Interview of GENERAL JAMES L. JONES, USMC - The Stimson Center
Interview of GENERAL JAMES L. JONES, USMC - The Stimson Center
Interview of GENERAL JAMES L. JONES, USMC - The Stimson Center
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ATTENDEE (Gareth Porter): You were quoted by Bob Woodward, who<br />
obviously you spent a lot <strong>of</strong> time talking to, over a period <strong>of</strong> months, saying that<br />
Afghanistan is a clash <strong>of</strong> civilizations, among other things, and that the worst<br />
possible thing for the United States would be to allow the militants to win in<br />
Afghanistan, because then militants all over the Middle East and beyond would<br />
believe that they could defeat the United States, with terrible consequences. Now,<br />
obviously this is the <strong>of</strong>ficial position <strong>of</strong> the US military, it’s been articulated over the<br />
months.<br />
But I would like to ask you whether you agree that there is an alternative<br />
view <strong>of</strong> this question <strong>of</strong> the relationship between US military presence in<br />
Afghanistan and the impact that the outcome would have on Islamic populations<br />
across the Middle East (that alternative being that, in fact, what is far more<br />
important than how effective the US military is in a particular conflict, is whether<br />
the United States is occupying Islamic lands)? So I’d like to ask if you agree that<br />
there is that alternative view, was that thoroughly discussed in the policy‐making<br />
process in the Obama Administration before those critical decisions were made?<br />
<strong>JONES</strong>: <strong>The</strong> one thing that I think we did do well is—and we touched on this<br />
earlier in our conversation—the need to engage, as much as you can in different<br />
parts <strong>of</strong> the world, but on a regional aspect <strong>of</strong> things.<br />
When we started out in Afghanistan, it seems to me that we dealt with<br />
Afghanistan as Afghanistan, and Pakistan as Pakistan, and India as India. But we<br />
tried to basically take a strategic approach, and it’s turned out to be essentially<br />
correct, unfortunately, that you can’t really have a discussion about Afghanistan<br />
without talking about Pakistan.<br />
And frankly, <strong>of</strong> the two, the most worrisome one, to me, right now would be<br />
Pakistan. Afghanistan is, in my view, on the path <strong>of</strong> by 2014 <strong>of</strong> becoming whatever it<br />
can become between now and then. And it’s going to have to be, probably good<br />
enough, because not just the United States but the international community has<br />
basically said, in some way, that we can’t want for the Afghans that which they don’t<br />
want for themselves. We can’t want it worse than they do.<br />
So, between now and 2014, we’ve made some serious progress in the overall<br />
security environment in the country, particularly in the real troubled areas <strong>of</strong> the<br />
East and the South, we’ve tried to do our best with regard to catapulting economic<br />
programs, we’ve discovered potential vast resources in terms <strong>of</strong> copper and other<br />
minerals that exist in Afghanistan that could be very, very helpful for the<br />
development <strong>of</strong> the Afghan economy. And we have pressed the government <strong>of</strong><br />
President Karzai on governance, the rule <strong>of</strong> law, corruption, ad nauseam.<br />
At the end <strong>of</strong> the day—and the end <strong>of</strong> the day is somewhere around 2014<br />
where we will have a major pivot to a new relationship where the Afghans are going<br />
to have to step up and as President Karzai said at the London conference over a year