Long-term Debt Limits in Saskatchewan - Nipawin
Long-term Debt Limits in Saskatchewan - Nipawin
Long-term Debt Limits in Saskatchewan - Nipawin
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THE POLICY SHOP<br />
<strong>Long</strong>-<strong>term</strong> <strong>Debt</strong> <strong>Limits</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong><br />
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES<br />
Kristopher Schmaltz, Sara McPhee-Knowles, Travis Reynolds,<br />
Cody Sharpe, Mike Veltri & Andrew Coff<strong>in</strong><br />
photo courtesy of BriYYZ on flickr.com
The Policy Shop is a student-managed consult<strong>in</strong>g firm run by the Johnson-Shoyama Graduate Students’<br />
Association at the University of <strong>Saskatchewan</strong>. Graduate student volunteers deliver research and analytic<br />
services to non-profits and charities on a pro-bono basis, which allows those organizations to receive policy<br />
expertise they would not otherwise have access to. At the same time, students build practical policy skills<br />
and ga<strong>in</strong> valuable hands-on experience. This project was the first completed by the Policy Shop. It was<br />
presented to SUMA <strong>in</strong> June 2012.
Executive Summary<br />
This report expla<strong>in</strong>s the policies and processes that<br />
comprise debt regulation of urban governments. Initially,<br />
the report was organized around answer<strong>in</strong>g the question<br />
of why the utilities-based debt is <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> the debt-limit<br />
calculation. Analyz<strong>in</strong>g the policy and speak<strong>in</strong>g to municipal<br />
stakeholders, made it clear that municipal concerns about<br />
debt-limits are much broader <strong>in</strong> nature.<br />
To ga<strong>in</strong> a thorough understand<strong>in</strong>g of the municipal<br />
perspective, a series of <strong>in</strong>-depth <strong>in</strong>terviews were completed<br />
with municipal adm<strong>in</strong>istrators, mayors, and senior staff. In<br />
addition, a survey was sent to members of SUMA to provide<br />
the research team with a larger sample, allow<strong>in</strong>g for more<br />
reliable generalizations.<br />
The current policy on debt-limits is as follows. Municipal<br />
Affairs regulates municipal debt through the <strong>Saskatchewan</strong><br />
Municipal Board (SMB). The formula bases debt-limits<br />
on municipal revenues. Some urban governments have<br />
suggested that utilities-based debt should be excluded from<br />
the formula; s<strong>in</strong>ce utilities are funded through user fees, they<br />
are self-fund<strong>in</strong>g and do not need to be regulated by the SMB.<br />
The SMB’s perspective is that they need to <strong>in</strong>clude utilitiesbased<br />
debt <strong>in</strong> the formula because they <strong>in</strong>clude revenue<br />
from utilities. Moreover, by <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g utilities-based debt <strong>in</strong><br />
the formula, the SMB is better able to monitor municipal<br />
f<strong>in</strong>ances and ensure susta<strong>in</strong>ability. Many municipalities<br />
believe that by exclud<strong>in</strong>g utilities-debt from the formula, they<br />
would have greater flexibility to access debt. In practice, it<br />
seems that the SMB is able to provide that flexibility so long<br />
as the municipality has a susta<strong>in</strong>able bus<strong>in</strong>ess plan. There are,<br />
however, a number of other important policy and process<br />
issues related to municipal debt among stakeholders:<br />
• n Policy Clarity: Urban governments are not clear on why<br />
the policy is the way it is, how it functions, and what they can<br />
expect from the prov<strong>in</strong>ce. There seems to be a lot of anxiety<br />
around debt-limits because urban governments are not<br />
conv<strong>in</strong>ced that they will be able to access sufficient debt <strong>in</strong><br />
the future.<br />
• n <strong>Debt</strong> Capacity for Growth: Many municipalities do not<br />
have adequate debt capacity to accommodate the costs of<br />
growth. In many cases, municipalities rely heavily on grants.<br />
Moreover, they are experienc<strong>in</strong>g an <strong>in</strong>frastructure deficit<br />
<strong>in</strong> key areas such as water and sewer, and roads. Many are<br />
concerned that without grants, they will not be able to<br />
ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> and upgrade key <strong>in</strong>frastructure, particularly as<br />
other levels of government change regulations and <strong>in</strong>crease<br />
standards.<br />
• n Lack of Flexibility: Many respondents were conv<strong>in</strong>ced<br />
that the current regulatory environment is <strong>in</strong>flexible, and<br />
that municipalities are miss<strong>in</strong>g out on opportunities to take<br />
advantage of more flexible, lower-cost debt options.<br />
• n Process Issues: Many respondents believed that processes<br />
of the SMB could be improved to serve them better, such as<br />
quicker turn-around times.<br />
In addition to diagnos<strong>in</strong>g some of the key concerns,<br />
the report provides an analysis of comparative policies<br />
on debt-regulation for municipalities <strong>in</strong> the prov<strong>in</strong>ces of<br />
Alberta, Manitoba, and Nova Scotia. The most <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g<br />
policy option was found <strong>in</strong> Alberta where utility services are<br />
often delivered through regionalized bodies called Regional<br />
Service Commissions (RSC). These organizations are able<br />
to take on debt that is separate from municipal debt, and<br />
are able to reduce utility costs for municipalities, as well<br />
as provide higher quality services by operat<strong>in</strong>g regionally.<br />
The applicability of f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> other prov<strong>in</strong>ces was found<br />
to be m<strong>in</strong>imal to moderate, with the most useful example<br />
of <strong>in</strong>novation be<strong>in</strong>g the RSC, which could potentially be<br />
emulated <strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong>. In fact, there are examples of<br />
regional municipal service-delivery partnerships tak<strong>in</strong>g place<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong> around water.<br />
The follow<strong>in</strong>g recommendations were <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> the<br />
report, and are for SUMA to consider <strong>in</strong> de<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g its stance<br />
<strong>in</strong> negotiations with the prov<strong>in</strong>ce around policy and program<br />
changes that would serve urban municipalities, which<br />
currently have to respond to major challenges created by<br />
a grow<strong>in</strong>g economy.<br />
Key Issues<br />
Recommendations<br />
We recommend that SUMA consider the follow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
alternatives to rectify the above policy and process issues:<br />
1) <strong>Debt</strong> Capacity Issues<br />
A. Work with the SMB to Develop Guidel<strong>in</strong>es for<br />
Municipalities: Municipalities were very concerned about<br />
the lack of clarity on debt limit policy, and would like to see<br />
clear guidel<strong>in</strong>es to help them plan for their <strong>in</strong>teractions with<br />
the SMB.<br />
B. Request that the Prov<strong>in</strong>ce Develop a More Substantive<br />
Policy: Many municipalities consider the current debt-limit<br />
policy to be a “one-size-fits-all” approach. It is recommended<br />
that the prov<strong>in</strong>ce be encouraged to consider ways <strong>in</strong> which<br />
it could re-design debt limit policy so that municipalities of<br />
greater capacity are given more freedom, while still provid<strong>in</strong>g<br />
oversight and assistance to those municipalities that need it.<br />
C. Request that the Prov<strong>in</strong>ce Consider Remov<strong>in</strong>g Utilities<br />
<strong>Debt</strong> from Calculation: This option should be considered. It<br />
is unlikely that this alone would address the issues above, but<br />
it may, <strong>in</strong> some cases, provide additional flexibility to some<br />
municipalities.<br />
1
D. Advocate for a Prov<strong>in</strong>ce-wide Solution to Infrastructure<br />
Needs: Infrastructure challenges are the s<strong>in</strong>gle most<br />
important issue driv<strong>in</strong>g the concern over debt-limits, and a<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>cial strategy around <strong>in</strong>frastructure may alleviate some<br />
of these concerns.<br />
2) Infrastructure Challenges<br />
A. Survey Members about Interest <strong>in</strong> Regional Service<br />
Delivery Options: SUMA should survey members to<br />
de<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong>e if there is an <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> creat<strong>in</strong>g partnerships<br />
around service delivery.<br />
B. Communicate with Municipal Partners: Organizations<br />
such as SARM and other municipal partners should be<br />
approached about their <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>itiative to <strong>in</strong>crease<br />
regionalized service delivery.<br />
C. Approach Prov<strong>in</strong>ce about Fund<strong>in</strong>g: If there is<br />
an appetite for this, SUMA and <strong>in</strong>terested partners should<br />
approach the prov<strong>in</strong>cial and federal governments about<br />
targeted fund<strong>in</strong>g for sett<strong>in</strong>g up and implement<strong>in</strong>g regional<br />
service delivery groups. It is clear from our research that<br />
regional service delivery arrangements require fund<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to be developed.<br />
3) Process Challenges<br />
A. Approach SMB about review<strong>in</strong>g borrow<strong>in</strong>g options:<br />
Municipalities have suggested that they are miss<strong>in</strong>g out<br />
on short-<strong>term</strong> borrow<strong>in</strong>g options that would decrease<br />
<strong>in</strong>terest costs. SUMA should request that the SMB exam<strong>in</strong>e its<br />
current policies to de<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong>e if this is the case, and if so,<br />
if changes could be made to <strong>in</strong>crease flexibility and lower<br />
costs for municipalities.<br />
B. Legislated Process<strong>in</strong>g Times: The SMB should <strong>in</strong>stitute<br />
maximum application turn-around times.<br />
C. Review Application Process: It was noted by the SMB<br />
that process<strong>in</strong>g times are often lengthy due to <strong>in</strong>complete<br />
applications. The application process should be reviewed<br />
to de<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong>e the reason for this so that it may be resolved<br />
through process changes, build<strong>in</strong>g municipal capacity, or both.<br />
2
Introduction<br />
In <strong>Saskatchewan</strong>, many municipalities are tak<strong>in</strong>g on<br />
debt to f<strong>in</strong>ance the costs associated with development<br />
and a grow<strong>in</strong>g prov<strong>in</strong>cial economy. One issue that has<br />
recently become more important for urban municipalities<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong> is the legislation surround<strong>in</strong>g municipal<br />
long-<strong>term</strong> debt. At its 107th Annual Convention, SUMA<br />
passed a resolution to work with the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Municipal<br />
Affairs to <strong>in</strong>itiate a review of the criteria for establish<strong>in</strong>g long<strong>term</strong><br />
debt limits. This report is an analysis of long-<strong>term</strong>-debt<br />
legislation <strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong>, as well as a stakeholder analysis<br />
of the issues and concerns surround<strong>in</strong>g this policy. The report<br />
conta<strong>in</strong>s four ma<strong>in</strong> sections:<br />
1. An analysis of municipal long-<strong>term</strong> debt legislation <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>Saskatchewan</strong>: This section exam<strong>in</strong>es the legislation govern<strong>in</strong>g<br />
municipal long-<strong>term</strong> debt <strong>in</strong> the prov<strong>in</strong>ce of <strong>Saskatchewan</strong>.<br />
2. A stakeholder analysis: To ga<strong>in</strong> an adequate<br />
understand<strong>in</strong>g of the perspective of municipalities on long<strong>term</strong><br />
debt policy, a stakeholder consultation and analysis<br />
was performed utiliz<strong>in</strong>g a survey and a number of <strong>in</strong>terviews.<br />
Several urban governments were <strong>in</strong>terviewed, and over 100<br />
were surveyed. The purpose of this section is to construct<br />
a def<strong>in</strong>ition of the problems that municipalities are fac<strong>in</strong>g<br />
with regard to f<strong>in</strong>ancial capacity and long-<strong>term</strong> debt issues.<br />
3. A comparative perspective on long-<strong>term</strong> debt policy:<br />
This section provides a comparative assessment of<br />
the policies and regulations surround<strong>in</strong>g municipal long<strong>term</strong><br />
debt <strong>in</strong> other prov<strong>in</strong>ces. The purpose of this section is<br />
to provide examples of alternative policies used elsewhere<br />
that could <strong>in</strong>form discussions on potential modifications to<br />
<strong>Saskatchewan</strong> policies.<br />
4. Recommendations: This section provides some<br />
recommendations on how policies and processes might<br />
be improved.<br />
An Overview of Municipal Borrow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Municipal expenses are generally funded <strong>in</strong> two ways:<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternal and external revenue sources. Internal revenue<br />
sources <strong>in</strong>clude: operat<strong>in</strong>g revenues; earmarked taxes,<br />
reserves and reserve funds, special charges (improvement<br />
charges or levies, lot levies, and other special fees), and<br />
development charges. External revenue sources fall <strong>in</strong>to<br />
two basic categories: grants and borrow<strong>in</strong>g. Grants are<br />
transfers from the prov<strong>in</strong>cial or federal levels of government.<br />
Borrow<strong>in</strong>g is when the municipality accesses capital through<br />
borrow<strong>in</strong>g arrangements, and this practice has become<br />
much more common as municipalities are expected to<br />
deliver a greater level of services (Kitchen 2002, 193–202).<br />
Municipal Borrow<strong>in</strong>g:<br />
Short-<strong>term</strong> Borrow<strong>in</strong>g:<br />
Short-<strong>term</strong> borrow<strong>in</strong>g can be used to f<strong>in</strong>ance capital<br />
expenditures or cover short-<strong>term</strong> deficits <strong>in</strong> general operat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
budgets (Kitchen 2002, 202).<br />
<strong>Long</strong>-<strong>term</strong> Borrow<strong>in</strong>g:<br />
<strong>Long</strong>-<strong>term</strong> borrow<strong>in</strong>g is used for capital expenditures<br />
only, and “is justified if one can reasonably expect the benefits<br />
from the project to fall on future users, so that the f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>term</strong> will match the asset’s lifespan. The project is f<strong>in</strong>anced<br />
by borrowed funds and the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple and <strong>in</strong>terest charges are<br />
repaid out of future operat<strong>in</strong>g revenues. This policy attempts<br />
to make sure that future beneficiaries are also those who<br />
bear the costs” (Kitchen 2002, 202). Borrow<strong>in</strong>g is typically<br />
controlled by prov<strong>in</strong>cial regulations. The reason for prov<strong>in</strong>cial<br />
limits be<strong>in</strong>g placed on municipalities is that “municipalities<br />
are creatures of the prov<strong>in</strong>ce and the prov<strong>in</strong>ces do not wish<br />
to be responsible for unlimited municipal borrow<strong>in</strong>g and<br />
possible repayment of municipal debt” (Kitchen 2002, 202).<br />
Borrow<strong>in</strong>g is controlled through regulations such as those<br />
that limit borrow<strong>in</strong>g to:<br />
• n Capital projects<br />
• n Tax payer approved debt<br />
• n <strong>Debt</strong> approved by prov<strong>in</strong>cial regulatory body<br />
• n A specified percentage of revenue for f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g debt<br />
• n Limit<strong>in</strong>g borrow<strong>in</strong>g to a prov<strong>in</strong>cially controlled<br />
“municipal fund” (Kitchen 2002, 202–203)<br />
Every prov<strong>in</strong>ce, with the exception of Ontario, makes use<br />
of a prov<strong>in</strong>cially-organized body that assists municipalities<br />
with undertak<strong>in</strong>g long-<strong>term</strong> borrow<strong>in</strong>g. In these prov<strong>in</strong>ces,<br />
municipalities “apply for funds through the prov<strong>in</strong>ce-wide<br />
authority which totals up all of the requests for local funds<br />
and issues long-<strong>term</strong> debentures aga<strong>in</strong>st the authority itself.<br />
. . When the authority receives the proceeds from the sale of<br />
the debentures, it distributes the funds among the request<strong>in</strong>g<br />
municipalities, usually on the basis of a loan agreement with<br />
the municipality” (Kitchen 2002, 203).<br />
Decisions on f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>struments, whether to borrow<br />
<strong>in</strong> the short-<strong>term</strong> or long-<strong>term</strong>, and whether to take<br />
on debt of any k<strong>in</strong>d are largely made based on the needs<br />
of the municipality, tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to account f<strong>in</strong>ancial capacity,<br />
<strong>in</strong>terest-rates, level of growth, and other factors. Many<br />
municipalities <strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong> are experienc<strong>in</strong>g growth,<br />
and thus are mak<strong>in</strong>g large <strong>in</strong>vestments <strong>in</strong> major capital<br />
projects such as recreational facilities, sub-division<br />
expansions, water and sewer, waste disposal, etc.<br />
With relatively low <strong>in</strong>terest rates, coupled with the recent<br />
availability of federal and prov<strong>in</strong>cial stimulus fund<strong>in</strong>g that<br />
provided matched fund<strong>in</strong>g for <strong>in</strong>frastructure projects,<br />
municipalities <strong>in</strong> the prov<strong>in</strong>ce have been <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g their<br />
3
long-<strong>term</strong> debt to take advantage of these opportunities.<br />
Municipalities are also hav<strong>in</strong>g to deal with ag<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>frastructure and are look<strong>in</strong>g for additional f<strong>in</strong>ancial<br />
capacity to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> and upgrade their <strong>in</strong>frastructure.<br />
Constitutional Background<br />
A few po<strong>in</strong>ts of constitutional background<br />
are important for fram<strong>in</strong>g the relationship between<br />
municipalities and the federal and prov<strong>in</strong>cial governments.<br />
The municipalities are “creatures” of the prov<strong>in</strong>ces; all<br />
municipal powers are conferred by prov<strong>in</strong>cial legislation.<br />
This has two important implications:<br />
• n Firstly, municipal powers cannot exceed those of<br />
the prov<strong>in</strong>ces, an issue that has become more press<strong>in</strong>g<br />
as certa<strong>in</strong> large, metropolitan cities’ populations have<br />
far exceeded that of the smaller prov<strong>in</strong>ces.<br />
• n Secondly, municipalities cannot <strong>in</strong>troduce bylaws<br />
that <strong>in</strong>trude <strong>in</strong>to areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction<br />
(Stefaniuk 2007, 54).<br />
A further important po<strong>in</strong>t, now conta<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
<strong>in</strong> the Interpretation Act, is that federal and prov<strong>in</strong>cial<br />
governments are not bound to comply with municipal<br />
bylaws, although they will generally make efforts to do<br />
so as a means of ensur<strong>in</strong>g positive relations. Municipalities,<br />
however, are bound to comply with all federal and prov<strong>in</strong>cial<br />
legislation (Stefaniuk 2007).<br />
Municipalities are <strong>in</strong> the difficult position of hav<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to provide basic services to urban residents, without hav<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the autonomy to do a number of th<strong>in</strong>gs, such as <strong>in</strong>crease their<br />
debt thresholds without permission from the prov<strong>in</strong>ce. Urban<br />
governments vary <strong>in</strong> size and capacity, and some of these<br />
governments <strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong> have voiced concerns that<br />
the current policy is not meet<strong>in</strong>g their needs. It is not<br />
plausible, nor constitutionally possible, for the prov<strong>in</strong>ce to stop<br />
regulat<strong>in</strong>g municipal debt, and so it is essential that the policies<br />
and processes around debt-limits be designed to meet the<br />
needs of municipalities with<strong>in</strong> these jurisdictional restrictions.<br />
Current <strong>Saskatchewan</strong> Policy<br />
Summary<br />
<strong>Debt</strong> limits <strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong> are regulated by both<br />
legislation, and by an adm<strong>in</strong>istrative body called the<br />
<strong>Saskatchewan</strong> Municipal Board (SMB). While debt limits <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>Saskatchewan</strong> are legislated, municipalities are expected<br />
to work very closely with the SMB to establish debt-limits<br />
consistent with their operational plans. Thus, many of the<br />
decisions around debt-limits are ad hoc and depend upon<br />
the ability of the municipality to work with the SMB to<br />
establish adequate f<strong>in</strong>ancial plans.<br />
4<br />
Legislation and Regulations<br />
In <strong>Saskatchewan</strong>, three pieces of legislation and the<br />
<strong>Saskatchewan</strong> Municipal Board form the legislative foundation<br />
for long-<strong>term</strong> debt limits. Municipalities <strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong> are<br />
governed by one of three pieces of legislation, depend<strong>in</strong>g on<br />
the municipality’s particular characteristics:<br />
1. The Cities Act: governs municipalities with populations<br />
greater than 5,000.<br />
2. The Municipalities Act: governs towns, villages,<br />
and rural municipalities.<br />
Populations range from:<br />
• n Towns: generally range from 500 to 5,000.<br />
• n Villages and resort villages: populations under 500.<br />
• n Rural municipalities: established on the basis of area,<br />
not population, and <strong>in</strong>clude any un<strong>in</strong>corporated<br />
communities (hamlets and organized hamlets) that fall<br />
with<strong>in</strong> their boundaries.<br />
3. The Northern Municipalities Act, 2010: governs towns,<br />
villages, and hamlets and other un<strong>in</strong>corporated northern<br />
settlements located <strong>in</strong> northern <strong>Saskatchewan</strong>.<br />
These pieces of legislation also spell out the requirements<br />
for long-<strong>term</strong> debt limits. For the purposes of this report, we<br />
will focus on urban governments regulated by the Cities Act<br />
and the Municipalities Act. Under the Cities Act, debt limits<br />
are de<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong>ed by the <strong>Saskatchewan</strong> Municipal Board (The<br />
Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of <strong>Saskatchewan</strong> 2002). The board is responsible for<br />
review<strong>in</strong>g applications and establish<strong>in</strong>g the debt limits for<br />
cities, which are renewed every three years. If a city wishes to<br />
have a debt limit established, or its current limit exceeded, the<br />
SMB requires a resolution or bylaw be passed by city council<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g the size of the debt limit desired, or the amount of<br />
excess borrow<strong>in</strong>g. As per the Municipalities Act, a municipality’s<br />
debt limit is equal to the total amount of own-source revenue<br />
for the previous year (The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of <strong>Saskatchewan</strong> 2005).<br />
De<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g debt limits falls under the jurisdiction of<br />
the <strong>Saskatchewan</strong> Municipal Board, which was established<br />
on October 1st, 1988. The SMB’s mandate is to decide on<br />
regulatory and judicial issues surround<strong>in</strong>g local authorities,<br />
<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g municipalities and school boards. The regulatory<br />
function of the SMB is to review debt obligations and provide<br />
oversight, particularly with respect to the f<strong>in</strong>ancial health of<br />
municipalities. The Board’s judicial function is to adjudicate,<br />
at the prov<strong>in</strong>cial level, appeals from the general public <strong>in</strong><br />
municipal matters relat<strong>in</strong>g to property tax, assessments,<br />
plann<strong>in</strong>g and development issues, and municipal orders<br />
(for example, property ma<strong>in</strong>tenance orders). Specific to<br />
municipal debt, the SMB reviews local authorities’ long <strong>term</strong><br />
debt applications, which are subject to approval. This review<br />
process is <strong>in</strong>tended to ensure the municipality’s f<strong>in</strong>ancial<br />
stability, which provides assurance to taxpayers and lenders<br />
(<strong>Saskatchewan</strong> Municipal Board).
With<strong>in</strong> the SMB, the Local Government Committee is<br />
responsible for the review and approval of a number specific<br />
issues. Borrow<strong>in</strong>g by a town, village, resort village, or rural<br />
municipality must be approved if it:<br />
• n causes the municipality to exceed its debt limit;<br />
• n is not repayable with<strong>in</strong> a three year <strong>term</strong>; or<br />
• n is secured by a debenture issue.<br />
Also subject to approval are cases where the above<br />
municipal governments:<br />
• n lend money or guarantee a loan <strong>in</strong> an amount that<br />
causes the municipality to exceed its debt limit;<br />
• n enter <strong>in</strong>to an agreement to purchase or lease capital<br />
property, if the <strong>term</strong> exceed five years; or<br />
• n share <strong>in</strong> the operat<strong>in</strong>g losses of a service, facility<br />
or project, if the <strong>term</strong> exceeds five years.<br />
In addition to this, the SMB is also responsible for approv<strong>in</strong>g:<br />
• n water and sewer utility rates for towns, villages, resort<br />
villages, rural municipalities and northern municipalities;<br />
• n <strong>in</strong>vestments made by the above local governments <strong>in</strong><br />
certa<strong>in</strong> securities not listed <strong>in</strong> the Municipalities Act; and<br />
• n local improvement projects pursuant to the Local<br />
Improvements Act, 1993.<br />
F<strong>in</strong>ally, the SMB has the general authority to <strong>in</strong>quire<br />
<strong>in</strong>to the f<strong>in</strong>ancial, and other, affairs of a city, urban, or rural<br />
municipality when the local authority’s f<strong>in</strong>ancial position<br />
warrants such an action.<br />
Challenges and Concerns<br />
To identify challenges and areas of concern among<br />
urban governments regard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Long</strong>-Term <strong>Debt</strong> (LTD) policy, a<br />
number of <strong>in</strong>terviews were conducted with six municipalities,<br />
which will be identified here as Municipalities A, B, C, D, E and<br />
F, a representative from the SMB, and representatives from<br />
Municipal Affairs.<br />
The first municipality, Municipality A, <strong>in</strong>dicated that a<br />
previous prov<strong>in</strong>cial government program, the <strong>Saskatchewan</strong><br />
Infrastructure Growth Initiative, was very helpful for<br />
municipalities experienc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>frastructure needs related to<br />
growth. This municipality was experienc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>creased costs<br />
due to a grow<strong>in</strong>g population, but was limit<strong>in</strong>g risk by build<strong>in</strong>g<br />
smaller subdivisions to account for peaks and valleys <strong>in</strong><br />
growth. A larger city, Municipality B, specifically mentioned<br />
cash-flow issues due to high growth <strong>in</strong> four sectors around<br />
the city all at once. However, this municipality <strong>in</strong>dicated<br />
that they would not be <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> borrow<strong>in</strong>g beyond the<br />
debt limit because of credit rat<strong>in</strong>g concerns. Specifically,<br />
the representatives mentioned develop<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>novative<br />
opportunities for revenue to lessen the need for additional<br />
debt. In particular, this municipality mentioned focus<strong>in</strong>g<br />
on mill rate supported debt, rather than debt supported by<br />
federal gas taxes or utility rates, s<strong>in</strong>ce mill rate supported debt<br />
is the prime concern for the city’s taxpayers.<br />
Municipality C noted that they were experienc<strong>in</strong>g<br />
exceptional growth <strong>in</strong> both population and bus<strong>in</strong>ess, and<br />
that debt limits had held back their potential for growth. This<br />
municipality’s debt has <strong>in</strong>creased significantly <strong>in</strong> the last ten<br />
years, <strong>in</strong> part due to a lack of prov<strong>in</strong>cial fund<strong>in</strong>g. Two projects<br />
have contributed to the debt limit cap: a water treatment<br />
plant and a health centre, even though these projects are<br />
both fully funded through own-source revenues. The water<br />
treatment plant is funded through utility rates and the health<br />
centre from the leases paid by medical professionals, such<br />
as dentists and optometrists. One recommendation from<br />
this municipality was to remove projects funded through<br />
own-source revenues from the debt limit calculation. This<br />
recommendation was also echoed by Municipality F; these<br />
officials felt that the current system is limit<strong>in</strong>g, and would<br />
appreciate more clarity from the prov<strong>in</strong>ce as to how ownsource<br />
revenue is currently used <strong>in</strong> calculations.<br />
The f<strong>in</strong>al municipality we <strong>in</strong>terviewed, Municipality F, is<br />
experienc<strong>in</strong>g major resource related growth. This municipality<br />
has seen its debt level double <strong>in</strong> recent years. The municipal<br />
officials were most concerned about the potential for debtlimits<br />
to constra<strong>in</strong> future growth. Currently, the municipality<br />
is able to access sufficient capital through debt arrangements<br />
approved by the SMB. However, there is a concern that the<br />
SMB could <strong>in</strong>hibit growth by not permitt<strong>in</strong>g extensions <strong>in</strong><br />
the future. The municipality expressed an explicit desire to be<br />
treated more autonomously and given more flexibility. For<br />
example, <strong>in</strong> the future there will likely be more <strong>in</strong>frastructure<br />
spend<strong>in</strong>g programs from the federal government, and<br />
the municipality needs to be ready to match those funds<br />
when they come available, otherwise it might miss out on<br />
an important opportunity. This po<strong>in</strong>t was also reflected<br />
by Municipality A. In <strong>term</strong>s of utility-related debt, it was<br />
suggested that perhaps the SMB should classify utility debt<br />
separately from regular debt; this would give the municipality<br />
more flexibility to grow. Utility debt can be larger s<strong>in</strong>ce it is<br />
paid by service fees.<br />
All municipalities mentioned their deal<strong>in</strong>gs with the<br />
SMB. One representative noted that deal<strong>in</strong>gs with the<br />
SMB had been overwhelm<strong>in</strong>gly positive, and that their<br />
adm<strong>in</strong>istrators had received help mak<strong>in</strong>g a debt plan and<br />
felt well-supported. One other representative noted that the<br />
municipality had not dealt with the SMB dur<strong>in</strong>g her tenure.<br />
Three of the six noted that the time taken to<br />
complete debt limit <strong>in</strong>creases was longer than expected.<br />
Representatives from the largest municipality, Municipality B,<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicated that, s<strong>in</strong>ce they had planned <strong>in</strong> advance, this delay<br />
was not a problem and that the whole process seemed quite<br />
smooth. Officials from Municipality A expressed that the time<br />
delay was a concern that could result <strong>in</strong> lost opportunities<br />
for growth. A potential policy recommendation mentioned<br />
by those from the larger municipality was that it would<br />
5
make sense to have debt limits <strong>in</strong>dexed to the municipality’s<br />
revenue, so that as revenue <strong>in</strong>creases the debt limit would<br />
<strong>in</strong>crease automatically rather than the municipality need<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to constantly re-apply for debt limit <strong>in</strong>creases. Municipality<br />
C’s respondent mentioned that the SMB had been difficult to<br />
work with, as it provides an unwanted layer of redundancy<br />
and bureaucracy. This representative mentioned that they<br />
have a professional staff for plann<strong>in</strong>g and account<strong>in</strong>g that<br />
prepare applications, and although the application was<br />
eventually approved, the work the professional staff did<br />
to prepare the bus<strong>in</strong>ess plan was sent back multiple times<br />
with m<strong>in</strong>ute detail changes to ultimately arrive at the same<br />
conclusion. This municipality mentioned that the SMB should<br />
take <strong>in</strong>to account the larger municipalities’ ability to handle<br />
their own affairs, particularly when those municipalities have<br />
professional staff capacity. The SMB could then take on more<br />
of a partnership or resource role for those able to prepare<br />
their own debt plans, while provid<strong>in</strong>g additional oversight for<br />
municipalities that lack capacity and need more assistance<br />
with application preparation.<br />
Officials from two of the other municipalities (D and E)<br />
were concerned about other levels of government impos<strong>in</strong>g<br />
regulations on municipalities, lead<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>in</strong>creased costs. For<br />
example, the federal government has recently changed water<br />
standards, requir<strong>in</strong>g the municipalities to make expensive<br />
upgrades. No additional support for municipalities has been<br />
provided. One municipality’s representative noted that<br />
simpler grants would be greatly appreciated, as the current<br />
applications are complex and require either a professional<br />
grant writer or multiple rejections and revisions – both of<br />
these entail high costs.<br />
A number of municipal officials mentioned the concern<br />
that utilities-related debt is <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> LTD calculations. The<br />
general perspective of these municipalities is that utilitiesrelated<br />
debt does not impact general f<strong>in</strong>ancial capacity<br />
of municipalities because utilities are paid for by user fees,<br />
which rise as costs <strong>in</strong>crease. For example, if a municipality<br />
makes upgrades to its water and sewer system, the costs<br />
associated with servic<strong>in</strong>g debt and pay<strong>in</strong>g for the upgrades is<br />
paid for by user fees; the municipality’s ability to service debt<br />
for other purposes is not impacted. For this reason, many<br />
urban governments would prefer to see the policy around<br />
LTD calculation modified to remove utilities-based debt from<br />
the formula.<br />
In summary, the ma<strong>in</strong> themes raised by the<br />
municipalities were centred on autonomy, flexibility, and<br />
preserv<strong>in</strong>g growth. These municipalities raised concerns<br />
around the current “one size fits all” policy of SMB oversight,<br />
and recommended additional flexibility so that municipalities<br />
that have sufficient capacity can be autonomous and<br />
those that need more assistance with applications and<br />
f<strong>in</strong>ancial monitor<strong>in</strong>g can receive the support they need.<br />
By <strong>in</strong>troduc<strong>in</strong>g more flexibility <strong>in</strong>to the current system, the<br />
municipalities will have access to the resources they need<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g times of growth.<br />
6<br />
SMB Response<br />
The legislation does not clearly outl<strong>in</strong>e a rationale for the<br />
<strong>in</strong>clusion of utility debt <strong>in</strong> the formula for calculat<strong>in</strong>g LTD for<br />
municipalities. SMB was able to provide a basic explanation<br />
of the practice. First, utility debt is <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> the LTD limit<br />
calculation as are revenues from the utility. Second, SMB is<br />
responsible for approv<strong>in</strong>g sewer and water rates, and<br />
it is important for them to be able to see that utility debt is<br />
supported by utility rates. The perspective of the SMB was that<br />
whether utilities are <strong>in</strong>cluded or excluded from the formula<br />
should not be an issue; under the current system, it will<br />
not make a difference to the SMB when mak<strong>in</strong>g a decision<br />
about debt extensions. The primary issue for SMB is that the<br />
municipality has a bus<strong>in</strong>ess plan for support<strong>in</strong>g the debt when<br />
they are ask<strong>in</strong>g for a debt extension. If the bus<strong>in</strong>ess plan for<br />
utilities-based debt shows that utilities debt is covered by<br />
utility fees, then the SMB will take this <strong>in</strong>to consideration <strong>in</strong><br />
de<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g whether to approve a debt limit <strong>in</strong>crease.<br />
In response to the issue of lengthy approval times, the<br />
representative from the SMB <strong>in</strong>dicated that it does take some<br />
time for the SMB to assess applications, <strong>in</strong> part because of<br />
efforts to undertake a comprehensive review that assesses<br />
all relevant factors. The SMB representative also noted that, <strong>in</strong><br />
many cases, the received applications are <strong>in</strong>complete and this<br />
results <strong>in</strong> further delays. The SMB works with municipalities to<br />
revise applications and repayment plans to ensure they meet<br />
all of the regulations.<br />
The representative from Municipal Affairs <strong>in</strong>dicated<br />
that debt limit calculation is an area that they have flagged<br />
as potentially requir<strong>in</strong>g review, and they are quite open to<br />
consider<strong>in</strong>g potential amendments to the relevant legislation.<br />
The representative mentioned that the department has also<br />
conducted some comparative work and may be open to<br />
shar<strong>in</strong>g some of their research <strong>in</strong> this area.<br />
Survey F<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs<br />
In order to ga<strong>in</strong> an adequate understand<strong>in</strong>g of the<br />
perspective of urban governments on the issues surround<strong>in</strong>g<br />
LTD policy <strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong>, a survey was conducted. The<br />
survey was sent to all urban governments <strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong><br />
that had not already been <strong>in</strong>terviewed or surveyed by other<br />
means. The survey highlighted further issues and challenges.<br />
The majority (127 of 135) of respondents represented<br />
towns and villages. Moreover, a majority of respondents<br />
represented communities of less than 1000 residents. A<br />
number of <strong>in</strong>terviews were conducted with larger urban<br />
centers, and thus the number of small urban municipalities<br />
that responded to the survey was helpful <strong>in</strong> provid<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
research team with a better understand<strong>in</strong>g of the issues<br />
fac<strong>in</strong>g urban governments of all sizes.<br />
Of the 135 urban governments surveyed, 91 reported<br />
that their population had been <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g. Growth rates were<br />
varied with 31.8% of respondents report<strong>in</strong>g a growth rate of<br />
less than 10%, 27.4% report<strong>in</strong>g growth of 10-24%, and 4.4%
Table 1.0<br />
Very<br />
dissatisfied<br />
Somewhat<br />
dissatisfied<br />
Neither<br />
satisfied or<br />
dissatisfied<br />
Somewhat<br />
satisfied<br />
Very<br />
satisfied<br />
Responsiveness to your needs 11% (6) 6% (3) 15% (8) 20% (11) 48% (26)<br />
Timely service 11% (6) 20% (11) 17% (9) 20% (11) 31% (17)<br />
Clear communication 7% (4) 9% (5) 17% (9) 22% (12) 44% (24)<br />
Understandable decision-mak<strong>in</strong>g process 9% (5) 6% (3) 15% (8) 28% (15) 43% (23)<br />
Simplicity of applications 9% (5) 20% (11) 17% (9) 28% (15) 26% (14)<br />
report<strong>in</strong>g a growth rate of 25-50%. Growth is a common<br />
factor among the urban governments <strong>in</strong> this prov<strong>in</strong>ce.<br />
Policy Clarity<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>terviews, responsiveness to municipal<br />
requests for debt-limit re-calculations and clarity of rationale<br />
for debt-allocation were reported as challenges <strong>in</strong> the process<br />
for obta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g debt approval through the SMB. To ga<strong>in</strong> a better<br />
understand<strong>in</strong>g of the urban government perspective on the<br />
SMB, respondents were asked to rate their satisfaction with<br />
the SMB based on past experiences:<br />
As can be seen <strong>in</strong> Table 1.0, no apparent trends emerged,<br />
with respondents report<strong>in</strong>g a mixed level of satisfaction.<br />
On average it should be noted that more respondents were<br />
satisfied than were dissatisfied, which suggests that the<br />
<strong>in</strong>teractions between the SMB and urban governments are<br />
generally positive. However, the mixed level of satisfaction<br />
does suggest that there are areas for improvement accord<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to urban governments <strong>in</strong>terviewed. For example, timely<br />
service and clear communication were two areas where<br />
urban governments would like to see the SMB improve.<br />
Perspectives on Utilities <strong>Debt</strong><br />
The issue of utilities debt has been mentioned as<br />
problematic by some municipalities. To better appreciate<br />
the level of utilities-related debt <strong>in</strong> urban governments <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>Saskatchewan</strong>, respondents were asked to provide a rough<br />
estimate on the level of municipal debt currently used for<br />
utilities purposes. Over 58% or respondents reported that<br />
less than 25% of debt is currently associated with utilities.<br />
Utilities-related debt does appear to play a significant role <strong>in</strong><br />
the debt of urban governments <strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong>, but it does<br />
not comprise total debt capacity for the majority of urban<br />
governments: only 27% of respondents report<strong>in</strong>g utilities<br />
related debt of 50% or greater. However, 20% of respondents<br />
did note that utilities-related debt accounted for nearly 100%.<br />
In some cases, utilities debt does appear to be a significant<br />
factor, and this warrants closer <strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>in</strong>to the reasons<br />
beh<strong>in</strong>d these abnormally high utilities debt levels.<br />
<strong>Debt</strong> Capacity and Growth<br />
Respondents were asked the follow<strong>in</strong>g question: Based<br />
on your expectations for growth, and any planned projects<br />
that you know about, do you believe that the current debt<br />
limit formula for your urban government is sufficient to<br />
meet borrow<strong>in</strong>g needs over the next five years? A number of<br />
important issues and challenges arose from this question.<br />
Reliance on Grants:<br />
Many smaller communities are not eligible for loans to<br />
<strong>in</strong>crease major <strong>in</strong>frastructure because they cannot service<br />
the debt. These small communities are heavily dependent<br />
upon <strong>in</strong>frastructure grants to make any improvements to<br />
<strong>in</strong>frastructure. Some of these municipalities are experienc<strong>in</strong>g<br />
decl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g populations, or have already seen their populations<br />
shr<strong>in</strong>k considerably.<br />
Infrastructure: Water, Sewer, Roads, and Recreation<br />
The most significant <strong>in</strong>frastructure need reported is<br />
water and sewer <strong>in</strong>frastructure. Most respondents raised the<br />
concern that water and sewer upgrades were very costly, and<br />
would far exceed their municipality’s current debt threshold.<br />
Most of these municipalities would not be able to proceed<br />
with necessary upgrades without <strong>in</strong>creased debt, grant<br />
fund<strong>in</strong>g, or both. The second largest <strong>in</strong>frastructure challenge<br />
is the ma<strong>in</strong>tenance of roads, followed by recreational<br />
<strong>in</strong>frastructure. Both are a challenge, especially for smaller<br />
municipalities.<br />
The Challenges of Growth:<br />
Some municipalities reported that growth <strong>in</strong><br />
population and size of the municipality has placed pressure<br />
on the municipal governments to <strong>in</strong>crease capacity <strong>in</strong><br />
utilities such as water and sewer. One municipality was<br />
experienc<strong>in</strong>g growth of over 400 lots, and needed to upgrade<br />
<strong>in</strong>frastructure to accommodate; entail<strong>in</strong>g a debt <strong>in</strong>crease<br />
beyond current limits.<br />
7
<strong>Debt</strong>-Limit is Too Low:<br />
Over twenty respondents (out of the 39 responses)<br />
reported that the debt-limit is too low to accommodate<br />
growth <strong>in</strong> the municipality. Some reported that even if their<br />
debt-limit were <strong>in</strong>creased, they do not have the ability to<br />
service and repay <strong>in</strong>creased debt. Of these respondents,<br />
many noted that their projects will not proceed if they are<br />
unable to access more capital. Moreover, many of these<br />
respondents mentioned that they are count<strong>in</strong>g on federal,<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>cial, or other types of grants to assist with <strong>in</strong>frastructure<br />
costs. In addition to the general need to upgrade out-of-date<br />
<strong>in</strong>frastructure, many municipalities mentioned that <strong>in</strong>creased<br />
lot development was creat<strong>in</strong>g significant pressure <strong>in</strong> <strong>term</strong>s of<br />
utilities services.<br />
Other Comments:<br />
Some municipalities noted that the debt-limits were<br />
currently sufficient to accommodate municipal needs. Others<br />
were unsure of what their debt limit was. They were also<br />
unsure of how debt-limits are calculated, po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g to a lack of<br />
policy and process clarity, as well as municipal capacity.<br />
Suggested Changes to LTD Policy<br />
If you were given the authority to make changes to current<br />
legislation, regulation and process relat<strong>in</strong>g to the issue of<br />
municipal debt limits, what changes would you make?<br />
The above question was asked of municipalities to<br />
provide them with an opportunity to concisely outl<strong>in</strong>e what,<br />
<strong>in</strong> their op<strong>in</strong>ion, should be changed about current long-<strong>term</strong><br />
debt policies. This section is not meant to serve as a list of<br />
formal recommendations. Rather, it serves as a list of possible<br />
alternatives given by practitioners <strong>in</strong> the field of municipal<br />
adm<strong>in</strong>istration, and should form the basis of an <strong>in</strong>formed<br />
discussion on how to improve current process and policy<br />
accord<strong>in</strong>g to an important group of municipal stakeholders.<br />
Abolish or Limit Role of SMB<br />
<strong>in</strong> Sett<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Debt</strong> <strong>Limits</strong>:<br />
Some municipalities suggested that the SMB should<br />
be removed altogether, whereas others suggested that<br />
it needed to be reformed. In general, municipalities fell<br />
<strong>in</strong>to two camps with regard to the SMB.<br />
1. Local governments are autonomous and accountable<br />
to their residents, and thus the function of prov<strong>in</strong>cial<br />
oversight is not necessary.<br />
2. Municipalities are f<strong>in</strong>ancially responsible, and should<br />
only have to report on their f<strong>in</strong>ancial status and bus<strong>in</strong>ess<br />
plans to the SMB, but should not have to ask for their<br />
permission (see above section on constitutional limitations<br />
on municipal governments).<br />
8<br />
Dist<strong>in</strong>guish Between Utilities-Related <strong>Debt</strong><br />
and Other <strong>Debt</strong>:<br />
Many municipal representatives believed that utilities<br />
related debt should be separated from general borrow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
because utilities are self-funded, and do not actually impact<br />
the municipalities’ overall f<strong>in</strong>ancial capacity if the fee<br />
structure is susta<strong>in</strong>able and does not require subsidization<br />
by the municipality.<br />
Permit Greater Flexibility<br />
One municipality mentioned that permitt<strong>in</strong>g<br />
municipalities to <strong>in</strong>clude <strong>in</strong>come from community-owned<br />
bus<strong>in</strong>esses would <strong>in</strong>crease debt-capacity. It was believed<br />
that this practice would not only make <strong>in</strong>frastructure selfsusta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g,<br />
but also profitable <strong>in</strong> some cases.<br />
The Importance of Growth<br />
Many respondents mentioned that growth is an important<br />
factor <strong>in</strong> their municipalities, and that there was an immediate<br />
need for greater levels of <strong>in</strong>frastructure grants to ensure that<br />
they can move forward and prepare for future growth.<br />
Improvements to SMB<br />
and <strong>Debt</strong> Regulation Process<br />
Respondents recommended that the SMB be improved<br />
<strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g ways:<br />
1. Simplify the process: make applications and <strong>in</strong>teractions<br />
with the SMB much simpler.<br />
2. Increase the transparency of SMB operations.<br />
3. Clarity: Provide clear explanations of how debt-limits are<br />
calculated, as this was unclear for many municipalities. Some<br />
municipalities were concerned that the lack of clarity as to<br />
how debt-limits are arrived at makes plann<strong>in</strong>g difficult.<br />
a. Some municipalities f<strong>in</strong>d <strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong>ology, such as “own<br />
source revenue,” unclear.<br />
b. Another municipality was confused about whether<br />
the ownership of municipal controlled corporations<br />
affects municipal debt levels.<br />
4. Capital Expenditures: Some municipalities would like<br />
to see the SMB allow capital expenditures to be over the debtlimits<br />
and restrict operat<strong>in</strong>g borrow<strong>in</strong>g to current legislation<br />
and regulations. It was suggested that capital expenditures<br />
should be l<strong>in</strong>ked to capital asset management, and ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
separately from the operat<strong>in</strong>g side of the equation.<br />
5. Turnaround Time Standards: Many respondents<br />
reported a lengthy turnaround time, and suggested that<br />
the SMB have legislated turn-around times and that the<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>ce should <strong>in</strong>crease staff<strong>in</strong>g of the SMB.
6. Ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> Regulation While Increas<strong>in</strong>g Flexibility:<br />
While a number of municipalities noted their preference for<br />
the SMB to be abolished entirely, others noted a preference<br />
for the ma<strong>in</strong>tenance of the SMB as an important oversight<br />
mechanism. However, these respondents did note that the<br />
SMB’s policies and processes need to be changed to permit<br />
more discretion for municipalities to <strong>in</strong>crease or decrease<br />
debt-limits when necessary. It was also suggested that more<br />
flexibility needs to be given to municipalities to allow them<br />
to take advantage of short-<strong>term</strong> borrow<strong>in</strong>g options and lower<br />
<strong>in</strong>terest rates.<br />
7. Problem is larger than LTD: There was the general sense<br />
that the smaller municipalities are able to borrow more money<br />
than what they can afford to pay back, which is not enough<br />
to cover their <strong>in</strong>frastructure needs – thus, <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g debt-limits<br />
is not viewed as the answer, but rather <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g revenue<br />
streams and improv<strong>in</strong>g susta<strong>in</strong>ability of <strong>in</strong>frastructure.<br />
Comparative Policies<br />
In addition to <strong>in</strong>terviews and the survey, we conducted<br />
a comparative analysis of policies <strong>in</strong> Nova Scotia, Manitoba,<br />
and Alberta to ga<strong>in</strong> a better understand<strong>in</strong>g of how other<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>ces have approached municipal governance and<br />
long-<strong>term</strong> debt calculations. These prov<strong>in</strong>ces were chosen<br />
for a number of reasons: Nova Scotia does not <strong>in</strong>clude utility<br />
debt <strong>in</strong> long-<strong>term</strong> debt calculations, Manitoba has a similar<br />
population, and Alberta has led growth and implemented<br />
some <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g policies to cope with regional growth. The<br />
section to follow describes the current policy environment <strong>in</strong><br />
these three prov<strong>in</strong>ces, and provides an overview of potential<br />
lessons to be drawn from them.<br />
Nova Scotia<br />
Legislative and Regulatory Environment<br />
Rules surround<strong>in</strong>g municipal borrow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Nova Scotia are<br />
the responsibility of three bodies and one piece of legislation:<br />
the M<strong>in</strong>ister of Hous<strong>in</strong>g and Municipal Affairs; Service Nova<br />
Scotia and Municipal Relations (SNSMR); the Nova Scotia<br />
Municipal F<strong>in</strong>ance Corporation (NSMFC); and the Municipal<br />
Governance Act, 1998. The roles of each of these entities and<br />
how they <strong>in</strong>teract with one another will be discussed <strong>in</strong> turn.<br />
The M<strong>in</strong>ister of Hous<strong>in</strong>g and Municipal Affairs has control<br />
over whether or not a municipality is allowed to borrow for<br />
capital projects. Section 86 of the Municipal Governance Act,<br />
1998 gives the M<strong>in</strong>ister the power to establish borrow<strong>in</strong>g limits<br />
for each municipality; Section 87 prevents him from sett<strong>in</strong>g<br />
such limits or approv<strong>in</strong>g any borrow<strong>in</strong>g if the municipality has<br />
not filed its annual capital budget with SNSMR; and Section<br />
88 gives him the power of f<strong>in</strong>al approval over a municipality’s<br />
borrow<strong>in</strong>g request (The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Nova Scotia 1998).<br />
Service Nova Scotia and Municipal Relations (SNSMR) is<br />
the l<strong>in</strong>e department responsible for enforc<strong>in</strong>g the borrow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
limits set by the M<strong>in</strong>ister and review<strong>in</strong>g the municipal capital<br />
budgets required under the Municipal Governance Act. At<br />
present, the policy of SNSMR is that municipalities should not<br />
have a debt service ratio <strong>in</strong> excess of 30% (Service Nova Scotia<br />
and Municipal Relations 2010, sec. 3.5) . Two po<strong>in</strong>ts ought to<br />
be made about this rate. First, it is a flat rate which applies<br />
to every municipality without modification, regardless of its<br />
specific f<strong>in</strong>ancial context. While the Municipal Governance<br />
Act does allow the M<strong>in</strong>ister to set rates on a case-by-case<br />
basis, this power is apparently not exercised <strong>in</strong> Nova Scotia.<br />
Second, SNSMR’s 30% debt service ratio does not <strong>in</strong>clude the<br />
debt carried by municipalities which are attributable to water<br />
and electrical utilities, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g transmission <strong>in</strong>frastructure.<br />
M<strong>in</strong>isterial approval is still required when municipalities<br />
attempt to borrow for utility capital projects, as well as approval<br />
from the prov<strong>in</strong>ce’s Utility and Review Board.<br />
The Nova Scotia Municipal F<strong>in</strong>ance Corporation (NSMFC) is<br />
responsible for issu<strong>in</strong>g debentures on behalf of municipalities;<br />
two issues are produced per year. The Corporation also reviews<br />
the borrow<strong>in</strong>g plans produced by municipalities – suggest<strong>in</strong>g<br />
some adm<strong>in</strong>istrative overlap with SNSMR – and uses a 15% debt<br />
service ratio as a benchmark to evaluate each municipality’s<br />
fiscal situation. This 15% does not have the same stand<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong> policy as SNSMR’s 30% ratio, but nor does it <strong>in</strong>clude debt<br />
attributable to water and electrical utilities. The Corporation<br />
provides additional services to municipalities, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g f<strong>in</strong>ancial<br />
tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g for municipal employees <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the borrow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
process, assistance with long-<strong>term</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ancial plann<strong>in</strong>g and<br />
a short-<strong>term</strong> borrow<strong>in</strong>g program for municipalities which<br />
have received approval to borrow but are still await<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
next debenture issue(Service Nova Scotia and Municipal<br />
Relations 2010, sec. 3.4). F<strong>in</strong>ally, the Corporation monitors<br />
its own performance with annual satisfaction surveys of the<br />
municipalities which participated <strong>in</strong> the borrow<strong>in</strong>g process that<br />
year (Nova Scotia Municipal F<strong>in</strong>ance Corporation 2011).<br />
F<strong>in</strong>ally, the role of the Municipal Governance Act, 1998<br />
has been mentioned, but two more sections ought to be<br />
highlighted. First, Section 91 gives municipalities the right<br />
to set rates, repayment schedules and issue debentures on<br />
their own, without go<strong>in</strong>g through the NSMFC. To date, no<br />
municipality <strong>in</strong> Nova Scotia has taken advantage of this option,<br />
suggest<strong>in</strong>g that the quality of service and adm<strong>in</strong>istrative<br />
sav<strong>in</strong>gs offered by the NSMFC are significant. Second, Section<br />
99 grants that municipalities may borrow from their own<br />
capital reserve funds to pay for capital projects at the same<br />
<strong>in</strong>terest rate the municipality would pay if it accessed outside<br />
sources of fund<strong>in</strong>g. Interest<strong>in</strong>gly, this borrow<strong>in</strong>g may be done<br />
by resolution of the council alone, and does not require the<br />
approval of the M<strong>in</strong>ister (The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Nova Scotia 1998).<br />
F<strong>in</strong>ally, while the Regional Municipality of Halifax does have its<br />
own Charter, similar to Ontario’s City of Toronto Act, its sections<br />
on municipal borrow<strong>in</strong>g are lifted verbatim from the Municipal<br />
Governance Act, 1998 and conta<strong>in</strong> no special provisions or<br />
processes (Government of Nova Scotia 2008).<br />
9
Manitoba<br />
Legislative and Regulatory Environment<br />
All borrow<strong>in</strong>g by urban governments <strong>in</strong> Manitoba is<br />
conducted <strong>in</strong> accordance with the Municipal Board Act,<br />
the Municipal Act, the City of W<strong>in</strong>nipeg Charter Act, and the<br />
<strong>Debt</strong> Management Policy of the City of W<strong>in</strong>nipeg. The City<br />
of W<strong>in</strong>nipeg Charter Act applies only to that City, while the<br />
Municipal Board Act and Municipal Act apply to the rema<strong>in</strong>der<br />
of Manitoba’s urban governments. The two provide largely<br />
similar methods and requirements regard<strong>in</strong>g municipal<br />
borrow<strong>in</strong>g and debt limits.<br />
The Municipal Board Act provides the legislative framework<br />
for the prov<strong>in</strong>ce’s twenty-five member Municipal Board, and<br />
charges it with the duty of review<strong>in</strong>g all bylaws that <strong>in</strong>clude<br />
capital borrow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> municipalities other than W<strong>in</strong>nipeg. As<br />
a quasi-judicial body, the Municipal Board is empowered to<br />
reject, amend or accept all proposed capital borrow<strong>in</strong>g bylaws;<br />
they do so accord<strong>in</strong>g to a legislated series of considerations,<br />
<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g “the nature of the work, undertak<strong>in</strong>g or proposed<br />
project,” “the necessity or expediency thereof,” and “the f<strong>in</strong>ancial<br />
position of the local authority.” The Board has some scope for<br />
discretion and further <strong>in</strong>vestigation, and may consider “any<br />
other relevant matter” (The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Manitoba 2011).<br />
In pass<strong>in</strong>g judgment, the Municipal Board may conduct<br />
public hear<strong>in</strong>gs as well as require urban governments to<br />
submit five-year capital forecasts. Furthermore, Section 69 of<br />
the Municipal Board Act states that the Board may “require the<br />
municipality to submit the by-law or contract for the sanction<br />
of the voters or ratepayers …” Municipal governments are not<br />
bound by the approval of the Municipal Board for any debts<br />
that are repayable with<strong>in</strong> the year (Amborski 1998, 19–20).<br />
Neither the Municipal Board Act nor the Municipal Act set<br />
a statutory limit to debt for urban governments. However,<br />
the ratio of debt to municipal assessment is often used by<br />
the Board to de<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong>e whether tak<strong>in</strong>g on additional debt<br />
is advisable. Amborski’s qualitative study of the Municipal<br />
Board’s actions showed that the Municipal Board often took<br />
population trends and economic growth potential <strong>in</strong>to<br />
consideration (1998, 20). In of the 33 applications made to<br />
the Board <strong>in</strong> 2008 and 2009, 9 were accepted, 10 dismissed<br />
and 14 withdrawn (Tyler 2011, 72). Unless the Board can be<br />
shown to be apply<strong>in</strong>g the law <strong>in</strong>correctly or act<strong>in</strong>g beyond its<br />
jurisdiction, its decisions cannot be appealed.<br />
The City of W<strong>in</strong>nipeg Charter Act requires that City to<br />
submit its borrow<strong>in</strong>g plans to the M<strong>in</strong>ister of F<strong>in</strong>ance for<br />
approval. The M<strong>in</strong>ister may, at his discretion, forward the<br />
application to the Municipal Board for review, though the<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ister is not bound by the Board’s advice. Like Manitoba’s<br />
other urban governments, no statutory limit on debt exists.<br />
However, W<strong>in</strong>nipeg does regulate debt accord<strong>in</strong>g to the<br />
guidel<strong>in</strong>es established <strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>ternal document, the <strong>Debt</strong><br />
Management Policy; this self-imposed policy was <strong>in</strong>tended to<br />
shift the City toward pay-as-you-go f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g for tax-supported<br />
capital works. In 1996, City Council established an annual<br />
debt limit of $61 million on both <strong>in</strong>ternally and externallyraised<br />
f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g for tax-supported capital projects. The <strong>Debt</strong><br />
Management Policy is the only document that imposes a limit<br />
on capital borrow<strong>in</strong>g and reports “no new external borrow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
for tax-supported capital expenditures has been approved<br />
s<strong>in</strong>ce 1998” (The City of W<strong>in</strong>nipeg n.d., 2) The policy also<br />
imposes a restriction on the length of f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g periods. Under<br />
normal circumstances, the repayment period will not exceed<br />
the useful life of the asset be<strong>in</strong>g f<strong>in</strong>anced.<br />
All urban governments <strong>in</strong> Manitoba are free to pursue<br />
loans <strong>in</strong> the private sector. The City of W<strong>in</strong>nipeg does not<br />
have a specific objective to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g relationships with<br />
rat<strong>in</strong>g agencies but does note <strong>in</strong> the <strong>Debt</strong> Management Policy<br />
that a high rat<strong>in</strong>g is desirable as it de<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong>es <strong>in</strong>terest rates<br />
and may be used as a comparative measure of general wellbe<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
W<strong>in</strong>nipeg is currently rated by Standard and Poor’s and<br />
Moody’s. The City of Brandon also ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s a relationship<br />
with Moody’s.<br />
None of the acts, regulations or policies explicitly mentions<br />
utility debt, or any other type of specific debt.<br />
Municipal Stakeholder Perspectives<br />
City adm<strong>in</strong>istrators who agreed to be <strong>in</strong>terviewed<br />
reported that their ability to grow was not <strong>in</strong>hibited by the<br />
decisions of Manitoba’s Municipal Board. An adm<strong>in</strong>istrator<br />
of one smaller urban government confided that the amount<br />
of debt that they had been cleared for exceeded what he<br />
deemed to be fiscally responsible.<br />
One emerg<strong>in</strong>g trend <strong>in</strong>volves f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g utility projects<br />
through ratepayer or user fees rather than taxes. Though<br />
loans are still required, these schemes are based on utility<br />
revenue forecasts and allow for <strong>in</strong>creased security for the<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>ce, which is ultimately responsible for <strong>in</strong>solvent<br />
municipalities. The adm<strong>in</strong>istrator who brought this trend to<br />
light noted that their upcom<strong>in</strong>g capital project will be funded<br />
by taxpayers but that pass<strong>in</strong>g the debt on to ratepayers<br />
entirely was considered more politically legitimate.<br />
The Association of Manitoba Municipalities is currently<br />
argu<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> favour of development fees – one-time levies on<br />
developers to f<strong>in</strong>ance the costs associated with development<br />
– to fund projects such as extend<strong>in</strong>g utility services to new<br />
hous<strong>in</strong>g projects. Their argument is that it is unfair to burden<br />
exist<strong>in</strong>g taxpayers with the expenses of municipal expansion.<br />
The Association argues <strong>in</strong>stead that development expenses<br />
ought to be transferred to buyers of new homes, commercial,<br />
and <strong>in</strong>dustrial properties (Slack 2011, 40).<br />
Alberta<br />
Legislative and Regulatory Environment<br />
Municipal debt-limits are regulated <strong>in</strong> Alberta through<br />
the Municipal Government Act. The Act outl<strong>in</strong>es how debtlimits<br />
are de<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong>ed, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g a basic formula. Alberta is<br />
unique <strong>in</strong> that it has legislation govern<strong>in</strong>g debt-limits for<br />
regional service commissions – corporate structures that<br />
are owned by municipalities and provide utility services on<br />
a regional basis. Municipalities <strong>in</strong> Alberta have established<br />
10
commissions for various reasons: the commission’s debt<br />
may be calculated separately from the municipality’s debt,<br />
commissions have higher debt-ceil<strong>in</strong>gs, and commissions<br />
create regional economies of scale because they are owned<br />
by several municipalities.<br />
<strong>Long</strong>-<strong>term</strong> <strong>Debt</strong> <strong>Limits</strong> for Municipalities <strong>in</strong> Alberta<br />
<strong>Debt</strong>-limits for municipalities <strong>in</strong> Alberta are de<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong>ed via<br />
two basic formulas. For most municipalities, total debt cannot<br />
exceed 150% of total municipal revenue, and their debt-service<br />
ratio cannot exceed 25% of municipal revenue (The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
of Alberta, sec. 2). The figures applied to Calgary, Edmonton,<br />
Medic<strong>in</strong>e Hat, and the Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo<br />
are different, however. The debt of these municipalities cannot<br />
exceed 200% of the revenue of the municipality, while their<br />
debt-service ratio may not exceed 35% of the same. (See<br />
Appendix for outl<strong>in</strong>e of formulas).<br />
Municipal Stakeholder Perspectives On Municipal <strong>Debt</strong><br />
Representatives from The City of Calgary suggested that<br />
the bulk of impediments to municipal borrow<strong>in</strong>g were selfimposed;<br />
they cited the City’s <strong>in</strong>ternal debt ceil<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong>ternal<br />
debt-service ratio limit and the desire of both elected and<br />
bureaucratic officials to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> the City’s AAA credit rat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
as examples of such self-imposed f<strong>in</strong>ancial choke-po<strong>in</strong>ts<br />
(Amborski 1998, 41). This latter goal also <strong>in</strong>fluences current<br />
behaviour <strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong>, where cities such as Saskatoon<br />
want to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> their AAA credit rat<strong>in</strong>g and restra<strong>in</strong> their<br />
borrow<strong>in</strong>g activity accord<strong>in</strong>gly.<br />
The Town of Okotoks, a town of approximately 25,000<br />
which is located 20km south of Calgary, is currently debat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
how to handle its long-<strong>term</strong> municipal debt. The town was<br />
one of the ten fastest grow<strong>in</strong>g communities <strong>in</strong> Canada<br />
between 2006 and 2011, and serves as a good comparator<br />
to small-and-medium sized <strong>Saskatchewan</strong> cities because<br />
of this susta<strong>in</strong>ed growth. The town operates under a selfimposed<br />
debt limit that is only 75% of the limit that the town<br />
is legally permitted to assume under prov<strong>in</strong>cial legislation.<br />
S<strong>in</strong>ce 2007, municipal debt has risen dramatically and<br />
both councillors and residents have been openly ask<strong>in</strong>g<br />
whether or not Okotoks will change its <strong>in</strong>ternal debt-limit<br />
to cope with the costs of growth. The current municipal<br />
government is committed to rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g fiscally conservative<br />
while simultaneously access<strong>in</strong>g as many grants as possible<br />
for <strong>in</strong>frastructure upgrades, and monitor<strong>in</strong>g whether debt<br />
<strong>in</strong>creases are actually tied to growth. In short, the municipality<br />
does not f<strong>in</strong>d prov<strong>in</strong>cial debt limits to be problematic. Rather,<br />
the municipality is be<strong>in</strong>g challenged by the costs of growth,<br />
and is exam<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g whether its own <strong>in</strong>ternal fiscal policies are<br />
exacerbat<strong>in</strong>g this stress (Patterson 2011).<br />
Okotoks is not alone <strong>in</strong> operat<strong>in</strong>g under this k<strong>in</strong>d of<br />
self-imposed fiscal responsibility. One of the fastest grow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
municipalities <strong>in</strong> Canada, the Regional Municipality of Wood<br />
Buffalo, has also imposed strict limitations on itself. As noted<br />
above, Wood Buffalo – along with the Cities of Edmonton,<br />
Calgary, and Medic<strong>in</strong>e Hat – has a total debt-limit of 200%<br />
of municipal revenue and a debt-service ratio limit of 35%.<br />
However, the RM has chosen to further restra<strong>in</strong> their debt<br />
obligations by sett<strong>in</strong>g their municipal debt-limit at 75% of<br />
total revenues (Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo 2012).<br />
This limitation is rooted <strong>in</strong> a belief that each generation should<br />
pay <strong>in</strong>to the cost of <strong>in</strong>frastructure, result<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a pay-as-you-go<br />
approach to build<strong>in</strong>g and ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>frastructure.<br />
There was no evidence that Albertan municipalities<br />
would like to see utilities based debt calculated separately<br />
from other municipal debt. However, this may have more<br />
to do with the common use of alternative regional service<br />
delivery mechanisms <strong>in</strong> Alberta, such as Regional Service<br />
Commissions, regional partnerships, or Municipal Controlled<br />
Corporations (as is the case <strong>in</strong> Calgary and Edmonton).<br />
The Role of Corporate Structures <strong>in</strong> Utilities Service<br />
Delivery: Regional Service Commissions (RSC)<br />
and Other Arrangements<br />
In Alberta, many municipalities are utiliz<strong>in</strong>g corporate<br />
structures to own/operate/ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>frastructure and to<br />
provide municipal services on a regional basis. These entities<br />
range from simple <strong>in</strong>ter-municipal partnerships to Regional<br />
Services Commissions to municipal-controlled corporations.<br />
These more complex structures, such as RSCs, enable<br />
municipalities to borrow more money from the Alberta<br />
Capital F<strong>in</strong>ance Authority, because the debt limits for these<br />
bodies are recorded separately from the municipality and<br />
are larger as a percentage of revenue (200% for RSCs vs. 150%<br />
for municipalities).<br />
Regional Service Commissions play a major role <strong>in</strong> the<br />
delivery of services to municipalities. They lower the cost and/<br />
or <strong>in</strong>crease the quality of utilities services for municipalities<br />
by deliver<strong>in</strong>g these services on a regional basis through<br />
a regional adm<strong>in</strong>istrative body. The use of RSCs allows<br />
Albertan municipalities to <strong>in</strong>crease the quality of dr<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g<br />
water, someth<strong>in</strong>g that is often a challenge for small urban<br />
and rural municipalities.<br />
RSCs are very significant <strong>in</strong> <strong>term</strong>s of their role <strong>in</strong><br />
construct<strong>in</strong>g and manag<strong>in</strong>g regional water and sewer<br />
<strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>in</strong> Alberta. There are 69 RSCs, and the majority of<br />
these are <strong>in</strong> the water/wastewater/waste management service<br />
areas. In an <strong>in</strong>terview, an official from the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Municipal<br />
Affairs was not able to provide a precise measure to quantify<br />
the significance of RSCs <strong>in</strong> <strong>term</strong>s of their role <strong>in</strong> municipal<br />
debt, but the official did note that the majority of debt limit<br />
extension approvals made by the prov<strong>in</strong>ce are for RSCs that<br />
require start-up capital for the construction of <strong>in</strong>frastructure for<br />
water/waste water utilities. In <strong>term</strong>s of adm<strong>in</strong>istration, hav<strong>in</strong>g<br />
utilities managed by a separate entity frees up adm<strong>in</strong>istrative<br />
capacity for other <strong>in</strong>itiatives. Moreover, RSCs have a higher<br />
debt-limit ratio as a percentage of revenue.<br />
RSCs have become <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly important <strong>in</strong> Alberta<br />
for the delivery of potable water. Several years ago the<br />
government <strong>in</strong>itiated the Water for Life Strategy, which came<br />
from a policy that high quality water should be available<br />
for all residents of Alberta, no matter where they live <strong>in</strong> the<br />
11
prov<strong>in</strong>ce (Government of Alberta). The prov<strong>in</strong>ce has been<br />
provid<strong>in</strong>g up to 90% grants to municipalities to set-up RSCs<br />
to deliver water on a regional basis because this <strong>in</strong>creases<br />
the quality and reduces the costs of <strong>in</strong>frastructure for<br />
municipalities, thereby reduc<strong>in</strong>g demand on the prov<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
for <strong>in</strong>frastructure dollars. Although costs for the municipality<br />
have been reduced, municipal residents have seen their<br />
water costs rise because they are now pay<strong>in</strong>g the true<br />
cost of water. This has been somewhat problematic <strong>in</strong><br />
that some residents are upset with cost <strong>in</strong>creases. In some<br />
cases, water bills may have <strong>in</strong>creased by as much as 500%,<br />
which is <strong>in</strong>credibly difficult for those customers that were<br />
not prepared for the <strong>in</strong>crease, nor given time to adjust their<br />
water consumption habits. However, <strong>in</strong> the long-<strong>term</strong>, the<br />
municipalities and residents will benefit <strong>in</strong> that <strong>in</strong>frastructure<br />
will be susta<strong>in</strong>able and consumption will be curbed.<br />
RSCs are not just used for water services. They are<br />
also utilized for the delivery of sewer, waste management<br />
(recycl<strong>in</strong>g and solid waste), community plann<strong>in</strong>g, and even<br />
public transportation. Wherever there is a public service<br />
that a number of municipalities with<strong>in</strong> a region perceive as<br />
a benefit, and where these municipalities are <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong><br />
work<strong>in</strong>g together, an RSC may be utilized. Water, sewer, and<br />
waste management are the most common forms of RSC.<br />
Why are Regional Service Commissions so Common<br />
<strong>in</strong> Alberta?<br />
Government grants have <strong>in</strong>centivized the development<br />
of RSCs. The official with Alberta Municipal Affairs noted that<br />
many of the RSCs would probably not have been created if<br />
it were not for significant prov<strong>in</strong>cial grants to assist with setup<br />
costs. For example, the Water For Life Strategy <strong>in</strong>cluded<br />
up to 90% grants for the set-up of water service delivery<br />
RSCs. Other grants have been made available for sewer, and<br />
waste management <strong>in</strong>frastructure. Organiz<strong>in</strong>g the delivery<br />
of services <strong>in</strong> this way has made possible for some fairly<br />
significant achievements <strong>in</strong> <strong>term</strong>s of service delivery. For<br />
example, one major <strong>in</strong>frastructure project <strong>in</strong>volves the pip<strong>in</strong>g<br />
of water from Edmonton, several hundred kilometres away<br />
to Vermillion, servic<strong>in</strong>g many jurisdictions along the way<br />
through a modernized web of service commissions. However,<br />
it is important to note that these would not likely have taken<br />
place without major prov<strong>in</strong>cial support.<br />
Benefits and Challenges of Regional Arrangements<br />
When asked about whether regional bodies such as<br />
RSCs, or other such regional partnerships for the delivery<br />
of utilities services <strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong> would be beneficial,<br />
one official with the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Municipal Affairs <strong>in</strong> Alberta<br />
noted that some k<strong>in</strong>d of regional service mechanism is likely<br />
a good idea, but the key is to provide an <strong>in</strong>centive, such as<br />
cover<strong>in</strong>g start-up costs, to develop them regionally and to<br />
make them competitive. This official thought that it was quite<br />
likely that many municipalities would fear the loss of control<br />
over regional entities, as well as the loss of jobs with<strong>in</strong> their<br />
community, or even the idea that water or some other service<br />
12<br />
would potentially come from a facility <strong>in</strong> another community.<br />
These challenges would need to be overcome before a<br />
regional service delivery option could be feasible. This official<br />
suggested that regardless of the challenges and hurdles, the<br />
benefits far outweigh the costs for smaller municipalities<br />
that would be able to access higher quality services for their<br />
residents, and reduce <strong>in</strong>frastructure costs through some<br />
form of regionalized service delivery mechanism. This official<br />
emphasized that though RSCs are a useful tool, they should<br />
only be one tool <strong>in</strong> the arsenal of municipalities experienc<strong>in</strong>g<br />
growth, and that there are other options. The key po<strong>in</strong>t is that<br />
municipalities need to build capacity.<br />
RSCs provide for greater utility debt flexibility <strong>in</strong> the long<strong>term</strong><br />
because they have a larger debt threshold. Alberta’s<br />
legislation says that RSCs are entitled to a debt limit of 200%<br />
of revenue. But s<strong>in</strong>ce RSCs do not have revenue when<br />
they beg<strong>in</strong> operat<strong>in</strong>g, they require prov<strong>in</strong>cial approval of<br />
a debt-limit extension to give them time to set-up and beg<strong>in</strong><br />
deliver<strong>in</strong>g services to earn revenue. Only those municipalities<br />
that have the capacity to set up an RSC with a solid bus<strong>in</strong>ess<br />
plan, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g 5 year projections on operat<strong>in</strong>g a capital<br />
budgets, will be granted base-extensions for up to five years<br />
to get them operational. Thus, the ability of municipalities to<br />
take advantage of this type of mechanism largely cont<strong>in</strong>gent<br />
upon f<strong>in</strong>ancial and development capacity. Regardless of what<br />
the debt-limit is <strong>in</strong> legislation, the government of Alberta<br />
works with municipalities and RSCs to ensure that they have<br />
solid bus<strong>in</strong>ess plans and organizational capacity. The Alberta<br />
Government is exam<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g options to give municipalities<br />
more autonomy, such as greater debt limits, but would likely<br />
<strong>in</strong>crease report<strong>in</strong>g requirements, such as quarterly report<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
An important feature of this method of service delivery is<br />
<strong>in</strong>creased operational capacity. Many of the RSCs have their<br />
own dedicated staff <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g a chief adm<strong>in</strong>istrative officer<br />
(CAO). It was noted by one official that these RSCs were the<br />
most effective because they had the management capacity<br />
to operate as an effective bus<strong>in</strong>ess.<br />
Another regional mechanism that may become more<br />
common as growth pressures <strong>in</strong>crease is the Municipal<br />
Controlled Corporation. Many municipalities would like to<br />
convert their RSCs <strong>in</strong>to municipal controlled corporations.<br />
RSCs are not permitted to make a profit, whereas Municipal<br />
Controlled Corporations are. Examples of this are Enmax<br />
<strong>in</strong> Calgary. Municipal Controlled Corporations are over<br />
50% owned by a municipality. Although regulated, these<br />
corporations can raise funds, and sell-stocks, so long as<br />
the municipality ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s control of them. This could be<br />
problematic for the prov<strong>in</strong>ce if a significant number of<br />
municipalities created municipal controlled corporations,<br />
and if those corporations experienced significant f<strong>in</strong>ancial<br />
hardships, as the prov<strong>in</strong>ce could potentially be liable for any<br />
losses. The prov<strong>in</strong>ce has much better capacity to regulate the<br />
use of RSCs than it does Municipal Controlled Corporations.
Table 2.0 Comparison with <strong>Saskatchewan</strong><br />
Who approves<br />
borrow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
What are the restrictions on borrow<strong>in</strong>g?<br />
What is the turnaround time<br />
on applications to borrow?<br />
Prov<strong>in</strong>ce M<strong>in</strong>ister Board Restrictions Turnaround<br />
Nova Scotia Yes 1 n/a<br />
• n 30% debt-service limit<br />
• n 15% debt-service limit used as<br />
a benchmark by NSMFC<br />
• n utilities debt not <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> calculation<br />
2-4 weeks<br />
Manitoba Yes 2 Yes 3 $61 million <strong>in</strong> debt on tax-funded capital<br />
expenditures, and is presently mov<strong>in</strong>g<br />
• n W<strong>in</strong>nipeg may carry no more than<br />
to pay-as-you-go f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g<br />
10-30 days<br />
Alberta Yes 4 n/a<br />
<strong>Saskatchewan</strong> No Yes<br />
• n Calgary, Edmonton, Medic<strong>in</strong>e Hat<br />
& RM of Wood Buffalo: maximum debt load<br />
of 2 times municipal revenues; debt service<br />
ratio of 35%<br />
• n all other municipal governments:<br />
maximum debt load of 1.5 times municipal<br />
revenues; debt service ratio of 25%<br />
• n Municipalities: 100 % of previous years<br />
revenue<br />
• n Cities: De<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> consultation with<br />
SMB and expressed as a percentage of<br />
revenue (very ad hoc <strong>in</strong> nature).<br />
1-4 weeks<br />
Varies<br />
Notes<br />
1) Save for borrow<strong>in</strong>g from capital reserve fund<br />
2) For the City of W<strong>in</strong>nipeg<br />
3) For all other urban areas<br />
4) For debt limits that exceed legislated limits.<br />
Summary of Alternative Service Delivery Arrangements:<br />
An Alberta Perspective<br />
The use of alternative service delivery arrangements <strong>in</strong><br />
Alberta has proved useful to both municipalities and for the<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>ce. For the prov<strong>in</strong>ce it has created a venue through<br />
which to standardize the delivery of certa<strong>in</strong> services, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g<br />
potable water, among municipalities. It has also created<br />
service delivery capacity among municipalities, which could<br />
potentially reduce the demand for grants <strong>in</strong> the future,<br />
especially among self-susta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g RSCs. For municipalities,<br />
the adoption of RSCs has improved the quality of some<br />
services, reduced <strong>in</strong>frastructure costs for the municipalities,<br />
and created regional economies of scale. Success <strong>in</strong> this<br />
area was only possible because of a will<strong>in</strong>gness on behalf<br />
of municipalities to work together, as well as leadership and<br />
support from the prov<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> the provision of grants for<br />
the creation of RSCs. Some RSCs have been challenged by<br />
f<strong>in</strong>ancial capacity, adm<strong>in</strong>istrative capacity, and other issues.<br />
Others have been hugely successful, and some have even<br />
created an adm<strong>in</strong>istrative identity that has become separate<br />
from that of the municipality. It is important to note that RSCs<br />
are only useful <strong>in</strong>sofar as municipalities are committed to<br />
<strong>in</strong>vest<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> their adm<strong>in</strong>istrative capacity, and if the prov<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
is will<strong>in</strong>g to support their development. They may be a<br />
potential opportunity for reduc<strong>in</strong>g utilities-related costs for<br />
municipalities <strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong>, but they will only be part of<br />
the solution.<br />
Comparison with <strong>Saskatchewan</strong><br />
The table above compares municipal debt policy <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>Saskatchewan</strong> with the three comparator prov<strong>in</strong>ces. It is<br />
<strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g to note that a municipal board that regulates<br />
municipal debt is only present <strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong> and<br />
Manitoba. In Nova Scotia debt is regulated by the M<strong>in</strong>istry<br />
responsible for municipal government, and <strong>in</strong> Alberta, only<br />
municipalities seek<strong>in</strong>g debt-level extensions above legislated<br />
limits require m<strong>in</strong>isterial approval. Each prov<strong>in</strong>ce differs on<br />
their debt-limit calculation formula. Nova Scotia is the only<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>ce we analyzed where utility debt differentiated from<br />
other municipal debt. As well, <strong>in</strong> Nova Scotia, debt-limits<br />
are regulated largely by a service limit as a percentage of<br />
revenues, rather than by a total debt limit as a percentage<br />
of revenue as is the case <strong>in</strong> the other prov<strong>in</strong>ces.<br />
13
Recommendations<br />
Below are potential changes to policy and process that<br />
could be beneficial to urban governments <strong>in</strong> Canada. These<br />
recommendations have been <strong>in</strong>formed by our understand<strong>in</strong>g<br />
of long-<strong>term</strong> debt policy <strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong>, <strong>in</strong> other prov<strong>in</strong>ces,<br />
and from surveys and <strong>in</strong>terviews conducted with urban<br />
governments and stakeholders <strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong>. These<br />
recommendations are meant to focus the attention of SUMA<br />
on specific issues and options that, <strong>in</strong> our view, would address<br />
the issues that we uncovered over the course this project.<br />
Policy Problem 1:<br />
A significant number of municipalities <strong>in</strong>terviewed noted<br />
that their debt capacity is <strong>in</strong>sufficient to accommodate<br />
future needs and growth.<br />
Analysis:<br />
In our discussions with municipalities and municipal<br />
stakeholders, a number of issues arose that are related to<br />
the concern over debt, and that <strong>in</strong>form our recommendation:<br />
1. SMB <strong>in</strong> Practice: Under the current system,<br />
municipalities must work with SMB to establish a debt-limit<br />
when the debt-limit exceeds their current limit. The current<br />
practice of the SMB is to work with the municipality to ensure<br />
that a sound bus<strong>in</strong>ess plan is <strong>in</strong> place to ensure that the<br />
f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g of the municipality is susta<strong>in</strong>able. So long as debt<br />
is susta<strong>in</strong>able as outl<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> the municipality’s bus<strong>in</strong>ess plan,<br />
the SMB will likely grant a debt extension. There were no<br />
examples of municipalities be<strong>in</strong>g refused debt extensions<br />
from the <strong>in</strong>terviews and surveys, so this system, while<br />
unpopular with some municipalities, appears to be provid<strong>in</strong>g<br />
urban governments with adequate debt capacity on average.<br />
Some municipalities suggested that <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g utilities-based<br />
debt <strong>in</strong> the debt-limit formula is <strong>in</strong>appropriate because<br />
utilities-based debt is funded by user fees, not mill rates, and<br />
by exclud<strong>in</strong>g this type of debt, municipalities would have<br />
greater capacity to access debt for non-utilities purposes<br />
without hav<strong>in</strong>g to approach the SMB for an extension.<br />
a. The SMB approach to regulat<strong>in</strong>g debt is very ad hoc.<br />
Municipalities can count on receiv<strong>in</strong>g a review of their<br />
debt-management plans, and be<strong>in</strong>g granted a debt-level<br />
extension so long as a plan is <strong>in</strong> place. Thus, the system is<br />
ad hoc and flexible. Some municipalities were comfortable<br />
with this, while others were concerned that the system<br />
is unclear and potentially unpredictable, as they worried<br />
about miss<strong>in</strong>g opportunities <strong>in</strong> the future if the SMB<br />
decided not to grant the municipality an extension.<br />
2. Infrastructure Needs and Additional <strong>Debt</strong> Capacity:<br />
Concern over <strong>in</strong>sufficient debt-capacity is most often<br />
associated with the need for major <strong>in</strong>frastructure upgrades for<br />
utilities such as water and sewer. However, <strong>in</strong> most cases it was<br />
suggested that the municipality would not be able to afford<br />
these upgrades without significant prov<strong>in</strong>cial or federal grants.<br />
14<br />
3. Responsiveness: Some of the larger municipalities<br />
were of the op<strong>in</strong>ion that the current policy is a “one size<br />
fits all” approach provid<strong>in</strong>g the same level of oversight to<br />
larger municipalities with adequate professional staff as to<br />
smaller municipalities without adequate capacity. These<br />
municipalities would like to see the policy and practice of<br />
debt-regulation reformed to recognize the various levels of<br />
capacity among municipalities.<br />
Recommendations:<br />
It does not appear that the current system has reduced<br />
the capacity of municipalities to access sufficient debt. So<br />
long as an adequate bus<strong>in</strong>ess plan is <strong>in</strong> place, the SMB works<br />
with municipalities to ensure that they can access debt. Thus,<br />
the <strong>in</strong>clusion of utility debt is more of annoyance for some<br />
municipalities than it is a h<strong>in</strong>drance to growth. What seems<br />
to be the bigger concern among municipalities is the lack of<br />
clarity around how debt-levels are de<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong>ed, the rationale<br />
for the <strong>in</strong>clusion of utility debt, and generally, the policies of<br />
the SMB. Moreover, <strong>in</strong> cases where debt-levels are <strong>in</strong>sufficient,<br />
the municipality is often unable to service additional debt,<br />
and thus is <strong>in</strong> need of additional municipal grants for<br />
<strong>in</strong>frastructure rather than additional debt-capacity.<br />
In order to address the above concerns, SUMA should<br />
consider the follow<strong>in</strong>g actions:<br />
A. Work with the SMB to Develop Guidel<strong>in</strong>es for<br />
Municipalities: Approach the SMB about develop<strong>in</strong>g<br />
a comprehensive guide to municipal debt to provide<br />
municipalities with a thorough explanation of how debt<br />
levels are calculated, application criteria, key <strong>term</strong>s such<br />
as “own source revenue” and other factors that they should<br />
consider. This could help alleviate some of the concerns that<br />
municipalities have about obta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g adequate debt. Currently<br />
there seems to be a high level of uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty among<br />
municipalities about how the SMB works.<br />
B. Request that the Prov<strong>in</strong>ce Develop a More Substantive<br />
Policy: The survey data <strong>in</strong>dicated that there are some<br />
municipalities that are grow<strong>in</strong>g and will cont<strong>in</strong>ue to require<br />
additional debt capacity; they can handle additional debt.<br />
However, there are others that cannot service additional debt.<br />
The current system permits the SMB work with municipalities<br />
<strong>in</strong> an ad hoc manner to de<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong>e if an extension should<br />
be granted. If SUMA would like to advocate on behalf of<br />
municipalities that are frustrated by this process, it should<br />
consider request<strong>in</strong>g that the prov<strong>in</strong>ce change its policy<br />
to provide greater long-<strong>term</strong> debt limits to municipalities<br />
that demonstrate a capacity to manage greater debt, and<br />
that are grow<strong>in</strong>g. The SMB could utilize a tier system, where<br />
different tiers of municipalities are granted different levels of<br />
debt automatically, and only need to approach the SMB for<br />
ma<strong>in</strong>tenance of that status periodically. This system could<br />
preserve the oversight and f<strong>in</strong>ancial regulation of smaller<br />
municipalities that cannot accommodate greater debt,<br />
while provid<strong>in</strong>g greater capacity and flexibility to grow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
municipalities. The current policy allows the prov<strong>in</strong>ce to<br />
ensure that small municipalities ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> reasonable levels
of debt, while permitt<strong>in</strong>g the prov<strong>in</strong>ce the flexibility<br />
to <strong>in</strong>crease debt where feasible. If this is too ad hoc for<br />
municipalities, then a more precise policy needs to be<br />
developed so that municipalities can plan.<br />
C. Request that the Prov<strong>in</strong>ce Consider Remov<strong>in</strong>g Utilities<br />
<strong>Debt</strong> from Calculation: As mentioned above, Nova Scotia<br />
does not <strong>in</strong>clude water and electrical utilities debt <strong>in</strong> debtlimit<br />
calculations. <strong>Debt</strong> for these utilities is still regulated by<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>ce. <strong>Saskatchewan</strong> could do the same, and cont<strong>in</strong>ue<br />
to regulate municipal debt through the SMB, which would<br />
ensure oversight ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed. However, this may, <strong>in</strong> some<br />
cases, provide greater flexibility to municipalities.<br />
D. Advocate for a Prov<strong>in</strong>ce-wide Solution to Infrastructure<br />
Needs: Many municipalities mentioned that they need to<br />
make major upgrades to water and sewer system, as per<br />
new federal regulations. Many of these municipalities cannot<br />
afford to make these upgrades without <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g their debt<br />
load, but cannot feasibly service debt at the levels needed to<br />
meet the new requirements . Thus, it appears that there is<br />
a need for a strategy to assist municipalities with develop<strong>in</strong>g<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>able <strong>in</strong>frastructure.<br />
Policy Problem 2:<br />
A number of municipalities are fac<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>frastructure<br />
challenges, and cannot afford to replace necessary utilities<br />
<strong>in</strong>frastructure such as water and sewer.<br />
Analysis:<br />
Our comparative research on Alberta’s RSC models,<br />
as well as our discussions with municipal officials <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>Saskatchewan</strong> highlighted the option of regionalized service<br />
delivery, which may make replac<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>frastructure feasible<br />
for some municipalities. This is especially true for smaller<br />
municipalities <strong>in</strong> rural areas where it may not be possible for<br />
one municipality to build its own water treatment plant, but<br />
where collaboration on a regional scale might be achievable.<br />
It may also be easier for municipalities to access grant<br />
fund<strong>in</strong>g to build regional <strong>in</strong>frastructure, as was the case<br />
with the Sask Land<strong>in</strong>g Regional Water Pipel<strong>in</strong>e Utility.<br />
To summarize, the two options we exam<strong>in</strong>ed are:<br />
1. RSCs: As mentioned, municipalities <strong>in</strong> Alberta engage <strong>in</strong><br />
RSCs to deliver services on a regional basis. This is potentially<br />
beneficial because it removes some utilities-based debt from<br />
the municipality to the RSC, creates efficiencies <strong>in</strong> service<br />
deliver, reduces costs, and allows some municipalities to<br />
access grants for service delivery through RSCs. With RSCs the<br />
municipality frees up adm<strong>in</strong>istrative capacity for other activities.<br />
2. Regional Service Delivery <strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong>: One<br />
group of municipalities has regionalized the delivery of water<br />
purification and transportation. The Sask Land<strong>in</strong>g Regional<br />
Water Pipel<strong>in</strong>e Utility, which was created by a group of towns<br />
and RMs <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the Towns of Kyle and Elrose, will treat and<br />
deliver potable water to the Towns of Kyle and Elrose,<br />
as well as to the residents of the surround<strong>in</strong>g RMs, and some<br />
major customers such as nearby Hutterite colonies and large<br />
farm operations (Infrastructure Canada). The Sask Land<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Regional Water Pipel<strong>in</strong>e Utility was set up because water<br />
quality was poor, and it was a solution that was recommended<br />
by SaskWater. The municipalities were able to develop this<br />
because of grant fund<strong>in</strong>g available from the federal and<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>cial governments, and fund<strong>in</strong>g costs worked out to<br />
roughly 1/3 municipal, 1/3 prov<strong>in</strong>cial, and 1/3 federal dollars.<br />
In the long run, because the utility is separate from the<br />
municipality, and because the costs are recovered on a fee for<br />
service basis, this should shift utilities related debt away from<br />
the municipalities, free<strong>in</strong>g debt capacity for other needs. One<br />
municipal partner suggested that this type of <strong>in</strong>itiative, while it<br />
is <strong>in</strong>novative and has proved successful, would not have been<br />
possible without grant fund<strong>in</strong>g. Moreover, the will<strong>in</strong>gness<br />
to work together with neighbours and create a third party<br />
organization was imperative to the success of this <strong>in</strong>itiative,<br />
which is now shovel ready with pipes be<strong>in</strong>g laid <strong>in</strong> some areas.<br />
Recommendations:<br />
The above two examples are options for <strong>Saskatchewan</strong><br />
municipalities to consider <strong>in</strong> address<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>frastructure<br />
challenges, especially water and sewer, which appear to<br />
be significant challenges <strong>in</strong> <strong>Saskatchewan</strong>.<br />
In order to address the above concerns, SUMA should<br />
consider the follow<strong>in</strong>g actions:<br />
A. Survey Members About Regional Service Delivery:<br />
Survey members about their <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> engag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> regional<br />
service delivery arrangements. De<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong>e the level of <strong>in</strong>terest,<br />
as well as the perspective of members on how such<br />
an arrangement ought to be designed.<br />
B. Communicate with Municipal Partners: If there is<br />
an appetite among members, SARM should be approached<br />
to de<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong>e if their members have an <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> this.<br />
C. Approach Prov<strong>in</strong>ce about Fund<strong>in</strong>g: If there is<br />
an appetite for this, approach the prov<strong>in</strong>ce and federal<br />
government about targeted fund<strong>in</strong>g for sett<strong>in</strong>g up and<br />
implement<strong>in</strong>g regional service delivery groups. It is clear<br />
from our research that regional service delivery arrangements<br />
require fund<strong>in</strong>g to be developed.<br />
Process Problem 3:<br />
A number of municipalities mentioned that the processes<br />
of the SMB could be improved and streaml<strong>in</strong>ed to better<br />
serve municipalities.<br />
Analysis:<br />
The municipalities we <strong>in</strong>terviewed mentioned that<br />
streaml<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g and simplify<strong>in</strong>g the application process would<br />
improve efficiency. This was also reflected <strong>in</strong> the survey data.<br />
Municipalities suggested that the SMB could be improved <strong>in</strong><br />
the follow<strong>in</strong>g areas:<br />
15
1. Flexibility: Many municipalities suggested that they<br />
would benefit from greater flexibility <strong>in</strong> order to take<br />
advantage of short-<strong>term</strong> borrow<strong>in</strong>g options and lower<br />
<strong>in</strong>terest rates, particularly with the historic low <strong>in</strong>terest rates<br />
currently available.<br />
2. Speed: Most municipalities suggested that the SMB<br />
could improve the speed at which applications are reviewed.<br />
Some municipalities believed that <strong>in</strong> the future they might<br />
miss important opportunities while await<strong>in</strong>g approval of<br />
debt-limit extensions. One suggestion revealed <strong>in</strong> the survey<br />
data was for the SMB to legislate turnaround times, which<br />
would require additional staff resources from the prov<strong>in</strong>ce.<br />
Recommendations:<br />
In order to address the above issues, the follow<strong>in</strong>g policy<br />
solutions should be exam<strong>in</strong>ed:<br />
A. Approach SMB about review<strong>in</strong>g borrow<strong>in</strong>g options:<br />
Municipalities have suggested that they are miss<strong>in</strong>g out on<br />
short-<strong>term</strong> borrow<strong>in</strong>g options that would decrease <strong>in</strong>terest<br />
costs. SUMA should request that the SMB exam<strong>in</strong>e its current<br />
policies to de<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong>e if this is the case, and if so, if changes<br />
could be made to <strong>in</strong>crease flexibility and lower costs<br />
for municipalities.<br />
B. Legislated Process<strong>in</strong>g Times: Many municipalities were<br />
concerned that process<strong>in</strong>g times for applications to the SMB<br />
were too lengthy. The prov<strong>in</strong>ce should be encouraged to<br />
legislate standards <strong>in</strong> this area.<br />
C. Review Application Process: It was noted by the SMB<br />
that process<strong>in</strong>g times are often lengthy due to <strong>in</strong>complete<br />
applications. The application process should be reviewed<br />
to de<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong>e the reason for this so that it may be resolved<br />
through process changes, build<strong>in</strong>g municipal capacity, or both.<br />
Appendix<br />
Alberta <strong>Debt</strong>-Limit Formula<br />
<strong>Debt</strong> limits are calculated by de<strong>term</strong><strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g revenue,<br />
total debt, and debt service costs:<br />
Revenue =<br />
“the total revenue reported <strong>in</strong> the last audited annual<br />
f<strong>in</strong>ancial statement of the municipality prepared before<br />
the calculation time, less transfers from the governments<br />
of Alberta and Canada for the purposes of a capital property<br />
reported <strong>in</strong> that statement if those transfers are <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong><br />
the total revenue, and less amounts reported as contributed<br />
or donated tangible capital assets if those amounts are<br />
<strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> the total revenue” (The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Alberta, sec. 3)<br />
Total debt is calculated <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g way:<br />
TD = (a + b) – c<br />
TD = total debt<br />
a = “the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple outstand<strong>in</strong>g at the calculation time<br />
on borrow<strong>in</strong>gs made by the municipality;”<br />
b = “the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple outstand<strong>in</strong>g at the calculation time<br />
of loans <strong>in</strong> good stand<strong>in</strong>g that have been guaranteed by<br />
the municipality, plus the amount that the municipality<br />
is liable to pay at the calculation time under loans not <strong>in</strong> good<br />
stand<strong>in</strong>g that have been guaranteed by the municipality;”<br />
(The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Alberta, sec. 4)<br />
c = “the amount of a and b that the municipality is entitled<br />
to recover from another municipality at the calculation time”<br />
(The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Alberta, sec. 4)<br />
To summarize, total debt is the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple outstand<strong>in</strong>g at<br />
the time of calculation, plus the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple outstand<strong>in</strong>g at the<br />
calculation time for loans <strong>in</strong> good stand<strong>in</strong>g, and that have been<br />
guaranteed by the municipality <strong>in</strong> addition to the amount<br />
of money the municipality is liable for on loans not <strong>in</strong> good<br />
stand<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>in</strong>us the amount of a and b that the municipality<br />
is owed by other municipalities at the calculation time.<br />
<strong>Debt</strong> servic<strong>in</strong>g limits are calculated as follows:<br />
DS = (a + b) – C<br />
a = the sum of:<br />
i) The total amount of the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple and <strong>in</strong>terest that<br />
the municipality is required to pay for those debts where<br />
the municipality is required to pay pr<strong>in</strong>ciple dur<strong>in</strong>g the 12<br />
months after the calculation time; and<br />
ii) For those debts where the municipality is not required to<br />
pay any of pr<strong>in</strong>ciple dur<strong>in</strong>g the 12 months after calculation,<br />
the total of the pro rata amounts for those 12 months.<br />
b = the total amount that the council estimates<br />
“on reasonable grounds” that the municipality will be liable<br />
for dur<strong>in</strong>g the 12 months after calculation time for loans<br />
not <strong>in</strong> good stand<strong>in</strong>g but that have been guaranteed by<br />
the municipality.<br />
c = the amount of a and b that the municipality is entitled<br />
to recover from another municipality dur<strong>in</strong>g the 12 month<br />
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period after calculation time (The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Alberta, sec. 5).<br />
<strong>Debt</strong> Limit calculations may or may not <strong>in</strong>clude regional<br />
service commission debt. A municipality “may choose to<br />
calculate its revenue, total debt and debt service as though<br />
one or more of the controlled corporations are part of<br />
the municipality” (The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Alberta, sec. 6.1). If the<br />
municipality chooses to do this, then all of that corporation’s<br />
“revenue, borrow<strong>in</strong>gs, guarantees and loans must be <strong>in</strong>cluded<br />
<strong>in</strong> those calculations except” (The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Alberta, sec. 6.2)<br />
for the follow<strong>in</strong>g conditions:<br />
<strong>Debt</strong> service is calculated as follows:<br />
<strong>Debt</strong> service = the sum of the total <strong>in</strong>terest and pr<strong>in</strong>ciple<br />
the RSC will have to pay for debts that will be serviced dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the 12 months after calculation time plus the pro rata amounts<br />
on debts for which the municipality does not pay pr<strong>in</strong>ciple<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g the 12 months follow<strong>in</strong>g the calculation time, m<strong>in</strong>us<br />
the amount the RSC is entitled to recover from another RSC<br />
or municipality (The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Alberta 2000, sec. 5).<br />
• n Revenues that arise from transactions between the<br />
municipality and the corporation, or between the corporation<br />
and another municipal controlled corporation are not to be<br />
<strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> the comb<strong>in</strong>ed revenues.<br />
• n Guarantees and loans between the municipality and<br />
controlled corporations or between municipal controlled<br />
corporations are not to be <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> comb<strong>in</strong>ed total debt<br />
or debt service calculation.<br />
Regional Service Commissions (RSCs) <strong>Debt</strong> <strong>Limits</strong><br />
<strong>Debt</strong> limits for regional service commissions<br />
are separate from municipal long-<strong>term</strong> debt regulations.<br />
Both are covered by the Municipal Government Act,<br />
but appear <strong>in</strong> separate sections.<br />
RSC Provid<strong>in</strong>g Public Utilities<br />
For regional service commissions authorized to provide<br />
public utility services to municipalities, total debt must not<br />
exceed 2 times revenue of the regional service commission.<br />
<strong>Debt</strong> service must not exceed 0.35 times revenue of<br />
the regional service commission (The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Alberta<br />
2000, sec. 1).<br />
RSC Provid<strong>in</strong>g Non-Utility Related Services<br />
For regional service commissions that are authorized<br />
to provide services other than public utilities, total debt must<br />
not exceed 0.5 times the total revenue, and debt service must<br />
not exceed 0.1 times the revenue (The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Alberta<br />
2000, sec. 2).<br />
<strong>Debt</strong>-Limit Calculation Formula<br />
Revenue for Regional Service Commissions is calculated<br />
similar to municipalities. Revenue is “the total of all revenue<br />
reported <strong>in</strong> the most recent audited f<strong>in</strong>ancial statement of<br />
the commission, exclud<strong>in</strong>g transfers from the governments<br />
of Alberta and Canada for the purposes of a capital property<br />
reported <strong>in</strong> that statement if those transfers are <strong>in</strong>cluded<br />
<strong>in</strong> the total revenue, and before expenses are deducted”<br />
(The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Alberta 2000, sec. 3). <strong>Debt</strong> of regional service<br />
commissions is quite simply the total pr<strong>in</strong>ciple outstand<strong>in</strong>g<br />
at calculation time, m<strong>in</strong>us the amount of pr<strong>in</strong>ciple<br />
the commission is entitled to recover from another RSC<br />
or municipality at that time.<br />
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References<br />
Amborski, David P. 1998. “Review of the Regulatory Environment of Municipal Capital Borrow<strong>in</strong>g”. ICURR Press. http://www.<br />
muniscope.ca/_files/file.php?fileid=fileZOMcseGaEn&filename=file_Review_of_the_regulatory.pdf.<br />
Government of Alberta. “Water for Life.” http://www.waterforlife.alberta.ca/.<br />
Government of Nova Scotia. 2008. Halifax Regional Municipality Charter: An Act Respect<strong>in</strong>g the Halifax Regional Municipality.<br />
Infrastructure Canada. “Grant and Contribution Awards Over $25,000.” http://www.<strong>in</strong>frastructure.gc.ca/pd-dp/gc-sc/reportsrapports-eng.php?type=c&ref=83&p=2008&q=3.<br />
Kitchen, Harry M. 2002. Muncipal Revenue and Expenditure Issues <strong>in</strong> Canada. Canadian Tax Paper. Toronto, ONT:<br />
Canadian Tax Foundation.<br />
Nova Scotia Municipal F<strong>in</strong>ance Corporation. 2011. “Crown Corporation Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Plans for the Fiscal Year 2011-2012”.<br />
Government of Nova Scotia.<br />
Patterson, Don. 2011. “Town <strong>Debt</strong> Ris<strong>in</strong>g Close to Limit.” Okotoks Western Wheel, August 3.<br />
Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo. 2012. “<strong>Debt</strong> and <strong>Debt</strong> Management Summaries, 2008-2012.” http://www.woodbuffalo.<br />
ab.ca/Assets/Departments/F<strong>in</strong>ancial+Services/2012+Proposed+Budget+$!26+F<strong>in</strong>ancial+Plans/2012+Proposed+Budget/<br />
<strong>Debt</strong>+$!26+<strong>Debt</strong>+Management+Summaries.pdf.<br />
<strong>Saskatchewan</strong> Municipal Board. “<strong>Saskatchewan</strong> Municipal Board: About the Board.” http://www.smb.gov.sk.ca/.<br />
Service Nova Scotia and Municipal Relations. 2010. “Local Government Resource Handbook”. Government of Nova Scotia.<br />
Slack, Enid. 2011. “Roles and Responsibilities of Government <strong>in</strong> Fund<strong>in</strong>g Municipal Infrastructure.” Municipal Leader.<br />
Stefaniuk, John D. 2007. “Municipalities and the Constitution Part 1: Powers and Paramountcy.” Municipal Leader.<br />
The City of W<strong>in</strong>nipeg. n.d. “<strong>Debt</strong> Management Policy.” http://www.w<strong>in</strong>nipeg.ca/f<strong>in</strong>ance/files/approved_debt_management_<br />
policy.pdf.<br />
The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Alberta. 2000. Municipal Government Act: Regional Services Commission.<br />
———. Municipal Government Act. Chapter M - 26.<br />
———. Municipal Government Act - <strong>Debt</strong> Limit Regulation. 255/2000.<br />
The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Manitoba. 2011. The Municipal Board Act. CCSM C. M240. http://web2.gov.mb.ca/laws/statutes/ccsm/m240e.php.<br />
The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Nova Scotia. 1998. Municipal Governance Act.<br />
The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of <strong>Saskatchewan</strong>. 2002. The Cities Act. Chapter C-11.1.<br />
———. 2005. The Municipalities Act. Chapter M-36.1.<br />
Tyler, Robert L. 2011. “The Manitoba Municipal Board.” Municipal Leader.<br />
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