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The european dimension of political discourse in Italy. A ... - CIRCaP

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THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE IN ITALY.<br />

critique <strong>of</strong> the Euro-bureaucracy’s centralism, emerged already <strong>in</strong> 1998 (when the League<br />

was runn<strong>in</strong>g alone) and, above all, after the re-affiliation <strong>of</strong> this party to the centre-right cartel.<br />

This change <strong>in</strong> the attitudes <strong>of</strong> the Northern League overlaps with a grow<strong>in</strong>g dissatisfaction<br />

with the outcomes <strong>of</strong> European <strong>in</strong>tegration, both <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitution-build<strong>in</strong>g and <strong>of</strong> impact<br />

on domestic party <strong>in</strong>terests. Here we also need to underl<strong>in</strong>e that the positive orientation to<br />

EU until 1996 belongs to the category that we labelled as functional Europeanism. In fact, the<br />

Northern League seems never to develop a sense <strong>of</strong> full identification with the process <strong>of</strong><br />

European <strong>in</strong>tegration. On the contrary, EU seems to be perceived by the party as a tool to<br />

achieve other goals than <strong>in</strong>tegration, both <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> party aims and economic<br />

achievements. Overall, the process <strong>of</strong> European <strong>in</strong>tegration seems to be rather <strong>in</strong>strumental<br />

to other party goals and not a goal <strong>in</strong> itself.<br />

In fact, we can <strong>in</strong>terpret that there has been <strong>in</strong> the party a sense <strong>of</strong> dissatisfaction with the<br />

process <strong>of</strong> European <strong>in</strong>tegration the party earlier supported, s<strong>in</strong>ce the process itself changed<br />

the pre-conditions to atta<strong>in</strong> the ma<strong>in</strong> party goal, that is the self-determ<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> the more<br />

developed northern regions <strong>of</strong> <strong>Italy</strong>. At an earlier stage, support to European <strong>in</strong>tegration was<br />

seen by the Northern League as a tool for the North to exit the nation-state, but <strong>in</strong> the reality<br />

the <strong>in</strong>tegration process changed the process where the exit-orientation <strong>of</strong> the North might<br />

grow and so the process itself turned somehow aga<strong>in</strong>st the party 23 . From that po<strong>in</strong>t on, the<br />

party started to oppose EU with <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly radical tones. In the end, the picture we can<br />

draw is one <strong>of</strong> a party with no ideological predisposition (positive or negative) towards<br />

European <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>in</strong> an earlier stage, and <strong>in</strong>stead <strong>of</strong> a party sensitive to the opportunities<br />

<strong>of</strong>fered by the European issue to serve other specific party goals. Over time, this party<br />

gradually evolved <strong>in</strong>to a s<strong>of</strong>t, but unambiguous opposition to EU, to end up with hard<br />

Eurosceptical stances <strong>in</strong> more recent times.<br />

<strong>The</strong> other two major parties <strong>of</strong> the centre-right cartel, Forza Italia and National Alliance, show<br />

h<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>of</strong> Euroscepticism at different po<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> time throughout the decade. <strong>The</strong>ir <strong>political</strong><br />

<strong>discourse</strong> moves forth and back from s<strong>of</strong>t Euroscepticism to vagueness to functional<br />

Europeanism, where this last is ma<strong>in</strong>ly made <strong>of</strong> a supportive rhetoric <strong>of</strong> European <strong>in</strong>tegration,<br />

ma<strong>in</strong>ly used <strong>in</strong> order to ga<strong>in</strong> legitimacy <strong>in</strong> the domestic, as well as <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>ternational arena.<br />

In fact, support to European <strong>in</strong>tegration from these two parties is never issue-specific (apart,<br />

at some po<strong>in</strong>ts, from support to a Common Foreign and Security policy), <strong>in</strong>stead it is ma<strong>in</strong>ly<br />

phrased as support to a general idea <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegration. In fact, it seems that contrary to the<br />

23 “(…) the Lira jo<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the Euro changed the situation and the society that earlier was ready to secede<br />

was not any longer”, speech <strong>of</strong> the party leader Umberto Bossi at the Congress <strong>of</strong> the Northern<br />

League, 1-3 March 2002.<br />

31

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