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The european dimension of political discourse in Italy. A ... - CIRCaP

The european dimension of political discourse in Italy. A ... - CIRCaP

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THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE IN ITALY.<br />

construction <strong>of</strong> the EU. <strong>The</strong> party aimed at the construction <strong>of</strong> a <strong>political</strong> union, ruled by<br />

supranational <strong>in</strong>stitutions able to br<strong>in</strong>g the country to the most advanced European standards<br />

<strong>of</strong> efficiency and economic development. It is evident that European <strong>in</strong>tegration was seen as<br />

a solution to domestic stagnation, and for this reason deeper <strong>in</strong>tegration was presented as<br />

equal to domestic convenience.<br />

<strong>The</strong> comb<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> Atlanticism and pro-Europeanism figured as an unchallenged choice and<br />

by the eighties the party reached on this position the largest consensus ever. Explicit<br />

reference to this position can be found <strong>in</strong> the party documents until the end <strong>of</strong> the eighties. In<br />

this decade the Dc also reached its highest level <strong>of</strong> commitment to the idea <strong>of</strong> a common<br />

European identity. In the party documents, strong and recurrent references were made on<br />

this issue, and <strong>in</strong> particular on the need to re-found national identity by merg<strong>in</strong>g it with a<br />

European one, and on the creation <strong>of</strong> a European citizenship. An extract from the 1983 Dc<br />

electoral manifesto states:<br />

..the Dc was loyal to its choice for the West, seen not only as military but also as <strong>political</strong> solidarity<br />

and with<strong>in</strong> this choice the party developed its free-market policy and a policy <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />

<strong>in</strong>tegration, dur<strong>in</strong>g the years <strong>of</strong> the reconstruction as well as today, particularly aimed at build<strong>in</strong>g a<br />

united Europe.<br />

In spite <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>dubitable high level <strong>of</strong> commitment to European <strong>in</strong>tegration, the party not<br />

always produced documents cover<strong>in</strong>g specific aspects like the <strong>in</strong>stitutional EC enforcement.<br />

This phenomenon can be expla<strong>in</strong>ed only by look<strong>in</strong>g at the peculiar nature <strong>of</strong> Dc’s politics:<br />

many observers agree that activism <strong>in</strong> the European field depended less on the party than on<br />

the <strong>in</strong>itiative <strong>of</strong> various <strong>in</strong>dividuals such as prime m<strong>in</strong>isters or m<strong>in</strong>isters <strong>of</strong> Foreign Affairs.<br />

This resulted <strong>in</strong> a “policentric presence” <strong>of</strong> the Dc <strong>in</strong> matters <strong>of</strong> foreign policy <strong>in</strong> general, and<br />

<strong>of</strong> European affairs <strong>in</strong> particular (Pilati 1982), reveal<strong>in</strong>g lack <strong>of</strong> strategy and discont<strong>in</strong>uity <strong>in</strong><br />

the party European activism. F<strong>in</strong>ally, this led to a low-pr<strong>of</strong>ile and underdeveloped party<br />

foreign policy (Bull 1994), secondary to the party concern for domestic problems. <strong>The</strong> Dc’s<br />

European policy was essentially reactive and not proactive and, as Bull argued (1994), it was<br />

characterised more by “flawed” than by “genu<strong>in</strong>e” Europeanism. This image matches the<br />

evidence we produced on the party preferences on European <strong>in</strong>tegration, always supportive<br />

but at several po<strong>in</strong>ts lack<strong>in</strong>g pro-active programmatic commitment, even more <strong>in</strong> a period <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> the speed <strong>of</strong> supranational <strong>in</strong>tegration, as from the middle <strong>of</strong> the eighties where,<br />

on the contrary, the party <strong>political</strong> <strong>discourse</strong> <strong>of</strong>ten proved silent. This allows us to argue that,<br />

differently from the “Atlanticist” but proactive pro-Europeanism <strong>of</strong> the De Gasperi’s age, the<br />

<strong>political</strong> <strong>discourse</strong> <strong>of</strong> the last generation <strong>of</strong> Christian democratic leaders was less proactive<br />

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