Interview of GENERAL JAMES L. JONES, USMC - The Stimson Center

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here and analyzing all of our problems and telling us what we do, but what we really appreciate is the Chinese giving us everything that we need to develop ourselves with.” Or words like “we would really like to buy US products, US technology, but it’s just too hard, and you put too many strings on it, and by the way we can by it from the French or Israelis or the Germans or the Japanese without any strings attached.” We have a system that worked well in the 20 th century, when we were the unquestioned global leader in so many areas. We need to take another look at ourselves in order to be competitive in the ways that we’re going to have to be to meet the challenges that are coming, not only economically but in other spheres. This is the world that we shaped in the 20 th century, so we got what we asked for. And now we find that some of our institutions and some of our elected representatives are living in a different century, they’re not focusing on the environment that we’re in. And like any business, if you don’t understand the environment you’re in, you can’t compete. So it’s time to really take a look at our laws, our regulations, our policies, and to empower the greatness of America. When we face challenges, we’ve always overcome them. And we are definitely being challenged. BLOOMFIELD: That’s a very interesting comment, and the business analogy is probably apt because the bureaucracy is quite content to live amongst itself inside the beltway. And the question is: Who’s the customer, and are they in tune with the speed of business? You mentioned export control, so let me pivot off of that. This is a process question. It is traditional, I would venture to say, that when an Administration comes in they do policy reviews and they say: “Let’s take a look at export controls, let’s look at space policy, let’s look at nonproliferation, let’s look at arms control issues.” The list is long. And then they push it out into the bureaucracy, saying “come back with a revised policy.” But you’re giving it to all the people that are in that 20 th century architecture that you just described, and I would guess that rare is the bureaucrat that says “why don’t you just disband my office, fire me, because I’m really not relevant to what is needed out there today.” And so, in the case of export control, Secretary Gates spoke up and said, let’s scrap the whole thing—new agency, one list, one law—which was quite different from what the bureaucracy, including my colleagues in my old bureau, doing defense export controls, would have wanted. What’s your reaction to that? What’s the right way for an administration to affect relevant change on this list of policies when they come in? Do you ask the bureaucracy to tell you what you should do? Or do you bring in a whole new change and impose it on them, or what? JONES: It’s been my experience that everyone in Washington is for change. There’s nobody who fights change except when it’s imposed on them, and then it’s not fun. As long as you’re okay, you’re happy to change everybody else.
I don’t think, given the pace and intensity of the daily workload, that it’s possible to accomplish the type of reorganization that we need from the inside. We can do some things, but if you start going down that trail, then that’s all you’re going to do, and bad things are really going to happen around the world. We did Goldwater Nichols—I see Jim sitting here—you know, that was done from the outside. I mean it was inside the Legislative Branch, but it was opposed by every sitting Service Chief unanimously, with a very well‐orchestrated campaign to block it. I think the vote was ninety‐nine to nothing in the Senate, if I’m not mistaken. I think it’s going to have to be done from the outside, but I think there are some things that can be done. For example, one of my big concerns about our future of national security has to do with energy. I’m still unconvinced that we have a strategic energy plan that most Americans understand or that’s been adhered to. Instead, I think we have an ala carte energy policy where somebody like Boone Pickens spends a few million dollars and you hear about wind and solar and gas for several months, and then that disappears. Then another sector of our energy portfolio spends money, and you hear about that for awhile. But nobody’s really put it all together, and no administration, including this one, has really grabbed the energy problem and made it a truly national security issue in a way that we can explain what the energy portfolio is, measure it against the technology capabilities of every element in that portfolio, and then present a coherent picture of how we’re moving down that trail for five years, or the next ten years. I think that’s a critical aspect and a critical shortcoming of the overall discussion of our national security policy. And I failed to make the case adequately to have a Senior Director in the National Security Council for energy. By the time January 20 th of 2009 came around, they had already decided how they were going to do the energy portfolio, and I said “look I’ve got enough on my plate right now, but we’ll watch it.” But, when I left the White House, the President asked me what I would have done differently—what I wish I could have done but I didn’t get done— and I said, clearly, “energy.” BLOOMFIELD: Well, just to tip my cap to people on the outside of the government, there are many people who run NGOs, and academic and scientific experts in energy, there are CEOs, there are technology players. There’s a lot of talent and knowledge out there … people writing about it, etc. Let me serve up to you a possible strategic‐level national security way to look at it. For decades we’ve been subject to a cartel on the price of oil—it’s not perfect, but even in Vienna a couple of weeks ago you could argue it was still functioning. Is the neutralization of a cartel, that puts leverage on the United States of America, a worthy national security goal, or is that a bridge too far?
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Interview of GENERAL JAMES L. JONES, USMC - The Stimson Center

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