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Officers to Commander 6th Brigade who was by this time on the way, telling h1im1 to press on to Sidi Rezegh, start fighting, and get in touch with Gaeneral Gott. Although I had an instinctive feeling all was not well I did no)t know, the true facts. I was not aware of the 6th Brigade situation at this time 1)ut I-have since learnt that during their move along the Trigh ( t apuzzo on the 22nd the Brigade Commander was asked to detach his tanks to go to the immediate assistance of the Support Group at Sidi Rezegh. In view of the urgency of the request the Brigade Commander agreed but the- Group was already marching at 8 m.i.h. and the Tank Commander said' le -couli not better this speed. My cipher message and further requests by iasison Officers tade it quite clear to Commander 6th Brigade that speed: \as vital. Opposition at Gasr El Arid was disposed of and the column did not halt until 2000 hours for a much- needed rest and'meal. Orders were givc to advance .again at 0300 hours next morning. WE OVE ON TOBRUiK (MAP Vi) l)epite the optimistic reports regarding the destruction of enemy tanks I felt uneasy about splitting up my force more than I could help. I \V I S convinced that the Division should press on to Tobruk. A success there \-()111(l be (lecisive. The wedge in the Bardia-Halfaya-Sidi Omar fortress line in iiiVy opinion had also to be held. The speed and suddenness of our o11slaughlt had disorganised the enemy. That. was obvious. If, however, he xeis given time he wold recover and concentrate. He would then be able to attack our. widely spread Groups, defeating them in detail. Time was of th Ii eence. This being the situation I put forward the following plan to dhe Corps Comanl llder in a letter which I ser t that evening:- Cc rj) 'Ciilllllilnder, CS I have seen a Liaison Officer from 30th Corps and also a personal one from General Gott, 7th Arioured Division. I amd taking Musaid and clearing the enemy out of the area 1 apuzzo-Musaid-Salum. This should. be done at dawn to-morrow. In view: of the gelieral situation I suggest that I rearrange my forces rouind Bardia as follows:- 20th Battalion andl one squadron tanks astride the road Bardia- Tobruk and on the escarpment. One battalion of infantry at Musaid: Two companies of infantry at Capuzzo with squadron of I Tanks. Remaining two companies in Brigade Reserve at Sidi Azeiz. Although this would leave thegarrisons very weak, I could, if necessary, take the -remaining two battalions under Brigadier Hargest -aid get him to join forces with Brigadier Inglis who has two Iattalions of 4th Infantry Brigade, two squadrons of " I " Tanks and one squadron Divisional Cavalry. I suggest that this force could march on Tobruk along the escarpment to break through the Bologna Division, or give such other help as is necessary. I feel I could do this starting early in the morning (23rd). If this is done it would be necessary to get the 4th Indian 'Division to extend their boundary up to Capuzzo. P'.S.-I have as you know despatched the 6th New Zealand Infantry Brigade with all haste, complete with Valentines, to relieve the Support Group. I know they will do well.)) Pla~ns were worked out during the night of the 22nd to takre aay the maximumun number of tiroops wctithout weazkening he osition near ]Bardia 9,.. .
unduly. All my staff weighed in heavily against breaking existing organisation in staff and signals. By dawn on the morning of the 23rd Musaid had been occupied by 23rd Battalion without opposition and 28th Battalion had captured Salumn Barracks, taking prisoners and material. These successes clarified the situation and I sent the G2 to Corps to explain alterations in our plans. The following notes of my instructions to the G2 explain the position:- ((See Corps Commander and say: (1) We think we have cleaned up all round Bardia. (2) There is a considerable force of enemy in Bardia. As long as he is surrounded there is no chance of his trying to get out. (3) We also think we. have cleaned up and occupied Musaid and Salum. (4) 4th Brigade have cleaned up the wadis immediately West of Bardia halfway to the sea. I am going to relieve Kippenberger (20th Battalion, 4th Brigade) now on Bardia-Tobruk Road with one battalion of 5th Brigade and I am gding to send Kippenberger with attached troops to join Inglis' 4th Brigade. (5) I suggest Divisional Headquarters should move to Gambut area and then we should advance to 6th Brigade and get the Division on a two-brigade front opposite Tobruk. I suggest my Headquarters should move immediately and hand over the situation here on the Bardia Front to Hargest. (6) Messervey might take over command of our 5th Brigade. (7) Administration: We can.carry on as we are at the moment. We have three days' water, petrol, oil, food and ammunition in hand. We could either transfer to 30 Corps or go on as we are if they put in another link. (8) We shall take Gambut today. (9) Corps Commander could release Hargest's 5th Brigade by relieving them by 4th Indian Division. I could bring him to Gambut and we could go on pushing on as a complete Division at the side of the Armoured Division. Our dispositions tonight will lie:- (a) We will leave 5th Brigade at Bardia. (b) 4th Brigade Group will be in Gambut this afternoon. (c) 6th Brigade Group will interpose on the flank of the Armnoured Brigade opposite Tobruk. Position Summarised:- 1st Phase: Move with all troops available, join with the 6th New Zealand Infantry Brigade and march on Tobruk. 5th Brigade to come under command of Indian Division. 2nd Phase: To relieve 5th Infantry Brigade which could come forward to join us.)) Preparations for our move were continued. I called off the attacki of 21st Battalion on Bir Ghirba which had made progress during the nigt but required further artillery support, and ordered them into Divisional Reserve. We finally receivedl a message at aout 1000 hours to carry- out the first phase as suggested. The G2 then returned and reported more fully. joa F~~I1 i"
Page 1: , ri N -/ _ ':T' i ?s _ - - 't Tke
Page 5 and 6: FOREWORD The following short accoun
Page 7 and 8: UNLASsIFIIp Those of us who are old
Page 9 and 10: 4th Brigade Group was to advance on
Page 11 and 12: MNrC LzIStIE9~A battle were many an
Page 13: ( The 4th New Zealand Infantry Brig
Page 17 and 18: g~9li~s; :~a~.lIWA and onc squadron
Page 19 and 20: and by 0700 hours had secured their
Page 21 and 22: IW 'W 40 rIail" 14 It It 0 Few pris
Page 23 and 24: MkLASSLr IE Ravenstein's maps gave
Page 25 and 26: Despite these moves, we knew there
Page 27 and 28: 5Uf BRIGADE GROUP. (Dolacod) In the
Page 29 and 30: Sth BRIGADE GROUP MOVES WEST (MAP X
Page 31 and 32: LESSONS FOR NEW ZEALAND DIVISION We
Page 33 and 34: TANKS The tank is the German Army's
Page 35 and 36: disclosed their positions and were
Page 37 and 38: UCLASSIFIED -- VA j9AuqQT Iva - \ v
Page 39 and 40: USFE / 4, / ° I 0 0 iJ / ./ 0 - _
Page 41 and 42: +A L got UN/CLA Ss, 4. A Z u c WJ h
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