1942 FREYBERG Nz-Div-in-Cyreniaca - Societa italiana di storia ...

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The New Zealand Division in Cyrenaica and Lessons of tke Campaign INTRODUCTION The New Zealand Division has now been withdrawn after taking part in the campaign in Cyrenaica. Fighting took place over a wide area, but the main operations in which we were engaged were the battles fought near Tobruk. In those battles a smaller mixed Imperial Force met a well-equipped German force in a series of open warfare engagements which can be studied by us with advantage. The run of the battle demonstrated not only the German strength and weakness but also our own. in The camipaign illustrates the German conception of an active defence Which the counter-attack was.employed -upon every possible occasion, showing a 1oldness we would (10 well to study, both from the.larger.aspect of (lefence as well as from the point of view of the tactical employment of various arms. We saw the.latest: German tactics in attack and the German methods of using the tank. : It will be noted that throughout the whole campaign there was little 'variation in their general technique. The outstanding lessons for us in this campaign will be found at, the end of this Report. In the day to day narrative attention is drawn to the way the German commanders used their tanks. There is no doubt that it has become their batsic weapon.- The enemy tactics are different.from ours and it is quite clear we have much.to learn. No doubt the relative merits of our Armoured Division and the Geriman Panzer Division and the performances of our own tanks and guns compared with- those of the enemy will be considered in light of experience in Libya. Those questions cannot be lealt with here. j.ut the need of an armoured component to support. an infantry: division is. established. It is interestisi3g to record the view of a German pajooprisoner of war belonging to a lorried infantry. regiment who criticised General Rommel very bitterly for temporarily separating the tank regiments from the infantry. There is no doubt that the German comnmandei s have had a great dleal more experience in actual fighting than' we have. Their high Conmand are resourceful and, in some cases, ruthless in committing troops to a forlorn hope. Although At the commencement their action was offensive and they were ready to move and strike with boldness, it. is equally true Sthat when opposed and fought with determination they showed' a' "tendency to panic, especially if'they were left without the immediate support of tanks. The report we. had of, General Boetteher's calls for help when the Afrika Division was left in the Tobruk sector, without. armoured support during General Rommel's turning movement is an example of this. It is .fair to say, that as the Campaign progressed the" morale of the German infantry fell. It is certain that it is not proof against heavy. pressure. and it has again been ;denionstrated that although -the.: .German is a hard fighter he is. not a tough one. The German Army, however, is always' formidable. Its army organisation and equipment are good and the fighting soldier, even though his -morale may deteriorate, will do.what he is told. IJ do not, know if the troops we met, the 13th and. 21st :Panzer .Divisions and the Afrika Korps. are fair samples of the German Field Army. If they are, then I. am sure that although success with their tank tactics has made them most proficient in mechanised warfare, it'has hada very'; adverse effect upon the training and efficiency of their army.as a whole. Their infantry' appeartoh a ve deera.teditotank-fllwLezs T. I ji nk the German in antry so mer~i has lost his old skill with his personal weas, and te he enem ~iiThTyvfir e w~e"-~~ ' p el &f \Va~T"ftffi~ps'lie ? uuri ,,,,-i.,-i,. ;;;~~;_~,.~.~:,,~;;;;- i _ I*_ ~e
UNLASsIFIIp Those of us who are old enough to remember fighting upon the Sommc know that the German infantry deteriorated from the moment they got the ((Deep Dugout Habit.) .jOnce we. perfected the creeping barrage and rushed the dugout entrances, the Germans surrendered without further resistance. The dugout habit played a large part in the disintegration of the German infantry soldier I believe a similar condition exists today. They depend entirely on the tank.. Knock out the tank and we have gone a long way to achieving success. All efforts now'should be exerted to get tank superiority. The test for tIp sis whether the can take it and fight back. For the first time in this war the odds were about even and we had a chance to (fight back.)) We know now that we can both (( take it and (( fight back.)) Nobody, I hope, doubted it. This is the acid test of war and it is a test the Germans have yet to pass through. An interesting phase has been reached in the war for history appears to be repeating itself. The last war was an artillery war. Then, as now, -the Germans had a long start, and during the earlier years they hammered us unmercifully. Later on, when we had the guns and ammunition, the Germans became the receivers and they sought cover underground like rabbits. They could not (( take it.)) This time it is a tank war in which again they have had a big lead in the equipment race. But the timeis coming when the tide will turn. When it does, the Germans will have: to show they can ((take it.)) The experience of this Campaign makes me feel certain they can't. PREPARATIONS Fully conscious of the fact that the Division had been associated with reverses in Greece and Crete, we set out early in September to take part in our third campaign. By the 13th, the New Zealand Division, fully ecluipped and completely mobile, had concentrated at Bagush to train for a role in the Second Libyan Offensive. There were six weeks in which to train for the specialised type of fighting that has developed in desert warfare. We trained for the most difficult operation in which we were likely to take part. An attack on a heavily defended fortress covered by wire and mines seemed to present the greatest difficulties. Two dummy fortresses, ( Sidi Clif and Bir Stella,) based on air photographs of Sidi and Libyan Omars were prepared, wired, and covered by live minefields. A series of exercises was then carried out to capture them. Each Infantry Brigade, supported by the full Divisional Artillery and a ( mock up battalion of In Tanks, did the attack. An approach march of about 30 miles was carried out without any vehicle lights by night. The element of surprise was always sought. The attacking force deployed by dark and attacked as soon as possible after the artillery had registered at first light. 'Infantry in buses supported by tanks advanced under cover of a barrage of high explosive and smoke. A point of entry was secured, sappers clearing a lane through the minefields with mine detectors; tanks exploited it'and infantry, field, anti-tank, and anti-aircraft artillery followed rapidly to consolidate and prepare for the counter-attack. While we were busy with our training plans and running in our new equipment, detailed preparations for the operations were being dealt with by Corps and Army Headquarters. By the 6th October plans were made. The Army Commander held a conference and gave Divisional Commanders details of the outline plan. Briefly, Eighth Army were to take Cyrenaica. the immediate object being the destruction of the enemy's armoured forces by our own armoured forces. We.were estimated to have a numerical superiority -in tanks of five to four. The plan was that our Armoured Division should threaten the enemy investing Tobruk and force them to fight a decisive_ battle :on terms that favoured us. Plans for the relief of Tobruk depended on success in the armoured encounter. The Eighth Army was divided into three groups, 30th Corps, 13th Corps, and the Oasis Group. 30th it~ il
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1942 FREYBERG Nz-Div-in-Cyreniaca - Societa italiana di storia ...

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