Applying wildlife welfare principles to individual animals

(as in the example of shelter seeking in mice), both are also affected by other - very different
- factors and by the same token may at times conflict (Barnett and Hemsworth, 1990; Mendl
and Deag, 1995).
We must in fact recognise (after Korte et al. 2009) that natural selection exerts genetic
benefits by maximising reproductive success of the adapted organisms even at the expense
of individual happiness, health and longevity. In effect: if we presume welfare to mean
positive or negative “well-being” (e.g. Fox, 1990) then that welfare status may be
compromised without affecting the ability to leave offspring (unhappy animals can still
reproduce successfully). By converse: even if fitness is compromised in some way and, in
consequence, the animal's ability to leave progeny is reduced, this fitness issue is not
necessarily a welfare issue as animals’ ability to carry out behavioural routines that, under
natural conditions, may simultaneously enhance fitness.
From all this (and see also review by Mendl and Deag, 1995), it seems clear to us that
welfare is not identical to fitness. But following the concept that animal welfare might be
defined by the animal’s freedom to adapt to changing environmental circumstances
(paragraphs 4.3 - 4.7 below), perhaps welfare might depend on the animals’ ability to carry
out behavioural routines that, under natural conditions, may simultaneously enhance fitness.
These considerations of the relationship between welfare and individual fitness are
developed further in Ohl and Putman (2013b).
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