Balloon Bomb - Smithsonian Institution Libraries

American Reaction
The first discovery of a Japanese balloon introduced
more mystery than immediate concern. This sighting was
on 4 November 1944, when a navy patrol craft spotted
what looked like a large fragment of tattered cloth
floating on the sea, sixty-six miles southwest of San
Pedro, California. The unidentified debris was hauled on
board, and was soon determined to be a rubberized-silk
balloon with a heavy undercarriage attached. Ironically,
this balloon was from the first group launched on 3
November (Japan date), just two days earlier—two days
because of the international dateline.
The apparatus, still connected to the undercarriage of
the balloon, consisted of a small radio transmitter. The
equipment bore Japanese markings and indicated that
something new and mysterious had been introduced into
these finalmonths of the war.
The incident was reported through military channels,
but it caused little concern until two weeks later when a
second fragment was salvaged from the ocean. Within
the next four weeks, balloons were found in Wyoming
and Montana. This clear evidence of a new and unexpected
balloon-borne weapon gave rise to increased
concern, and the assistance of all government agenciesnational,
state, and local—was immediatelv summoned.
Forest rangers—state and national—were ordered to
report any balloon landings and any recoveries of
portions of balloons or their undercarriages.
Of more and immediate vital concern was the
reaction of the American people to this unorthodox
weapon. What psychological response would develop
from realization that the American continent was under
sustained enemy air attack for the first time in the
history of the United States? What panic might result
from the thought that countless silently moving balloons
could be drifting across our continent, randomly discharging
their bombs into homes and factories? The
threat was a potential reality.
And what of this load? The destructive explosive
power was measurable, but what of the incendiary
threat? With our great forests along the entire West
Coast and extending inland, a massive incendiary raid
during the dry season could envelop the entire area in
one gigantic, uncontrolled holocaust. From this alone,
the loss of lives, property, and building materials would
be beyond imagination.
There were further possibilities to consider. Biological
agents could also be transported by balloon, spreading
disease among the people and livestock over large areas
of the United States.
Panic-based on the fear of the unknown potential of
this new weapon-was in itself a vital concern to
responsible agencies in the United States government.
The best defense against panic was to say as little as
possible about this new menace, and play down any
local anxieties.
Publicity
The lack of publicity associated with the balloon
bombs had still another far-reaching effect. After the
announcement in the newspapers of discovery of a
Japanese bombing balloon in Thermopolis, Wyoming,
elaborate and apparently successful efforts were made to
prevent the Japanese from gaining any knowledge of
bomb damage and balloon sightings in the United States.
It was obvious that the Japanese would be eager to know
the effects of the attacks, and that information on the
courses followed by the balloons and the areas hit by the
bombs would enable them to evaluate and improve their
techniques.
The one incident that had made the papers in the
United States was indeed known in Japan. The Chinese
newspaper Takungpao had picked up the report from
American sources and repeated it in late December
1944. For the moment, this proved to the Japanese high
command that the concept was sound and allowed the
program to continue. To their chagrin, however, no
further comments on the balloons were found, although
United States, Russian, and Chinese reports were
continually screened.
Considering the widespread dispersion of the
balloons—reported from the Arctic Circle to the Mexican
border—the primary goal was to prevent the Japanese
from learning of their effectiveness.
On 4 January 1945, the Office of Censorship
requested newspaper editors and radio broadcasters to
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