <strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong>, but they will only be part of<br />

the solution.<br />

Comparison with <strong>Saskatchewan</strong><br />

The table above compares municipal debt policy <strong>in</strong><br />

<strong>Saskatchewan</strong> with the three comparator prov<strong>in</strong>ces. It is<br />

<strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g to note that a municipal board that regulates<br />

municipal debt is only present <strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong> and<br />

Manitoba. In Nova Scotia debt is regulated by the M<strong>in</strong>istry<br />

responsible for municipal government, and <strong>in</strong> Alberta, only<br />

municipalities seek<strong>in</strong>g debt-level extensions above legislated<br />

limits require m<strong>in</strong>isterial approval. Each prov<strong>in</strong>ce differs on<br />

their debt-limit calculation formula. Nova Scotia is the only<br />

prov<strong>in</strong>ce we analyzed where utility debt differentiated from<br />

other municipal debt. As well, <strong>in</strong> Nova Scotia, debt-limits<br />

are regulated largely by a service limit as a percentage of<br />

revenues, rather than by a total debt limit as a percentage<br />

of revenue as is the case <strong>in</strong> the other prov<strong>in</strong>ces.<br />

13


Recommendations<br />

Below are potential changes to policy and process that<br />

could be beneficial to urban governments <strong>in</strong> Canada. These<br />

recommendations have been <strong>in</strong>formed by our understand<strong>in</strong>g<br />

of long-<strong>term</strong> debt policy <strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong>, <strong>in</strong> other prov<strong>in</strong>ces,<br />

and from surveys and <strong>in</strong>terviews conducted with urban<br />

governments and stakeholders <strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong>. These<br />

recommendations are meant to focus the attention of SUMA<br />

on specific issues and options that, <strong>in</strong> our view, would address<br />

the issues that we uncovered over the course this project.<br />

Policy Problem 1:<br />

A significant number of municipalities <strong>in</strong>terviewed noted<br />

that their debt capacity is <strong>in</strong>sufficient to accommodate<br />

future needs and growth.<br />

Analysis:<br />

In our discussions with municipalities and municipal<br />

stakeholders, a number of issues arose that are related to<br />

the concern over debt, and that <strong>in</strong>form our recommendation:<br />

1. SMB <strong>in</strong> Practice: Under the current system,<br />

municipalities must work with SMB to establish a debt-limit<br />

when the debt-limit exceeds their current limit. The current<br />

practice of the SMB is to work with the municipality to ensure<br />

that a sound bus<strong>in</strong>ess plan is <strong>in</strong> place to ensure that the<br />

f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g of the municipality is susta<strong>in</strong>able. So long as debt<br />

is susta<strong>in</strong>able as outl<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> the municipality’s bus<strong>in</strong>ess plan,<br />

the SMB will likely grant a debt extension. There were no<br />

examples of municipalities be<strong>in</strong>g refused debt extensions<br />

from the <strong>in</strong>terviews and surveys, so this system, while<br />

unpopular with some municipalities, appears to be provid<strong>in</strong>g<br />

urban governments with adequate debt capacity on average.<br />

Some municipalities suggested that <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g utilities-based<br />

debt <strong>in</strong> the debt-limit formula is <strong>in</strong>appropriate because<br />

utilities-based debt is funded by user fees, not mill rates, and<br />

by exclud<strong>in</strong>g this type of debt, municipalities would have<br />

greater capacity to access debt for non-utilities purposes<br />

without hav<strong>in</strong>g to approach the SMB for an extension.<br />

a. The SMB approach to regulat<strong>in</strong>g debt is very ad hoc.<br />

Municipalities can count on receiv<strong>in</strong>g a review of their<br />

debt-management plans, and be<strong>in</strong>g granted a debt-level<br />

extension so long as a plan is <strong>in</strong> place. Thus, the system is<br />

ad hoc and flexible. Some municipalities were comfortable<br />

with this, while others were concerned that the system<br />

is unclear and potentially unpredictable, as they worried<br />

about miss<strong>in</strong>g opportunities <strong>in</strong> the future if the SMB<br />

decided not to grant the municipality an extension.<br />

2. Infrastructure Needs and Additional <strong>Debt</strong> Capacity:<br />

Concern over <strong>in</strong>sufficient debt-capacity is most often<br />

associated with the need for major <strong>in</strong>frastructure upgrades for<br />

utilities such as water and sewer. However, <strong>in</strong> most cases it was<br />

suggested that the municipality would not be able to afford<br />

these upgrades without significant prov<strong>in</strong>cial or federal grants.<br />

14<br />

3. Responsiveness: Some of the larger municipalities<br />

were of the op<strong>in</strong>ion that the current policy is a “one size<br />

fits all” approach provid<strong>in</strong>g the same level of oversight to<br />

larger municipalities with adequate professional staff as to<br />

smaller municipalities without adequate capacity. These<br />

municipalities would like to see the policy and practice of<br />

debt-regulation reformed to recognize the various levels of<br />

capacity among municipalities.<br />

Recommendations:<br />

It does not appear that the current system has reduced<br />

the capacity of municipalities to access sufficient debt. So<br />

long as an adequate bus<strong>in</strong>ess plan is <strong>in</strong> place, the SMB works<br />

with municipalities to ensure that they can access debt. Thus,<br />

the <strong>in</strong>clusion of utility debt is more of annoyance for some<br />

municipalities than it is a h<strong>in</strong>drance to growth. What seems<br />

to be the bigger concern among municipalities is the lack of<br />

clarity around how debt-levels are de<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong>ed, the rationale<br />

for the <strong>in</strong>clusion of utility debt, and generally, the policies of<br />

the SMB. Moreover, <strong>in</strong> cases where debt-levels are <strong>in</strong>sufficient,<br />

the municipality is often unable to service additional debt,<br />

and thus is <strong>in</strong> need of additional municipal grants for<br />

<strong>in</strong>frastructure rather than additional debt-capacity.<br />

In order to address the above concerns, SUMA should<br />

consider the follow<strong>in</strong>g actions:<br />

A. Work with the SMB to Develop Guidel<strong>in</strong>es for<br />

Municipalities: Approach the SMB about develop<strong>in</strong>g<br />

a comprehensive guide to municipal debt to provide<br />

municipalities with a thorough explanation of how debt<br />

levels are calculated, application criteria, key <strong>term</strong>s such<br />

as “own source revenue” and other factors that they should<br />

consider. This could help alleviate some of the concerns that<br />

municipalities have about obta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g adequate debt. Currently<br />

there seems to be a high level of uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty among<br />

municipalities about how the SMB works.<br />

B. Request that the Prov<strong>in</strong>ce Develop a More Substantive<br />

Policy: The survey data <strong>in</strong>dicated that there are some<br />

municipalities that are grow<strong>in</strong>g and will cont<strong>in</strong>ue to require<br />

additional debt capacity; they can handle additional debt.<br />

However, there are others that cannot service additional debt.<br />

The current system permits the SMB work with municipalities<br />

<strong>in</strong> an ad hoc manner to de<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong>e if an extension should<br />

be granted. If SUMA would like to advocate on behalf of<br />

municipalities that are frustrated by this process, it should<br />

consider request<strong>in</strong>g that the prov<strong>in</strong>ce change its policy<br />

to provide greater long-<strong>term</strong> debt limits to municipalities<br />

that demonstrate a capacity to manage greater debt, and<br />

that are grow<strong>in</strong>g. The SMB could utilize a tier system, where<br />

different tiers of municipalities are granted different levels of<br />

debt automatically, and only need to approach the SMB for<br />

ma<strong>in</strong>tenance of that status periodically. This system could<br />

preserve the oversight and f<strong>in</strong>ancial regulation of smaller<br />

municipalities that cannot accommodate greater debt,<br />

while provid<strong>in</strong>g greater capacity and flexibility to grow<strong>in</strong>g<br />

municipalities. The current policy allows the prov<strong>in</strong>ce to<br />

ensure that small municipalities ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> reasonable levels


of debt, while permitt<strong>in</strong>g the prov<strong>in</strong>ce the flexibility<br />

to <strong>in</strong>crease debt where feasible. If this is too ad hoc for<br />

municipalities, then a more precise policy needs to be<br />

developed so that municipalities can plan.<br />

C. Request that the Prov<strong>in</strong>ce Consider Remov<strong>in</strong>g Utilities<br />

<strong>Debt</strong> from Calculation: As mentioned above, Nova Scotia<br />

does not <strong>in</strong>clude water and electrical utilities debt <strong>in</strong> debtlimit<br />

calculations. <strong>Debt</strong> for these utilities is still regulated by<br />

prov<strong>in</strong>ce. <strong>Saskatchewan</strong> could do the same, and cont<strong>in</strong>ue<br />

to regulate municipal debt through the SMB, which would<br />

ensure oversight ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed. However, this may, <strong>in</strong> some<br />

cases, provide greater flexibility to municipalities.<br />

D. Advocate for a Prov<strong>in</strong>ce-wide Solution to Infrastructure<br />

Needs: Many municipalities mentioned that they need to<br />

make major upgrades to water and sewer system, as per<br />

new federal regulations. Many of these municipalities cannot<br />

afford to make these upgrades without <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g their debt<br />

load, but cannot feasibly service debt at the levels needed to<br />

meet the new requirements . Thus, it appears that there is<br />

a need for a strategy to assist municipalities with develop<strong>in</strong>g<br />

susta<strong>in</strong>able <strong>in</strong>frastructure.<br />

Policy Problem 2:<br />

A number of municipalities are fac<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>frastructure<br />

challenges, and cannot afford to replace necessary utilities<br />

<strong>in</strong>frastructure such as water and sewer.<br />

Analysis:<br />

Our comparative research on Alberta’s RSC models,<br />

as well as our discussions with municipal officials <strong>in</strong><br />

<strong>Saskatchewan</strong> highlighted the option of regionalized service<br />

delivery, which may make replac<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>frastructure feasible<br />

for some municipalities. This is especially true for smaller<br />

municipalities <strong>in</strong> rural areas where it may not be possible for<br />

one municipality to build its own water treatment plant, but<br />

where collaboration on a regional scale might be achievable.<br />

It may also be easier for municipalities to access grant<br />

fund<strong>in</strong>g to build regional <strong>in</strong>frastructure, as was the case<br />

with the Sask Land<strong>in</strong>g Regional Water Pipel<strong>in</strong>e Utility.<br />

To summarize, the two options we exam<strong>in</strong>ed are:<br />

1. RSCs: As mentioned, municipalities <strong>in</strong> Alberta engage <strong>in</strong><br />

RSCs to deliver services on a regional basis. This is potentially<br />

beneficial because it removes some utilities-based debt from<br />

the municipality to the RSC, creates efficiencies <strong>in</strong> service<br />

deliver, reduces costs, and allows some municipalities to<br />

access grants for service delivery through RSCs. With RSCs the<br />

municipality frees up adm<strong>in</strong>istrative capacity for other activities.<br />

2. Regional Service Delivery <strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong>: One<br />

group of municipalities has regionalized the delivery of water<br />

purification and transportation. The Sask Land<strong>in</strong>g Regional<br />

Water Pipel<strong>in</strong>e Utility, which was created by a group of towns<br />

and RMs <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the Towns of Kyle and Elrose, will treat and<br />

deliver potable water to the Towns of Kyle and Elrose,<br />

as well as to the residents of the surround<strong>in</strong>g RMs, and some<br />

major customers such as nearby Hutterite colonies and large<br />

farm operations (Infrastructure Canada). The Sask Land<strong>in</strong>g<br />

Regional Water Pipel<strong>in</strong>e Utility was set up because water<br />

quality was poor, and it was a solution that was recommended<br />

by SaskWater. The municipalities were able to develop this<br />

because of grant fund<strong>in</strong>g available from the federal and<br />

prov<strong>in</strong>cial governments, and fund<strong>in</strong>g costs worked out to<br />

roughly 1/3 municipal, 1/3 prov<strong>in</strong>cial, and 1/3 federal dollars.<br />

In the long run, because the utility is separate from the<br />

municipality, and because the costs are recovered on a fee for<br />

service basis, this should shift utilities related debt away from<br />

the municipalities, free<strong>in</strong>g debt capacity for other needs. One<br />

municipal partner suggested that this type of <strong>in</strong>itiative, while it<br />

is <strong>in</strong>novative and has proved successful, would not have been<br />

possible without grant fund<strong>in</strong>g. Moreover, the will<strong>in</strong>gness<br />

to work together with neighbours and create a third party<br />

organization was imperative to the success of this <strong>in</strong>itiative,<br />

which is now shovel ready with pipes be<strong>in</strong>g laid <strong>in</strong> some areas.<br />

Recommendations:<br />

The above two examples are options for <strong>Saskatchewan</strong><br />

municipalities to consider <strong>in</strong> address<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>frastructure<br />

challenges, especially water and sewer, which appear to<br />

be significant challenges <strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong>.<br />

In order to address the above concerns, SUMA should<br />

consider the follow<strong>in</strong>g actions:<br />

A. Survey Members About Regional Service Delivery:<br />

Survey members about their <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> engag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> regional<br />

service delivery arrangements. De<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong>e the level of <strong>in</strong>terest,<br />

as well as the perspective of members on how such<br />

an arrangement ought to be designed.<br />

B. Communicate with Municipal Partners: If there is<br />

an appetite among members, SARM should be approached<br />

to de<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong>e if their members have an <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> this.<br />

C. Approach Prov<strong>in</strong>ce about Fund<strong>in</strong>g: If there is<br />

an appetite for this, approach the prov<strong>in</strong>ce and federal<br />

government about targeted fund<strong>in</strong>g for sett<strong>in</strong>g up and<br />

implement<strong>in</strong>g regional service delivery groups. It is clear<br />

from our research that regional service delivery arrangements<br />

require fund<strong>in</strong>g to be developed.<br />

Process Problem 3:<br />

A number of municipalities mentioned that the processes<br />

of the SMB could be improved and streaml<strong>in</strong>ed to better<br />

serve municipalities.<br />

Analysis:<br />

The municipalities we <strong>in</strong>terviewed mentioned that<br />

streaml<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g and simplify<strong>in</strong>g the application process would<br />

improve efficiency. This was also reflected <strong>in</strong> the survey data.<br />

Municipalities suggested that the SMB could be improved <strong>in</strong><br />

the follow<strong>in</strong>g areas:<br />

15


1. Flexibility: Many municipalities suggested that they<br />

would benefit from greater flexibility <strong>in</strong> order to take<br />

advantage of short-<strong>term</strong> borrow<strong>in</strong>g options and lower<br />

<strong>in</strong>terest rates, particularly with the historic low <strong>in</strong>terest rates<br />

currently available.<br />

2. Speed: Most municipalities suggested that the SMB<br />

could improve the speed at which applications are reviewed.<br />

Some municipalities believed that <strong>in</strong> the future they might<br />

miss important opportunities while await<strong>in</strong>g approval of<br />

debt-limit extensions. One suggestion revealed <strong>in</strong> the survey<br />

data was for the SMB to legislate turnaround times, which<br />

would require additional staff resources from the prov<strong>in</strong>ce.<br />

Recommendations:<br />

In order to address the above issues, the follow<strong>in</strong>g policy<br />

solutions should be exam<strong>in</strong>ed:<br />

A. Approach SMB about review<strong>in</strong>g borrow<strong>in</strong>g options:<br />

Municipalities have suggested that they are miss<strong>in</strong>g out on<br />

short-<strong>term</strong> borrow<strong>in</strong>g options that would decrease <strong>in</strong>terest<br />

costs. SUMA should request that the SMB exam<strong>in</strong>e its current<br />

policies to de<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong>e if this is the case, and if so, if changes<br />

could be made to <strong>in</strong>crease flexibility and lower costs<br />

for municipalities.<br />

B. Legislated Process<strong>in</strong>g Times: Many municipalities were<br />

concerned that process<strong>in</strong>g times for applications to the SMB<br />

were too lengthy. The prov<strong>in</strong>ce should be encouraged to<br />

legislate standards <strong>in</strong> this area.<br />

C. Review Application Process: It was noted by the SMB<br />

that process<strong>in</strong>g times are often lengthy due to <strong>in</strong>complete<br />

applications. The application process should be reviewed<br />

to de<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong>e the reason for this so that it may be resolved<br />

through process changes, build<strong>in</strong>g municipal capacity, or both.<br />

Appendix<br />

Alberta <strong>Debt</strong>-Limit Formula<br />

<strong>Debt</strong> limits are calculated by de<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g revenue,<br />

total debt, and debt service costs:<br />

Revenue =<br />

“the total revenue reported <strong>in</strong> the last audited annual<br />

f<strong>in</strong>ancial statement of the municipality prepared before<br />

the calculation time, less transfers from the governments<br />

of Alberta and Canada for the purposes of a capital property<br />

reported <strong>in</strong> that statement if those transfers are <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong><br />

the total revenue, and less amounts reported as contributed<br />

or donated tangible capital assets if those amounts are<br />

<strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> the total revenue” (The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Alberta, sec. 3)<br />

Total debt is calculated <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g way:<br />

TD = (a + b) – c<br />

TD = total debt<br />

a = “the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple outstand<strong>in</strong>g at the calculation time<br />

on borrow<strong>in</strong>gs made by the municipality;”<br />

b = “the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple outstand<strong>in</strong>g at the calculation time<br />

of loans <strong>in</strong> good stand<strong>in</strong>g that have been guaranteed by<br />

the municipality, plus the amount that the municipality<br />

is liable to pay at the calculation time under loans not <strong>in</strong> good<br />

stand<strong>in</strong>g that have been guaranteed by the municipality;”<br />

(The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Alberta, sec. 4)<br />

c = “the amount of a and b that the municipality is entitled<br />

to recover from another municipality at the calculation time”<br />

(The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Alberta, sec. 4)<br />

To summarize, total debt is the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple outstand<strong>in</strong>g at<br />

the time of calculation, plus the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple outstand<strong>in</strong>g at the<br />

calculation time for loans <strong>in</strong> good stand<strong>in</strong>g, and that have been<br />

guaranteed by the municipality <strong>in</strong> addition to the amount<br />

of money the municipality is liable for on loans not <strong>in</strong> good<br />

stand<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>in</strong>us the amount of a and b that the municipality<br />

is owed by other municipalities at the calculation time.<br />

<strong>Debt</strong> servic<strong>in</strong>g limits are calculated as follows:<br />

DS = (a + b) – C<br />

a = the sum of:<br />

i) The total amount of the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple and <strong>in</strong>terest that<br />

the municipality is required to pay for those debts where<br />

the municipality is required to pay pr<strong>in</strong>ciple dur<strong>in</strong>g the 12<br />

months after the calculation time; and<br />

ii) For those debts where the municipality is not required to<br />

pay any of pr<strong>in</strong>ciple dur<strong>in</strong>g the 12 months after calculation,<br />

the total of the pro rata amounts for those 12 months.<br />

b = the total amount that the council estimates<br />

“on reasonable grounds” that the municipality will be liable<br />

for dur<strong>in</strong>g the 12 months after calculation time for loans<br />

not <strong>in</strong> good stand<strong>in</strong>g but that have been guaranteed by<br />

the municipality.<br />

c = the amount of a and b that the municipality is entitled<br />

to recover from another municipality dur<strong>in</strong>g the 12 month<br />

16


period after calculation time (The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Alberta, sec. 5).<br />

<strong>Debt</strong> Limit calculations may or may not <strong>in</strong>clude regional<br />

service commission debt. A municipality “may choose to<br />

calculate its revenue, total debt and debt service as though<br />

one or more of the controlled corporations are part of<br />

the municipality” (The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Alberta, sec. 6.1). If the<br />

municipality chooses to do this, then all of that corporation’s<br />

“revenue, borrow<strong>in</strong>gs, guarantees and loans must be <strong>in</strong>cluded<br />

<strong>in</strong> those calculations except” (The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Alberta, sec. 6.2)<br />

for the follow<strong>in</strong>g conditions:<br />

<strong>Debt</strong> service is calculated as follows:<br />

<strong>Debt</strong> service = the sum of the total <strong>in</strong>terest and pr<strong>in</strong>ciple<br />

the RSC will have to pay for debts that will be serviced dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />

the 12 months after calculation time plus the pro rata amounts<br />

on debts for which the municipality does not pay pr<strong>in</strong>ciple<br />

dur<strong>in</strong>g the 12 months follow<strong>in</strong>g the calculation time, m<strong>in</strong>us<br />

the amount the RSC is entitled to recover from another RSC<br />

or municipality (The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Alberta 2000, sec. 5).<br />

• n Revenues that arise from transactions between the<br />

municipality and the corporation, or between the corporation<br />

and another municipal controlled corporation are not to be<br />

<strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> the comb<strong>in</strong>ed revenues.<br />

• n Guarantees and loans between the municipality and<br />

controlled corporations or between municipal controlled<br />

corporations are not to be <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> comb<strong>in</strong>ed total debt<br />

or debt service calculation.<br />

Regional Service Commissions (RSCs) <strong>Debt</strong> <strong>Limits</strong><br />

<strong>Debt</strong> limits for regional service commissions<br />

are separate from municipal long-<strong>term</strong> debt regulations.<br />

Both are covered by the Municipal Government Act,<br />

but appear <strong>in</strong> separate sections.<br />

RSC Provid<strong>in</strong>g Public Utilities<br />

For regional service commissions authorized to provide<br />

public utility services to municipalities, total debt must not<br />

exceed 2 times revenue of the regional service commission.<br />

<strong>Debt</strong> service must not exceed 0.35 times revenue of<br />

the regional service commission (The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Alberta<br />

2000, sec. 1).<br />

RSC Provid<strong>in</strong>g Non-Utility Related Services<br />

For regional service commissions that are authorized<br />

to provide services other than public utilities, total debt must<br />

not exceed 0.5 times the total revenue, and debt service must<br />

not exceed 0.1 times the revenue (The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Alberta<br />

2000, sec. 2).<br />

<strong>Debt</strong>-Limit Calculation Formula<br />

Revenue for Regional Service Commissions is calculated<br />

similar to municipalities. Revenue is “the total of all revenue<br />

reported <strong>in</strong> the most recent audited f<strong>in</strong>ancial statement of<br />

the commission, exclud<strong>in</strong>g transfers from the governments<br />

of Alberta and Canada for the purposes of a capital property<br />

reported <strong>in</strong> that statement if those transfers are <strong>in</strong>cluded<br />

<strong>in</strong> the total revenue, and before expenses are deducted”<br />

(The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Alberta 2000, sec. 3). <strong>Debt</strong> of regional service<br />

commissions is quite simply the total pr<strong>in</strong>ciple outstand<strong>in</strong>g<br />

at calculation time, m<strong>in</strong>us the amount of pr<strong>in</strong>ciple<br />

the commission is entitled to recover from another RSC<br />

or municipality at that time.<br />

17


References<br />

Amborski, David P. 1998. “Review of the Regulatory Environment of Municipal Capital Borrow<strong>in</strong>g”. ICURR Press. http://www.<br />

muniscope.ca/_files/file.php?fileid=fileZOMcseGaEn&filename=file_Review_of_the_regulatory.pdf.<br />

Government of Alberta. “Water for Life.” http://www.waterforlife.alberta.ca/.<br />

Government of Nova Scotia. 2008. Halifax Regional Municipality Charter: An Act Respect<strong>in</strong>g the Halifax Regional Municipality.<br />

Infrastructure Canada. “Grant and Contribution Awards Over $25,000.” http://www.<strong>in</strong>frastructure.gc.ca/pd-dp/gc-sc/reportsrapports-eng.php?type=c&ref=83&p=2008&q=3.<br />

Kitchen, Harry M. 2002. Muncipal Revenue and Expenditure Issues <strong>in</strong> Canada. Canadian Tax Paper. Toronto, ONT:<br />

Canadian Tax Foundation.<br />

Nova Scotia Municipal F<strong>in</strong>ance Corporation. 2011. “Crown Corporation Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Plans for the Fiscal Year 2011-2012”.<br />

Government of Nova Scotia.<br />

Patterson, Don. 2011. “Town <strong>Debt</strong> Ris<strong>in</strong>g Close to Limit.” Okotoks Western Wheel, August 3.<br />

Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo. 2012. “<strong>Debt</strong> and <strong>Debt</strong> Management Summaries, 2008-2012.” http://www.woodbuffalo.<br />

ab.ca/Assets/Departments/F<strong>in</strong>ancial+Services/2012+Proposed+Budget+$!26+F<strong>in</strong>ancial+Plans/2012+Proposed+Budget/<br />

<strong>Debt</strong>+$!26+<strong>Debt</strong>+Management+Summaries.pdf.<br />

<strong>Saskatchewan</strong> Municipal Board. “<strong>Saskatchewan</strong> Municipal Board: About the Board.” http://www.smb.gov.sk.ca/.<br />

Service Nova Scotia and Municipal Relations. 2010. “Local Government Resource Handbook”. Government of Nova Scotia.<br />

Slack, Enid. 2011. “Roles and Responsibilities of Government <strong>in</strong> Fund<strong>in</strong>g Municipal Infrastructure.” Municipal Leader.<br />

Stefaniuk, John D. 2007. “Municipalities and the Constitution Part 1: Powers and Paramountcy.” Municipal Leader.<br />

The City of W<strong>in</strong>nipeg. n.d. “<strong>Debt</strong> Management Policy.” http://www.w<strong>in</strong>nipeg.ca/f<strong>in</strong>ance/files/approved_debt_management_<br />

policy.pdf.<br />

The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Alberta. 2000. Municipal Government Act: Regional Services Commission.<br />

———. Municipal Government Act. Chapter M - 26.<br />

———. Municipal Government Act - <strong>Debt</strong> Limit Regulation. 255/2000.<br />

The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Manitoba. 2011. The Municipal Board Act. CCSM C. M240. http://web2.gov.mb.ca/laws/statutes/ccsm/m240e.php.<br />

The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Nova Scotia. 1998. Municipal Governance Act.<br />

The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of <strong>Saskatchewan</strong>. 2002. The Cities Act. Chapter C-11.1.<br />

———. 2005. The Municipalities Act. Chapter M-36.1.<br />

Tyler, Robert L. 2011. “The Manitoba Municipal Board.” Municipal Leader.<br />

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