1942 FREYBERG Nz-Div-in-Cyreniaca - Societa italiana di storia ...
1942 FREYBERG Nz-Div-in-Cyreniaca - Societa italiana di storia ...
1942 FREYBERG Nz-Div-in-Cyreniaca - Societa italiana di storia ...
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<strong>di</strong>sclosed their positions and were often put out of action by the enemy<br />
tanks. A weapon of higher performance than the two pounder is required<br />
for the Anti-Tank Regiment.<br />
There was a tendency for guns to be left portee under con<strong>di</strong>tions<br />
when they should have been <strong>di</strong>smounted for ground action. Two pounders<br />
should be fired from the lorry only under the follow<strong>in</strong>g circumstances:-<br />
threat.<br />
(1) When protect<strong>in</strong>g mobile columns on the move.<br />
(2) In. withdrawals.<br />
thet As reserve guns <strong>in</strong> a Brigade or <strong>Div</strong>isional area moved to counter a<br />
Two pounders were on some occasions used successfully as a close<br />
support weapon- to <strong>in</strong>fantry <strong>in</strong> attack<strong>in</strong>g mach<strong>in</strong>e gun and light miach<strong>in</strong>e<br />
gun posts.<br />
THE 25 POUNDER<br />
The 25 pounder is an excellent weapon and much superior <strong>in</strong> shell,<br />
power to the German and Italian field guns encountered dur<strong>in</strong>g 'the<br />
campaign. On occasions when troops were attacked by small :groups of<br />
tanks, fire was withheld down to ranges of 800 to 1200 yards and very<br />
good results were achieved. Until we are provided with proper anti-tank<br />
guns we must speed up ammunition supply to our field regiments.<br />
DIVISIONAL CAVALRY<br />
Lightly equipped as our <strong>Div</strong>isional Cavalry was, it proved to be<br />
<strong>in</strong>valuable. Given the right equipment, e.g., armoured cars and American<br />
type tanks with a good tank gun, it would have been even more useful.<br />
There appears to be no place for a <strong>Div</strong>isional Reconnaissance Unit.<br />
INFORMATION<br />
With<strong>in</strong> the <strong>Div</strong>ision the flow of <strong>in</strong>formation both upwards and<br />
downwards .has greatly improved and it was found satisfactory, even<br />
under the worst con<strong>di</strong>tions. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the battle period <strong>in</strong>formation regard<strong>in</strong>g<br />
troops on our flanks was.only satisfactory on the rare occasions when<br />
we were actually <strong>in</strong> touch with them.<br />
CODES<br />
The very elaborate and unwieldy code system, produced before the<br />
campaign, broke down partly under its own weight and partly because it<br />
was frequently compromised by capture. The two essentials appear tobe<br />
the time code and the map reference code and the latter could be simplified<br />
by us<strong>in</strong>g only the daily adder. Apart from these two codes it'is considered<br />
that messages with<strong>in</strong> the <strong>Div</strong>ision should be either <strong>in</strong> cipher or <strong>in</strong> clear.<br />
CONCLUSION<br />
To sum up: This campaign has shown aga<strong>in</strong> that the well-established<br />
pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of War still apply. Of all the factors which contribute towards<br />
success, surprise is still the most important. To achieve surprise we must be<br />
highly tra<strong>in</strong>ed. We must tra<strong>in</strong> to reach the highest standard of efficiency <strong>in</strong><br />
mlovement, :<strong>in</strong> the use of weapons, and <strong>in</strong> co-operation with other armTTs.<br />
Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g now is more necessary than ever. Success- depends on the ~ill to<br />
w<strong>in</strong> of a full-tra<strong>in</strong>ed_ force at the highest pitch of physical fitness.