Space Operations

ed system (SBIRS) as an example, the theater may request constant vigilance
(CV), a tactic used by the 2 SWS for focused warning support to a very specific
geographic region. However, CV is very manpower- and operator-intensive. Very
often 2 SWS can support the supported commander’s request for warning with other
tactics and procedures that are less demanding than CV. Theaters should not
request specific tactics. Rather, theater commanders must state their desired
effects.
Theater missile warning requirements should also be considered. Many factors will
determine the support requirements for missile warning capabilities. Decisions on
timeliness, tolerance of false reports, coverage, and data distribution may drive
configuration changes in missile warning constellation alignment and possibly in the
communications allocation for transmitting the reports to the theater.
Since GPS accuracy varies due to the number of visible satellites, orientation, and
other factors, planners should identify AOR accuracy requirements so GPS assets
can be better deployed/commanded. Specific geographical accuracy enhancements
may be temporarily achieved which could possibly result in changing operational
time lines.
Satellite bandwidth is another consideration, including the potential for increasing
bandwidth through arrangements with commercial providers for voice, data, imagery,
and video communications. Bandwidth usage is directly dependent on the amount
of US access to satellite. The theater has normal processes that address these and
other communication-related issues, like frequency deconfliction and restricted
frequency list management.
Protected satellite communications is another consideration. Protected communications
is a valuable capability that ensures secure, survivable, jam-resistant
global communications to meet essential wartime requirements for high priority
users.
Space-based ISR capabilities provide large amounts of data. Assessment of this
data requires significant analysis by the intelligence community. Planners should
account for intelligence assessments throughout the COA development process.
Combat weather assets provide the capability to forecast environmental conditions.
Planners should consider the DMSP combined with meteorological information from
US civil geostationary and polar-orbiting satellites. This forecast information affects
military operations from timing of maneuvers to selection of targets and weapons
systems. Planners should also consider potential system performance degradation
due to the effect of space weather on space capabilities, like ionosphere scintillation,
solar events, and meteor showers.
Planners must characterize the operational environment to include full understanding
of the threats to friendly space operations. As with any campaign,
appropriate knowledge of the operational environment is essential to conducting
22