A Case Study in Policy Entrepreneurship - The Stimson Center

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Thus, for example, we decided to adopt a norm-based, indirect approach to banning kinetic energy ASAT tests that produce long-lasting debris with indiscriminate and harmful effects on space operations, rather than to specifically ban such tests. We did not seek to define space weapons or to ban them in our revised draft Code of Conduct. An Idea Whose Time Has Come? Toward the end of the Bush Administration, several events combined to clarify the utility of a Code of Conduct for responsible space-faring nations. Over a twenty-five month period, from January 2007 to February 2009, there were four wake-up calls attesting to the need for rules of the road in space, particularly with respect to debris mitigation and space traffic management. In January 2007, the Peoples Liberation Army conducted a kinetic energy ASAT test that produced the largest man-made debris field in the history of the space age. In February of that year, a Russian missile body orbiting earth broke up, creating another large debris field. In February 2008, the United States shot down a nonfunctioning satellite in a way not to create persistent debris, ostensibly for safety reasons. In February 2009, a dead Russian satellite collided with a functioning US communication satellite, further compounding the debris problem in heavily trafficked areas of space. These developments badly undermined the Bush Administration’s stance that no arms control-related diplomatic initiatives were needed for space because there were no troublesome practices in need of control. In particular, the dramatic increase in space debris during this two-year period had the practical effect of endangering and constraining US freedom of action in space – the fundamental reason why the Bush Administration opposed diplomatic initiatives like the Code of Conduct. These unfortunate developments heightened mainstream media interest in the topic of space security, a subject previously confined for the most part in trade publications. After the Chinese ASAT test, the Stimson Center’s work was cited in major articles appearing in the New York Times and Washington Post. The Post also carried an article by the author in its Sunday Outlook section of the paper. Another essay appeared in Survival. The Economist twice editorialized in support of a Code of Conduct for space-faring nations, citing the Stimson Center’s work in this area. Space News and Aviation Week and Space Technology also editorialized in support of the Code of Conduct. Throughout the course of this project, Stimson-authored op eds appeared in Space News and Defense News, trade publications which reach all of Stimson’s key target audiences. Another way of reaching key target audiences was through the author’s weekly blog posts on armscontrolwonk.com. 17 After the Chinese kinetic energy ASAT test, Stimson accelerated the pace of private meetings and public events on the Code of Conduct. The author met with Gen. Kevin Chilton, then-Commander in Chief of STRATCOM in Omaha, and with Gen. Bob Kehler, then head of SPACECOM (and subsequently nominated to run STRATCOM) at the Pentagon. Stimson convened workshops in Washington on the policy implications of a degraded space environment. In November 2007, Gregory Kulacki, a China space watcher with the Union of Concerned Scientists, gave a presentation on China’s ASAT test. In February 2008, Clay Moltz, Deputy Director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, and David Wright, Co-Director and Senior Scientist for the Global Security program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, discussed space weapons and the Chinese test. The extended 2008 election campaign provided numerous opportunities to brief experts supporting Republican and Democratic candidates on space security. In a strictly personal capacity, the author served as a policy advisor to presidential candidate Barack Obama on issues pertaining to space and South Asia. Presidential candidate Barack Obama’s campaign platform endorsed the Code of Conduct: • Ensure Freedom of Space: America’s ability to use space as a location for its satellites and communications grid is critical to our national security and economy. Unfortunately, this issue has been ignored and many nations are preparing to threaten space as a commons available to all nations. An Obama Administration will: • Restore US leadership on space issues by seeking code of conduct for space-faring nations, including a worldwide ban on weapons to interfere with satellites and a ban on testing anti-satellite weapons. 10 | A Code of Conduct for Responsible Space-Faring Nations
• Initiating and stating a willingness to participate in a regime protecting access to space will help the United States return to a position of leadership in promoting global stability. 18 During every presidential campaign, the Council for a Livable World sends a questionnaire to candidates. One of their questions in 2008 related to space diplomacy: “Do you support or oppose a multilateral international ban on placing weapons in space?” The Obama campaign responded that a treaty increasing space security, while “a good idea,” would “take a long time to negotiate” and therefore suggested a “simpler and quicker” alternative: a “Code of Conduct for responsible space-faring nations.” 19 A Change in Administrations: A Workshop in Bellagio Shortly after the November 2008 elections, Stimson convened a Track II initiative at The Rockefeller Conference Center in Bellagio, Italy, to discuss next steps in space diplomacy. Two operating foundations, the Secure World Foundation and the One Earth Future Foundation, partnered with Stimson to make this workshop a reality, helping to defray travel costs associated with the event. Our Track II event was planned before the outcome of the presidential election was known. Stimson invited an adviser to the McCain campaign and an advisor to the Obama campaign, to attend, along with diplomats from Russia, China, Canada, Japan, Germany, Colombia, France, India, Italy, Japan, and the United States. 20 The Bellagio workshop was convened with governmental and nongovernmental experts to discuss ways to provide momentum to space diplomacy and to facilitate new diplomatic initiatives if the US, Chinese, and Russian governments were inclined to revise diplomatic postures adopted during the Bush Administration. For this impasse to be broken, a new US administration would need to revisit President Bush’s rejection of any diplomatic initiatives that might constrain the US military’s freedom of action in space. For their part, Beijing and Moscow would need to favorably consider a diplomatic initiative far short of their proposed treaty banning “any kinds of weapons” in outer space. Their draft “Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects,” submitted to the CD in February 12, 2008, would not constrain the development, testing, and production of terrestrially-based ASAT weapons, and did not have any verification provisions. 21 The Bellagio workshop was premised on several assumptions. First, that space security was diminished as a result of recent anti-satellite tests. Second, new diplomatic initiatives were warranted to increase space security. Third, these initiatives could be structured in ways to benefit all space-faring nations. The immediate workshop objective was to have serious and constructive conversations, including “out of the box” thinking on diplomatic initiatives. In order to promote meaningful dialogue, workshop discussions were off the record and views were expressed on a not-for-attribution basis. During the course of our deliberations, workshop participants conceived of three initiatives that might promote space security, if governments would be prepared to move beyond current positions. It was clearly understood that governmental representatives were not committed to the diplomatic agenda discussed at Bellagio, nor were they asked to support this agenda, in whole or in part. Participants agreed to take these proposals back to their capitals for due consideration. The three initiatives are as follows: • An agreement to enter into negotiations on a treaty that would seek to ban the testing and use of destructive methods against space objects. • Pending the completion of such a treaty, states participating in the negotiations would agree to pledge not to test or use destructive methods against space objects. • An agreement to enter into negotiations on transparency and confidence-building measures contained in a Code of Conduct including preambular language outlining a common vision for the peaceful uses of outer space in which weapons are not deployed. A Case Study in Policy Entrepreneurship | 11
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