A Case Study in Policy Entrepreneurship - The Stimson Center

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(CD), which has not been able to agree upon a program of work for more than a decade, as well as the harsh realities of Senate treaty ratification in a highly polarized US political environment. Getting Started MacArthur’s initial grant was for the production of a monograph analyzing the costs and benefits of the weaponization of space. To help in this effort, the Stimson Center convened former government officials, negotiators, Capitol Hill staffers, and nongovernmental experts for a series of workshops convened between April 2002 and February 2003. Stimson received help in these deliberations from former US government officials and negotiators, as well as policy experts from Capitol Hill and nongovernmental organizations. 2 Their inputs helped inform a monograph written by the author with research assistant Christopher Clary, published in 2003, Space Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space. 3 This monograph concluded that the costs of weaponizing space far exceeded potential benefits for all spacefaring nations, especially for the United States. Stimson’s assessment also concluded that the weaponization of space is not inevitable, and that with wise US policy choices, it might be prevented. Our analysis concluded that, while a “space Pearl Harbor” couldn’t be excluded as a possibility, a surprise attack is far less likely in space than on the ground, and that a US-led weaponization of space was a very poor choice to counter worst-case assumptions. The monograph offered the concept of space assurance as an alternative to space weaponization and dominance. We defined space assurance as the assured ability of the United States to utilize space for national, economic, and personal security. We postulated that one of the key elements of space assurance was a Code of Conduct to prevent dangerous military activities in space, analogous to existing codes of conduct governing responsible military activities at sea, on the ground, and in the air. The Stimson Center’s monograph was widely circulated and downloaded from our website by government officials, diplomats, defense officials, military officers, legislators, reporters, and NGOs. First Steps in Drafting a Code of Conduct After the publication of this monograph, Stimson was fortunate to receive additional grant support from the MacArthur Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, the New-Land Foundation, and the US Institute of Peace to particularize and popularize initiatives to promote the peaceful uses of outer space and to prevent dangerous, destabilizing activities in this domain. Space Assurance or Space Dominance? highlighted key provisions for a Code of Conduct, including responsible uses of lasers in outer space, dangerous maneuvers, simulated attacks, collision avoidance, notification and registration, interference with space objects, orbital debris mitigation, and space traffic management. Stimson’s next step was to convene a group of experts conversant with military space policy and international law to consider how these key elements might be worded in a draft Code of Conduct aimed at preventing destabilizing military activities in space. These deliberations were held in October 2003 and December 2003. Stimson’s project advisors suggested that the best way to develop rules of the road in space would be to work by analogy, mostly by applying and adapting provisions of the 1972 Incidents at Sea (“IncSea”) Agreement and the 1988 Prevention of Dangerous Military Practices Agreement. Our sessions focused on provisions to avoid risk of collision, not simulate attacks, provide notification of actions, exchange appropriate information, and not use a laser in a manner that may potentially cause harm to personnel or equipment. Stimson’s workshops also focused on provisions relating to space debris management and reduction; communication measures to avoid inadvertent collisions, both with respect to active and dead objects in space; information measures, such as providing notification of “non functioning space assets” or other objects in space; notification measures, such as prior notification of space launches; transparency measures, such as providing more data on registration and ownership of space assets; protection measures, such as prohibiting activities that interfered with the proper functioning of satellites belonging to others, and prohibiting non-registered satellites; prohibition on simulated attacks; prohibition on the use of lasers or 6 | A Code of Conduct for Responsible Space-Faring Nations
other directed-energy devises in ways that interfere with, or do harm to, the proper functioning of satellites; prohibition on ASAT tests, including tests against a point in space; and prohibition on space-based interceptors, mines, and other devices. At the December 2003 session, participants recommended that we offer policy-makers, diplomats, and legislators with two complimentary choices. The first option for consideration would be a Code of Conduct focusing on non-interference provisions and other aspects of “good citizenship” for space-faring nations. A more ambitious option would be an international convention of much broader scope, focusing on prohibitions against ASAT tests and deployments. (We also understood that a mid-way point could be found between these two approaches by including anti-ASAT provisions to a Code of Conduct.) We agreed that we could best serve policy-makers, diplomats and legislators by providing a range of options for their consideration. Stimson’s initial draft of a Code of Conduct for responsible space-faring nations was posted on our website on May 19, 2004. 4 The initial Stimson draft of a Code of Conduct looked very much like a treaty, with a preamble, a section defining terms, and various articles. We sought at this early stage to ban space weapons, which we defined as “any device or component of a system specifically designed, tested, or deployed to disrupt, degrade, impair or destroy a satellite, and any device in space specifically designed, tested, or deployed to disrupt, degrade, impair or destroy a satellite in space or an object on Earth.” 5 Among the general obligations of Stimson’s initial draft Code of Conduct were: • The use of outer space in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding. • The promotion of the peaceful uses of outer space by avoiding incidents and refraining from dangerous military practices in space, including: • Simulating an attack on a satellite; engaging in actions that increase the risk of collision and actions that fail to reduce the risk of collision in space; • Using a directed energy device, including a laser, to disrupt, degrade, impair, or destroy a satellite; • Flight testing or deploying an anti-satellite weapon or a space weapon Other articles of the 2004 iteration of Stimson’s draft Code of Conduct dealt with collisions, special caution zones, dangerous maneuvers;,simulated attacks, lasers, communication and notification measures, registration, data exchanges, space debris, traffic management, monitoring, cooperative measures, and consultation. 6 While Stimson was trying to particularize and popularize the concept of a Code of Conduct, others offered more ambitious proposals. For example, Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr. suggested “the development and negotiation of an international treaty on space weapons and anti-satellite weapons.” 7 The Russian and Chinese governments were clearly inclined to endorse this approach, especially after the Bush Administration’s withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in December, 2001. The following June, Russia and China submitted a paper at the Conference on Disarmament entitled “Possible elements for a future international legal agreement on the prevention of the deployment of weapons in outer space, the threat or use of force against outer space objects.” 8 Gaining Traction During the Bush Administration The release of the first draft of Stimson’s Code of Conduct was accompanied by outreach activities with key target audiences, especially US government officials and military officers; members of Congress and their staffs on Capitol Hill; foreign diplomats based in Washington and in key space-faring nations; the interested public and NGOs; and media outlets. During this period, Stimson briefed scores of offices on Capitol Hill; made annual presentations on the Code of Conduct at large workshops at the CD in Geneva; visited with diplomats A Case Study in Policy Entrepreneurship | 7
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